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

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# The American Historical Review

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**Cover illustration:** "The Last Gasp of the Aristocracy, June 20–21 [1791]" (Anonymous, courtesy of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France). Louis XVI of France looks on as a group of aristocrats and upper clergymen stir the pot of conspiracy. The reference is to the king's attempted flight from French revolutionary Paris, before being stopped in Varennes on the night of June 21, 1791. One can distinguish the marquis de Bouillé vomiting into the pot, as well as the king's younger sister, Elizabeth of France (who fled with the king), the emigrant cardinal de Rohan, and the emigrant archbishop of Paris, Le Clerc de Juigné. Of those depicted, only Bouillé was actually involved in organizing the plot. But patriots suspected a wide-ranging conspiracy in what they hoped would be a last-ditch effort by counterrevolutionaries to foil the revolution. Louis' position in the conspiracy is here left somewhat ambiguous. See the article in this issue by Timothy Tackett.

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## In This Issue

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This rather full issue contains four articles, an *AHR Forum Essay*, and a review essay. The articles assess conspiracy obsessions during the French Revolution, French economic imperialism in nineteenth-century Mexico, the Algerian War for Independence, and Western Civ and World History textbooks. The *Forum Essay* uses the advent of a new millennium to raise questions about the twentieth century as a distinctive epoch and periodization as a tool of historical analysis. It is the third of a series that we call *Forum Essays*. Instead of commissioning comments on the essay, as is our usual practice with *Forums*, we are opening up the commentary process to readers by soliciting their reactions to the article. And this year, rather than print a few replies, we will take advantage of the new online *AHR* to hold a moderated discussion between the author and commentators in early September. Details can be found in the *Forum Essay* introduction. The article section concludes with a comprehensive review essay on the historiography of Rwanda. In addition, the issue contains our usual array of book and film reviews.

### Articles

**Timothy Tackett** reflects on the origins and nature of conspiracy obsessions among political leaders of the French Revolution and the links between this phenomenon and the psychology of the Reign of Terror. He contends that, unlike in the English-speaking world, in prerevolutionary France the fear of plots was not a conspicuous feature of the political culture of elites, despite its pervasive presence among the common people. However, he chronicles how a “paranoid style” of politics emerged during the revolution because of the discovery of real counterrevolutionary plots and the influence of conspiracy fears among the Parisian masses. In addition, Tackett argues that a new phase of this “paranoid style” arose after 1791, when many deputies came to believe in a single grand conspiracy in which all internal and external enemies were in league against the revolution. He links this development to the breakdown of collective identity caused by the anarchy and unpredictability of events that defied explanation by the revolutionaries’ Enlightened analytical apparatus. Tackett’s thoughtful analysis of the power of conspiracy beliefs addresses issues of concern to all historians who study revolutions.

**Steven C. Topik** presents a biography of bonds issued by Emperor Maximilian in 1864 to finance the French invasion of Mexico: *les petits bleus*. He explains that, although Maximilian was executed in 1867, the bonds lived on until 1904. By following the money, he contends, issues not usually associated with financial history such as national identity and the power of symbols can be examined. The story of the bonds thus illuminates Mexico's changing position in the international capital market and the transformation of that market during a period of unprecedented expansion. The bonds' tale also reveals the nature and extent of imperialism in the Age of Empire, particularly French overseas activities and the budding acts of the United States. By exposing different layers of overseas ambition from early modern colonialism to modern colonialism to neo-colonialism, Topik's tale demonstrates as well that globalism has a long history. Equally important, he shows that the numerous actors in his tale were not simply motivated by cold calculations of profit and loss, they were also driven by dreams of colonial glory, nationalist and racial hatred, and the power of family allegiance among members of international financial diasporas. Topik's essay is thus a compelling demonstration of what can be found by combining cultural, political, economic, and diplomatic history.

**Matthew Connelly** critiques the tendency of scholars to analyze imperialism as either discourse or elite decision-making. The result of doing so, he argues, is that an arbitrary distinction is drawn between imperialism's cultural and its political and economic elements. Instead, Connelly asserts, both approaches must be used to understand the nature and extent of critical issues such as decolonization. He makes that case through an analysis of Algeria's War for Independence that reveals how ideas and imagery of modernization and conflicts among civilizations shaped policy debates among French and American elites. While these discourses were intended to consolidate Western authority, Connelly demonstrates that they ultimately proved divisive and self-defeating. Indeed, he shows that Algerian nationalists managed to harness them to their own agendas. More generally, Connelly argues that the specter of North-South conflict preoccupied policymakers at a time when most historians assume that they viewed the world only through a "Cold War lens." By reexamining the period through different optics, he contends, scholars can see how and why people in the First and Third Worlds began to reject "us versus them" dichotomies that did not effectively represent their lived experiences. Connelly's thought-provoking essay makes a persuasive case for the need to de-center the Cold War in post-World War II diplomatic history and to bring together diplomatic history and postcolonial studies.

**Daniel A. Segal** analyzes Western Civ and World History undergraduate courses textbooks written over the last eight decades. In a two-part argument, he first focuses on the formation and standardization of the Western Civ survey. He argues that it was organized by a social evolutionary construction of "history" as post-prehistory; that is, history became a developmental stage that began at the end of a much vaster expanse of human existence. Segal contends that this social evolutionary framework played a central role in the "new history" championed by James Harvey Robinson early in the twentieth century. Robinson then used this

understanding of human time to organize his influential graduate course on the rise of rational thought, which, in turn, provided the model for the first undergraduate surveys of Western Civ that appeared after World War I. Segal then moves forward in time to examine Western Civ and World History textbooks currently in use. He maintains that texts in both genres continue to rely on the social evolutionary narrative pioneered by Robinson. According to Segal, by continuing to collapse such a great part of human socio-cultural diversity into prehistory, these textbooks provide students with a highly circumscribed sense of historical contingency and human possibilities. Segal's provocative essay thus raises challenging questions about the connections between scholarship and pedagogy of interest to all historians.

### ***AHR Forum Essay***

**Charles S. Maier** asks whether the twentieth century represents anything more than a conventional period of one hundred years. After analyzing periodization as a critical tool of historical analysis, he discusses alternative narrative approaches to the question. First, Maier explains that "structural" narratives would use institutional changes to demarcate the era by focusing on trajectories of political, social, and economic development through time. But he concludes that current political and social histories do fit easily into span of the twentieth century. Second, he contends that the rise and fall of "territoriality" between the 1850s and the 1970s would be a far more compelling narrative approach. By territoriality, he means the organization of human institutions into bounded spatial units in which the reinforcement of boundaries and frontiers and the control of space at home and then abroad provided decisive political resources. Modern territoriality, he argues, arose nearly everywhere as nation-states were centralized and class coalitions came to dominate their politics with the participation of industrial, financial, and professional groups. It began to dissolve due to globalization and the advent of computer technology. But even though the era of territoriality did not coincide with the twentieth century in any neat fashion, Maier goes on to acknowledge, it is not easy to discard centuries as units of history, because they offer the traditional chronological framework for what he terms moral narratives. And he admits these already exist for the twentieth century in narratives that focus on the world wars, totalitarian regimes, and genocide. Yet, he notes, differences exist between Western moral narratives that focus on the Holocaust and/or the Gulag and those in the former colonial world that stress the human costs of imperialism. Although Western intellectuals continue to respond to the first narrative, he contends that the trends that accompany globalization seem to endow the imperialist narrative with renewed relevance. Maier concludes by examining the political implications of choosing among these periodization narratives. Rather than commission commentators for this *Forum*, we invite interested readers to participate in an online discussion of Maier's essay during the first two weeks of September 2000. Details can be found in the introduction to the *Forum*.



***Review Essay***

**David Newbury and Catharine Newbury** evaluate dominant trends in the historiography of Rwanda. They explain that initial European travelers to the Great Lakes region of Africa were fascinated with the forms of centralized kingship they found there. Europeans constructed elaborate historical scenarios of migration and conquest by immigrant groups racially and culturally different from the local inhabitants to explain Rwanda's highly centralized political power, marked social stratification, and mixed economy. Then with the creation of colonial states and the marking of fixed boundaries, Europeans came to define the nation by the royal aristocracy and produced a new set of histories that equated the Rwandan past with the history of the dynasty. But, Newbury and Newbury maintain, this statist historiography omitted the evidence and significance of internal differences and local identities, and it excluded important historical actors. However, they report, research since the 1970s has overcome this narrow view of history by documenting the importance of local agency and internal differences during the precolonial and colonial past of the region now called Rwanda. And they also show that technical studies of rural areas have provided evidence to reassess the dominant historical assumptions about the postcolonial period as well. Drawing on this new work, they challenge the assumption that Rwanda's past was one of a modernizing elite and a traditional peasantry. Instead, they contend, the dynastic elite reinforced its legitimacy by claiming "traditional" status while rural people were being modernized through forced labor camps, cash crops, and ecological schemes such as reforestation and anti-erosion measures. Their historiographical analysis suggests how "bringing the peasants back in" will help transform our understanding of Rwandan history. Newbury and Newbury thus provide a compelling example of ways to analyze colonial societies and the construction of historical narratives.



"The Aristocracy Unmasked. Beware of its caresses, its thousand arms are ready to strike" (ca. 1791–1792 (anonymous, courtesy of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France). The theme of conspiracy and counterrevolution, hiding behind a reassuring mask, appeared widely in French revolutionary rhetoric. Here, the Janus-like depiction of the aristocratic woman and the priest, bound together by a serpent, is particularly intriguing, prefiguring a common motif in nineteenth-century France. Note the cloven hoof and the claw, only partly hidden by the clergyman's cassock and the woman's gown.

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## Conspiracy Obsession in a Time of Revolution: French Elites and the Origins of the Terror, 1789–1792

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TIMOTHY TACKETT

ON THE MORNING OF MAY 23, 1792, in the third year of the French Revolution, Jacques-Pierre Brissot and Armand Gensonné climbed to the rostrum to address the National Assembly. In successive speeches, the two deputies revealed the existence of a terrifying plot to destroy the Assembly and the revolution itself. The whole was masterminded by the “Machiavellian” Austrian minister, Prince Wenzel Von Kaunitz, but it was coordinated in France by a shadowy “Austrian Committee” of the king’s closest advisers, and it was said to be responsible for almost all the ills besetting the new French regime: the disappointing results of the recently declared war, the counterrevolutionary movements in the countryside, and even the divisions within the Assembly itself. Brissot recognized that there was very little concrete proof of this plot. But it was the essence of conspiracies to be secret and impenetrable: “they leave no written records.” The plotters had hidden their heinous activities behind a mask of pro-revolutionary pronouncements, and if one waited to uncover “legal proof” it might be too late. For the most part, one could only rely on a kind of deductive logic based on signs, unusual coincidences, and rumor.<sup>1</sup>

To what extent this “Austrian Committee” ever existed is difficult to know. Brissot was not above demagoguery, and in the previous months he had proposed several different and sometimes contradictory conspiracy theories.<sup>2</sup> But whatever

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<sup>1</sup> See *Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres françaises: Première série (1787–1799)*, Jérôme Mavidal, et al., eds., 99 vols. (Paris, 1867–1995), 44: 33–43 (hereafter, *AP*). See also Michael Hochedlinger, “‘La cause de tous les maux de la France’: Die ‘Austrophobie’ im revolutionären Frankreich und der Sturz des Königtums, 1789–1792,” *Francia: Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte* 24, no. 2 (1997): 73–120; and Thomas E. Kaiser, “Who’s Afraid of Marie-Antoinette? Diplomacy, Austrophobia, and the Queen,” *French History*, forthcoming.

<sup>2</sup> The accusations were also well timed to divert attention from the “Brissotins,” who controlled the ministry and who had led the nation into its frustrating war situation. See especially H. A. Goetz-Bernstein, *La diplomatie de la Gironde: Jacques-Pierre Brissot* (Paris, 1912), 49, 57–58, 74–79. Pierre-Victor Malouet and A. F. Bertrand de Moleville, two supposed participants in the “Committee,” both avowed that it never existed: Antoine-François Bertrand de Moleville, *Histoire de la Révolution de France pendant les dernières années du règne de Louis XVI*, 10 vols. (Paris, 1801–02), 8: 8–9, 36–37. Goetz-Bernstein thought that it did exist as a small coterie around the Habsburg queen, Marie-Antoinette, who regularly sent French war plans to the Austrian court: Goetz-Bernstein, 215–17.

the reality of the “grand conspiracy” set out by Brissot and Gensonné, it is clear that a large number of their fellow deputies believed it was real. There was a long stunned silence after the two men had spoken. Individual members soon wrote home of the fear and uncertainty generated by the speeches.<sup>3</sup> A few days later, as the representatives continued to debate the accusations, a veritable panic swept through the hall. Word spread rapidly that a plot was about to break to spirit away the king and destroy the Assembly. The deputies went into permanent session, and Paris itself was placed on a war footing, patrolled continually, and illuminated throughout the night. The ultra-radical *sans-culotte* women and men, armed with pikes and “diverse aggressive instruments,” were allowed to parade through the Assembly’s hall, beating drums and singing revolutionary songs.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, a consuming fear of the presence of conspiracy, of a small group of perpetrators or even a single master conspirator, willfully seeking to destroy the revolution and the revolutionaries through secret action, beset much of France’s political elite between the spring of 1792 and the summer of 1794. During this period, over 90 percent of judicially ordered executions were against individuals accused of various forms of sedition or collusion with enemies of the republic.<sup>5</sup> An obsession with plots was clearly part and parcel of the political culture of the Reign of Terror.

The conspiracy fears of the French Revolution are all the more fascinating in that similar reactions have been associated with other revolutionary episodes in world history. Thucydides’ grim description of the Hellenic world during the Peloponnesian War is well known: “When troubles had once begun in the cities, those who followed carried the revolutionary spirit further and further . . . He who succeeded in a plot was deemed knowing, but a still greater master in craft was he who detected one.”<sup>6</sup> In the period of the American Revolution, as Bernard Bailyn persuasively demonstrated, large numbers of colonists were convinced that the British government or its ministers were engaged in a vast, secret and concerted conspiracy to pervert their liberty.<sup>7</sup> So, too, the Russians after 1917 experienced waves of conspiracy fears at various moments, from the Bolshevik seizure of power through the Stalinist dictatorship. After the attempted assassination of V. I. Lenin in August 1918, Soviet newspapers and government proclamations abounded in revelations of “endless plots perpetrated by counterrevolutionaries and Right Socialist revolutionaries,” and of the “huge conspiracy” of the Allied powers and a continually shifting cohort of political and class enemies.<sup>8</sup> During the Stalinist

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the letters of Antoine Rabusson-Lamothe, “Lettres sur l’Assemblée législative,” Francisque Mège, ed., *Mémoires de l’Académie des sciences, belles-lettres et arts de Clermont-Ferrand* 11 (1869): 346–47, 349–50; of Sylvain Codet: Archives départementales de l’Ille-et-Vilaine, L 294 (2), May 30 (written “April 30” by error); of Georges Couthon, *Correspondance de Georges Couthon*, Francisque Mège, ed. (Paris, 1872), 143, 146–47; and of Blaise Cavellier and Romain-Nicolas Malassis: Archives Communales de Brest, Series D, uncatalogued, May 26.

<sup>4</sup> *AP*, 44: 189–96, 274.

<sup>5</sup> Donald Greer, *The Incidence of the Terror during the French Revolution: A Statistical Interpretation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), 81. Compare Mona Ozouf, “‘Jacobins’: Fortune et infortune d’un mot,” in *L’école de la France: Essais sur la Révolution, l’utopie et l’enseignement* (Paris, 1984), 82.

<sup>6</sup> *Thucydides*, Benjamin Jowett, trans., 2d edn., 2 vols. (Oxford, 1900), 1: 242.

<sup>7</sup> Bernard A. Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), chaps. 3–4.

<sup>8</sup> William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1921*, 2 vols. (New York, 1935), 2:



purges, plot theories were invoked both by those ordering arrests and by those who were arrested and who struggled to understand the reason for such unjust accusations.<sup>9</sup> The Cultural Revolution in China seems also to have arisen in part from Mao Zedong's suspicions of threats to his power, and the movement soon engendered widespread fears of insidious "bourgeois reactionaries" and foreign enemies plotting to sabotage the revolution and perhaps to launch a white terror. As the Cultural Revolution waned, all the evils of that chaotic episode were attributed to the nefarious Gang of Four conspiring for their own hold on power.<sup>10</sup>

A comparative study of conspiracy obsessions in these various revolutions would be extremely difficult in the present state of our knowledge. It would require a thorough examination of the nature and extent of conspiracy beliefs in the vastly different cultural and political contexts of the countries involved. It would also require an evaluation of the presence or absence of real conspiracies and of the possible promotion of such fears by manipulative leaders. But it seems clear that in a time of revolution substantial numbers of people commonly come to believe in the reality of great webs of secret concerted action perpetrated by small groups of conspirators, threatening their lives and their political goals. It also seems clear that in the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, obsessive fears of this kind led directly to the deaths of many thousands of people. It would thus seem appropriate to explore more carefully the themes and variations of conspiracy obsessions in one of those revolutions.

In most of the older historical treatments of the French Revolution, the preoccupation with plots was little emphasized and was often ignored altogether. If mentioned at all, it was usually attributed to the panic fears of the Parisian masses, to the activities of real enemy agents, and above all to the war that pitted France against most of Europe in a life or death struggle to preserve the ideals of 1789.<sup>11</sup> But the recent interest in the language of the revolution has brought the whole issue to the fore. Several authors have argued that this peculiar habit of thought was

66–69, 77–78, 344; also Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924* (London, 1996), 629, 642.

<sup>9</sup> F. Beck and W. Godin, *The Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession* (New York, 1951), esp. 221–25; also Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times; Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York, 1999), 190–217. Reiterated accusations of foreign conspiracy were also voiced in the Soviet Union during the great war scare of 1927: Jon Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics* (Berkeley, Calif., 1994), 216–24, 264–67.

<sup>10</sup> Tai Sung An, *Mao Tse-Tung's Cultural Revolution* (Indianapolis, 1972), 1–4; Thomas W. Robinson, ed., *The Cultural Revolution in China* (Berkeley, Calif., 1971), esp. 51, 95–96. It may be, however, that in the Chinese Cultural Revolution opposition was perceived to arise less from plots and conspiracies than from class and the class struggle in general: see, for example, Hong Yung Lee, *Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study* (Berkeley, 1978), 41–63.

<sup>11</sup> For example, Alphonse Aulard, *Histoire politique de la Révolution française*, 5th edn. (Paris, 1913), esp. 357–66; Albert Mathiez, *La Révolution française*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1922), 3: chap. 8; Georges Lefebvre, *The French Revolution*, 2 vols. (New York, 1962–64), 2: 64–76. Crane Brinton never mentions the issue in either *The Jacobins* (New York, 1930) or *The Anatomy of Revolution*, rev. edn. (New York, 1952). Robert R. Palmer is more probing, but he devotes only a paragraph to the question: *Twelve Who Ruled* (Princeton, N.J., 1941), 64. Among nineteenth-century historians, see especially Edgar Quinet, *La révolution*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1865), 1: 187–89. The only book I have found entirely devoted to the issue is Jacques Duhamel, *Essai du rôle des éléments paranoïaques dans la genèse des idées révolutionnaires* (Paris, 1929), but it is poorly documented and disappointing. On the related question of denunciations, see Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately, eds., *Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789–1989* (Chicago, 1996).



fundamental not only to the uneducated masses but to the revolutionary elites as well, and that it characterized the mentality and discourse of the leadership from the onset of events. In a particularly influential book, François Furet argued that “the idea of plot in revolutionary ideology . . . was truly a central and polymorphous notion that served as a reference point for organizing and interpreting action. It was the notion that mobilized men’s convictions and beliefs, and made it possible at every point to elaborate an interpretation and justification of what had happened.”<sup>12</sup> Lynn Hunt has asserted much the same position: “the obsession with conspiracy became the central organizing principle of French revolutionary rhetoric. The narrative of Revolution was dominated by plots.”<sup>13</sup>

Moreover, for both of these historians, the conspiratorial mode of explanation was linked to the political culture of the French elites on the eve of the revolution. Furet laid particular stress on the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of popular sovereignty as elucidated in *The Social Contract* (1762). It was the revolutionaries’ belief in a single, indivisible “general will” that led them to conclude that all opposition or dissent was criminal and “counterrevolutionary,” and that brought them to stipulate the existence of conspiracy—for what other explanation could there be for popular opposition to the “general will”? In this sense, the revolutionaries were following a kind of “Hegelian dialectic”; they “invented a single, indivisible, pervasive enemy and imagined a death struggle with this opposite, whose supposed power and coherence vastly exaggerated the tangible evidence.”<sup>14</sup> For in Furet’s view, the plots were largely illusory, “the figment of a frenzied preoccupation with power.”<sup>15</sup> Hunt’s interpretation was more complex. Comparing the French situation to that in eighteenth-century England and the nascent United States, she stressed a French lack of familiarity with “politics” before the revolution, as well as the absence of “sacred texts”—like the American Constitution—on which to rely. But she also placed a considerable emphasis on the force of ideas: on a Rousseauist preoccupation with the general will and with transparency and authenticity, all of which seemed to make any kind of factional politics “synonymous with conspiracy.”<sup>16</sup>

The suggestions of Furet and Hunt are intriguing and provocative. They are also self-consciously speculative and subsidiary to the broader interpretations of revolutionary culture developed by these authors. But when in fact did this peculiar obsession begin, how did it evolve over time, and how important to its inception was the dialectic of ideas? Can the revolutionaries themselves give us any indication of

<sup>12</sup> François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1981), 53. See also Furet’s article “The Terror,” in Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, Arthur Goldhammer, trans. (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), esp. 137–38.

<sup>13</sup> Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, Calif., 1984), 39.

<sup>14</sup> Colin Lucas, “The Theory and Practice of Denunciation in the French Revolution,” in Fitzpatrick and Gellately, *Accusatory Practices*, 23. Lucas characterizes Furet’s point of view, without subscribing to it himself.

<sup>15</sup> Furet, *Interpreting the Revolution*, 54.

<sup>16</sup> Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, 39–44. Among other historians supporting positions similar to those of Furet and Hunt, see Ozouf, “‘Jacobin,’” 82; Norman Hampson, *Prelude to Terror: The Constituent Assembly and the Failure of Consensus* (Oxford, 1988), 61–62; G. T. Cubitt, “Denouncing Conspiracy in the French Revolution,” *Renaissance and Modern Studies* 33 (1989): 145–46; Lucien Jaume, *Le discours Jacobin et la démocratie* (Paris, 1989), esp. part 2, chap. 2; and Patrice Higonnet, *Goodness beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), 241–47.

the birth of this particular turn of mind? The present essay seeks to explore empirically the origins and development of the conspiracy obsession during the early years of the French Revolution and thus to offer possible points of reference for future comparative studies of other revolutions. It will focus, in particular, on the psychology of conspiratorial fears among the French revolutionary elites, as a complement to the better known history of such fears among the popular classes.<sup>17</sup> After a rapid overview of conspiracy beliefs before 1789, it will examine the inception and evolution of such beliefs through the "First Terror" of the summer of 1792 for a key leadership group: the deputies of the Constituent and the Legislative Assemblies.<sup>18</sup>

WE NOW KNOW THAT in the early modern era conspiratorial beliefs were by no means confined to revolutionary periods alone. In a remarkable article written in 1982, Gordon Wood applied the concept of a "paranoid style of politics"—first developed by Richard Hofstadter for nineteenth and twentieth-century America—to the general "Anglo-American world" during much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.<sup>19</sup> Throughout this region, according to Wood, "conspiratorial interpretations . . . became a major means by which educated men in the early modern period ordered and gave meaning to their political world." "Everywhere people sensed designs within designs, cabals within cabals," assuming the existence of "a world of autonomous, freely acting individuals who were capable of directly and deliberately bringing about events through their decisions and actions." Indeed, "there was scarcely a major figure who did not tend to explain political events in these terms."<sup>20</sup>

Wood made very little attempt to apply his interpretation to the European continent. But a preliminary investigation of the French case would suggest that in the eighteenth century there were both similarities and differences. Among the masses of the common people in France, historians have found ample evidence of a susceptibility to conspiracy interpretations. Steven Kaplan has documented a pervasive popular belief in "famine plots," which "was built into the structure of the collective mentality" and in which a wide assortment of villains—depending on circumstances—were thought to conspire to starve the population.<sup>21</sup> Arlette Farge

<sup>17</sup> See esp. Georges Lefebvre, *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France*, Joan White, trans. (New York, 1973); George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (Oxford, 1959); and Albert Soboul, *The Sans-Culottes*, Remy Inglis Hall, trans. (Garden City, N.Y., 1972).

<sup>18</sup> For an overview of the "First Terror," which includes the August 10 storming of the Tuileries Palace and the September Massacres, see Georges Lefebvre: *La Révolution française: La première terreur* (Paris, 1952).

<sup>19</sup> Gordon S. Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 39 (1982): 401–41; Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York, 1965), 3–40. See also Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, chaps. 3–4; and David Brion Davis, ed., *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971).

<sup>20</sup> Wood, "Conspiracy," 407, 409, 411. Wood also links the "paranoid style" to the wide assumption among Anglo-American elites of deceit and dissembling within political circles.

<sup>21</sup> Steven L. Kaplan, *The Famine Plot Persuasion in Eighteenth-Century France* (Philadelphia, 1982), 1–2, 62. Kaplan argues that certain elements of the educated elites might also adhere to the "famine plot persuasion."

and Jacques Revel have revealed the vulnerability of the Parisian popular classes to plot explanations in the mid-eighteenth century, when thousands could accept rumors that royal officials were abducting local children. The power of popular conspiratorial fears on the eve of the revolution has been explored by Georges Lefebvre in his pioneering study of the Great Fear.<sup>22</sup> In a world where the undisclosed actions of royal, seigneurial, and ecclesiastical authorities so dominated the lives of the common people, such fears were not necessarily irrational. In fact, throughout much of history, the pervasive explanatory model for understanding events assumed the willed interventions of individual beings, sometimes human, more commonly supernatural—whether gods, saints, demons, or the diverse supernatural beings of popular folklore. The only viable alternative model, one based on chaos or blind chance, probably struck most people as singularly frightening and unacceptable. At other times and in other situations, Jews and Protestants and witches in league with the devil have been invoked to explain various kinds of evil done to individuals, their families, and their communities.<sup>23</sup>

In certain situations, some members of the French educated elites might also subscribe to plot interpretations. A search for the word “conspiracy” in a broad sample of works published between 1700 and 1789—and available for analysis through the ARTFL database<sup>24</sup>—reveals a handful of writers who believed in the existence of various contemporary conspiracies.<sup>25</sup> In the early and mid-eighteenth century, the most important accusations of this kind were leveled at the Society of Jesus. Voltaire, in particular, long portrayed the Jesuits as the embodiment of the power-grubbing clergy who were such an anathema to the writers of the Enlightenment—an image eagerly reinforced by certain Jansenist authors.<sup>26</sup> But with the suppression of the Jesuits in France in the mid-1760s, such accusations abruptly disappeared. At the end of the Old Regime, the most vigorous conspiratorial allegations were registered by the ex-Jesuit abbé Augustin Barruel in a work implicitly linking the demise of his former order to a plot of the philosophes.<sup>27</sup> Barruel joined forces with the journalist Elie Fréron and the abbé Thomas-Marie Royou in the *Année littéraire*, a review that relentlessly indicted the philosophes, the Freemasons, and the Protestants for secretly plotting the destruction of both

<sup>22</sup> Arlette Farge and Jacques Revel, *The Vanishing Children of Paris*, Claudia Mievile, trans. (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), esp. chap. 4; Lefebvre, *Great Fear*, esp. part 2.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Jean Delumeau, *La peur en Occident, XIV<sup>e</sup>–XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècles: Une cité assiégée* (Paris, 1978); and René Girard, *The Scapegoat*, Yvonne Freccero, trans. (Baltimore, 1986).

<sup>24</sup> “American and French Research on the Treasury of the French Language” (ARTFL), a database housed at the University of Chicago and accessible through the World Wide Web: <http://humanities.uchicago.edu/ARTFL/>. The sample contained 434 works published during this period. The analysis is based on the occurrence of the word *conspiration* (singular or plural). The word appeared 258 times, in about one in seven (62) of the sample works, written by 37 different authors.

<sup>25</sup> Thirteen of the 258 occurrences appeared to entail a belief in the existence of contemporary conspiracies. These were used in the texts of five different authors. One of the latter was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who expressed his conviction that there was a general conspiracy of philosophes aligned against him personally.

<sup>26</sup> Voltaire, *Essai sur l'histoire générale* (Geneva, 1756), 143, 337; E. J. F. Barbier, *Chronique de la Régence, Tome 7* (1761; Paris, 1866), 410. In 1757, the Jansenist and Gallican press even insinuated that the Jesuits had supported Robert-François Damiens' assassination attempt against Louis XV: Dale Van Kley, *The Damiens Affair and the Unraveling of the Ancien Régime, 1750–1770* (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 65–80. See also Geoffrey Cubitt, *The Jesuit Myth: Conspiracy Theory and Politics in Nineteenth-Century France* (Oxford, 1993).

<sup>27</sup> Augustin Barruel, *Les Helviennes, ou Lettres provinciales philosophiques* (Amsterdam, 1781).

religion and the monarchy. Such writings directly prefigured the conservative interpretation of the revolution developed in Royou's newspaper *L'ami du roi* and in Barruel's later conspiratorial "history" of Jacobinism.<sup>28</sup>

Yet beliefs of this kind would seem to have been the exception among eighteenth-century French writers. The vast majority of authors searched in the ARTFL database never used the word "conspiracy" at all, and those who did referred primarily to events in the historical past.<sup>29</sup> There were accounts of plots and intrigues from Greek and Roman history—with the inevitable stories of the Roman politicians Catiline and Brutus—as well as from the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Wars of Religion. Episodes specific to French history were also mentioned: the Conspiracy of Amboise in 1560, the Saint-Bartholomew's Day massacre of Huguenots in 1572, and the marquis de Cinq-Mars' conspiracy against Cardinal Richelieu in 1642 were among the most common. Clearly, the fact of past conspiracies persisted in the collective memory of French educated elites.<sup>30</sup> Yet very few imagined—or at least wrote about—such machinations in their own day and age. Montesquieu even specifically announced that conspiracies were far more unlikely in his contemporary world than in Greek and Roman times, a reality he attributed to the wide distribution of information through newspapers, journals, and the public mail system.<sup>31</sup>

Indeed, by the later eighteenth century, new explanatory models for the analysis of political and economic events were becoming available to the educated classes, models that did not require the willed maneuvering of individuals. Mechanistic explanations of the world, born of Cartesian rationalism and the new astronomical interpretations based on scientific laws and natural causes—as popularized by Voltaire and others—had a profound impact not only on the elites' religious views but on their general understanding of causation as well. Applying such perspectives to human affairs, eighteenth-century French thinkers made important advances in identifying more abstract political and economic processes at work in the world. Such was the case with Montesquieu's analysis of political processes in the "spirit of the laws," for example, or with the physiocrats' examination of the general circulation of wealth and the laws of market forces—anticipating Adam Smith's "hidden hand." Such also, in a sense, was Rousseau's concept of the "general will," predicated on the existence of a collective community of interest active in society.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Amos Hofman, "The Origins of the Theory of the Philosophe Conspiracy," *French History* 2 (1988): 152–72. See also J. M. Roberts, *The Mythology of the Secret Societies* (London, 1972), 140–41; Darrin M. McMahon, "The Counter-Enlightenment and the Low-Life of Literature in Pre-Revolutionary France," *Past and Present* 159 (May 1998): 77–112; and Barruel's *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du jacobinisme*, 4 vols. (London, 1797–98).

<sup>29</sup> A total of 182 (71 percent) of the 258 occurrences referred to the historical past. In most of the remaining cases, the word was used metaphorically or in a literary context—as in the plots of plays or novels. See, for example, Louis-Sébastien Mercier, *Du théâtre* (Paris, 1773), 49.

<sup>30</sup> See also Yves-Marie Bercé and Elena Fasano Guarini, eds., *Complots et conjurations dans l'Europe moderne* (Rome, 1996), 1–5 (Bercé's introduction). Compare John D. Woodbridge, *Revolt in Prerevolutionary France: The Prince de Conti's Conspiracy against Louis XV, 1755–1757* (Princeton, N.J., 1995).

<sup>31</sup> *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence*, Gonzague Truc, ed. (1748; Paris, 1967), 122–23.

<sup>32</sup> Gordon Wood identifies similar trends in the Anglo-American world, linking them above all to writers of the Scottish Enlightenment. But he feels that they had a broad effect on the population only after the outbreak of the French Revolution: Wood, "Conspiracy," 430–32.

If a few eighteenth-century French elites continued to subscribe to conspiracy interpretations of the political events of their day, such beliefs were not widespread, and were probably far less central to the thinking of the educated classes than they were in the Anglo-American world. The writings produced during two major political events at the end of the Old Regime, the Maupeou crisis of the early 1770s and the “pre-revolution” of 1787–1789, further substantiate this conclusion. In the long struggle between Chancellor René-Nicolas de Maupeou on the one hand and the Parlement of Paris and its liberal “patriot party” supporters on the other, the latter seem almost never to have resorted to plot theories to explain events. Although one Jansenist jurist tried to persuade his colleagues that the affair had been engineered by the Jesuits and that Maupeou was merely their pawn, virtually no one accepted the idea.<sup>33</sup> A rapid reading of the patriot brochure literature of the period reveals no mention of the words “plot” or “conspiracy.” If the chancellor’s motives were alluded to at all, he was usually portrayed as acting alone, moved primarily by personal ambition. Most commentators viewed the affair in more abstract institutional terms, as a “constitutional” struggle in which “tyranny” and “despotism” were opposed by those defending liberty, a government of laws, and the “constitution” of the “nation.”<sup>34</sup>

Throughout the prerevolutionary period, from the winter of 1787 to the spring of 1789, conspiratorial fears again remained remarkably rare, virtually nonexistent among proto-liberal patriots—in sharp contrast to the position of the proto-conservatives in the Fréron-Barruel group. In the pamphlet literature written during this period by thirty-two future Third Estate deputies, only one individual, the future Jacobin leader Maximilien Robespierre, gave any indication of a paranoid style. All the other writings were marked, rather, by a tone of optimism and good will. Most revealed an almost boundless praise for the king. And while they were highly critical of the nobility, many claimed to be confident that the nobles could overcome their “prejudices” and be won over to the patriot cause through reason and persuasion.<sup>35</sup> Much the same tone was to be found in the “general” *cahiers de doléances* drawn up by the urban elites in early 1789. While there were numerous demands for ministerial accountability and public knowledge of government finances, conspiratorial notions and language were largely absent.<sup>36</sup>

The reasons for the relative absence of conspiracy fears in French political

<sup>33</sup> The Jansenist Robert de Saint-Vincent: Durand Echeverria, *The Maupeou Revolution, A Study in the History of Libertarianism: France, 1770–1774* (Baton Rouge, La., 1985), 45.

<sup>34</sup> See, for example, Guy-Jean-Baptiste Target, *Lettres d'un homme à un autre homme sur les affaires du temps* (n.p., [1771]). I have examined the pamphlets preserved in series Lb<sup>38</sup> and Lb<sup>39</sup> of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, as listed in the *Catalogue de l'histoire de France*. See also Shanti Singham, “‘A Conspiracy of Twenty Million Frenchmen’: Public Opinion, Patriotism, and the Assault on Absolutism during the Maupeou Years, 1770–1775” (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1991), 21–23, 99–100; and “The *Correspondance secrète*: Forging Patriotic Public Opinion during the Maupeou Years,” *Historical Reflections/Réflexions historiques* 18, no. 2 (1992): 65–100; and Dale Van Kley, “The Religious Origins of the Patriot and Ministerial Parties in Pre-Revolutionary France: Controversy over the Chancellor’s Constitutional Coup, 1771–1775,” *Historical Reflections*, same issue, 17–63.

<sup>35</sup> On this sample of pamphlet literature, see Timothy Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789–1790)* (Princeton, N.J., 1996), 101. Robespierre warned of the insidious “plotting of the enemies of the people” in the Estates of Artois: *A la nation artésienne, sur la nécessité de réformer les Etats d'Artois* (n.p., 1788), 4, 83. See also Maximilien Robespierre, *Les ennemis de la patrie démasqués* (Arras, 1789).

<sup>36</sup> Conclusion based on an extensive reading of the “general cahiers,” those drawn up at the final



culture, by comparison with the English-speaking world, are undoubtedly complex and cannot be developed here. Perhaps one might look to the impact of Protestantism in the Anglo-American sphere—with its emphasis on the pervasiveness of evil and the deceptive wiles of Satan—and to the general weakness of such a tradition in France. One might also emphasize the very different political traditions in France and Anglo-America. Gordon Wood stressed the increasing complexity and impersonal character of politics in the Augustan Age, where a far greater number of people were involved in decision making than ever before: “The more people became strangers to one another and the less they knew of one another’s hearts, the more suspicious and mistrustful they became, ready as never before in Western history to see deceit and deception at work.”<sup>37</sup> Compared to the more diffuse nature of political authority and decision making in Britain and America—through the presence of representative bodies and the strength of regional power—the lines of authority in the French polity became increasingly centralized and clarified with the growth of absolutism and a strong bureaucracy. Indeed, Yves-Marie Bercé would specifically associate the decline of a conspiratorial culture in France in the seventeenth century to the consolidation of the monarchy.<sup>38</sup> But in any case, and whatever the reason, a paranoid style was little in evidence among the future patriot leadership class on the eve of the French Revolution.

A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS of the conspiracy obsession among the elites during the revolutionary period itself would need to be based on a wide diversity of documents, including newspapers, brochures, and speeches within the various clubs and assemblies, both in Paris and the provinces. Here, in the manner of a first approach, I will concentrate on records left by the deputies to the first two revolutionary assemblies, from the early days of the revolution through the period of the First Terror. In this, I will make use of three sets of sources: a compilation of the proceedings of the assemblies,<sup>39</sup> the published records of the Paris Jacobin Club,<sup>40</sup> and the published or manuscript letters of a sample of fourteen deputies or delegations of deputies for whom more or less continuous series of correspondence are preserved.<sup>41</sup> Even though the number of deputies represented in the latter

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stage of the electoral process for the Estates General and intended to be sent with the deputies directly to Versailles.

<sup>37</sup> Wood, “Conspiracy,” 410. Wood also linked these trends with the peculiar forms of moral philosophy that arose in the Anglo-American Enlightenment and that sought to find a place for free will in a mechanistic causal universe by identifying “causes in human affairs with the motives, mind, or will of individuals”; p. 416. It is difficult to discern equivalent trends in the French Enlightenment.

<sup>38</sup> Bercé and Guarini, *Complots et conjurations*, 4–5.

<sup>39</sup> As based on the *AP*. I examined selected debates on topics that seemed most likely to lend themselves to conspiratorial interpretations, such as those dealing with popular unrest, emigrants, refractory clergy, international threats, and war. These were identified, first, from the observations of the deputies in their correspondence: see below note 41; and, second, from the cumulative indexes to the *AP*: vol. 34 (the Constituent Assembly) and vol. 51 (the Legislative Assembly).

<sup>40</sup> F.-A. Aulard, ed., *La Société des Jacobins: Recueil de documents pour l'histoire du club des Jacobins de Paris*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1889–97). Unfortunately, Aulard found only sketchy records for the first months of the club's existence. Initially, the Jacobins consisted exclusively of National Assembly deputies. Over time, increasing numbers of non-deputies were admitted.

<sup>41</sup> I have examined a total of 1,460 letters for seven deputies written during the Constituent Assembly

sample is small, their correspondence totals close to two thousand letters, dating from May 1789 through September 1792. The sample includes a wide variation of age groups, occupations, and geographic origins, and a full range of political affiliations.<sup>42</sup> The letters from these deputies allow a systematic enumeration of specific indications of conspiracy belief in the reflections individuals shared with their families and friends back home.<sup>43</sup>

On the basis of these letters and the published debates, it would seem clear that the paucity of a rhetoric of conspiracy among the patriot elites—observed for the prerevolutionary period—persisted through the first weeks of the Estates General

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(about 50 per month for the twenty-nine-month duration) and 443 for seven deputies or delegations of deputies written during the first ten months of the Legislative Assembly (about 44 per month for ten months). These specific sets of correspondence were chosen as being among the most continuous and complete series available for the respective bodies. Unfortunately, relatively few letters seem to be preserved for August and September 1792, presumably because of the general chaos of the period. Sources for the Constituent Assembly: François-René-Pierre Ménéard de La Groye, *Correspondance (1789–1791)*, Florence Mirouse, ed. (Le Mans, 1989); Pierre-François and Marie-Angélique Lepoutre, *Député-paysan et fermière de Flandre en 1789: La correspondance des Lepoutre*, Jean-Pierre Jessenne and Edna Hindie Lemay, eds. (Lille, 1998); Claude Gantheret, ms. letters to Pierre Leflaive: private collection of Françoise Misserey, Dijon; Antoine Durand, ms. journal: Archives Episcopales de Cahors, carton 5–56, and ms. letters to the municipality of Cahors: Archives Municipales de Cahors, uncatalogued box; Michel-René Maupetit, “Lettres (1789–91),” Quériau-Lamérie, ed., *Bulletin de la Commission historique et archéologique de la Mayenne*, 2<sup>ème</sup> sér., vols. 17–23 (1901–07); Jean-François Gaultier de Biauzat, *Gaultier de Biauzat, député du Tiers état aux Etats généraux de 1789: Sa vie et sa correspondance*, Francisque Mège, ed., 2 vols. (Clermont-Ferrand, 1890), and Bibliothèque Municipale de Clermont-Ferrand, mss. 788–89; and Jean-André Périsset Du Luc, ms. letters to Jean-Baptiste Willermoz: Bibliothèque Municipale de Lyon, ms. F.G. 5430. Sources for the Legislative Assembly: Rabusson-Lamothe, “Lettres”; François-Yves Roubaud, “Lettres de François-Yves Roubaud,” Edmond Poupé, ed., *Bulletin de la Société d'études scientifiques et archéologiques de Draguignan* 36 (1926–27): 3–218; Couthon, *Correspondance*; Pierre Dubreuil-Chambardel, *Lettres parisiennes d'un révolutionnaire poitevin*, Marie-Luce Llorca, ed. (Tours, 1994); Jean-Baptiste-Annibal Aubert-Dubayet, “Aubert-Dubayet, législateur (1791–1792),” F. Vermales, ed., *Bulletin de l'Académie delphinale*, 6<sup>e</sup> série, 9–10 (1938–39): 115–41; D. Tempier, ed., “Correspondance des députés des Côtes-du-Nord à l'Assemblée législative” (written by five different deputies, although half were penned by Jean-Louis Bagot), *Société d'émulation des Côtes-du-Nord, Bulletins et mémoires* 28 (1890): 61–169; and ms. letters of the Legislative deputies of Ille-et-Vilaine (six different deputies, although two—Sylvain Codet and François-Alexandre Tardiveau—wrote well over half of them): Archives Départementales de l'Ille-et-Vilaine, L 294. On the use of deputy letters as a source, see Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 8–13.

<sup>42</sup> The sample of Constituent deputies averaged 49.7 years of age in 1789, compared to 46.4 for the body as a whole; while the Legislative deputies averaged 38.6 compared to 38.4 for the whole. There were four lawyers, three judges, three wealthy farmers, two doctors, a bookseller, and a former military officer. Seven came from north of the Loire, seven from south of the Loire, residing in communities that included large towns (Lyons), medium-sized towns (Le Mans, Clermont-Ferrand [three], Grenoble, Rennes, Saint-Brieuc, Mayenne, and Grasse), and small towns or villages (Gourdon, Linselle, Bourgnon, and Avon). A total of five are known to have been Jacobins, four were probably Feuillants, and five were apparently nonaligned. Two of the deputies (the Constituent deputy Gaultier and the Legislative deputy Couthon) were major players in their assemblies, while most of the others were minor players or back-benchers. Note that for the purpose of these statistics I have used only the deputies from Ille-et-Vilaine and Côtes-du-Nord who largely dominated their delegation's correspondence: respectively, Codet and Bagot.

<sup>43</sup> I have enumerated all occurrences of a stated belief in the existence of plots or conspiracies (*conspirations, complots, intrigues, conjurations, manoeuvres, cabales, trames, brigues*, etc.). Overall, such references occurred in 4 percent of the Constituent deputies' letters and 14 percent of the Legislative deputies' letters. I have excluded those deputy reports of conspiracy beliefs held by others that are rejected as unsubstantiated or of dubious authenticity. An earlier overview of conspiracy interpretations in deputy correspondence was based on an impressionistic assessment of selected letters of the Constituent deputies only: see Timothy Tackett, “The Constituent Assembly and the Terror,” in Keith Baker, ed., *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Vol. 4, *The Terror* (Oxford, 1994), 46–49.

and the National Assembly. There is virtually no such language in deputy correspondence during the major revolutionary developments from early May through late June 1789. In their letters as in their speeches, most of the Third Estate deputies maintained a remarkably upbeat tone and conveyed their continued optimism that they could rely on the support of the king. Significantly, in the debates over the problem of grain shortages, debates that began on June 19 immediately after the creation of the National Assembly, the vast majority of the speakers gave no credence to the “famine plot persuasion.” While they recognized the existence of such fears among the popular classes, they took care to distinguish their own enlightened position from the beliefs of “the multitude.” The unidentified speaker from Bordeaux who moved for the creation of a Subsistence Committee carefully specified that the shortage came from natural causes, not from the decisions and actions of individuals: “It would be senseless,” he announced, “to attribute [the food shortage] to fraudulent hoarding by individuals.” “The hail storms and the miserable harvest [of 1788] are the sole causes.”<sup>44</sup> Indeed, the only substantial evidence of a paranoid style in the early Estates General was among certain members of the clergy and nobility. Partly as a tactic for winning over moderate parish priests and noblemen to their position, bishops and conservative aristocrats accused the Third Estate of secretly intriguing to destroy both religion and the nobility. The conservative clergy, in particular, relied on some of the themes developed by the Fréron-Barruel group before the revolution.<sup>45</sup> Yet, if a “Hegelian dialectic” of ideas ever existed among the Third Estate deputies, pushing them toward an obsession with conspiracy, there is no evidence of its presence during the first weeks of the revolution.

When a language of conspiracy did appear in the speeches and letters of the patriot deputies, it arose not as “the figment of a frenzied preoccupation with power”—as Furet has proposed—but from fears engendered by the very real plots hatched among elements of the royal government in late June and early July. The massing of mercenary troops around Paris and Versailles and the dismissal of the liberal minister Jacques Necker were part of an initially secret plan improvised by the king’s conservative advisers to disband or seize control of the National Assembly by force.<sup>46</sup> François-René-Pierre Ménéard de La Groye first mentioned rumors of troop concentrations and “odious plots” on the last day of June, and Comte Honoré-Gabriel de Mirabeau made a dramatic warning to the Assembly one week later.<sup>47</sup> But in most cases, it was only after the fall of the Bastille and in direct reference to a royalist plan whose full extent could only be surmised—and easily exaggerated—that the fear of conspiracy penetrated the correspondence of the deputies. Looking back on the previous days, Jean-François Gaultier de Biauzat believed there had been an aristocratic plot for “the horrible assassination” of the deputies; and the Burgundy wine merchant Claude Gantheret reported the widely held conviction that the king’s emigrant brother Charles, Comte d’Artois, was

<sup>44</sup> *AP*, 8: 135–37. See also the report by Necker on July 4 and the bureau reports on July 6, 1789: *AP*, 8: 183, 194–98. Compare, however, the speech by Barère: *AP*, 8: 137.

<sup>45</sup> Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 131–32, 135–36.

<sup>46</sup> Pierre Caron, “La tentative de contre-révolution de juin-juillet 1789,” *Revue d’histoire moderne* 7 (1906–07): 5–34, 649–78.

<sup>47</sup> Ménéard, *Correspondance*, 55. Mirabeau’s speech was on July 8.

organizing a general invasion of the country and a new Saint-Bartholomew's Day Massacre.<sup>48</sup> Plot theories continued rampant during the rural panic of the Great Fear in the summer of 1789. It was in the midst of the alarms at the end of July that the deputies created the revolution's first surveillance committee, the Committee on Research. None of the speakers in the debate surrounding this creation doubted the existence of a counterrevolutionary plot earlier in the month. Terrified by an apparently simultaneous outbreak of rural violence everywhere in the country—violence that would be confirmed by Georges Lefebvre as a series of chain-reaction panics only in the twentieth century<sup>49</sup>—many came to the conclusion that a giant conspiracy must have created the Great Fear as well. "There can be no doubt," announced Adrien Duport to the Assembly, "that plots are being organized against the state." Even speakers on the moderate Monarchien right did not question the reality of conspiracy, although they would have preferred to use regular judicial procedures to carry out an investigation.<sup>50</sup>

Over the next two years, the fear of conspiracy never entirely disappeared from the Assembly. (See graph.) But, as attested by the deputies' speeches and correspondence, there were numerous ups and downs in the incidence of such fears, often evolving in response to real and proven instances of counterrevolutionary conspiracies—such as the counterrevolutionary gathering of Catholic national guardsmen at Jalès in August 1790 or the conspiracy of Lyons in December of that year. Heightened suspicions were also generated by the major political and economic protest demonstration by women marching on Versailles in October 1789, which most deputies were at a loss to explain by anything other than a plot; and by a confrontation between England and Spain that raised the possibility of French involvement in a war—a war for which the deputies felt desperately unprepared, both militarily and psychologically. Other conspiracy accusations appeared at intervals through the winter and spring of 1790–1791—linked in part to the growing barrage of threats from the emigrant leaders, whose real power and influence was difficult to assess, and, above all, to the growing popular unrest toward the revolutionary transformation of the Catholic Church in the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. All such apprehensions were invariably intensified by the existence in the Assembly itself of a solid phalanx of reactionary deputies from the First and Second Estates, overtly opposed to the revolution and on occasion secretly militating to arouse the opposition of their constituencies.<sup>51</sup>

Nevertheless, most deputies at the center and the moderate left of the Assembly were by no means continuously obsessed with conspiracies and were frequently quite critical of the paranoid style—especially after the panic atmosphere of the summer of 1789 had dissipated. Thus the debates on the massive peasant uprisings in Quercy and Limousin during the winter of 1789–1790 were generally calm and


<sup>48</sup> Gaultier, *Correspondance*, 2: 175; Gantheret, private collection, July 26. Georges Lefebvre cites a report in early June of fears among the popular classes of a conspiracy of the clergy and the nobility. But widespread fears of an "aristocratic plot" seem to have arisen only in early July and, above all, after the fall of the Bastille: Lefebvre, *Great Fear*, 59–61. Compare the explosion of plot accusations beginning in July in newspapers and brochures: Antoine de Baecque, *The Body Politic: Corporeal Metaphor in Revolutionary France*, Charlotte Mandell, trans. (Stanford, Calif., 1997), 217–33.

<sup>49</sup> Lefebvre, *Great Fear*, pt. 3.

<sup>50</sup> *AP*, 8: 293–95.

<sup>51</sup> Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 271.

Letters Indicating a Belief in Conspiracies Written by a Sample of 14 Constituent and Legislative Deputies or Delegation of Deputies (May 1789 - July 1792)



Source: see text, note 41.

Chart prepared by M. Kanda



analytical. No references were made in the printed debates to plots by aristocrats or foreign powers.<sup>52</sup> Most of the Constituent Assembly deputies whose correspondence I have examined were generally cautious in their reaction to conspiracy theories. Many were lawyers or magistrates by profession, well trained in the use of evidence and wary of accusations without proof. They took pains in their account of events to distinguish rumors of plots based on unverifiable hearsay from plots for which they believed irrefutable confirmation existed. In the summer of 1791, for instance, the Brest magistrate Laurent-François Legendre was careful to assess the real threat from the presence of foreigners in Paris, concluding that they were too few in number to represent any genuine danger, despite the contentions of certain journalists.<sup>53</sup> Individual deputies could be exceptionally lucid about the very idea of conspiracies. In late 1790, Gaultier reflected on the recent predictions of conspiratorial insurrections that had never materialized: "I have never really placed any credence in them, and you have seen that [such beliefs] were totally unfounded . . . Nothing can more surely arouse fears among the common people than announcements that they are in danger."<sup>54</sup> "Such are the anxieties of nascent liberty," wrote Antoine Durand, "that we conceive enemies everywhere plotting against us, that we give ourselves over to imagination, whether to gratify our hopes or feed our fears."<sup>55</sup> In the winter of 1790, those deputies who continued to be obsessed with conspiracies—a relatively small number—were viewed by their colleagues as distinctly marginal to the mainstream of Constituent Assembly thought. Such was the opinion of Adrien Duquesnoy toward Robespierre, for example, whose oratorical style—with its persistent denunciation of hidden conspirators and plots—was portrayed as demagogic and a bit ridiculous.<sup>56</sup>

IF FOR MOST OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, conspiracy fears seem to have been only episodic, there was one faction that became much more closely linked to a paranoid style: the radical Jacobins, those 200 or so deputies who remained in the club in the spring of 1790 after a schism with the Society of 1789. The process by which this group came to embrace conspiracy fears is not entirely clear. The Jacobins' initial manifesto, written in February 1790 by the young radical from Dauphiné, Antoine Barnave, spoke of the members' duty of defending the constitution, but there was no specific mention of plots and conspiracies.<sup>57</sup> While conspiratorial concerns appear occasionally in the fragmented early records of the club, they do not seem to have become a dominant feature until late in the summer of 1790. A turning point may well have occurred in August–September 1790, in reaction to the bloody repression of soldiers in Nancy who had mutinied against their aristocratic officers, a repression led by the reactionary royalist general, François-Claude-Amour, the

<sup>52</sup> *AP*, 11: 652–58, 665–73, 676–82.

<sup>53</sup> Laurent-François Legendre, August 31, 1791, Archives Municipales de Brest, series D, uncatalogued.

<sup>54</sup> Gaultier de Biauzat, Bibliothèque Municipale de Clermont-Ferrand, ms. 788, December 23, 1790.

<sup>55</sup> Durand to his cousin, May 23, 1790, Archives Municipales de Cahors.

<sup>56</sup> Adrien-Cyprien Duquesnoy, *Journal d'Adrien Duquesnoy*, Robert de Crèvecoeur, ed., 2 vols. (Paris, 1894), 1: 458–59; 2: 290, 301.

<sup>57</sup> See Aulard, *Société des Jacobins*, especially 1: xxviii–xxxiii (*Règlement* of the Jacobins).



marquis de Bouillé. The Nancy Affair aroused strong suspicions among both the Jacobins and lower-class Parisians that the marquis de Lafayette, who was Bouillé's brother-in-law and who had vigorously urged the Constituent Assembly to support the repression in the name of military subordination, was duplicitous and not to be trusted.<sup>58</sup> Fears of conspiracy among high officials continued in evidence through the fall, notably when the loyalty of several royal ministers came into question and when an emigrant plot to launch a major insurrection in the southeast was uncovered—and then detailed for the members in a report from the Jacobins' affiliate in Lyons. The intensity of the anxiety was revealed in late December, when many Jacobins came to believe that someone had planted a bomb in the basement of their building and that the newly created Club Monarchique was plotting to kill them all as part of a generalized massacre.<sup>59</sup>

To some extent, the radical left's obsession with conspiracies arose from a deeply held sentiment that their version of democratic egalitarianism was profoundly true and right—an ideological commitment that contrasted sharply with the pragmatism of the majority of the patriot deputies. It was only one step further to the assumption that all who disagreed with the Jacobins' positions must of necessity be fools, dupes, or conspirators. In this sense, the Jacobins' paranoid style was linked to the intensity of their convictions and not specifically to the tenets of Rousseau's philosophy. But, in part, the conspiracy obsession was tied to the radical Jacobins' identification with the common people. Already, by the autumn of 1789—at a time when most deputies were reacting in horror and outrage to the violence of the Parisians—many Jacobins were coming to idealize and glorify the urban masses as representing the true soul of the revolution and the embodiment of the democratic values for which they had become the principal spokesmen. Had the Parisians not already come to the Assembly's rescue on two separate occasions, through their insurrections of July and October? The image of “the good people” rapidly became a leitmotif in the writings of many radicals. “Ah, the good people, the good French people,” wrote Ménard to his wife. “How much they have been slandered by those who said that liberty would never suit them.”<sup>60</sup>

In their self-conscious identification with the lower classes, the radical Jacobins were all the more susceptible to the influence of urban popular culture and to the longstanding Parisian obsession with conspiracy. Such an influence could only have been intensified by the influx of non-deputies into the Jacobin Club, including significant contingents from the more popular Parisian “fraternal societies” and the Cordelier Club. The Cordeliers, in particular, were dominated by a group of journalists—such as Jean-Paul Marat, Camille Desmoulins, François Robert, and Jacques-René Hébert—who specialized in newspapers addressed to the masses and who had rapidly assumed the perspectives and voice of their audience.<sup>61</sup> In any case,

<sup>58</sup> Aulard, *Société des Jacobins*, for example, 1: 283–86, 294. Some 40,000 Parisians were said to have demonstrated near the Assembly during the debates on the Nancy Affair; Legendre, letter of September 3, 1790.

<sup>59</sup> Aulard, *Société des Jacobins*, 1: 324, 390, 422, 431, 437, 448.

<sup>60</sup> Ménard, *Correspondance*, 246. See also Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 254–55.

<sup>61</sup> Gérard Walter, *Histoire des Jacobins* (Paris, 1946), 53–55; Albert Mathiez, *Le Club des Cordeliers pendant la crise de Varennes* (Paris, 1910), 8–9; Isabelle Bourdin, *Les sociétés populaires à Paris pendant la Révolution* (Paris, 1937), 53, 58, 155–57, 175–76, 199.

by 1791, the pursuit and denunciation of conspiracy had become part and parcel of the Jacobins' political culture and rhetoric, a common characteristic in the speeches and brochures emanating from members of the group. The first denunciations of the "Austrian Committee" seem to have appeared in the radical press in early 1791.<sup>62</sup> At almost the same time, the Jacobins adopted a formal oath to be taken by the entire membership—and by all new members as they were admitted—"to denounce, even at the risk of our lives and our fortunes, all traitors of the fatherland."<sup>63</sup>

For the Constituent Assembly as a whole, the single most important event in intensifying convictions of conspiracy was the king's attempted escape from Paris and his capture in the small town of Varennes in June 1791. All the deputies, indeed all the political elites throughout the country, were profoundly shocked and shaken by the experience. Once the deputies had found the monarch's handwritten statement formally denouncing most of the revolutionary transformations and affirming that his previous cooperation had been coerced and insincere, there could be no doubt that he had left of his own accord.<sup>64</sup> As the Assembly's various investigative committees delved into the affair, interviewing dozens of witnesses and reading confiscated documents in the royal household, it became patently clear that a comprehensive plot had been afoot for months, involving numerous participants in Paris, in the army, and among the emigrants in Germany; entailing, as well, a pattern of boldfaced deception and perjury on the part of the king—who had sworn a solemn oath to uphold the constitution in July 1790 and vowed only a few weeks earlier that he backed the revolution and would do everything in his power to promote it. In the revolutionary ethos, imbued with the ideals of transparency and authenticity, there was perhaps no greater sin than deceitfully to swear false oaths, and this is precisely what Louis had done.<sup>65</sup> Even though a handful of political journalists, such as Marat and Hébert, had been prophesying such a flight, the Constituent Assembly leadership had dismissed it as irresponsible ranting.<sup>66</sup> But now, all of these seemingly paranoid predictions had come true. Never, since the revolution began, had there been more extensive and conclusive proof of the reality of grand and coordinated conspiracy at the highest levels.

In the end, the majority of the Constituent Assembly agreed to reinstate the king—despite the bitter opposition of the radical Jacobins—and maintain the constitution, which the deputies had been drafting for over two years. Partly, it was

<sup>62</sup> Jack Richard Censer, *Prelude to Power: The Parisian Radical Press, 1789–1791* (Baltimore, 1976), 96–97.

<sup>63</sup> Walter, *Histoire des Jacobins*, 97–99; Aulard, *Société des Jacobins*, 2: 468. This oath is not mentioned in the *Règlement* of February 1790.

<sup>64</sup> See, for example, the letters by Lepoutre, *Correspondance*, 487; and Gantheret, private collection, June 24, 1791. See also Jean Dreyfus, "Le manifeste royal du 20 juin 1791," *La Révolution française* 54 (1908): 5–22.

<sup>65</sup> The conclusions here are based on an extensive reading of documents in the Archives Nationales, D XXIX bis 35–38; and C 124–31. The king and queen had been discussing the possibility of flight since the fall of 1790. On the king's self-conscious efforts to mislead and lull the revolutionaries into thinking he supported their cause, see, for example, Axel Von Fersen to Baron de Breteuil, April 2, 1791, R. M. de Klinckowström, ed., *Le comte de Fersen et la cour de France*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1877), 1: 97–98.

<sup>66</sup> See, for example, Marc-Alexis Vadier—a radical Jacobin and future member of the Committee of General Security—to his constituency in the *département* of Ariège, early June, Gaston Arnaud, *Histoire de la Révolution dans le département de l'Ariège, 1789–1795* (Toulouse, 1904), 241.

a question of apprehension of the unknown and of the anarchy the patriot majority feared would result if they were to launch the nation at this late date into a regency or a republican government; partly, it was a question of inertia and of the emotional difficulty in renouncing the time and effort they had already devoted to forging a new constitution. But the fear of conspiracy and distrust of the king would hang like a shadow over that constitution and over the new Legislative Assembly it created.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE INTERNAL HISTORY of the second revolutionary assembly, the "Legislative," is less well known than that of the first.<sup>67</sup> Yet the evidence of the deputy correspondence suggests an inflationary expansion of the paranoid style among its members from the earliest meetings of that body. The sampled letter writers referred to belief in plots and conspiracies nearly three times more frequently under the Legislative than under the Constituent Assembly.<sup>68</sup> (See graph.) For the majority of the Constituent deputies—the Jacobins being the principal exception—such fears had been largely episodic, linked for the most part to the explanation of specific events. Now the existence of plots became a true obsession, and not only for radical Jacobins like Georges Couthon but for moderates like Antoine Rabusson-Lamothe and for the spectrum of deputies with diverse political positions from the *département* of Côtes-du-Nord.

Not only were there more mentions of conspiracy during the Legislative, but the very nature of the acts envisioned seemed to evolve. Under the Constituent, virtually all references in the correspondence had been to single plots or to a multiplicity of plots instigated by diffuse categories of perpetrators. Now the deputies were increasingly preoccupied with the "grand conspiracy," wherein all threats were viewed as part of a monolithic master plan, directed from a single source—which, depending on the version, might be the emigrant princes, a particular foreign government, or French "executive authority" itself. While there had been only one such reference in the correspondence of the sampled deputies during the twenty-nine months of the Constituent, there were close to twenty during the first ten months of the Legislative.

The new character of the obsession was clearly in evidence in the Legislative motion of November 1791 creating a Surveillance Committee—heir to the Constituent's Committee on Research. While the corresponding motion in 1789 had referred to a plurality of conspiracies, the Legislative evoked the word in the singular. "We are surrounded by conspiracy," proclaimed the deputy Claude Basire. "Everywhere plots are being hatched, and we are brought continual denunciations of specific incidents which can only be linked to the grand conspiracy whose existence no one here can doubt."<sup>69</sup> Indeed, it was probably only in the third year of the revolution—not at the beginning—that a "frenzied" and to some extent

<sup>67</sup> The best study is Charles J. Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791* (Leiden, 1988).

<sup>68</sup> There were 2.2 references per month in the letters of the Constituent deputies and 6.0 per month in those of the Legislative deputies.

<sup>69</sup> *AP*, 35: 361. Compare Lucas, "Denunciation," 24. The new Surveillance Committee was formally created on November 25, with ten of the first twelve members chosen from the left: *AP*, 35: 370.

irrational obsession with “grand conspiracy” took hold of substantial numbers of the political elite.

The idea of a general conspiracy appeared frequently in the language of the Legislative during its two most important debates in the fall of 1791: on the problems of the emigrant nobles and of the refractory clergy. The paranoid style had been virtually absent eight months earlier, when the Constituent had taken up the question of emigrants.<sup>70</sup> But now Pierre-Victorien Vergniaud announced that “a wall of conspiracy has been formed around [the fatherland],” that this was closely linked to “the internal uprisings which are tearing the *départements* apart,” and that all was directed by a faction close to the king himself. Several days later, Maximin Isnard proclaimed, “I fear that a volcano of conspiracy is about to explode and that we are being lulled to sleep [*endormis*] with a false sense of security.” Indeed, the metaphor of the “endormeurs,” those seeking to hide their nefarious plans through the pretense of patriotism, became a recurring theme in the rhetoric of the left. The final decree formally declared that all emigrants were “under suspicion of conspiracy against the fatherland.”<sup>71</sup> Similar language was mobilized by certain deputies in the debates on the refractory clergy. Thus, for the deputy Louis François, all the unrest emerging in the countryside “results from plots hatched secretly, and sometimes even openly, by the greatest enemy of our Revolution, the non-juring priests.”<sup>72</sup>

The “grand conspiracy” was also a major theme in the great debates that unrolled in the Legislative Assembly between January and March 1792 over whether the nation should go to war. Increasingly, fears were focused on the royal government itself, viewed by the left as the mastermind of all the threats facing France at home and abroad. Elie Guadet thundered against “this abominable plot” hatched by a league of enemies both inside and outside the country. Jacques Thuriot accused members of the central government of simultaneously launching peasant insurrections, weakening the army, encouraging the export of gold, and inciting the intervention of foreign powers: “We are betrayed by everyone!” And it was in this context that Brissot first launched his accusations against the “Austrian Committee.”<sup>73</sup>

While not all deputies agreed with Brissot’s analysis, the correspondence suggests that such views were increasingly accepted by a great many moderates as well as by the left. Indeed, March 1792, on the eve of the war, saw a greater intensity of conspiracy fears than any other month during the first three years of the revolution. (See graph.) Clearly, a paranoid style was coming to dominate much of the Assembly’s rhetoric even before the actual declaration of war on April 20, at a time when most deputies seemed optimistic that France could easily defeat any foreign armies. The failures in the initial war effort and the eventual Prussian invasion would enormously intensify the conspiracy obsession, but the roots of that obsession were already in place before the fighting had begun.

<sup>70</sup> *AP*, 23: 566–75. Only the radical Jacobin Prieur [de la Marne] had alluded to the conspiracy theme: *AP*, 23: 569.

<sup>71</sup> *AP*, 34: 402–03, 541, 711–12. The bill was vetoed by Louis XVI.

<sup>72</sup> *AP*, 35: 145.

<sup>73</sup> *AP*, 37: 412–13; and 39: 427. Brissot had suggested the existence of an “Austrian Committee” in January: see his newspaper, *Patriote français*, January 29, 1792.

The explanation of this phase change in the nature and intensity of the paranoid style under the Legislative Assembly may be related in part to the composition of that body. The Constituent's self-exclusionary rule, adopted in the spring of 1791, had created an entirely new legislative corps devoid of direct continuity with its predecessor. The deputies of the second assembly of the revolution were not only a half generation younger than the Constituent deputies, but in far greater numbers they came from small towns and rural areas and from distinctly lower levels in the occupational hierarchy of the middle class.<sup>74</sup> It is at least plausible that some of the Legislative deputies, arriving from more mediocre social positions and from smaller communities, felt less social distance from the popular classes than had their predecessors. Possibly, for that very reason, they were in closer contact with a popular culture permeated with fears of plots and conspiracies and less touched by the rational skepticism of the Enlightenment.

It also seems clear that a substantially greater proportion of the new deputies self-consciously supported the radical left—the faction that, as we have seen, was the most susceptible to the paranoid style. Based on erroneous figures—figures repeated by several generations of historians—it is usually argued that deputies supporting the position of the more moderate Feuillant Club held a decisive majority at the beginning of the Legislative. But recent research suggests that the balance between the two factions was close to parity. In October 1791, approximately 150 (20 percent) of the 767 deputies adhered to the Jacobins, while about 170 (22 percent) threw in their lot with the Feuillants.<sup>75</sup> At the end of the Constituent, by contrast, only about 80 (7 percent) of the approximately 1,100 deputies still sitting had linked themselves to the Jacobin fold, while 290 (26 percent) had adhered to the Feuillants.<sup>76</sup> As for their occupational backgrounds, the salient fact is that nearly 80 percent of the Legislative deputies had already held elective administrative or judicial positions before 1791.<sup>77</sup> For over a year, they had been on the front lines, as it were, in the frustrating efforts to implement the Constituent's policies toward refractory priests and emigrants in the provinces. Many had exerted strong pressure on the Constituent—to little avail—for a harsher course of action on the emigrants, and they had often bitterly opposed the edict of May 1791, which instituted a policy of toleration toward the refractory clergy.<sup>78</sup> In

<sup>74</sup> See Timothy Tackett, "Les députés de l'Assemblée législative, 1791–1792," in *Pour la Révolution française: En hommage à Claude Mazauric* (Rouen, 1998), 139–44.

<sup>75</sup> Tackett, "Les députés de l'Assemblée législative," 142–43. According to Gensonné, some 200 deputies were attending the Jacobin Club by October 15; Goetz-Bernstein, *La diplomatie*, 46. Several generations of historians have mistakenly credited the Feuillants with 264 deputies. On the early de facto polarization of the Legislative Assembly, see Charles J. Mitchell, "Political Divisions within the Legislative Assembly of 1791," *French Historical Studies* 13 (1983–84): 356–89. See also the suggestions in François Furet, "Les Girondins et la guerre: Les débuts de l'Assemblée législative," in Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., *La Gironde et les Girondins* (Paris, 1991), 191.

<sup>76</sup> Figures based on an analysis of the newspaper *Journal des débats de la Société des amis de la Constitution séante aux Jacobins de Paris*, July 17–September 30, 1791; and, for the Feuillants, on Augustin Challamel, *Les clubs contre-révolutionnaires* (Paris, 1895), 286–93. Since a large number of conservatives ceased attending the sessions in the last months of the Constituent, the proportion of Feuillant deputies among those actually participating was even greater, probably a majority.

<sup>77</sup> Some 60 percent had been administrators and another 18 percent magistrates of various sorts: Tackett, "Les députés de l'Assemblée législative," 141.

<sup>78</sup> On the attitudes of administrators toward Constituent policies on emigrants, see the speech by the Jacobin Vernier in February 1791: *AP*, 23: 573. On the refractories, see Timothy Tackett, *Religion*,



this process, a great many had grown impatient and suspicious and were perhaps all the more tempted to see the opposition, which they were forced to confront daily, in conspiratorial terms.

But it would also be difficult to overestimate the impact of Louis XVI's Flight to Varennes on the attitudes of the elites both inside and outside the revolutionary assemblies. Much has been written in recent years on the purported "desacralization" of the French kingship at the end of the Old Regime.<sup>79</sup> That sometime between the high Middle Ages and the end of the eighteenth century the religious aura of the kingship had faded in intensity is not to be questioned. Yet the chronology of that transformation is far from clear, and much of the change may well have transpired even before the eighteenth century. Based on an analysis of the *cahiers de doléances* of 1789, John Markoff has shown that few educated French on the eve of the revolution still thought the monarch had a divine right to absolute rule. But those same *cahiers* also give evidence of a deep, emotive attachment to the king by much of the population.<sup>80</sup> Indeed, the myth of the kingship—as opposed to the reputation of individual kings—was multivalent. For some among the popular classes, that myth may have remained partly "religious"—and thus "sacral"—in nature. But it was also built on an array of secular legends and folklore, and classical and feudal traditions, as well as on the images of grandeur cultivated by the seventeenth and eighteenth-century monarchs through their military prowess and the splendor of their palaces and court life.

Throughout the first two years of the revolution, most French inhabitants had persisted in viewing the king with enormous affection and respect, whatever the ambiguities of the king's constitutional status in the nation, whatever their doubts about the ministerial government surrounding him or the aristocratic social structure of which he was a part. Even in the midst of the turmoil and uncertainty caused by popular uprisings, religious schism, and threats of foreign intervention, the great majority continued to rely on the monarch as an anchor of security, a vital center of social and emotional stability. As recently as March of 1791, a minor illness of Louis XVI's had engendered a great outpouring of affection and concern for the monarch in letters addressed to the Constituent Assembly.<sup>81</sup>

In circumstances such as these, the king's perceived betrayal in June had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the whole regime and was a powerful factor in

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*Revolution, and Regional Culture in Eighteenth-Century France: The Ecclesiastical Oath of 1791* (Princeton, N.J., 1986), 275–82.

<sup>79</sup> See, for example, Jeffrey W. Merrick, *The Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century* (Baton Rouge, La., 1990); and Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, Lydia Cochrane, trans. (Durham, N.C., 1991), chap. 6.

<sup>80</sup> John Markoff, "Images of the King at the Beginning of the Revolution," in Gilbert Shapiro and John Markoff, *Revolutionary Demands: A Content Analysis of the Cahiers de Doléances of 1789* (Stanford, Calif., 1997), 369–76.

<sup>81</sup> Spontaneous *Te Deum* services were held throughout the kingdom to give thanks for the king's recovery: see, for example, Archives Nationales, C 124–31; Marie de Roux, *La révolution à Poitiers et dans la Vienne* (Paris, 1910), 442–43; Eugène Dubois, *Histoire de la Révolution dans l'Ain: Tome I, La Constituante (1789–1791)* (Bourg-en-Bresse, 1931), 330; Marcel Bruneau, *Les débuts de la Révolution dans les départements du Cher et de l'Indre* (Paris, 1902), 164; Arnaud, *Histoire de la Révolution dans le département de l'Ariège*, 241. Even the principal radical newspapers had continued a positive—or at least noncommittal—treatment of the king, through the early months of 1791: Censer, *Prelude to Power*, 112–15.



promoting fears of conspiracy emanating from the “executive authority” in the spring and summer of 1792.<sup>82</sup> This core of mistrust was visible even among many moderates of the Legislative as they took their seats in October 1791. In letters to his constituents, Rabusson-Lamothe announced his hope that Louis had resigned himself to follow the constitution and that the king’s self-interest would triumph over the “prejudices of his birth and education.” But he also understood that many of his colleagues in the Assembly displayed “a defiance [toward the king], justified by the example of the past.”<sup>83</sup> More than any other single event, the Flight to Varennes had shaken the French to the roots of their being and produced a loss of trust, a loss that rendered the various conspiracy theories altogether possible and believable.

IN CONCLUSION, an understanding of the conspiracy obsession among revolutionary elites entails several layers of explanation. It is likely that in any given population a certain number of individuals are prone to view the world in conspiratorial terms, and this was true of some of the deputies as they arrived to take their posts in Versailles or Paris. Yet at the end of the Old Regime, the “paranoid style” was probably much less in evidence among the educated classes in France than in England and North America. Despite the contention of several recent historians, the great majority of the deputies almost certainly did not share such an outlook during the early weeks of the French Revolution. On the other hand, the evidence is conclusive that conspiracy fears had become widespread among the political elites by the fall of 1791, well before the coming of the war and the threats of invasion, thus invalidating the explanation proposed by an older generation of historians.

It is the contention here that the evolution toward an obsession with plots developed among the elites in the course of the revolution itself. In this process, the logic of ideas cannot be entirely excluded. There can be no doubt that the language of the philosophes was more in evidence in the deputies’ discourse in 1791 and 1792 than it had been in 1789. But if anything, these transformations in ideas and language came after the fact, as it were, through a growing awareness of the relevance and applicability of such ideas to the transforming political situation.<sup>84</sup> Of far greater significance was the deputies’ confrontation with a series of very real conspiracies and threatened conspiracies, from the attempted ministerial and military counterrevolution of July 1789 through the elaborate attempt to separate the king from the revolution in the summer of 1791. The fears engendered by these experiences were further intensified, as we have seen, through the influence of the more pervasive paranoid perspectives of the lower classes. It was probably the radical Jacobins who first came self-consciously to link themselves to the Parisian masses, but this influence gradually spread to the moderate deputies as well,

<sup>82</sup> On the psychological impact of Varennes, see notably Paolo Viola, *Il trono vuoto: La transizione della sovranità nella rivoluzione francese* (Turin, 1989).

<sup>83</sup> Rabusson-Lamothe, “Lettres,” 231, 264.

<sup>84</sup> Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 64–65, 110–13, 182, 190, 308–09.

perhaps particularly to those of more modest rural and small-town origins who sat in the Legislative Assembly.

The impact of real instances of plots and the influence of popular fears—mediated through the particular political culture of the Jacobins—go far to explain the conspiratorial fears of the political elites in the early years of the revolution. But can such factors alone explain the inflationary expansion of the paranoid style, the quasi-irrational obsession with the grand, omnipotent conspiracy so prevalent after the summer of 1791? Here, one might suggest, another level of analysis needs to be considered, an analysis that may also help us go beyond the contingent events of one revolution and explore the revolutionary process in a broader perspective. One of the most pervasive themes in the letters and diaries and in many contemporary accounts was the general breakdown of order and certainty. The rapidly spreading anarchy, the unpredictability of events, more impressive than anything previously encountered in the lifetime of those experiencing the revolution, seemed quite to defy explanation through the Enlightened analytical apparatus at the revolutionaries' disposal.

In this respect, it is interesting to note—if only in the guise of a heuristic approach—the curious parallels between clinical descriptions of paranoia in individuals and the collective paranoid style increasingly visible in a time of revolution. As some psychologists would describe it, individual paranoia is often characterized not only by a deep mistrust of others but by a mistrust of oneself: a weak and unstable sense of autonomy and an exceptionally frail sense of identity.<sup>85</sup> One might speculate that all revolutionary processes, by their very nature, tend to intensify similar sentiments within society as a whole. There can be no doubt that the most sweeping revolutions—the English, the Russian, the Chinese, as well as the French—commonly set in motion a progressive reexamination of all values, putting into question society's sense of collective identity.

This effort to follow the development of revolutionary psychology in France suggests that, for many elites, the transformation was not a sudden paradigmatic shift, where one worldview or ideology was abruptly replaced by another, but was a slow, halting, and painful process.<sup>86</sup> It was a liminal experience, par excellence, enormously unsettling and destabilizing, which left many individuals—to paraphrase Matthew Arnold—wandering between two worlds, the one dying, the other struggling to be born. Even the rigid, swaggering self-confidence, projected in the

<sup>85</sup> See, notably, Eli Sagan, *The Honey and the Hemlock: Democracy and Paranoia in Ancient Athens and Modern America* (New York, 1991), 4–23; and David Shapiro, *Neurotic Styles* (New York, 1965), 55–88. For more traditional Freudian approaches—which I have found little useful for the present study—see Yehuda Fried and Joseph Agassi, *Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis* (Boston, 1976); and John Farrell, *Freud's Paranoid Quest: Psychoanalysis and Modern Suspicion* (New York, 1996). For social psychological approaches to conspiracy interpretations, see Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici, eds., *Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy* (New York, 1987).

<sup>86</sup> Compare Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2d edn. (Stanford, Calif., 1982). Much of the recent theorizing about revolutions has focused on the initial breakdown—particularly in structural terms—of the various “Old Regimes” and has had little to say about the process of those revolutions once they had begun. See, for example, Nikki Keddie, ed., *Debating Revolutions* (New York, 1995); and John Foran, ed., *Theorizing Revolutions* (London, 1996). The comparative study of the revolutionary process by Arno J. Mayer, *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions* (Princeton, N.J., 2000), appeared too late to be integrated into this article. Among other themes, Mayer stresses the dialectical interaction between revolution and counterrevolution in the emergence of revolutionary violence and conspiracy fears.

public pronouncements of many revolutionaries, was often as much bluff and pose as true self-assurance. The personal correspondence of many such individuals was pervaded by "the anxieties of nascent liberty," as Durand had described it, with an oscillation of moods between hope and fear, with a sentiment of being swept along by circumstances over which one had little or no control.

It was precisely in the context of sentiments such as these that the king's desertion and betrayal in 1791 had such a traumatic effect, leaving many with the feeling of being cast adrift. With all the bonds of Old Regime society and culture progressively overthrown, there was an increasing fluidity of identity, a growing uncertainty as to who one was, what one could rely on, and whom one could trust. The ambiguity of one's own collective identity reverberated in uncertainty and mistrust of others—especially those others perceived as outsiders or potential outsiders to the revolutionary community.

Only a carefully conceived comparative study could adequately test the validity for other revolutions of the final hypothesis proposed above. But it seems clear, in the case of the French experience, that the phase change in late 1791 to a quasi-permanent obsession with grand conspiracy exerted a profound effect on the origins of a Terror mentality among political elites in the spring and summer of 1792. Indeed, by corollary, one might argue that the very term "Terror" should be ascribed a more complex meaning than that usually given it by historians. It should signify not only the judicial apparatus assembled to intimidate and punish the perceived enemies of the revolution but also the near panic state of fear and suspicion experienced during the period by the revolutionaries themselves.

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## When Mexico Had the Blues: A Transatlantic Tale of Bonds, Bankers, and Nationalists, 1862–1910

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STEVEN C. TOPIK

WHEN MAXIMILIAN VON HABSBURG'S GILDED COACH first entered Mexico City in May of 1864 to an enthusiastic greeting, the future appeared as glittering as his livery. French troops would help the Austrian prince resurrect Mexico's past brilliance. But Maximilian needed more than just soldiers to build his New World empire. The emperor needed gold. He turned to the Paris stock market, where the French regime of Napoleon III put its prestige behind bond issues of 1864 and 1865 worth some 534 million francs, in a stroke tripling Mexico's foreign debt. Alas, time would show that instead of sustaining the empire and cementing friendship and economic cooperation between France and Mexico, these bonds, known as the "petits bleus" because of their little blue coupons, would create persistent friction and ill feelings. The bonds that were introduced with a majestic triumphal march would linger on in the minor key of Mexican blues. Maximilian died in 1867, but the *maximilianitos* generated discord between the two countries until 1904. But this is not just a story of forsaken ambition.

The story of these bonds says much about Mexico's changing position in the international capital market and, indeed, the transformation of that market during this period of unprecedented expansion. Mexico shed its reputation as an unreliable, financial black hole to become one of the most hotly coveted areas in the world. The bonds' tale also helps illuminate the nature and extent of imperialism, particularly French overseas and budding United States activities, in the Age of Empire. Different layers of overseas ambition, from early modern colonialism to modern colonialism and neo-colonialism, were involved. Today's globalism is not new. During the "hundred years' peace" before World War I, international capital flowed freely over most of the globe.<sup>1</sup> By the end of the nineteenth century, the

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1943), 10, observed: "*Haute finance*, an institution *sui generis*, peculiar to the last third of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century, functioned as the main link between the political and the economic organizations of the world in this period."

formerly crippled and outcast Mexico had become one of the principal sites contested by British, French, German, and newly outward-looking U.S. investors.<sup>2</sup> But the nationalism of these actors, which is always emphasized in studies of the Age of Empire, has been exaggerated.

The lives of the little blue bonds suggest that the contests between financiers were not simply an extension of national rivalries between the Great Powers. They were also very much self-interested private efforts at enrichment. Money did not require a passport. The bonds' tortuous history demonstrates foreigners' and Mexicans' complex and contradictory interests and identities. Often, their nationalities were identifications of convenience, jettisoned or ignored when profit made it advisable. Cooperation between financiers of different nationalities was just as common as competition. Indeed, family allegiance among members of international financial diasporas was just as strong as their patriotism. The international banking houses were precursors of today's multinational corporations. They were founded on a basis of fluid capital and trust more than on technological innovation. The banking houses' bonds played a lead part in a far-flung drama that was acted out on stages all over the world. The "petits bleus," which were supposed to forge imperial harmony, instead inspired a cacophony of competing foreign voices.

This is also a tale of symbols. Although most people love money, few, ironically, like to read its history. Economics, after all, is considered "the dismal science" and banking the most strait-laced branch of that gray field. Philistine money, grimy, quantifiable, and absolute, is often snubbed in favor of free-spirited culture or intriguing politics. We must not let the economists fool us. Money and bonds do not constitute concrete, stable, objective value. A bond is the ultimate symbol. A feathery wisp of paper with virtually no intrinsic use or value, it can unlock whole worlds and conjure up circuses of images. Bonds signify a promise to repay, an imaginative property right that spells out reciprocal rights and obligations based on ethics, honor, and custom as much as law. As fiduciary property, the bond is only valuable because of public confidence and support, a most mercurial foundation.<sup>3</sup> Economics and semiotics overlap.

Bonds are socially constructed. Unless we wish to fall into crude commodity fetishism (admittedly an increasingly popular religion these days), we need to recognize that not only does money make the world go round, but people make money and commodities go round. Arjun Appadurai has shown that commodities are "thoroughly socialized" things that have social lives. They can take on different meanings at different points in the circuit of exchange, from use value to exchange value and back, from symbol of wealth to talisman, to heirloom or tool.<sup>4</sup> His volume does not consider money or bonds, probably because the scope of their uses and meanings seems so constricted. But in fact, historically, bonds sparked the public

<sup>2</sup> See Steven Topik, "The Emergence of Finance Capital in Mexico," in *Five Centuries of Mexican History*, Virginia Guedea and Jaime E. Rodríguez O., eds. (Mexico City, 1992), 227–42; Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution* (Chicago, 1981).

<sup>3</sup> In theology, a fiduciary refers to one who depends for salvation on faith without works. The case of the petits bleus demonstrates that many bondholders had to work to recover their investment; they did not simply leave it to faith.

<sup>4</sup> Arjun Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* (New York, 1986), 6.



imagination and led most interesting lives. As Joseph Schumpeter lyrically described the broader phenomenon of public finances: “The public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society . . . The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare—all this and more is written in its fiscal history . . . He who knows how to listen to the message here discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere else.”<sup>5</sup> Of the various fiscal instruments, bonds most dramatically reveal the international dynamics of the economy.

Such was the case with the “petits bleus.” For some French bondholders, these pieces of blue paper were dressed in regal finery, representing an imperial promise of return to Napoleonic glory and a prosperous future; for others, they stood for safe retirement, a comfortable allowance; still others saw them as the foundation for financial riches. For many Mexicans, however, the bonds were aching shackles and a national disgrace. None of these meanings were entirely stable. The shifting political fortunes of Maximilian and his Mexican successors, as well as Napoleon III and later French rulers, in addition to rapid changes in world capital markets, transformed the bonds’ personalities from promise to embarrassment. The imperial eagle became an albatross. The bonds’ value varied along with their dreams. This, then, is as much cultural history as it is economic and international relations. Actors were moved by many sentiments besides cold calculation of profit and loss.

Bonds often lived secret existences in the subterranean realm of high finance and stock speculation. Tracking them through their almost half-century of life required visits to archives and libraries in six countries on three continents. As the mystery unraveled, it revealed the machinations of conquistadors, swindlers, and fools, anti-Semites, soldiers, haute financiers, and nationalist politicians, arms dealers and land speculators, students, widows, and orphans, in addition to diplomats on four continents. Mexico’s little blue bonds lived a most cosmopolitan life. They provide a wide-angle lens to study the mechanics of international history. To write the biography of the “petits bleus,” we must follow the sage advice Deep Throat gave Woodward and Bernstein in the movie—“Follow the money.”<sup>6</sup>

BEFORE MAXIMILIAN’S INVASION, Mexico and France had had few monetary relations. Some French traders, especially from the small alpine town of Barcelonnette, prospered in commerce, and some Frenchmen had invested in land and mines in Mexico, but the scale was small.<sup>7</sup> Civil wars, coups, riots, and foreign invasions destroyed much of Mexico’s earlier fabled wealth in the four decades after the colony gained its independence in 1821. Mexico weighed most heavily in the French

<sup>5</sup> Joseph Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State,” in *International Economic Papers: Translations Prepared for the International Economic Association*, Alan T. Peacock, et al., eds. (New York, 1954).

<sup>6</sup> *All the President’s Men*, directed by Alan J. Pakula (1976). It turns out that Deep Throat’s advice, which plays such a central role in solving the Watergate puzzle in the movie, does not appear in Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward’s book (1974).

<sup>7</sup> Auguste Génin, *Les français au Mexique du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle a nos jours* (Paris, 1933), *passim*. In 1849, of the fourteen conventions Mexico agreed to, only one was with France, and it was for \$1,035,527; Jan Bazant, *Historia de la deuda exterior de México (1823–1946)* (Mexico City, 1968), 84, 86. Eugène Duflot de Mofras, *Exploration du territoire de l’Oregon, des Californies, et de la mer Vermeille, exécutée pendant les années 1840, 1841, et 1842* (Paris, 1844), 85, claimed the total was \$1,179,274.

“imaginaire” because of the tales the French had heard from Baron von Humboldt and later French travelers of its prodigious mineral wealth and wide fertile plains suitable for cotton cultivation.<sup>8</sup>

After Louis Napoleon grasped the crown of France, it was natural that Mexico occupied a prominent place in his drive to match the conquests of his famous uncle. As a young man, Napoleon III had been a promoter of a Nicaraguan canal and later continued to find Central America enticing. First sending French troops to New Caledonia, Algeria, Cochinchina, Senegal, Lebanon, and China, Napoleon III set out on perhaps his boldest quest when in 1862 he landed French soldiers at Veracruz together with Spanish and English troops.<sup>9</sup> Ostensibly, they made their uninvited visit to force repayment of earlier loans. Foreign bondholders, whose payments were greatly in arrears, had not received the payments Mexico had promised from funds obtained in the Gadsden Purchase<sup>10</sup> or from the nationalization of church lands. In fact, Mexico’s president, Benito Juárez, had declared a moratorium on debt payment.

While this might have been cause for occupying the customs house, it was not grounds for invasion. The debt was largely an excuse. The level of bellicosity was inversely related to the size of each invading nation’s debt. The French held only a tiny portion of the recognized debt. They demanded much more in payment of the notorious and largely fraudulent Jecker bonds. Although this was partly because influential men in Napoleon’s court had invested in them and sought a windfall profit, the more central motive for the claim was officially to legitimize what was in actuality a drive for colonial conquest.<sup>11</sup>

Naturally, the invasion gave French-held bonds a bad reputation in Mexico. But in France, the public applauded the apparent conquest of Mexico. For two decades, France had been undergoing unprecedented economic growth. Its factories were seeking foreign markets and raw materials, and its capitalists were becoming interested in overseas investments.<sup>12</sup> But they continued to be penurious. While they appreciated the prestige of owning this American neo-colony and reveled in its delicious economic prospects, the French did not want to foot the bill for the new relationship.<sup>13</sup> The people of Mexico were to pay for the privilege of a European monarch.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, de Mofras, *Exploration du territoire*; Michel Chevalier, *Lettres sur l’Amérique du Nord* (1836; rpt. edn., Princeton, N.J., 1944); Gabriel Ferry, *Scènes de la vie mexicaine* (Paris, 1855); Nancy Nichols Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico, 1821–1861: A History of Constant Misunderstanding* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979).

<sup>9</sup> James Matthew Thompson, *Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire* (New York, 1955), 212, 214.

<sup>10</sup> The Gadsden Purchase was the U.S. purchase of some 30,000 square miles of Mexican territory west of El Paso in 1854 that today constitutes about one-quarter of Arizona’s territory.

<sup>11</sup> According to Nancy N. Barker, “France Disserved: The Dishonorable Career of Dubois de Saligny,” in Barker and Marvin L. Brown, eds., *Diplomacy in an Age of Nationalism: Essays in Honor of Lynn Marshall Case* (The Hague, 1971), 72, France’s minister to Mexico was told to push the Jecker claim because “the French government has real need of a claim of this importance as the sum of what he has presented would not suffice to justify armed intervention.” On France’s exaggerated claims, also see Gustave Léon Niox, *Le expédition du Mexique 1861–1867: Récit politique et militaire*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1874), 35; Carl H. Bock, *Prelude to Tragedy: The Negotiation and Breakdown of the Tripartite Convention of London, October 31, 1861* (Philadelphia, 1966), appendix; Egon Caesar Corti, *Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico*, Catherine Alison Phillips, trans., 2 vols. (New York, 1928), 1: 132.

<sup>12</sup> François Caron, *An Economic History of Modern France*, Barbara Bray, trans. (New York, 1979), 11, 12, 60.

<sup>13</sup> Lynn Marshall Case, *French Opinion on the United States and Mexico, 1860–1867: Extracts from the Reports of the Procureurs Generaux* (1936; Hamden, Conn., 1969), *passim*.

The mechanism for this payment was the “petits bleus,” bonds issued in 1864 and 1865. These were the first large Mexican bonds ever issued on the Paris stock market and the first substantial Mexican loan in Europe since 1825. Despite Mexico’s apparently disastrous straits, decades of civil war, and unenviable record of failure in servicing its foreign debt, thousands of French investors of modest means enthusiastically subscribed at a 63 percent discount rate, approximately the same as the first bonds independent Mexico issued in London in 1824.<sup>14</sup> *Rentiers*, widows, and orphans were reassured by Napoleon III’s paternalistic involvement. Moreover, Emperor Maximilian had been widely respected as a progressive ruler while governor-general of Lombardy-Venetia; he would revive Mexico.<sup>15</sup>

One should not assume that the investors were all moved by hard-headed rational calculations of future returns. The purchase of a few bonds offered vicarious participation in a historic quest. The bonds conjured up images of the past—Napoleonic glory and prodigious Habsburg colonial New World silver—as much as they symbolized the launching of a new era of French industrial imperialism. Indeed, their lifetime would span the transition from old-style military empire to the modern reign of finance capital.

The issuance of the bonds signaled the emergence of modern financial institutions in France. The French had had the reputation of being among the most conservative investors on the European continent. The *Crédit Mobilier*, which underwrote the loans, had been founded in 1852 to coordinate the funds of France’s many small investors by serving as an investment bank. Several other investment banks such as the *Banque Franco-Egyptienne* were founded in the 1860s as France’s restrictive corporation laws were loosened.<sup>16</sup> The participation of the financially troubled *Crédit Mobilier* itself in the “petits bleus” probably stemmed more from the bank’s political motives than from confidence in the profitability of the loans. At the time, the *Crédit Mobilier* was seeking Napoleon’s permission to float its own bonds to obtain badly needed working capital.<sup>17</sup>

In fact, on their economic merits, the loans were not promising. Very little went to enhance Mexico’s future capacity to service its foreign debt. Virtually all of the proceeds of the “petits bleus” went to finance the French troops garrisoned in Mexico, to guarantee the loans, to cover the cost of floating the bonds, and to pay off past loans. Some 24 million francs’ worth of bonds were also given to British

<sup>14</sup> According to Phillip L. Cottrell, “La Coopération financière Franco-Anglaise, 1850–1880,” in Maurice Lévy-Leboyer, ed., *La position internationale de la France: Aspects économiques et financiers XIX<sup>e</sup>–XX<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Paris, 1977), 183, 184, the petits bleus were issued on London as well as Paris, but only 115 shares were sold in the City compared to 80,072 in Paris. For more on the 1824 loan, see Jaime Rodríguez O., “Los primeros empréstitos mexicanos, 1824–1825,” in *Pasado y presente de la deuda externa de México* (Mexico City, 1988).

<sup>15</sup> The historiography of Maximilian has too often treated him as a fool or an innocent. Robert Duncan, in the PhD dissertation he is currently finishing at the University of California, Irvine, “Building a New World Monarchy,” demonstrates Maximilian’s sagacity and breadth of vision. Bazant, *Historia de la deuda*, 92, 93.

<sup>16</sup> An excellent treatment of the rise of French finance banking in the 1860s and the relationship to imperialism is David S. Landes, *Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958). For a brief overview, see Hubert Bonin, “The Case of the French Banks,” in *International Banking 1870–1914*, Rondo Cameron and V. I. Bovykin, eds. (New York, 1991), 72–89.

<sup>17</sup> Bazant, *Historia de la deuda*, 105; Caron, *Economic History of France*, 41, 42, 53; Rondo Cameron, *France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800–1914* (1961; rpt. edn., New York, 1975), 190–93.

holders of earlier bonds, ostensibly to compensate them for the interest they had not received between 1854 and 1863. (In actuality, Maximilian was mostly concerned with buying British acceptance of his regime.) Of the 534 million francs nominally issued, only 34 million—about 6 percent of the total—were actually paid to Maximilian's government.<sup>18</sup>

In the end, the French bondholders backed the wrong side. As the volley of the firing squad in Queretaro put an end to Maximilian's dreams of glory, it also rendered worthless the little blue Mexican bonds held by thousands of the French. Juárez returned to Mexico's presidency with a bankrupt country. But had he been financially able to service the "petits bleus," he would have refused on political grounds. The French had invaded unprovoked, seized the country for five years, caused the death of tens of thousands of Mexicans, and then charged the bill to the Mexican state. If anyone should make restitution, he reasoned quite rightly, it should be the French state. Mexican officials were adamant that the French take financial responsibility for the costs of the invasion. Napoleon's government did accept responsibility to the extent that it took the unprecedented step of paying off one-third of the value of the bonds, probably from loan proceeds set aside to service it, even though France had never officially guaranteed the bonds. But the French sought repayment from Mexico for the rest.<sup>19</sup>

This standoff lasted for thirteen years as the countries refused to resume international relations. The French were not particularly concerned with forcing Mexican repayment of the "petits bleus," but they did not want to face the much more expensive and politically dangerous humiliation of acknowledging responsibility for war damages caused by French troops in Mexico. The impasse seemed finally resolved in 1880 when each side agreed to quit its own claims, and those of its citizens, against the other; the governments of France and Mexico resumed normal relations.<sup>20</sup>

This should have put the question of the "petits bleus" to rest and consigned the now apparently worthless little bonds to the dustbin of history.<sup>21</sup> Had that been the case, the story would be much simpler and shorter—and less interesting. But the bondholders were not consulted. The neglected, forsaken bonds still circulated, ghosts of their former imperial glory. They made the slightest of background music. A small group of speculators would later purchase these specters at a heavy discount. The new owners were unwilling to accept the accord. They had plans for resurrecting the coupons and would be heard from later.

The new French bond speculators were strengthened in their determination by

<sup>18</sup> Bazant, *Historia de la deuda*, 93–96.

<sup>19</sup> Clipping [Frankfurter Tagenblatt?], October 24, 1904, in Ausländisches Amt 1740, Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam (hereafter, DZP), Germany. According to the *Nouvelliste de la Bourse* of October 18, 1899, in the Archivo de la Embajada Mexicana en Francia (hereafter, AEMF), legajo 31, expediente 4, no. 50, in the Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano (hereafter, AHDM), the French government paid off 5,915,876 francs for 886,236 obligations in 1868, leaving only some 40,000 bonds outstanding. Edwin Borchard and William H. Wynne, *State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders* (1951; rpt. edn., New York, 1983), 30.

<sup>20</sup> Daniel Cosío Villegas, ed., *Historia moderna de Mexico* (Mexico City, 1955–74), 6: 609–84; and *Nouvelliste de la Bourse*, October 18, 1899.

<sup>21</sup> Théophile Delcassé to Directeur des Consuls et des Affaires Commerciales, Paris, January 4, 1901, Correspondance Politique: Mexique, Finance Publique (hereafter, CPMxFP), vol. 25, Archives de la Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (hereafter, MAE), Paris.

the actions of Mexico's London creditors. Even though, by 1884, the Mexican regime of President Porfirio Díaz had been recognized by all major powers and had gone a long way toward consolidating power internally, his government still suffered a serious revenue shortage. He had to suspend subsidies and debt payments and reduce government salaries as much as 50 percent in 1885. These were the sort of actions that had often led to *pronunciamientos* (coups) that toppled governments in the first half of the century. The country was thrown into a terrible crisis.<sup>22</sup> European capital became vital.

Fortunately for Mexico, the late 1880s found the most abundant European capital markets of the nineteenth century. Europeans—on the continent as well as in Great Britain—had become interested in Latin America after sixty years of reluctance. The countries of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Panama received the most interest, but Mexico also experienced a return to favor.<sup>23</sup> The Mexican government turned to London for a loan. However, the British Council of Foreign Bondholders was able to prevent official recognition of the Mexican state and keep Mexican bonds off the London stock market. (It was not surprising that they would take such a firm stand against Mexico: the council's precursor organization had been born as the Council of Mexican Bondholders to collect on Mexican bonds issued in the 1820s.)

Ironically, the solution of this standoff between Mexico and Britain was initiated by a Swiss-French capitalist, Eduard Noetzlin. This was not just a battle between countries. The Swiss head of a French bank in Mexico negotiated the repayment of British loans that had been used to support an Austrian prince, demonstrating the extensive globalism of the period. An officer of the Banque Franco-Egyptienne, the Banco Ottoman, and the Banque de Paris et Pays Bas, which loaned extensively to Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, Noetzlin was also a founder and director of the new Banco Nacional de México and for a time Mexico's financial agent in London.<sup>24</sup> The Banco Nacional, founded by French capital, had loaned the Mexican government under President Manuel Gonzalez (1880–1884) some \$5,761,000. Noetzlin sought for the Mexican government a 30 million dollar loan in London precisely to repay this debt to his own bank and to consolidate Mexico's other foreign debts. No nationalism was involved. The actual agreement was drafted by the Council of Foreign Bondholders in 1886, which received bonds worth from 15 to 50 percent of the outstanding debt for most claims. The Swiss Noetzlin earned a commission of 1 million dollars for representing Mexico (and his own Franco-Mexican bank) in the British transaction. While the agreement did not pay off the "petits bleus," the agreement did include the principal and interest (at 50 percent) on bonds

<sup>22</sup> Carlos Marichal, "El Banco Nacional de México y el manejo de la deuda publica: Análisis preliminar de la crisis financiera de 1884–1885," in Ludlow and Riquer, *Los negocios y las ganancias de la colonia*. Lorenzo Meyer, *Su Majestad Británica contra la Revolución Mexicana, 1900–1950: El fin de un imperio informal* (Mexico City, 1991), 56, notes that in 1888 "the chapter on the British debt closed."

<sup>23</sup> See Carlos Marichal, *A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression, 1820–1930* (Princeton, N.J., 1989); Steven C. Topik, "Brazil's Bourgeois Revolution," *The Americas* 48 (October 1991): 245–71.

<sup>24</sup> Noetzlin was actually Swiss, but his career had been based in France, where he became one of the country's most prominent bankers. Jean Favre, *Le capital française au service de l'étranger: La Banque de Paris et Pays Bas et son oeuvre anti-nationale* (Paris, 1917), 19; *Revue des deux monde* (July 15, 1888): 478.



Maximilian had provided British creditors, arguably recognizing the legitimacy of Maximilian's financial actions.<sup>25</sup>

We have a tendency to think of such loan negotiations as tedious technical transactions that bore the public because of their complicated minutiae. But this was not the case in 1880s Mexico, where passions against European imperialists continued to run high. The agreement was denounced in violent language as students and other nationalists took to the streets. The original agreement proposed by Noetzlin caused a heated outcry in Mexico City for the high commissions it charged to French capitalists. In response, President Gonzalez—like Díaz, a general—unleashed a savage repression that killed scores of students. The general was greatly discredited by the loan. As one contemporary observed: “Warrior presidents are now succeeded by mercantile presidents. The National Palace, which under the viceroys was a court and under later presidents was an encampment now has been converted into the stock market building.”<sup>26</sup>

Gonzalez's successor, Porfirio Díaz (1876–1880, 1884–1911), despite being in principle against contracting new loans and despite popular outrage, agreed to the Council of Foreign Bond Holders' plan two years later. He argued that with it he would “achieve the triumph of a great political ideal: the definitive extinction of pacts of an international character that for many years created many serious difficulties for the Republic.”<sup>27</sup> To pass the agreement, Díaz had to circumvent the Mexican Congress, resist an inflamed press campaign, and arrest student leaders.<sup>28</sup> Apparently, at this point, Díaz considered the friendship of British investors more important to his shaky regime than the support of his erstwhile Mexican nationalist supporters.

Although willing to brave the opposition of Congress and the public in order to accommodate the British Council of Foreign Bondholders, Díaz was not willing to include the “petits bleus” in the accord, even though they also represented a pact with an “international character.” He distinguished between the British and the French debt for a number of reasons. The most obvious was that Mexicans had contracted the British bonds, while an Austrian backed by French troops had initiated the French issues. Issues of realpolitik, however, were probably more important. The British bondholders had the support of their government and could close the generous London market to Mexican bonds. The French government, on

<sup>25</sup> United States, Department of State, *The Foreign Relations of the United States for the Year 1881* (1881), 801; Bazant, *Historia de la deuda*, 123, 125. For more on the founding of the Banco Nacional, see Leonor Ludlow, “La construcción de un banco: El Banco Nacional de México (1881–1884),” in Ludlow and Carlos Marichal, eds., *Banco y poder en México (1800–1925)* (Mexico City, 1986), 299–345. British-Mexican relations were also hurt by a boundary dispute between Yucatan and British Honduras and British sales of arms to rebel *cruzoob* Maya Indians. See Allen Wells and Gilbert M. Joseph, *Summer of Discontent, Seasons of Upheaval: Elite Politics and Rural Insurgency in Yucatan, 1876–1915* (Stanford, Calif., 1996), 46.

<sup>26</sup> Quoted in Donald M. Coerver, “The Mexican Department of Fomento during the Boom Years, 1880–1884,” *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 31 (Autumn 1977): 43. For a fine, detailed analysis of the 1884–1885 conjuncture in Mexico, see Marichal, “El manejo de la deuda pública,” 419–44; and for early banking in Mexico, Leonor Ludlow, “La primera etapa de formación bancaria (1864–1897),” in Ludlow and Riquer, *Los negocios y las ganancias de la colonia*, 330–62.

<sup>27</sup> Mexico, *La hacienda atraves informes presidenciales*, 232, from speech of September 16, 1890.

<sup>28</sup> Porfirio Díaz to General Luis Mier y Teran, Oaxaca, December 9, 1884, P. Díaz to Eduardo Herrera, Mexico City, December 24, 1884, P. Díaz to Octavio Rosado, Mexico City, December 5, 1884, copiador, Archivo Porfirio Díaz, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City; Kenneth Cott, “Porfirian Investment Policies, 1876–1910” (PhD dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1978), 117, 245.

the other hand, had forsworn support of the “petits bleus,” and the Paris stock market was already trading the stocks of the Banco Nacional, which was providing the Díaz government with substantial credits. Within Mexico, the public outcry against repaying the French invaders would have been much greater than the already vociferous complaints against satisfying London bankers.

Díaz had personal reasons to oppose the holders of the little blue bonds. As a hero of the Cinco de Mayo defense of Puebla in 1862, Díaz derived his prestige in no small part from his struggle against Maximilian’s forces as the Commander of the Army of the East. Indeed, combat experience against the French was the cement that held together his regime. Almost four-fifths of late nineteenth-century Mexican federal politicians had fought against the French. Díaz relied on comrades-in-arms in the French campaigns as his most trusted political allies throughout his thirty-year rule.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, he detested speculators, who had done much harm to Mexico’s credit in earlier years. The current owners of the “petits bleus” were seen as speculators.<sup>30</sup> But he would eventually have to compromise.

Díaz continuously found himself torn between the liberal populist nationalism of his military youth and his regime’s middle-aged need for the support of foreign bankers to consolidate order and progress. He found, as had Genghis Khan long before him, that a warrior can conquer from horseback, but he must dismount and compromise with his enemies in order to rule. These contradictory layers of Mexican history, conflated in the meanings of the *maximilianito* bonds, troubled Díaz and hindered a settlement, because the “petits bleus” were a palpable link between the financial speculators of the early republic and the demands of contemporary high finance.

Most financiers were willing to overlook the claims of the speculators. Mexico took advantage of international prosperity in 1888 when it contracted a loan for £10,500,000, mostly to consolidate the internal floating debt and the consolidated 1886 London debt. The loan, taken at 70 to 80 percent discount, demonstrated Mexico’s rising credit and its concern with diversifying dependence. The major part of the issue (62 percent) was subscribed by the German banking house Bleichröder & Co., 20 percent by the British house of Anthony Gibbs and Sons, and 18 percent by the French-dominated Banco Nacional de México. The U.S. secretary of state, James G. Blaine, proposed an American bank for the loan but was turned down.<sup>31</sup> Clearly, international capitalists were not discouraged by the outstanding “petits bleus” at this point. The Council of Foreign Bondholders praised the “wise financial policy of Mexico. Dealing in a spirit of equity with *all just claims* brought under their notice on behalf of Bondholders, the government has materially contributed to raise the public credit of the country.”<sup>32</sup> By implication, the “petits bleus” were not “just claims” in the eyes of London financiers.

<sup>29</sup> Roderic Ai Camp, *Political Recruitment across Two Centuries: Mexico, 1884–1991* (Austin, Tex., 1995), 62, shows that 81 percent of the leaders in Díaz’s government in both the 1876–1880 and the 1904–1910 administrations had fought against the French.

<sup>30</sup> Díaz wrote to Eduardo Herrera, December 24, 1884, copiador, Archivo Porfirio Díaz, that he had received three loan offers from U.S. and European “speculation houses,” but he wouldn’t accept any “that would injure the susceptibility of the country, hurting its dignity and national decorum.”

<sup>31</sup> Cott, “Porfirian Investment Policies, 1876–1910,” 250.

<sup>32</sup> Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, *Annual Report 1888* (London, 1888), 113.

The French were less happy with Mexico's 1888 loan than were the British. The fact that their detested rivals, the Germans, won the concession perturbed the French. The French government had acted forcefully to win the concession for a French bank and thought they were going to succeed until the Bleichröders prevailed at the last moment.

The main reason the French bank did not receive the 1888/89 loan was, apparently, the alliance of the British house of Gibbs and the French-dominated Banco Nacional de México with Bleichröder. That Frenchmen in Mexico undercut the bid of a French bank infuriated the French ministry of foreign affairs. This action was not an isolated one, however. French consuls consistently complained about the immigrants from the town of Barcelonette to Mexico. They were perceived as narrowly self-interested and unpatriotic to France. The immigrant merchants seemed to have allegiance only to other people from the village of Barcelonette; otherwise, the businessmen were Mexican, for it was in Mexico that they made their fortune. In the various enterprises in which they owned substantial shares, such as the Banco Nacional and the Banco de Londres, the Barcelonettes were satisfied to be silent partners, allowing Spanish or German immigrants to run the companies. The Barcelonettes were mainly interested in making a profit and maintaining good relations with the Mexican government. They rarely communicated with the French government or sought much assistance there.<sup>33</sup> As Joseph Signoret, one of the richest French immigrants observed: "All we heads of great merchant houses cannot make our business prosper without the aid of the Mexican government. Here, where caprice supersedes all regulations, it would be impossible to fight against a hostile administration. How can we formulate free opinions on issues that interest the government when the least criticism exposes us to ruinous vexations?"<sup>34</sup>

Some of the "petits bleus" holders began to lose faith in the support of the French government and, like the Barcelonettes, seek other allies—but in the United States rather than in Mexico. In 1887, a group of blue bondholders came together to form a pressure group. They turned to Congressman William Vandever of Los Angeles, who was engaged in speculations of his own. He called for the U.S. Congress to buy Baja California. Apparently, Vandever was working with Los Angeles and San Diego politicians who wanted to separate from Northern California and create a new state while extending their influence southward. This scheme interested "petits bleus" bondholders who had become landowners in Baja California by trading blue bonds for arid land belonging to the *Compañía de Colonización de Baja California*. One of the bondholders, a Mr. Goldschmitt, supposedly owned some 600,000 hectares of dusty Baja California land. Efforts to convert paper into soil, that is, the imperial bonds into land, seem to have continued for at least a decade.<sup>35</sup> But Baja California remained Mexican and the bondholders

<sup>33</sup> Ministère de Finance to Gabriel Hanotaux, Paris, August 7, 1896, Benoit to Hanotaux, Mexico, June 13, 1897, CPMxFP, vol. 1; Delcassé to Camille Blondel, Paris, May 12, 1905, A. Dumaine to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Mexico, March 8, 1908, CPMxFP, vol. 26, MAE.

<sup>34</sup> Dumaine to S. Pinchon, Mexico City, July 28, 1908, CPMxFP, vol. 26, MAE.

<sup>35</sup> Matias Romero to Ignacio Mariscal, Washington, January 17 and February 3, 1890, in *Archivo de la Embajada de México en los Estados Unidos de América* (hereafter, AEMEUA), legajo 392, no. 63, and legajo 393, no. 159; R. Fernandez to Mariscal, January 23, 1888, legajo 18, expediente 1, B. 15; Baz

unpaid. They would have to wait almost two decades for other U.S. capitalists to come to their rescue.

In 1895, Delfin Sanchez, a representative of the Mexican government, offered to pay off the “petits bleus” in return for official permission for a loan from Paris. He was seeking funding to rebuild the Tehuantepec Railroad, which the American Collis P. Huntington was trying to operate. The Mexican government was in a hurry to open effective rail service from the Atlantic to the Pacific in order to discourage the Nicaraguan canal that a U.S. company was building at the time. The turn to Paris at a moment North Americans had shown considerable interest in the Tehuantepec demonstrated Mexican wariness of U.S. ownership of that strategic line, which became manifest later when Americans were forbidden to bid for it. Instead, Mexico awarded it to the Englishman Weetman Pearson. For Mexicans, France became an anti-American alternative. Ironically, the French, who had been so interested in building a Panama canal and purchasing the Panama railroad, refused to fund this isthmian railroad in Mexico. The French minister of finance refused apparently because of dissatisfaction with the terms of the loan, not because of the blue bonds. The enormous scandal over the French Panama Canal company in 1891, which saw Ferdinand de Lesseppe and Alexandre Gustave Eiffel jailed for corruption, must also have hurt the Mexican proposal to raise money for an isthmian route.<sup>36</sup> But the “petits bleus” were not a significant barrier to French investment in Mexico at this point.

However, in 1898, after two decades of ignoring the speculators, for some reason the French government’s attitude toward the holders of the “petits bleus” changed. Paris came to support their claims. This is startling because strictly economic reasoning should have convinced France’s minister of finance to continue to ignore the bondholders’ pleas. After all, the French finance minister applauded Mexico’s financial improvement as the federal government began registering budget surpluses. Most capitalists had regained confidence in Mexico. Mexican bonds were now issued on Berlin, Frankfurt, and Amsterdam markets as well as New York at lower discounts (sometimes over standard value, or par), lower interest rates, and less collateral than ever before.

At the same time, French capitalists increased their economic ties with Mexico. In 1896, French investors took a large position in the Banco de Londres, Mexico’s second largest bank. Millions of francs of Mexican internal debt bonds payable in silver were unofficially placed on the Paris exchange. The Société Financière pour l’Industrie au Mexique consolidated many of Mexico’s largest factories.<sup>37</sup>

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to Mariscal, August 11, 1900, legajo 32, duplicado 107 pares AHDM. J. Petiteville to Hanotaux, Mexico, April 10, 1895, CPMxFP, vol. 1, and Ministre de Finance to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, February 6, 1899, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE; Cosío Villegas, *Historia moderna*, 6: 696.

<sup>36</sup> Boulard Pouqueville to Hanotaux, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Mexico, April 10, 1895, CPMxFP, vol. 1; Ministre de Finance to Delcassé, Paris, February 6, 1899, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE. C. P. Huntington to R. B. Gorsuch, Mexico City, June 6, 1893, in Collis P. Huntington Archive, San Marino, California, series 2, reel 34. On the scandal, see Jean Bouvier, *Les deux scandales de Panama* (Paris, 1964).

<sup>37</sup> Benoit to Hanotaux, Mexico, August 5, 1896, and June 13, 1897, CPMxFP, vol. 1; Ministre de Finance to Hanotaux, Paris, February 6, 1899, June 10, 1899; French Ambassador to Germany to Directeur des Consuls et des Affaires Commerciales, Berlin, March 1, 1899, CPMxFP, vol. 2; Pouqueville to Hanotaux, Mexico, October 8, 1900, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE.

Under these promising conditions for rapprochement with France, Mexico's minister of finance, José Yves Limantour, a Francophile of French parentage, traveled to France in 1899. Although he claimed to be going to the continent for health reasons (in order to avoid the political fallout of a compromise with the French), in reality his objective was to gain official acceptance of a Mexican loan issue there. He was eager to diversify Mexico's European dependence, rejecting attractive North American overtures to take the loan at the same time.<sup>38</sup> Memories of the Texas War and the Mexican-American War, which had cost the country over half its national territory, were still strong. Limantour tried to play on anti-American resentment to combat Mexican memories of Napoleonic imperialism. Probably to secure the loan, he had sent his brother—and partner in the banking house of Scherer and Limantour—before him as an attaché to the Mexican legation in Paris.<sup>39</sup> The Mexican finance minister dangled enticing concessions before French officials. Limantour suggested that he would be favorable to a French mortgage bank in Mexico and to the awarding of concessions to French industrialists if a loan were officially endorsed.<sup>40</sup> Eduard Noetzlin, director of France's largest development bank, the Banque de Paris, and numerous companies in Mexico, was eager to underwrite a Mexican loan in order to open Paris to Mexican investments as he had earlier opened London. Now the French government, which professed itself anxious for French citizens to invest in Mexico, could not claim any economic reason to oppose a Mexican issue. All other major powers accepted Mexican bonds, and French investors had been eagerly purchasing them on the unofficial market.<sup>41</sup> Nonetheless, Limantour was denied official sanction for the loan. Why? For a long time, I found this a mystery.

The rejection was as much a surprise as a disappointment to Limantour. He was

<sup>38</sup> Limantour told the French ambassador to Mexico: "I have always resisted the attempts of the United States government which wants to convince us to modify our financial system relative to banks so that it resembles the American model. I have tried, on the contrary, to distance our practices as far as possible from those adopted by our neighbors in order to make the establishment of American banks in Mexico more difficult. Unfortunately, the wealth of our soil tempts the capitalists of the United States and they will not refrain from any sacrifice to conquer it." Blondel to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Mexico City, August 5, 1909, CPMxFP, vol. 25, MAE.

<sup>39</sup> Baz to Mariscal, Paris, October 3, 1899, and Mariscal to Baz, Mexico City, June 28, 1899, AEMF, legajo 31, exp. 4, no. 42, and legajo 31, exp. 4, no. 169. This was a true wedding of finance and diplomacy, as the wife of Julio Limantour was Elena Mariscal, daughter of Ignacio Mariscal, Minister of Foreign Relations.

<sup>40</sup> This seems to have been a common practice. It was probably not a coincidence that the Banco Nacional, a French-owned bank, received its concession right after France recognized Mexico. There is reason to believe that part of the settlement of the British debt was a concession to the Banco de Londres y México. See Leonor Ludlow, "La formación de las bancas provinciales en el Porfiriato y la fundación del Banco Central Mexicano," in Ludlow and Riquer, *Los negocios y las ganancias de la colonia*. When Bleichröder and Deutsche Bank issued the 1898 loan, they received the concession to the Banco Central, and James Speyer received a concession for the Banco de Comercio y Industria after issuing the large 1904 loan.

<sup>41</sup> Pouqueville to Hanotaux, Mexico City, August 5, 1896, and October 4, 1896, CPMxFP, vol. 1, MAE; Pouqueville to Delcassé, Mexico City, January 3, 1899, February 28, 1899; French Consul, Frankfurt, to Delcassé, Frankfurt, February 19, 1899; French Ambassador to Germany to Delcassé, Berlin, July 5, 1899; Benoit, Chargé d'Affaires, to Delcassé, Mexico, April 2, 1899, and July 25, 1899; French Ambassador to Germany to Directeur des Consuls et des Affaires Commerciales, Berlin, March 1, 1899, CPMxFP, vol. 1. José Yves Limantour, *Apuntes sobre mi vida política* (Mexico City, 1965), 122. Baz to Mariscal, Paris, May 19, 1899, AEMF, legajo 21, exp. 4, B. 152, and May 31, 1899, leg. 21, exp. 4, B. 157, AHDm.



stunned because France's minister of finance had already rejected the claims of the French holders of the blue bonds. He wrote to the minister of foreign affairs, Théophile Delcassé, in February 1899, that Mexico's internal bonds were indeed circulating freely on the Paris market. This did not bother him because, he said, "The Civil Society for the Safeguarding of the Rights of the Obligations of the Bonds Contracted in France during the Years 1864–65" (*Société Civil*), which held two-thirds of the outstanding "petits bleus," was composed of Jewish speculators. Reflecting the virulent anti-Semitism that gained so much notoriety during the Dreyfus Affair, which mesmerized French attention between 1894 and 1906, and which was at its height in 1898 and 1899, the minister concluded that the Jews' claims could be ignored.<sup>42</sup> He saw no economic reason to oppose an official sanction for a new loan.

At the same time, the minister of foreign affairs, Delcassé, had shown Limantour "extreme cordiality" and "manifested his admiration for the administrative management of the president of Mexico and his government."<sup>43</sup> The recently inaugurated French president, Emile Loubet, was even more receptive. In a thirty-minute conversation with Limantour, he said as a native of an area near Barcelonnette and a friend of a French immigrant in Mexico, he "had followed with special care the [level] of development our country had reached and judged General Díaz to be an eminent statesman." Loubet concluded that French capital was now becoming interested in foreign bonds and would be available to convert the Mexican debt. Limantour left the interview "with gratitude and satisfaction."<sup>44</sup> French exporters who traded with Mexico threw a grand banquet in Limantour's honor. It appeared that the Paris Exchange was now open to Mexico.

But not so. Delcassé came to disagree with his fellow minister and insist that the blue bonds be paid before Mexican loans could be officially quoted on the Parisian stock market.<sup>45</sup> What had turned Delcassé against Limantour was a vast and expensive press campaign (supposedly at a cost of more than 500,000 francs), mounted by the *Société Civil* against the Mexican government and its loan. The little bonds, which had been born with great fanfare only to be later neglected, were once again the subjects of spectacle. But now, rather than being attended by an elegant monarch and glittering guards, the bonds were serenaded by a loud bourgeois publicity organ.<sup>46</sup> Major news services such as the Agence Havas and major newspapers such as *La matin* commonly sold their services to promote bonds. French deputies also served as spokesmen for the blue bondholders.<sup>47</sup> The foreign

<sup>42</sup> Ministre de Finance to Delcassé, Paris, February 10, 1899, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE.

<sup>43</sup> Baz to Mariscal, Paris, May 19, 1899, AEMF, legajo 31, exp. 4, no. 152, AHDM.

<sup>44</sup> Baz to Mariscal, Paris, May 1899, AEMF, legajo 31, exp. 4, no. 157, AHDM.

<sup>45</sup> When the 1899 loan was announced with Bleichröder, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Bank, and the Banco Nacional as its underwriters, France's minister of finance was surprised. He asked the minister of foreign affairs if he had attempted to put Limantour in contact with his finance ministry. Ministre de Finance to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, June 10, 1899, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE.

<sup>46</sup> For more on the politics of spectacle, see Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, Donald Nicholson-Smith, trans. (New York, 1994); and Jean Duvignaud, *Spectacle et société* (Paris, 1970).

<sup>47</sup> Michael B. Palmer, *Des petits journaux aux grandes agences: Naissance du journalisme moderne, 1863–1914* (Paris, 1983), 186, 187; AHDM, France, legajo 32, exp. 2, 103, Paris, March 2, 1900, notes that Deputy Stanislas Ferrand was a representative of the "petits bleus" holders. Marjorie H. Beale, *The Modernist Enterprise: French Elites and the Threat of Modernity, 1900–1940* (Stanford, Calif., 1999), notes: "the centralized monopolistic structure of the news and advertising business in France made

affairs minister became afraid of domestic political fallout discrediting the government.

The timing and the method of the Société Civil is revealing. The French government in 1898 and 1899 was particularly susceptible to the influence of the bondholders because the country was rocked by the Dreyfus Affair and appeared on the verge of civil war. The debate over anti-Semitism and the integrity of the armed forces brought the government, which only held a small parliamentary majority, to the point of collapse. There was fear of a military coup on the right (an abortive one did take place) and massive street demonstrations on the left. In the middle of this tumult, just as negotiations for the Mexican loan reached their most critical point, France's president died and was replaced by Loubet, a man with relatively weak support.<sup>48</sup>

Loubet, as well as many other protagonists in the affair, was a politician who had been discredited by the Panama Canal scandal of 1891, in which over a hundred deputies and other government officials and journalists were found to be in the pay of the company. Loubet was known as the "Panama Premier." He was clearly vulnerable to another stock market scandal. His government was opposed by Bonapartists, who, presumably, would favor recognizing Maximilian's bonds.<sup>49</sup> Both the Panama scandal and the Dreyfus Affair aroused heated anti-Semitism, as they supposedly involved Jewish financiers and traitors. Indeed, historian Albert Lindemann maintains that "the years 1898–1900 may be considered the high point of prewar anti-Semitism in France."<sup>50</sup> Anti-Semitism was turned to severe nationalist purposes by the Bonapartists, Boulangists, and royalists who attempted to assassinate France's president.<sup>51</sup>

The Loubet government therefore found itself in a very complicated and delicate position. To curry favor with Bonapartists, it could insist on repayment for the "petits bleus." Nationalists might be pleased that his government favored French bondholders over Mexican creditors. On the other hand, the Jewish speculators who were blocking Mexican access to the Parisian stock market could appear to represent a reincarnation of the Panama scandal and thereby inflame anti-Semitic passions against Loubet's government. Thus the little blue bonds might be transformed from monuments of glorious imperial ambition to tools of base speculation, which, rather than found an empire in Mexico, might overthrow a

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it remarkably vulnerable to infiltration by foreign or domestic agents who sought to destabilize public opinion or manipulate the market."

<sup>48</sup> Ministre de Finance to Delcassé, Paris, February 6, 1899, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE; Baz to Mariscal, Paris, March 2, 1900, legajo 32, exp. 2, Copia 103, and October 17, 1899, legajo 31, exp. 4, AHDM; Jacques Chastenet, *Histoire de la Troisième République*, Vol. 3: *La république triomphante, 1893–1906* (Paris, 1955), 162, 163, 173; Eugen Weber, *France fin de siècle* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 113, 114, 118, 122, 123; Auguste Soulier, *L'instabilité ministérielle sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1939), 76 and appendix; Palmer, *Des petits journaux*, 130, 186, 187; Gordon Wright, *France in Modern Times: From the Enlightenment to the Present* (New York, 1995), 258.

<sup>49</sup> Chastenet, *La république triomphante*, 162, 163. Baz reported to Mariscal, Paris, June 9, 1899, AEMF, legajo 31, exp. 161, no. 161, AHDM, that there had been an assassination attempt against Loubet and then a large demonstration against the president.

<sup>50</sup> Albert S. Lindemann, *The Jew Accused: Three Anti-Semitic Affairs (Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank), 1894–1915* (New York, 1991), 116.

<sup>51</sup> Nancy Fitch, "Mass Culture, Mass Parliamentary Politics, and Modern Anti-Semitism: The Dreyfus Affair in Rural France," *AHR* 97 (February 1992): 84.

government in France. Certainly, politics of racist and nationalist symbols seemed to have far outweighed calculations of economic gain in official decision-making. The “petits bleus” were being viewed through the lens of traditional shibboleths rather than the emerging economic formulas of the self-regulating market.<sup>52</sup>

Delcassé's decision to support the bondholders is a striking commentary on the nature and limits of French imperialism. Despite rapidly growing French investments in Mexico—indeed, virtual French control of its commerce and banking and an expanding position in industry—as well as the support of some of Paris's most important financiers, the internal political conjuncture could throw the government's support to a small relatively unimportant group of speculators over a few million francs of indemnity. It is perhaps even more surprising that the government, weathering a storm of anti-Semitism, nationalism, and hatred of speculators, sided with a small group apparently composed of Jewish speculators.

I suspect that the key to understanding the responses of the foreign ministers Gabriel Hanotaux (1894–1898) and Delcassé to Limantour's overtures is to be found overseas—but not in Mexico. Hanotaux and Delcassé were reviving foundering French colonialism in Africa, Indochina, and the South Pacific. This was a “period of unprecedented colonial advancement.”<sup>53</sup> The two foreign ministers were able to gain the backing of a large colonial bloc of republicans in the Chamber of Deputies. Preoccupied with revenge against Germany's crushing victory over France in 1870, the “new imperialists” sought to regain France's prestige and glory by carving out colonies in Africa and Asia. Although white supremacists in their treatment of Africans, the colonial bloc was not anti-Semitic. Favored by the backing of the Rothschilds, the colonialists sided with Dreyfus.<sup>54</sup> The religion of the blue bondholders would not bother them. The cause of the speculators, on the other hand, struck close to home. Refusing to support holders of Maximilian's bonds—even though, on economic and diplomatic grounds, their claims were specious—would undermine the government's image as a vigorous colonial power and damage the ongoing colonial project. Other prospective investors in French colonial adventures would come to doubt government protection.

This was particularly important in 1898 and 1899 because an incident in the Sudan during those years brought France's Africa policy much into question. Hoping to create a band of French colonies that would span Africa from Senegal to the Red Sea and still smarting from France's loss of the Suez Canal to the British, Delcassé authorized an expedition to establish a French presence in the upper Nile at the town of Fachoda. The British responded with troops under General H. H. Kitchener. At the end of 1898 and beginning of 1899, France and Britain were

<sup>52</sup> Jean Bouvier, René Girault, and Jacques Thobie, *L'impérialisme à la française* (Paris, 1986), 276: “Because French governments maintained a policy of colonial conquest after the defeat of 1870, they were sensitive to political morale, religious considerations and accessories to the machinations of speculators.”

<sup>53</sup> Alf Andrew Heggoy, *The African Policies of Gabriel Hanotaux, 1894–1898* (Athens, Ga., 1972), 3. Also see Christopher Andrew, *Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy, 1898–1905* (New York, 1968); and Charles W. Porter, *The Career of Théophile Delcassé* (1936; rpt. edn., Westport, Conn., 1975).

<sup>54</sup> James J. Cooke, *New French Imperialism, 1880–1910: The Third Republic and Colonial Expansion* (Hamden, Conn., 1973), 10, 11, 19, 44, 52, 68, 158; Gabriel Hanotaux, *Mon temps*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1933), 2: 28–32.

preparing to go to war with each other. Ultimately, the French withdrawal from Fachoda was negotiated peacefully. Paris acknowledged British control over Egypt and the Sudan in return for British acquiescence to French domination in Morocco. The settlement was, of course, something of an embarrassment to the French, as they had to rein in their dreams of colonial expansion in East Africa. In this context, it was no time to surrender the interests of supporters of an earlier French expansionist effort in Mexico.<sup>55</sup> The “petits bleus” were very much linked to French African colonial policy, as was fitting. After all, French expansion into Egypt in the 1860s had been an outgrowth of Napoleon III’s imperial vision just like the Mexican adventure was. But now the future of new French investors in Mexico was to be sacrificed to defend past indiscretions there and the future of French capitalists in Africa.

The French minister of finance, then, was forfeiting the potential profits of French capitalists in Mexico in favor of the Société Civil speculators and the more nebulous and far-off returns of African and Asian colonies. Put another way, Delcassé was surrendering the interests of neo-colonialism in favor of direct colonialism.

This case challenges both J. A. Hobson’s and V. I. Lenin’s analyses of high imperialism, which placed great emphasis on the need to place excess capital abroad. Yet here, at least, high finance was ignored. In fact, for the French government, visceral chauvinistic impulses and old-fashioned territorial aggrandizement seem to have been more important in the short run than rational financial calculations.

U.S. government officials responded quite differently from the French to an attempt by “petits bleus” bondholders to flex their muscle in New York. The United States also was entering into an age of imperialist expansion. For the first time, its banks began to look to Latin American financial markets. When Limantour failed to place Mexico’s 1898/1899 loan on the Paris market, he turned to a consortium of British, German, and U.S. banks. The loan marked a new era. As the *Daily Mail* of London observed: “The strangest fact of all is the appearance for the first time of an American banking house on a foreign loan prospectus. New York is flapping its wings over the new departure of Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co.”<sup>56</sup>

Concerned about Mexico’s new access to New York capital, which threatened to reduce the importance of access to the Paris market and the likelihood that their bonds would be repaid, “petits bleus” strategists targeted New York. A man named Hazzard, claiming to hold 3 million pesos of bonds from Maximilian’s 1864 loan, convinced New York State’s Supreme Court to block J. P. Morgan’s participation in Mexico’s 1898/1899 loans. Morgan at first claimed to be unaffected because he was not involved in the loan. In fact, his banking house and its London branch were responsible for about one-quarter of the issue. So the Mexican government intervened. Limantour prevailed on the U.S. attorney general to recommend that

<sup>55</sup> Muriel Evelyn Chamberlain, *The Scramble for Africa* (Thetford, Norfolk, 1974), 81–85; Jean Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 1900–1945*, Till Gottheiner, trans. (New York, 1971), 118; Gabriel Hanotaux, *Fachoda* (Paris, 1909), 80, 97–99, 103–04.

<sup>56</sup> Quoted in Vincent Carosso and Richard Sylla, “U.S. Banks in International Finance,” in Cameron and Bovykin, *International Banking, 1870–1914*, 60.

the New York court annul its order on the grounds that Hazzard's bonds were worthless. The New York judges concurred.<sup>57</sup>

The different responses of the French and U.S. governments to bondholders is striking. Although both governments were intimately involved in expansionist enterprises and both coveted the Mexico market, only the United States moved to satisfy the Mexicans. One could conclude that the U.S. government came to Limantour's aid either because it was more interested in Mexican favor and business than the French or that the French government's political position was weaker and its imperial designs more vulnerable to the influence of irate blue bondholders. The latter was probably the case.

But why did Mexico not take bolder steps to defend itself against the bondholders' publicity campaign in France or simply pay them off? Limantour, too, could have hired press agents to defend Mexico's claim as he often did in Mexico and the United States. French publicists certainly were offering their services.<sup>58</sup> Instead, he intransigently opposed paying off the bonds, even though he might have been able to float them at 4 1/2 percent in Paris rather than the 5 percent he eventually settled on in Germany, which would have more than compensated for the cost of the buyout.<sup>59</sup>

Limantour had means at his disposal to open the Paris market. The 1898/1899 loans issued by German, British, and Mexican bankers demonstrated the political advantages that Limantour would have offered French lenders had the French government settled the "petits bleus." The same banks that underwrote the international loans were granted the concession to create the powerful and profitable Banco Central, a private rediscount bank.<sup>60</sup> Limantour wanted to make the lesson even more overt. Still seeking official French acceptance in 1901, he offered in return to purchase military hardware from France for the sum of 15 million francs, and to extend a reciprocal trade treaty, a concession for a dynamite company, and other concessions.<sup>61</sup> He even reneged on his principle and offered to pay off the "petits bleus," though for very little.

The offer of arms purchases is particularly revealing since the minister of war at the time, Bernardo Reyes, preferred German weapons. Limantour, involved in a nasty public fight for prestige with General Reyes, was attempting to flex his political muscle by showing up the war minister. In Europe, the French cannon manufacturer Schneider was locked in a fierce battle with the German Krupp.

<sup>57</sup> Benoit to Delcassé, Mexico, July 26, 1899, November 20, 1899, Benoit to Directeur des Consultats et des Affaires Commerciales, Mexico, March 5, 1900; French Consul to New York to Delcassé, New York, April 20, 1900, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE.

<sup>58</sup> Baz reported to Mariscal, Paris, August 22, 1900, AEMF, legajo 32, no. 22, AHDM, that the director of the Agence Journier had offered his services, but Baz had turned him down: "I did not have the funds to spend on publicity. My opinion is that this expenditure is useless in the sections of [International] Relations and would perhaps be more appropriate for Finance [secretariat]."

<sup>59</sup> Ministre de Finance to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, February 6, 1899, and June 10, 1899; Société Civil pour le Sauve-Garde des Droits . . . to the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, January 26, 1898; Delcassé to Ministre de Finance, Paris, April 27, 1901, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE; Freiherr von Wangenheim to von Bülow, Mexico, December 14, 1906, Ausländisches Amt 1741, DZP. On Mexico's publicity campaigns, see Limantour, *Apuntes*, 102; *La novelliste de la Bourse*, October 17, 1899, AEMF, Paris, October 18, 1899, legajo 31, exp. 4, no. 50, AHDM.

<sup>60</sup> Pouqueville to Delcassé, Mexico, February 28, 1899, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE.

<sup>61</sup> Blondel to Delcassé, Mexico, August 31, 1901, and January 27, 1902, CPMxFP, vol. 25, MAE.



Indeed, Jean Bouvier asserts that this competition “gave to their rivalry a singular weight in increasing the tensions” between the French and the Germans.<sup>62</sup> Limantour’s offer should have been very attractive.<sup>63</sup>

However, Limantour could not come to an agreement with the blue bondholders on a price to buy them out. They demanded £921,750 (about 22 million francs), while Limantour offered 1.6 million francs. Between November of 1901 and March of 1902, the Société Civil lowered its demands, first to 12 million francs, then 8, then 6 million francs.<sup>64</sup> Limantour would not budge.

He probably felt reinforced by the support of France’s minister of finance and the director of consulates and commercial affairs. J. Caillowy, the finance minister, supported official recognition of Mexican bonds because, he said, there was no good economic reason not to. M. Bompard, director of consulates and commercial affairs, concurred.<sup>65</sup>

But this did not convince France’s foreign minister, who responded that the blue bondholders could still create problems for the government; they should be placated first. Despite the fact that major French bankers, weapons producers, and other capitalists supported the official recognition of Mexican bonds—indeed, many were trading in them on the Paris market anyway—and that substantial concessions and trade were attached to the gesture, the French government again sided with the speculators.<sup>66</sup> France’s minister to Mexico, Camille Blondel, was crestfallen. He lamented that the holders of Maximilian’s bonds were an obstacle to “our financial rapprochement with Mexico, which would have been very advantageous for our capitalists, our industrialists and important commercial houses installed in Mexico.”<sup>67</sup>

Limantour would not raise his offer, even though only 4 million francs now separated his proposal and the bondholders’ price. He purchased the war material in the United States instead. This demonstrates the limits of Limantour’s alleged francophilia.<sup>68</sup>

Limantour’s intransigence seems curious. Clearly, official recognition on the Paris market was important to him to offset German, British, and U.S. interests in Mexico. Otherwise, he would not have made so many attempts and offers to settle the controversy. France’s minister Blondel offered an insightful explanation for Limantour’s conduct. He averred that Limantour sought to succeed Mexico’s aged

<sup>62</sup> Bouvier, Gerault, and Thobie, *L’impérialisme à la française*, 277.

<sup>63</sup> Katz, *Secret War*, 60, argues that German arms manufacturers could not win a dominant position in Mexico because of the close links of some *científicos* with French financiers. This study brings into question the influence of French financiers in Mexico.

<sup>64</sup> Blondel to Delcassé, Mexico, January 27, 1902; J. Caillowy, Ministre de Finance, to Delcassé, Paris, March 12, 1902, CPMxFP, vol. 25, MAE.

<sup>65</sup> Caillowy to Delcassé, Paris, March 12, 1902, and M. Bompard to M. Benc, Directeur de Mouvement Général des Fonds, Ministre de Finance, Paris, October 10, 1901, CPMxFP, vol. 25, MAE.

<sup>66</sup> Caillowy to Delcassé, Paris, April 24, 1901, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE.

<sup>67</sup> Blondel, Mexico, March 9, 1901, CPMxFP, vol. 2, MAE.

<sup>68</sup> Katz, *Secret War*, 60, 61, argued that “the most important cause, however, for the inability of the German arms manufacturers to gain a dominant position in Mexico was the close links between some of the *científicos* and the French financiers.” The German foreign minister believed that Limantour preferred French manufacturers.

President Díaz. Limantour himself asserted in 1898 that Díaz confessed that he did not want to run in the 1900 presidential race, preferring Limantour for the office.<sup>69</sup>

Internationally, Limantour was highly respected, but the finance minister's foreign standing was a double-edged sword at home. He enjoyed very great respect abroad because of his fiscal probity. This, however, came at the price of sacrificing short-run domestic interests in Mexico through very conservative monetary and spending policies. Foreign credit was more important to Limantour than domestic demands for social spending and building projects. Many of Mexico's wealthy citizens supported his policy because foreign loans obviated the need to raise domestic taxes. But many nationalists and members of the popular classes, whose support was necessary for a president—if not for a finance minister—resented his policies. Limantour had to begin concerning himself with a larger constituency.

Foreign credit was particularly important at the dawn of the twentieth century because Mexico was in crisis at the time due to the collapse of the price of silver, historically Mexico's principal export. As a result, the peso lost half its value, and foreign debt payments ballooned. The minister of finance needed to act. He could not raise internal taxes because "the influence of large landlords [was] still preponderant," and they would not brook higher taxes.<sup>70</sup> At the same time, New York and Berlin investors (London was of relatively little importance to Mexico) opposed efforts to reduce Mexico's outstanding debt. That left the possibility of the Paris stock market.

But Limantour's presidential ambitions prevented him from submitting to the demands of the "petits bleus" owners. Ironically, the stern, strait-laced minister, who had gained an international reputation for making the hard, rational, unemotional economic decisions demanded by the market, found himself at the mercy of politics of symbolism. The blue bonds raised their voices as more than just tokens of money; they bore the legacy of a historical crime. While a minister of finance need not concern himself much with the bonds' wild youth, a presidential candidate did have to worry about domestic public responses to the bonds' antecedents. In this case, Limantour was particularly vulnerable. As he himself admitted, he was frequently attacked by his enemies for being a Frenchman because of his parentage and his friendship with Europeans. Limantour's principal political rival, General Reyes, launched a campaign while Limantour was in Paris to deny the finance minister's eligibility for the presidency because of his father's French nationality.<sup>71</sup> Limantour continued to seek Mexico's supreme office when Díaz's health and grip on office remained in question. A sizable payment to the "petits bleus" owners, though easily affordable and probably advisable on the grounds of realpolitik, was political suicide.<sup>72</sup> It could cost him a chance at the presidency.

Nonetheless, Mexico's desperate need for a loan in 1904 seemed to doom the minister of finance to taking the fateful step of settling the *maximilianitos*.

<sup>69</sup> Blondel to Directeur des Consuls et des Affaires Commerciales, Mexico, December 2, 1902, CPMxFP, vol. 25, MAE; Limantour, *Apuntes*, 106.

<sup>70</sup> Blondel to Directeur des Consuls et des Affaires Commerciales, Mexico, December 2, 1902, CPMxFP, vol. 25, MAE.

<sup>71</sup> Wells and Joseph, *Summer of Discontent*, 59–60.

<sup>72</sup> Blondel to Directeur des Consuls et des Affaires Commerciales, Mexico, December 2, 1902, CPMxFP, vol. 25, MAE; Limantour, *Apuntes*, 109, 112, 124, 132, 135.

Limantour again entered into negotiations with the Banque de Paris et Pays Bas, this time in conjunction with Bleichröder, for a loan of 40 million dollars. The French bankers thought they had no competition and therefore expected Mexico to pay off the “petits bleus.” Germany’s minister to Mexico, Freiherr von Wangenheim, assured his foreign minister that Limantour would not borrow from the U.S. competitor—Speyer and Co.—“because the Mexican dislike of strengthening their ties to the United States seems to be growing.”<sup>73</sup> The Banque de Paris’s director, Eduard Noetzelin, assuming that he could again profit handsomely from a Mexican loan, was intransigent on the loan’s conditions. Only 1 million francs separated his conditions from Limantour’s offer. But that was enough to quash the deal.

Limantour finally found a way to end the pesky life of the blue bonds in 1904 without appearing to give in to the speculators. But instead of just diversifying Mexico’s dependence by opening up Paris’s capital market, he also pushed Mexico into unwanted closer relations with the United States. Resenting Noetzelin’s “exaggerated pretensions,” the finance minister turned to New York instead.<sup>74</sup> For the first time, a U.S. banking house, Speyer and Co., issued a Mexican loan. Speyer succeeded in good part because of the extraordinary conditions it offered: 40 million dollars at 4 percent interest, 89 percent of the nominal amount, repayable in fifty years without prepayment penalty, and with no specific guarantees except the good credit of Mexico. (Previous foreign loans had attached specific revenues such as import duties.) Blondel found Speyer’s offer extraordinarily generous—and suspicious. He reported to Delcassé: “There is no doubt that the American offers were some sort of ‘war offer,’ that is, offers calculated to prevent all European financial activity in Mexico. The conditions are such . . . that the negotiation of the loan can barely cover its costs and only the hope of becoming master of the Mexican market could have caused them to offer them [these conditions].”<sup>75</sup> Blondel believed that the U.S. government was behind Speyer’s loan. It was part of an American “policy of commercial and industrial invasion in order to arrive . . . at a more effective role [*ingerence*] in the destiny of that country.”<sup>76</sup> Mexico was falling into the orbit of the United States. If Díaz died, he thought, “one can predict that the United States will seize upon the occasion to impose an intervention on Mexico.”<sup>77</sup> Blondel continued that he would not be surprised if the U.S. government had compensated Speyer for the loan’s generous terms.

It seems unlikely, for a number of reasons, that Speyer was in league with the American government, however. James Speyer himself had explained to the German minister Wangenheim that he offered such advantageous conditions because of the competition of the Banque de Paris.<sup>78</sup> Instead of serving U.S. foreign policy, the banking house was pursuing a broad strategy to gain private control over a large share of Mexico’s finances. It was a private business decision, not an

<sup>73</sup> Wangenheim to von Bülow, Mexico, September 27, 1904, and Sternberg to von Bülow, Mexico, October 20, 1904, Reichsamt des Innern 4383, DZP.

<sup>74</sup> Blondel to Delcassé, October 18, 1904, CPMxFP, vol. 25, MAE.

<sup>75</sup> Blondel to Delcassé, October 18, 1904.

<sup>76</sup> Blondel to Delcassé, October 18, 1904.

<sup>77</sup> Blondel to Delcassé, October 18, 1904.

<sup>78</sup> Wangenheim to von Bülow, Mexico, October 29, 1904, Reichsamt des Innern 4383, DZP.

American diplomatic initiative.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, the extent to which Speyer can be called an American house is questionable. James Speyer was very much an international financier. Born in New York in 1861, he left for Frankfurt, Germany, at the age of three to be educated and trained in banking, only returning to the United States twenty-four years later to head the American branch of Speyer and Co. He continued to hold an interest in the German house of Lazard Speyer Ellissen. Speyer also had a British branch. The German merchant banking house, the richest in Frankfurt at the end of the eighteenth century, had come to the United States in 1845 and made its fortune financing railways, especially Collis P. Huntington's Southern Pacific Railroad and the Central Pacific Railroad, by taking advantage of the access its German and English branches had to European capital. By 1900, James Speyer was second in wealth only to J. P. Morgan among New York financiers.<sup>80</sup>

The house of Speyer became involved in Mexico as an extension of its activity in U.S. railroads. Major lines that Speyer helped finance in the United States began in the 1880s to build into Mexico in attempts to monopolize regional freight routes.<sup>81</sup> In 1901, Speyer moved from railroad financing to actual ownership when it came to the aid of the Nacional Railroad in its competition with Harriman-Rockefeller interests, with whom Speyer had done battle in the United States. Speyer financed the reorganization of the Nacional and its purchase of another major Mexican line, the Internacional, eventually coming to dominate the lines. When Speyer tried to add the Interoceanico line, Limantour balked. Fearing American monopolization of the major Mexican railroads, the minister of finance instead purchased controlling interest in the three companies. He preferred increasing the state's debt to allowing Yankee trusts to dominate Mexico's iron nerve system. Demonstrating that he feared industrial capital more than finance capital, Limantour borrowed from the company from which he was purchasing the rail lines in order to pay for the acquisitions.<sup>82</sup> The loan was an appetizer to introduce Speyer into the Mexican feast.

That Speyer rather than the Banque de Paris won the 1904 loan was of extraordinary importance. As the *Mexican Herald* noted: "the loan is based on the

<sup>79</sup> James Speyer before the U.S. Senate in 1932 discussed a loan: "if we had not had the thought that we could make some money it is not likely that we would have been interested." Congratulated by a senator for his frankness, Speyer answered, "we are businessmen." *Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States: Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate*, 72d Congress, 1st session, pt. 2, January 4, 5, 6, 7, 1932 (Washington, D.C., 1932), 615–16.

<sup>80</sup> *Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States*, 609, 611; Vincent P. Carosso, *Investment Banking in America: A History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 11, 26, reports that before the rise of the Rothschilds, between 1770 and 1800, the Speyers were the richest Jewish bankers in Frankfurt. Gene Z. Hanrahan, *The Bad Yankee, El Peligro Yankee: American Entrepreneurs and Financiers in Mexico*, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), 1: 113, 122, 123; Paul H. Emden, *Money Powers of Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York, 1938), 274–77.

<sup>81</sup> Naomi R. Lamoreaux, *The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904* (Cambridge, 1985).

<sup>82</sup> Rakowitz to von Bülow, Mexico, December 21, 1907, Ausländisches Amt 1747, DZP; Carlos Díaz Dufoo, *Limantour* (Mexico City, 1910), 133; Luís Nicolau D'Oliver, "Las inversiones extranjeras," in Villegas, *Historia moderna de Mexico*, 2: 1068–70. Werner Hegeman, *Mexico' Übergang zur Gold Währung* (Stuttgart, 1908), 106; Lorena Parlee, "Porfirio Díaz, Railroads and Development in Northern Mexico: A Study of Government Policy toward the Central and National Railroads, 1876–1910" (PhD dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1981), 243–46; Hanrahan, *Bad Yankee*, 1: 123.

gold dollar of the United States. This in a way marks an epoch in international finance."<sup>83</sup> For the first time, a major loan was denominated in dollars and based in New York. This loan signaled the future predominance of North American capitalists in Mexico, even though in fact few of the actual funds were supplied by North American investors. Speyer worked with its London and Frankfurt cousins, so Europeans continued to provide most capital for New York enterprises.

The loan was part of two related actions, each tying Mexico closer to the United States. The first was the nationalization of the railroads in 1906, when Limantour purchased the Central Railroad, again relying in large part on Speyer.<sup>84</sup> The second action was the monetary reform of 1905. On the advice of U.S. economists, Mexico converted to the gold standard, tying the peso to the dollar, not the pound sterling. This gave New York bankers an edge in Mexican finances. The Speyer loan was part of the reform since it partly financed the stabilization fund necessary to maintain the value of the gold peso.<sup>85</sup>

Because of the monetary reform, foreign investment flooded into Mexico, particularly into banks, an area in which U.S. investors had been almost entirely absent. Speyer took advantage of his privileged position with the Mexican government to found what became one of the country's largest banks, the Banco Mexicano de Comercio y Industria. As in the 1904 loan, Speyer used this opportunity to combine with German capital, specifically the Deutsche Bank.<sup>86</sup> Thus because of the French government's intransigence, French companies not only lost Mexican loan opportunities and banking privileges to U.S. companies but lost them to their hated rivals, the Germans.

What does Speyer's entry onto the Mexican scene have to do with the blue bonds? The "petits bleus," which had been conceived as a weapon in France's outward thrust into Mexico and had been nurtured by internal crises in France, surrendered their lives to allow Americans to enter Mexico's capital markets. Ironically, the 1904 loan that sealed U.S. eminence in Mexico also finally opened the Paris market to Mexican bonds. But not because the French government finally relented. Rather, the star-crossed notes that the Austrian pretender to Mexico had issued to French investors finally ended their excited, troubled, and cosmopolitan lives when the American house of Speyer, using largely German funds (and probably French funds through the secondary Parisian market), bought out the French speculators. The settling of this last remaining vestige of Maximilian's

<sup>83</sup> Clipping in *Ausländisches Amt*, 1740 DZP. Also, in same file, a clipping from the *Monthly Bulletin of the International Bureau of the American Republics* notes that "for the first time an important foreign loan is made payable in dollars."

<sup>84</sup> Lefavre to Pinchon, Mexico, May 12, 1911, CPMxFP, vol. 26, MAE. McNeely, *Railroads of Mexico*, 18.

<sup>85</sup> Greville to Lansdowne, Mexico, December 6, 1904, Foreign Office 204 308, Foreign Office Archive, Kew, London. Von Duering wrote to von Bülow, Mexico, November 2, 1904 (*Ausländisches Amt* 1740, DZP): "Through timely and forward-looking action, the United States has permanently won the financial dependence of the Mexican Republic. When the monetary reform makes the fineness [gold content] of the ten and twenty-peso gold pieces the same as five and ten [dollars], the dependencies and colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines will offer more than enough business and expansion opportunities for the home industry and for North American commerce and immigration."

<sup>86</sup> Director of the Deutsche Bank to Wangenheim, Berlin, July 19, 1906, *Ausländisches Amt* 1746, DZP.



presence in Mexico was done quietly. This way, the Mexican government itself did not reach an accommodation with the speculators, and probably few people suspected that Speyer had. Speyer purchased the “petits bleus” for 1.7 million francs, the same amount Limantour had offered to the speculators two years before but they had rejected. Presumably, the Société Civil now felt its position weakened by the entrance of U.S. bankers into the contest for Mexico. The Parisian market had appeared attractive to Limantour as an alternative to New York, but his turn to Speyer demonstrated that the Mexican minister was not willing to avoid American loans at all costs. As Paris lost its allure for Limantour, the bondholders probably decided that this small amount was better than nothing.

France’s minister in Mexico, Blondel, was disgusted by the proceedings. For this small amount, he complained, France lost out on two major loans and the sales of goods while the United States became stronger.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, Speyer not only opened the Paris Exchange to Mexican bonds, he placed the first U.S. bonds on Paris.<sup>88</sup> Subsequently, many large North American undertakings in Mexico worked partially with French capital and, worse for the French, with German capital—the very enemies most hated by the French—because of Speyer’s ties to German financial houses.

The French minister’s math was exact when he mentioned the small amount of money that separated France and Mexico, but he had no sense of poetry. He overlooked the significance of the little bonds. No doubt for the speculators who held the bonds, the issue involved simply money. But for both the Mexican and French governments, the golden dreams and tortured lives of the “petits bleus” represented far more than their monetary value. Terms of domination and historic pretensions to empire separated the two countries, not simply a few million francs.

THE OFFICIAL QUOTATION FOR MEXICAN BONDS on the Paris stock market opened up Mexico to much greater French capital. Already before official acceptance of Mexican bonds, the French had invested an estimated 100 million francs in Mexican securities.<sup>89</sup> The amount grew quickly in the next few years.<sup>90</sup>

The settling of the “petits bleus” thus encouraged economic relations between France and Mexico. It did not, however, increase French influence. Not only were the Barcelonettes reluctant to take a leadership role, but even Paris capitalists rarely dominated the management of companies in which they invested. They seemed content to allow others to make the decisions. Jean Bouvier argues that, after 1905, French bankers became active entrepreneurs rather than simple

<sup>87</sup> Blondel to Delcassé, Mexico, April 10, 1905, and Directeur de la Banque Française pour le Commerce et l’Industrie to Directeur des Affaires Politiques, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, March 27, 1905, CPMxFP, vol. 26, MAE.

<sup>88</sup> Carosso, *Investment Banking*, 84. This is fitting since, according to the *New York Times* (November 1, 1941): 15, the Speyer house had been the first to introduce U.S. government bonds to the European market.

<sup>89</sup> Ministre de Finance to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, April 10, 1905, CPMxFP, vol. 26, MAE.

<sup>90</sup> Rakowitz to von Bülow, Mexico, December 1, 1910, Brestlow to von Bülow, Mexico, October 2, 1906, and Greigueil to von Bülow, n.d., Ausländisches Amt 1746, DZP. Ministre de Finance to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, December 30, 1910, CPMxFP, vol. 26, MAE.

*rentiers*.<sup>91</sup> The movement in that direction in Mexico was slow. French capitalists also had little cooperation with their government, to the chagrin of the foreign and finance ministries. In 1911, the French minister to Mexico, Lefaivre, complained that he had attempted to win concessions for French companies in return for official quotations on the Paris Exchange, but French bankers undercut the minister, using their own influence in Paris to gain official recognition without asking anything in return.<sup>92</sup> Given the track record of French officials in Mexico, it is not the least bit surprising that French capitalists ignored the foreign ministry.

James Speyer was not long able to enjoy the Mexican opening, either. The Mexican Revolution of 1911 did not perturb him—he simply funded revolutionary generals. But World War I was extremely damaging. A friend of Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm, Speyer lost his U.S. business connections in the heat of war chauvinism. His cousins in England also lost their banking house for the same reason. After the war, Germany was destitute, unable to supply the capital that had made Speyer and Co. so formidable.<sup>93</sup> The rise to power of the Nazis put an end to the German branch of the Jewish Speyers, and the American branch followed a few years later.<sup>94</sup> Rising to eminence on a current of internationalism, the merchant bankers were drowned by racial nationalism.

The "petits bleus" were cursed. Their fathers, Maximilian and Napoleon III, both of whom ended their lives in disgrace—one more violently than the other—had watched their imperial aspirations crushed. But the apparently innocuous bonds lived on, fueling failed schemes in Paris, Baja California, and New York, exciting speculative hopes and arousing fears among some of the most powerful men in France. The bonds represented conquest and defeat, rapprochement and enmity, quick profit and the foundation of a financial empire.

Following the complicated path of the little blue bonds illuminates the changing nature of the international capital market and Mexico's place in it. Mexico went from being a site for renewed dreams of Habsburg glory and for colonial conquest to an independent and much-sought-after borrower. The country diversified its dependence, improving its financial standing and its autonomy. Limantour was able to play off competing international bankers to Mexico's advantage and could ignore the Parisian speculators, who in another era could have (and in fact had) launched a French invasion of the Veracruz customs house.

Financiers did not work as instruments of national imperialist policies. Dominated by families with ties to numerous countries and continents, bankers were, like Speyer, businessmen for whom profit came first. International alliances were much more common than competition based on birth. Money did not need a passport nor did it have strong national allegiances, despite the efforts of various governments to use the bonds as nationalist weapons. However, politics were not irrelevant. National policies, directed as much by chauvinism, territorial aspirations, and racial nationalism as the hunt for profit, did affect access to capital. States were important actors in this drama, but they often were not associates of financiers. Indeed,

<sup>91</sup> Greigueil to Pinchon, Mexico, March 19, 1909; Lefaivre to Pinchon, Mexico, August 31, 1909, CPMxFP, vol. 26, MAE; Bouvier, Girault, and Thobie, *L'impérialisme à la française*, 331.

<sup>92</sup> Lefaivre to Pinchon, Mexico, May 12, 1911, CPMxFP, vol. 26, MAE.

<sup>93</sup> Speyer testimony, *Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States*, 615.

<sup>94</sup> Hanrahan, *Bad Yankee*, 1: 123.

domestic politics and international rivalries led to political decisions that often made little economic sense. The market was as much driven by dreams and hatreds as by “rational” calculations of profit and loss.

The bonds were symbols, not just markers of wealth. They lived social lives that dressed them in many different meanings for the people involved. Speculators, widows and orphans, soldiers, diplomats, financiers, nationalist students, anti-Semites, and arms dealers all saw them differently. The bonds were chameleon-like, taking on different identities at different times. They inspired the public’s imagination or reminded it of past disgraces. Even such a famed hard-headed “realist” such as José Limantour had to recognize the powerful symbolism of the “petits bleus.” They were tailored by sentiment, dreams, and hatreds.

In mid-1910, to commemorate the centennial of Mexican independence, France returned the keys to the city of Mexico that had been presented to General Elie-Frédéric Forey when he entered with French troops in 1863.<sup>95</sup> The French sought to exorcise the ghost of Maximilian that had haunted French-Mexican relations for half a century. The keys to the city had not sufficed to establish a successful French colonial empire on the American continent. Neither had the “petits bleus.” French neo-colonialism was not much more successful, because the French state continued to side with adventurers rather than their own haute bourgeoisie, and French bondholders were willing to buy Mexican bonds issued on London or Berlin. French immigrants in Mexico considered themselves Mexican, and even French bankers were willing to ally with German and U.S. bankers in search of profit, even when their actions undercut their own government’s diplomatic initiatives. Mexico could certainly withstand French pressures since Díaz and Limantour diversified their dependence. This policy made short-run sense, but they were not gifted fortune tellers. Ultimately, Mexico would fall under the sway of the United States. When the “petits bleus” finally ended their perturbed and exciting social lives and Mexico’s door to the Paris Exchange was at last opened, Yankees were standing there in wait. The Mexican blues ended . . . to enter into the Jazz Age.

<sup>95</sup> Mix to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Mexico, June 17, 1910, Correspondance Politique: Mexique, Politique Interne, vol. 1, MAE.

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## Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence

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MATTHEW CONNELLY

EVEN BEFORE EDWARD SAID'S *Orientalism* APPEARED SOME TWENTY YEARS AGO, Arab, French, and American scholars had begun to jostle the keystone connecting knowledge and power in the imperial edifice. Indeed, Anouar Abdel-Malek declared "Orientalism in Crisis" in 1963, as the triumph of national liberation movements like Algeria's shook the confidence of social scientists on both sides of the Atlantic. In succeeding years, nowhere more than in scholarship on North Africa, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians criticized their predecessors for legitimizing colonial authority by depicting Muslims as an underdeveloped "other." They recognized that orientalism could both reflect and reinforce inequality, ultimately serving as a coercive arm of the state.<sup>1</sup>

Since then, many more scholars have taken "the historic turn," becoming increasingly critical of their disciplinary histories.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, the new field of postcolonial studies has continued the pursuit of orientalism, ranging ever further from the institutions officially charged with preserving imperial power. Recoiling from the elitism of "official history," it would instead seek out the voice of the subaltern, or at least interrogate the discourses that keep them silent. Following Said's lead in literary criticism, postcolonial scholars today catalog the cultures of empire in novels and travel writing, museums and expositions, paintings and postcards—everywhere, it seems, but the archives and personal papers of European and U.S. policymakers. Consequently, diplomats and other high officials are becoming the exotic "other" of postcolonial studies—passively receiving all

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<sup>1</sup> Anouar Abdel-Malek, "Orientalism in Crisis," *Diogenes* 44 (1963): 103–40; Abdellatif Laâbi, "Le Gachis," *Souffles* 7–8 (1967): 1–14; Edmund Burke III, "The Image of the Moroccan State in French Ethnological Literature: A New Look at the Origin of Lyautey's Berber Policy," in Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa* (Lexington, Mass., 1972), 175–99; Abdallah Laroui, *L'histoire du Maghreb: Un essai de synthèse* (Paris, 1975); Philippe Lucas and Jean-Claude Vatin, *L'Algérie des anthropologues* (Paris, 1975); *Le mal de voir: Ethnologie et orientalisme: Politique et épistémologie, critique et autocritique . . .* (Paris, 1976); Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978).

<sup>2</sup> Terrence J. McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996).

manner of fanciful attributes and opinions, while always retaining an air of mystery and menace.<sup>3</sup>

To many imperial and diplomatic historians, on the other hand, postcolonial theorists themselves are “literary invaders” who have undertaken the “colonization of imperial studies.” Many more have all but ignored cultural studies of colonialism and Great Power diplomacy.<sup>4</sup> One of the exceptions, Emily S. Rosenberg, recently lamented the fact that cultural and political-economic histories of the U.S. experience abroad “seem to inhabit different planets.”<sup>5</sup> These worlds have begun to collide in *Diplomatic History*, the main journal in the field. Yet contributors’ increasingly frequent forays into cultural studies all too often replicate the more problematic aspects of postcolonial scholarship, especially the assumption that imperial projects can be analyzed as *either* discourse *or* elite decision-making. Opting for the former, authors sometimes stake out bold claims for the power of cultural representations and practices unsupported by the scope of their research.<sup>6</sup> This has not won over most readers, one of whom derided this work as “intellectual junk.”<sup>7</sup>

This article seeks to demonstrate how postcolonial studies and diplomatic history could engage in a more constructive dialogue if the ongoing critique of orientalism

<sup>3</sup> For a programmatic statement, see Ranajit Guha, “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India,” although it does not deny the utility of “elitist historiography,” and early Subaltern Studies skillfully used official sources to recover insurgent voices; *Subaltern Studies I* (New York, 1982), 1–7. More recent work has shifted from archival research to discourse analysis; see Gyan Prakash, “Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism,” *AHR* 99 (December 1994): 1477–83. While Benita Parry cautions against holding up representative works of this heterogeneous field, she observes that seminal studies by Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “are submerged in a shared programme marked by the exorbitation of discourse and a related incuriosity about the enabling socio-economic and political institutions.” Parry, “Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse,” *Oxford Literary Review* 9 (1987): 43. On this point, see also note 135.

<sup>4</sup> Dane Kennedy, “Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24 (September 1996): 346. Kennedy advocates a dialogue between the fields, although he used the imperial metaphor knowing that it “resonated with readers”; 359.

<sup>5</sup> Emily S. Rosenberg, “Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy: Narratives of Money and Manliness,” *Diplomatic History* 22 (Spring 1998): 158.

<sup>6</sup> See Anders Stephanson’s commentary on the recent symposium “Imperial Discourses: Power and Perception,” in which one contribution claims that the Philadelphia Commercial Museum was “the most significant institutional manifestation of the cultural and intellectual apparatus that made American imperialism possible at the turn of the twentieth century,” while another asserts that travel to Europe “formed a cultural or ideological foundation for imperialism and increasing U.S. engagement in world affairs.” Steven Conn, “An Epistemology for Empire: The Philadelphia Commercial Museum, 1893–1926,” *Diplomatic History* 22 (Fall 1998): 535; Christopher Endy, “Travel and World Power: Americans in Europe, 1890–1917,” 565; and Stephanson, “Diplomatic History in the Expanded Field,” 597–99.

<sup>7</sup> Bruce Kuklick, “Confessions of an Intransigent Revisionist about Cultural Studies,” *Diplomatic History* 18 (Winter 1994): 122. Kuklick was responding to studies of gendered discourses in foreign relations. Even though this work has grown increasingly sophisticated—grounding discursive analyses in archival research—it still elicits denunciations in H-Diplo, the field’s discussion list on the World Wide Web (<http://h-net2.msu.edu/diplo/Costigliola.htm>). Far fewer works have explored American policymakers’ attitudes toward race in the formulation of foreign policy, but see Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn., 1987); Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston, 1992); and Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* (Boulder, Colo., 1996). As Douglas Little notes, neither Hunt nor Lauren—nor any other diplomatic historian—has examined the influence of orientalism on U.S. policy toward the Arab world; Little, “Gideon’s Band: America and the Middle East since 1945,” in Michael J. Hogan, ed., *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941* (New York, 1995), 498–99.



were to recover its original focus on the exercise of state power. In particular, it will draw on the insights of postcolonial scholars to reexamine relations between the United States and its allies during the passing of the European empires. How, it is asked, did the political and economic crisis of the colonial world shape policymakers' ideas about "development" and cultural differences? Conversely, what can newly opened archives reveal about how the construction of "us-them" categories—long a concern of postcolonial theorists—actually affected high-level decisions on decolonization as it accelerated in the 1950s?<sup>8</sup>

But if we are to explore the interaction of state power and cultural representations, we must first confront a broad consensus among diplomatic historians that an East-West, Cold War dichotomy—not discourses about racial and religious differences—framed U.S. policymakers' perceptions of the emerging Third World. Summarizing "post-revisionist" scholarship, Robert McMahon writes that the Eisenhower administration "insisted on viewing the Third World through the invariably distorting lens of a Cold War geopolitical strategy that saw the Kremlin as the principal instigator of global unrest." In particular, Thomas Paterson argues that the "Cold War lens" of Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, prevented a more far-sighted approach to Arab nationalism. John Lewis Gaddis agrees: Dulles was "[d]etermined to force a Cold War frame of reference on [the Middle East]."<sup>9</sup>

While there is no denying that Eisenhower and his secretary of state saw their most pressing task as managing a protracted and unpredictable confrontation with Moscow, they could also imagine a still more disturbing prospect: an expanding and escalating conflict with "the great mass of mankind which is non-white and non-European"—as Dulles put it—whether in league with the Soviets or independent of them.<sup>10</sup> Eisenhower and Dulles hoped to appease antiwestern sentiment by accelerating decolonization, accepting the neutralism of some new states, and offering them economic aid. They considered the cooperative development of "Eurafrica" essential if the allies were ever to stand on their own, and they favored European integration even in the absence of the Soviet challenge.<sup>11</sup> Similarly,

<sup>8</sup> This article emphasizes the historically contingent and contested nature of concepts like development and geopolitical categories like the Third World, though they will appear hereafter without the "scare quotes."

<sup>9</sup> Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (1986): 457; Thomas Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (New York, 1988), 178; John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, 1997), 176. Similarly, Thomas J. Noer argues, "The Cold War view of international relations made it difficult for the United States to adapt to the changes brought about by the demise of European colonialism and the rise of race as an element of diplomacy." Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968* (Columbia, Mo., 1985), 253. Fawaz A. Gerges holds that "the Eisenhower administration looked at regional developments through the prism of Washington's rivalry with Moscow." *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967* (Boulder, Colo., 1994), 48. Penny M. Von Eschen contends that "officials in Washington understood such [nationalist] movements through the ideological prism of the Cold War," *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997), 133, although she stresses that this view was not monolithic.

<sup>10</sup> Dulles to Holmes, July 13, 1955, John Foster Dulles Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter, DDEL), Subject Series, Box 6, North African Survey–1955, Julius Holmes.

<sup>11</sup> On accepting neutralism, see Eisenhower memorandum of conversation (hereafter, memcon) with Wilson, Radford, March 13, 1956, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–57, XIX* (Washington, D.C., 1990), 239 (hereafter, FRUS with year and volume); and, more generally, H. W.

international conflict along racial and religious lines was an appalling prospect even if the communists kept out of it. Thus their appeasement policy was consistent with Cold War concerns, but it was not entirely dependent on them. It drew strength from images and ideas that antedated the U.S.-Soviet contest and have gained new currency in its aftermath—from turn-of-the-century visions of the “Yellow Peril” to millenarian forebodings of a “Clash of Civilizations.”<sup>12</sup>

To bring the relationship between the Cold War and representations of racial and religious conflict into sharper focus, this analysis will concentrate on Algeria, a country at the crossroads of the European, Arab, and African worlds. It will begin by describing its war for independence as part of a general crisis in the colonial world, when rapid demographic growth, the collapse of rural economies, and radio and film’s role in mobilizing discontent led many to question the inevitability of “modernization.” Even at the height of the Cold War, discourses about development and civilizational conflict helped delineate the shifting borders between North and South, “the West” and “the rest.” By presenting policymakers’ own words as evidence, this study suggests that a “Cold War lens” did not circumscribe the views of Eisenhower and his contemporaries as much as those of the historians who have studied them.<sup>13</sup>

Algeria is an ideal place to examine how the Cold War came to be overlaid—and undermined—by visions of North-South conflict. With nearly a million European colonists and immense oil and natural gas reserves, it was an integral part not only of France but also of the emerging European strategic and economic community. Indeed, its northern *départements* were made part of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty of Rome. But from the perspective of most of its 9 million Muslims, Algeria belonged to the Middle East and Africa beyond the Sahara. Seventy percent of them still lived in rural areas, typically subsisting on small, overworked plots and seasonal labor. By 1954, fully half were usually unemployed. When they tried to organize political opposition, French authorities arrested their candidates and massacred protesters.<sup>14</sup>

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Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960* (New York, 1989). Regarding support for European integration, see Ronald W. Pruessen, “Beyond the Cold War—Again: 1955 and the 1990s,” *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Spring 1993): 74–75; and Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, N.J., 1999), 146–52.

<sup>12</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 22–49; see also Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy, “Must It Be the Rest against the West?” *Atlantic Monthly* (December 1994): 61–84. Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman also argues that policymakers looked beyond the East-West contest, though she focuses on the 1960s and does not address fears of North-South conflict; Hoffman, “Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Foreign Policy of the Peace Corps,” *Diplomatic History* 20 (Winter 1996): 79.

<sup>13</sup> Some diplomatic historians influenced by world-systems theory have argued that the Cold War was directed at the Third World as much as the Soviet Union. For an overview, see David S. Painter, “Explaining U.S. Relations with the Third World,” *Diplomatic History* 19 (Summer 1995): 529–35. But a purely political-economic analysis, especially one premised on a “core-periphery” model, appears inadequate to explain either the crisis of the colonial world or American reactions to it, as this article will seek to demonstrate.

<sup>14</sup> Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, Michael Brett, trans. (London, 1991), 83–84, 87; Pierre Bourdieu, *The Algerians*, Alan C. M. Ross, trans. (Boston, 1961), 128; John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington, Ind., 1992), 120–21, 123. For examples of official complicity in election rigging and massacres, see Moch to

But while Algerians endured gross economic and political inequality, colonial administrators deemed that it was *demographic* inequality that explained dissension between Muslims and the European settlers, the *pieds noirs*.<sup>15</sup> They pointed to the growth rate of the Muslim population—twice that of the *pieds noirs*—and the increasing number migrating to the cities. Between 1926 and 1954, their share of Algiers' population grew from 26 to 46 percent.<sup>16</sup> By then, 300,000 Algerian Muslims had moved on to France, where in 1947 Louis Chevalier was already warning of “a real invasion and a berberisation of whole neighborhoods in Marseilles and Paris.”<sup>17</sup>

TO CONTEMPORARY OBSERVERS, FRENCH ALGERIA appeared to demonstrate in microcosm the problems of North and South as they came together and came apart. In his introduction to Chevalier's study, the famed French demographer Alfred Sauvy used Algeria to advance a general proposition with profound implications for colonial power around the world: “The current emancipation of Asiatic and Muslim countries is as directly related with their demographic vitality as was the European expansion in the 19th century. The relation of cause and effect is no more in doubt. It is the demographic factor that commands political expansion.”<sup>18</sup> Five years later, Sauvy coined the term Third World to describe these countries' position apart from both the Western and Eastern blocs. But it also connoted a kind of global Third Estate, one that challenged both the capitalist and communist powers of the North. Population pressure was building, Sauvy wrote, to the point where North Africans' cries of misery could almost be heard by vacationers in the South of France.<sup>19</sup>

From the beginning of the Cold War, some U.S. policymakers shared this North-South perspective on international politics. “We are in the middle of a world revolution—and I don't mean Communism,” George C. Marshall warned after a trip to Asia. “The revolution I'm talking about is that of the little people all over the

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Schuman, January 31, 1948, Archives d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (hereafter, AOM), Série MA, Affaires Algériennes (hereafter, MA), dossier 18; Barrat, “Additif à mon Rapport sur les événements de Guelma,” June 27, 1945, dossier 586.

<sup>15</sup> See, for instance, their most widely circulated propaganda pamphlet of the Algerian War, which insists that “Algeria's problem is, above all, a demographic problem.” “Notions Essentielles sur l'Algérie,” n.d. [c. 1956], AOM, Fonds du Cabinet Civil du Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie, 12/CAB/161.

<sup>16</sup> Charles-Robert Ageron, “Français, juifs et musulmans: L'union impossible,” in Ageron, ed., *L'Algérie des Français* (Saint-Quentin, 1993), 113; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 121.

<sup>17</sup> Louis Chevalier, *Le problème démographique nord-africain*, Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques: Travaux et documents (Paris, 1947), cahier no. 6: 148. It seems likely that this study influenced his seminal work *Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris pendant la première moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1958).

<sup>18</sup> Chevalier, *Le problème démographique*, 7.

<sup>19</sup> Carl E. Pletsch, “The Three Worlds, or the Division of Social Scientific Labor, circa 1950–1975,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23 (October 1981): 569–71. French propaganda encouraged the image of Algeria as “a small-scale model of the relationship between the underdeveloped countries and the industrialized nations of the world.” “The Constantine Plan for Algeria: Opening New Frontiers in Development,” n.d. [c. May 1961], British Library, London, SE.47/23.

world. They're beginning to learn what there is in life, and to learn what they are missing."<sup>20</sup>

Marshall's remark was part of a tradition among Westerners of imagining others as smaller, child-like versions of themselves. But most were confident that they wanted to grow up—that is, to become more modern, “more like us.” It was therefore up to the West to steady them through their growing pains. This was the agenda of the emerging field of modernization theory, which became the conventional wisdom in both Europe and North America. Implicit in both the “little people” imagery and modernization theory's “stages of economic growth” was the idea that Third World peoples could not *interact* with outside influences but only adhere to tradition or accept modernity through either its capitalist or communist variants (though most Western observers believed the latter would eventually be proved fraudulent). They were oblivious to the tautology of arguing that “the Western model of modernization” was universally relevant since all modernizing societies were, by definition, becoming more like the West.<sup>21</sup>

While modernization theory generated a vast literature, perhaps the quintessential text, as Andre Gunder Frank suggests, was Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society*.<sup>22</sup> Karl Deutsch's influential work on “social mobilization” had predicted that increasing literacy and exposure to new popular media would lead to assimilation within societies and—eventually—more Western-type nation-states. Lerner stressed the new media's role in teaching Third World peoples “what there is in life,” that is, what the West had to offer. There were dangers inherent in the resulting “revolution of rising expectations,” but at least the direction of progress was clear: the new media raised expectations, and economic and social development would meet them. It remained only to balance the demand and supply sides of development and measure the rate of advance along the road to modernity.<sup>23</sup>

Lerner therefore dispatched teams of researchers in 1951 to study the impact of new media in six Middle Eastern countries. They found that radio and film had indeed begun to reach broad sections of these societies. In Egypt, for instance, 78 percent of workers listened to the radio every day, and 45 percent attended movies

<sup>20</sup> Sargent Shriver, *Point of the Lance* (New York, 1964), 8–9, quoted in Hoffman, “Decolonization,” 79.

<sup>21</sup> Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, 1960). On racial hierarchies and modernization theory, see Hunt, *Ideology*, 161. As Burton Kaufman notes, Rostow and other development experts greatly influenced Eisenhower and his foreign aid program, *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy 1953–1961* (Baltimore, 1982), 10, 96–99. French strategists shared the assumptions of their American counterparts about development and Third World instability; see D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton, N.J., 1988), 138–65. For the following critique, I am indebted to Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, 66–77; Frederick Cooper, “Africa and the World Economy,” in Cooper, Allen F. Isaacman, and Florencia E. Mallon, *et al.*, eds., *Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America* (Madison, Wis., 1993), 87–90; Cooper and Randall Packard, “Introduction,” *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997), 1–41; and Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (Boulder, Colo., 1985), 1–13.

<sup>22</sup> Andre Gunder Frank, “The Underdevelopment of Development,” in Sing C. Chew and Robert A. Denemark, eds., *The Underdevelopment of Development: Essays in Honor of Andre Gunder Frank* (London, 1996), 23; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958).

<sup>23</sup> Karl Deutsch defines the supply and demand sides of social mobilization differently in *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (New York, 1953), 127–30.

weekly. Even among farmers, 42 percent heard radio broadcasts daily, while more than half went to the movies at least once a month. Total cinema attendance more than doubled between 1950 and 1956.<sup>24</sup>

But instead of heeding Hollywood and the U.S. Information Agency's Voice of America, Egyptians began to answer back. After Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in 1952, the Cairo-based Voice of the Arabs began attacking imperial pretensions for an audience stretching from Morocco to Iraq. In November 1954, it broadcast the first proclamation of Algeria's Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), inaugurating its revolt against French rule. By 1956, the FLN's own Voice of Algeria was broadcasting from clandestine transmitters just beyond its borders. As the famed FLN theorist and diplomat Frantz Fanon observed: "the purchase of a radio in Algeria has meant, not the adoption of a modern technique for getting news, but the obtaining of access to the only means of entering into communication with the Revolution."<sup>25</sup>

Egyptian cinema also radiated its influence throughout the region. By 1956, import licenses had been granted to 263 Egyptian films in Algeria alone. Here, too, movie attendance took off, totaling 22 million that year in nearly a thousand movie houses and screening rooms across the country.<sup>26</sup> Even though these films were devoid of overt political content, French authorities feared that they had become one of the principal vehicles for the spread of Arab nationalism by presenting images of a "supposedly free and modern" Arab society.<sup>27</sup>

Refused any new licenses, the Egyptians began producing pro-FLN films like *Djamila Bouhired*, which celebrated an urban guerrilla who hid bombs in her handbag. Yet rather than rejecting all forms of Western influence, the hero is taught that French education "is a weapon we shall use against our enemies." Likewise, the film's protagonists mobilize the international media to save Bouhired from execution.<sup>28</sup> The Quai d'Orsay tried to ban its foreign distribution but had little success. Soon, the FLN would be producing its own films, which were sometimes shown on American television news programs.<sup>29</sup>

Measured by their use of new media and rising expectations, Egyptians and Algerians were becoming ever more modern, but this was not what modernization theorists had in mind. As Irene Gendzier has shown, the issue was not the activity but its aim. If, as in Iran, urbanization, education, and new means of communication produced an anti-imperialist government, then they were associated not with modernity but with alienation, while "[t]hose who exhibited an enthusiasm for social change, previously considered a sign of empathy, were now castigated as troublemakers."<sup>30</sup> Thus, when one Syrian respondent, justifying overseas radio

<sup>24</sup> Lerner, *Passing*, 232, 235, 254.

<sup>25</sup> Frantz Fanon, *Studies in a Dying Colonialism*, 1965, Haakon Chevalier, trans. (London, 1989), 83.

<sup>26</sup> Pierre Boulanger, *Le cinéma colonial: De "l'Atlantide" à "Lawrence d'Arabie"* (Paris, 1975), 272.

<sup>27</sup> Coup de Frejac, "Note à l'attention de M. le Délégué Général," February 11, 1961; and Figière, "Note au sujet des films égyptiens," April 25, 1960, AOM, Fonds du Cabinet Civil du Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie, 15/CAB/119.

<sup>28</sup> Youssef Chahine, director, *Djamila Bouhired* (c. 1959).

<sup>29</sup> Alphand to Pineau, June 10, 1957, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris (hereafter, MAE), Mission de Liaison Algérien (hereafter, MLA), Vol. 23 bis (provisional number), Action Extérieure, Etats-Unis, déc 1956-déc 1957, Cote EU; Guy Hennebelle, preface to Boulanger, *Le cinéma*, 6.

<sup>30</sup> Gendzier, *Managing Political Change*, 132.



broadcasts, suggested that “[we] should not neglect to inform foreign countries of our presence, and give them our news and ideas just as they give us theirs,” Lerner reproved his taste for “foreign adventures.”<sup>31</sup>

To Lerner, the use of new media to advance an anticolonial agenda was not only misguided, it raised the specter of a global struggle between races and religions. He complained that in Egypt the Voice of the Arabs “unleashed the violent xenophobia of fanatics while silencing the voices of modern rationality,” and in North Africa it “became a major relay in the chain reaction of assassination and mob-violence through the area.” Even beyond the Arab world, Egyptian radio was said to work for “Islamic World Power” in Asia and anti-white insurgencies south of the Sahara “until Africa belongs to the Africans”—thus representing anticolonialism as a primordial, racial reaction to “modern rationality.”<sup>32</sup>

In fact, while Arabic radio services did encourage attacks on the colonial powers, the Algerian case shows how their message was manipulated to appear like mere bloodlust. Thus, when French propagandists found the Voice of the Arabs insufficiently inflammatory, they cited carefully edited excerpts from Radio Damascus instead. Rather than reproducing the full sentence “Kill them without pity and without commiseration, as they have killed your brothers without pity and without consideration,” they quoted the broadcast as saying simply, “Kill them,” and characterized it as a call for “holy war.”<sup>33</sup>

In this way, new means of communication were already being blamed for inciting communal conflict rather than promoting assimilation. By 1961, even Karl Deutsch had grown uncertain as to whether the whole process of “social mobilization” might “strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life.” Considering that nearly all of the new states were so divided, this prospect posed a grave threat to the international system.<sup>34</sup>

If the demand side of modernization challenged expectations, the supply side was still more aberrant. Modernization theory anticipated that Third World peoples would endure deprivation and threaten unrest during a transition phase, although integration in the world economy through specialization and trade would eventually lead to greater prosperity. In this respect, Algeria exhibited all the key features of the transformation of rural economies that had been occurring across the Third World: in China, too, commercialization had earlier led to the abolition of public granaries. In Mexico and Vietnam as in Algeria, it had threatened peasant control of communal land. In these cases and Cuba as well, property seizures drove peasants onto marginal lands insufficient for their subsistence.<sup>35</sup> In all these

<sup>31</sup> Lerner, *Passing*, 286.

<sup>32</sup> Lerner, *Passing*, 255–57.

<sup>33</sup> “Extraits de commentaires diffusés par Radio-Damas,” May 14, 1956, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 549; “L’Algérie et la question algérienne,” October 1956, dossier 550.

<sup>34</sup> Karl Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” *American Political Science Review* 55 (1961): 501. Note, however, that Deutsch pulled back from his insight, confident that individuals would recognize their interest in preserving states big enough to administer essential services with efficiency. Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, N.J., 1994), 32. But by the 1970s, many social scientists began to view ethnic conflict as a by-product of modernization; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, Calif., 1985), 3, 99–100.

<sup>35</sup> Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1969), 280–81.

countries, peasants rose up and challenged the new economic order. Both development theorists and their critics would agree that the commercialization of agrarian society was a primary cause of political unrest while differing about whether this painful process was unavoidable. What neither explained was why development—or exploitation—did not pay.<sup>36</sup>

In Algeria, for instance, the fact that wine accounted for more than half of all exports exemplified this Muslim country's integration in global markets. Yet the government paid growers 25 percent more than the market value of their product, two-thirds of which was considered useless. From 1952, the metropole had to subsidize the Algerian budget, as social services strained to accommodate the expanding, increasingly urban population.<sup>37</sup> But rather than forming a consumer society, producing and purchasing goods in global markets, many Muslims in the cities continued to live outside the cash economy—600,000 had no regular source of income. Pierre Bourdieu found it impossible to categorize their lives as traditional or capitalist; indeed, they existed entirely outside this framework of analysis. If there was an Algerian Muslim proletariat, he concluded, it was living in *France*, but only scraping by in order to send earnings home, thus sustaining subsistence agriculture. On the other hand—and despite massive development projects—private capital began to flow out of Algeria at an accelerating rate: 3.6 billion francs in 1954, 19.5 billion in 1955, 121.1 billion in 1956.<sup>38</sup>

Algeria was an extreme case of a problem common to colonial authorities throughout the continent. Neither Britain nor France devoted substantial resources to developing their African possessions until World War II, but private capital did not follow public investment. Moreover, now that the expense of imperialism had begun to pinch taxpayers, the British and French press and publics began to subject their colonies to cost-benefit analyses.<sup>39</sup> In the summer of 1956, Raymond Cartier argued in a series of influential articles for *Paris Match* that France ought to redirect investment to the metropole, since it paid inflated prices for what little its African colonies had to offer.<sup>40</sup> Likewise, in 1959, John Strachey—former war minister under Clement Attlee—argued that “imperialism has ceased to bring appreciable

<sup>36</sup> A vast literature on resistance to the commercialization of agriculture has developed since Wolf's contribution. See, for instance, Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World* (Princeton, N.J., 1974); James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, Conn., 1976); and Michael Adas, “Market Demand versus Imperial Control: Colonial Contradictions and the Origins of Agrarian Protest in South and Southeast Asia,” in Edmund Burke III, ed., *Global Crises and Social Movements: Artisans, Peasants, Populists, and the World Economy* (Boulder, Colo., 1988), esp. 106–08. For a critical view, see Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, 1979).

<sup>37</sup> Wolf, *Peasant Wars*, 223–24; Jacques Marseille, “L'Algérie était-elle rentable?” in Ageron, *L'Algérie des Français*, 153; Marseille, “L'Algérie dans l'économie française (1954–1962),” *Relations Internationales* 58 (1989): 169–76.

<sup>38</sup> Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 125; Pierre Bourdieu, “The Algerian Subproletariat,” in I. William Zartman, ed., *Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib* (New York, 1973), 86–87; Charles-Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine* (Paris, 1979), 526; Marseille, “L'Algérie dans l'économie,” 173. Marseille's figures are in “old” francs.

<sup>39</sup> John D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa*, 2d edn. (New York, 1996), 23, 100–12; Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept,” in Cooper and Packard, *International Development*, 76–81.

<sup>40</sup> Rudolf von Albertini, *Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919–1960* (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), 439–42.

benefits to the advanced countries (without ceasing to be ruinous for the underdeveloped)."<sup>41</sup>

There were economic successes in Africa, but they did not fit the development model. Migrant laborers in other African states also used their wages to strengthen rural economies, even though colonial officials were little interested in the growth of exports from small farms. As Frederick Cooper has argued, they wanted to form a disciplined labor force, but "Africans proved adept . . . at using mobility, kin networks, and the ability to move between alternative systems to avoid too much dependence on white employers"—in the same way that Algerian Muslims escaped the *colons* and low wages by working in France despite official efforts to keep them on the farm.<sup>42</sup> This was a rational response to market incentives, but even the most liberal economists shuddered at the thought of allowing labor to cross borders with the same freedom as capital, goods, and services.<sup>43</sup>

The issue of labor mobility was potentially explosive, given the pattern of world population growth. According to the prevailing dogma of "demographic transition theory," urbanization and industrialization reduced mortality rates and—after a lag period and rapid population growth—rates of natality. The population of developing countries was therefore expected to stabilize, just as in the West.<sup>44</sup> But, by the 1950s, demographers had discovered that improved public health measures had rapidly reduced death rates in *non*-industrial economies. This was the case not just in Algeria but also in Ceylon, Malaya, the West Indies, and much of Latin America. Moreover, in Algeria (as well as India and Egypt), urbanization initially appeared to have no effect on birth rates.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, in 1954, a French demographer found that natality among Algerian Muslims had remained nearly constant between 1926 and 1950. Indeed, by 1957, he reported that it had increased to 44–46 per 1,000, with virtually no variation between urban and rural areas. As a result, the Muslim population had grown by 260,000 each year since the start of the war. While the total number of European settlers was expected to reach 1.2 million in 1980, he projected that by then the Muslim population would be growing by nearly half a million each year.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>41</sup> John Strachey, *The End of Empire* (New York, 1959), 190.

<sup>42</sup> Frederick Cooper, "Africa and the Development Idea," paper delivered at the Conference on Population and Security, Centre for History and Economics, Cambridge, February 17–19, 1995, 10–11, quoted with permission; Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (New York, 1996), 400–02, 462–63.

<sup>43</sup> Connelly and Kennedy, "Must It Be," 72 (the latter is responsible for this point).

<sup>44</sup> Simon Szreter, "The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History," *Population and Development Review* 19 (December 1993): 661–63.

<sup>45</sup> A. J. Coale and E. M. H. Coale, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries* (Princeton, N.J., 1958), 13–16; John Sharpless, "Population Science, Private Foundations, and Development Aid: The Transformation of Demographic Knowledge in the United States, 1945–1965," in Cooper and Packard, *International Development*, 190.

<sup>46</sup> M. Jacques Breil, "Etude de Démographie Quantitative," *La population en Algérie: Rapport du Haut Comité Consultatif de la Population et de la Famille* (Paris, 1957), 110–11, 120, 125, 128. Breil's projections were exaggerated, but they accurately reflected a longstanding French obsession with natality, especially vis-à-vis North Africa. See Hervé Le Bras, *Marianne et les lapins: L'obsession démographique* (Saint-Amand-Motrand, 1991), 181–82, 217–19. This had implications for women in both societies. While French authorities promoted the education of Algerian women as the most promising way to reduce birth rates, pronatalism had long been associated with attacks on *la femme moderne* in France; "L'Algérie du demi siècle vue par les autorités," 56–57, 256, n.d. [c. 1954], AOM, Fonds du Cabinet Civil du Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie, 10/CAB/28; Cheryl A. Koos, "Gender,

The relative decline of the *pie* *noir* population paralleled a shift in the proportion of European and non-European peoples around the globe. Whereas Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans accounted for 55 percent of the world's population in the second half of the nineteenth century, according to a State Department report, by the 1950s they made up more than 77 percent. From the perspective of Western policymakers, population growth made economic development more difficult but all the more imperative, given the apparent menace posed by impoverished Third World peoples. It threatened to overwhelm both the supply and demand sides of the development model and overturn the entire modernization project.<sup>47</sup>

In this period, one can already detect a shift in policy circles from promoting development to dispensing aid. John Strachey, for one, argued that it was a moral imperative. But there was also a pragmatic argument based on Western self-interest—even survival. “The world is incomparably more aware of itself than ever before,” he noted. “For the first time in history, the nearly two thousand million peasants of the undeveloped world know of the existence of that other way of life in the West which seems to them so fabulous. What if they discover no way by which they may share in its benefits?”<sup>48</sup> Strachey left the rest to the reader's imagination. But that same year, Arthur Conte—who later wielded immense influence as director of French radio and television broadcasting—was more explicit. Advances in telecommunications, he asserted, were “making the misery that spans the globe each day less bearable.” “And if, tomorrow, nothing is done, the demographic deadline of the year 2000 will see not only wealthy countries, above all North America, Europe and the USSR, unable to protect their wealth from others' misery, but misery and hunger will become the lot of all humanity.” Thus new communications technologies and the capacity of people to empathize was not necessarily a formula for modernization. Some observers feared that instead of *imagining* themselves in their place, impoverished masses might actually take possession of it. Fanon spoke directly to this anxiety when he wrote that “the native” aspired to “all manner of possession . . . to sleep in the settler's bed, with his wife if possible.”<sup>49</sup>

As we shall see, such fears fueled nightmares about the future of North-South relations, visions inspired by the “Yellow Peril” and *jihad* instead of universal

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Anti-Individualism, and Nationalism: The Alliance Nationale and the Pronatalist Backlash against the *Femme Moderne*, 1933–1940,” *French Historical Studies* 19 (1996): 699–723.

<sup>47</sup> “World Population Trends and Problems,” July 23, 1959, State Department Intelligence Report No. 8057, U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter, USNA), RG 59. Of course, and as Amartya Sen has argued, dividing world population into racial categories presupposes that these categories have some political significance. Moreover, producing the intended effect requires a foreshortened historical perspective: in 1650, Asians and Africans alone are thought to have accounted for some 78 percent of world population. If the present trend continues and middle-range UN projections hold true, by 2050 they will “return to being proportionately almost exactly as numerous as they were before the European industrial revolution”; Sen, “Population: Delusion and Reality,” *New York Review of Books* 41 (September 22, 1994): 63.

<sup>48</sup> Strachey, *End of Empire*, 312.

<sup>49</sup> Arthur Conte, “Rapport d'Information sur l'Aide aux Pays sous-développés,” June 26, 1959, Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter, AN), Archives Privées, Papiers de Georges Bidault, 457AP, dossier 180. There are many such passages on perceptions of “a Third World which is rising like the tide to swallow up all Europe” in Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 1961, Constance Farrington, trans. (New York, 1968), 39.

ideals. We will not find a coherent body of “medievalization theory” backed by empirical research and expressed in social-science jargon. But the idea of modernization had itself become quite muddled, which helps to explain its vulnerability to that alternative view. New means of communications, market integration, and mass migration had so complicated ties between metropole and colony, city and countryside, modernity and tradition as to make the relationships between these apparent dichotomies increasingly ambiguous. It was difficult, if not impossible, for the French to go on defining themselves against or through some colonial “other” when Algerians, often living in their midst, appeared to be neither peasant nor proletarian, neither liberal nor communist, but French citizens, Algerian nationalists, and racial and religious separatists all at the same time.

The FLN, on the other hand, embraced both Western and Islamic ideals, rejecting the bipolarities that were supposed to exist between them. As its official newspaper, *El Moudjahid*, opined: “The Algerian people are at the same time the most nationalist and the most cosmopolitan, the most loyal to Islam and the most receptive to non-Islamic values. Among Muslim peoples it is perhaps one of the most attached to the Muslim faith and the most penetrated by the spirit of the modern West.”<sup>50</sup> In time, the spirit of Algerian independence penetrated France itself, as youths and intellectuals idealized the cause and aligned with immigrants against the state, resulting in pitched battles in the streets of Paris, with hundreds of casualties.

But for all their partisan fervor, few were certain how to reconcile this spirit with the French revolutionary tradition of universalist ideals: liberty appeared to mean consigning fellow citizens to an Islamic state, equality required that they submit to the will of the majority, and fraternity necessitated their accepting cultural practices that seemed alien even to the most cosmopolitan. The question was not just competing views of truth and justice but whether such concepts could exist independent of the political projects they served. Thus Fanon asserted that “truth is the property of the national cause. No absolute verity, no discourse on the purity of the soul, can shake this position . . . Truth is that which hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime.”<sup>51</sup> Albert Camus, for his part, declared that he would defend his *pied noir* mother before justice, indicating how ethnic violence could undermine faith in universalist ideals among even the most committed humanists.<sup>52</sup>

It may not, therefore, be coincidental that many of the leading lights of poststructuralist and postmodernist thought were shaped by the Algerian experience. During Vichy, Jacques Derrida found himself excluded from his school in Algiers as Jews were rejected by both sides of a polarizing society. Marginality would be one of the main themes of an oeuvre distinguished by a profound distrust of all claims to authority.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, after Bourdieu’s experience in Algeria—where social scientists served a repressive state—he espoused a more reflexive

<sup>50</sup> “Une révolution démocratique,” *El Moudjahid*, November 15, 1957.

<sup>51</sup> Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 50.

<sup>52</sup> Albert Camus, *Essais* (Paris, 1965), 1882. On the ideological confusion provoked by the war, see Daniel Lindenberg, “Guerres de mémoire en France,” *Vingtième siècle* 42 (April–June 1994): 91–94.

<sup>53</sup> Mitchell Stephens, “Deconstructing Jacques Derrida,” *Los Angeles Times Magazine* (July 21, 1991): 14; see also *Derrida and Différance*, David Wood and Robert Bernasconi, eds. (Coventry, England, 1985), 74–75.



sociology and strove to transcend false antinomies.<sup>54</sup> “Something has changed now, radically,” Philippe Sollers wrote after his best friend was killed in the war, “The world is less pure.” He hoped to reclaim an autonomous space for texts and textual analysis by founding the journal *Tel Quel*, which became a hothouse for critical theory.<sup>55</sup> As Michael Fischer has observed, Algeria “focused attention on the need to find alternatives to the construction of totalizing ideologies, the need for theories and strategies of government that could accommodate multiple cultural perspectives and not insist that everyone see history or progress the same way.”<sup>56</sup>

Of course, it would be “a turn-up for the books,” as Stuart Hall jokes, “if the ‘key object and achievement of the Algerian War of Independence was the overthrow of the Hegelian dialectic.’”<sup>57</sup> Most contemporaries judged that the answer to Algeria’s problems was to accelerate modernization even while disagreeing about whether continued French tutelage helped or hindered that process. The FLN won over foreign opinion by representing its struggle as the next step in the march of progress: the “normal course of the historical evolution of Humanity which no longer accepts the existence of captive nations,” as stated in its 1956 platform.<sup>58</sup> While modernization theory might have legitimated and perpetuated Western authority, the FLN managed to harness it to its own agenda (though this created a host of new problems after independence).<sup>59</sup>

The idea of development was strong enough to serve multiple political projects because of its deep roots in a powerful intellectual tradition that views progress as “inevitable and inevitably directional from lower to higher forms of society,” as Michael Shafer explains.<sup>60</sup> Yet even in its heyday, the apparent failure of progress

<sup>54</sup> Lucas and Vatin, *L’Algérie des anthropologues*, 72–75. See also Pierre Bourdieu, “Les conditions sociales de la production sociologique: Sociologie coloniale et décolonisation de la sociologie,” in *Le mal de voir*, 416–27.

<sup>55</sup> Quoted in Philippe Forest, *Histoire de Tel Quel, 1960–1982* (Paris, 1995), 94–102.

<sup>56</sup> Michael M. J. Fischer, “Is Islam the Odd-Civilization Out?” *New Perspectives Quarterly* 9 (Spring 1992): 54–55. “If so called ‘so-called poststructuralism’ is the product of a single historical moment,” Robert Young rather tentatively suggests, “then that moment is probably not May 1968 but rather the Algerian War for Independence—no doubt itself both a symptom and a product.” He adds Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser, and Jean-François Lyotard to the who’s who list of those “either born in Algeria or personally involved with the events of the war.” Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London, 1990), 1.

<sup>57</sup> Stuart Hall, “When Was ‘The Post-Colonial’? Thinking at the Limit,” in Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti, eds., *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons* (London, 1996), 249. Hall is quoting a rather unfair characterization of Young’s argument by Ruth Frankenberg and Lati Mani, “Crosscurrents, Crosstalk: Race, ‘Postcoloniality’ and the Politics of Location,” *Cultural Studies* 7 (May 1993): 301. But *White Mythologies* is vulnerable to this critique because it mythologizes the Algerian “moment” rather than seriously considering how the war’s complex and protracted history might have given rise to new critiques of Western philosophical traditions—a question ripe for further research.

<sup>58</sup> Reprinted in Philippe Tripiet, *Autopsie de la guerre d’Algérie* (Paris, 1972), 599.

<sup>59</sup> On anticolonial movements’ use of universalist discourses, see Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 468–70; and Partha Chatterjee’s thought-provoking discussion, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London, 1986). Notwithstanding the title, Chatterjee’s research is limited to India. In Algeria, the religious aspect of national identity has long been a subject of lively debate. See Hugh Roberts’s astute analysis, “From Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition: The Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian Islamism, 1979–1992,” in *The Fundamentalism Project*, Vol. 4: *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements*, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. (Chicago, 1994), 428–89.

<sup>60</sup> Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, 49–50.

in places like Algeria lent strength to another intellectual tradition—less respectable but no less influential—which posits the inevitability of *decline*.<sup>61</sup>

It was in this spirit that Maurice Papon, then secretary general of the French administration in Morocco, wrote in May 1955 to René Mayer, who would shortly assume the presidency of the European Coal and Steel Community. Papon admitted that his generation had a “bitter taste in our mouths . . . when we ruminate over the events of this past half-century, because we still remember the flavor of European hegemony.” Along with the technical and economic factors undergirding the two superpowers, he insisted on the importance of “irrational elements,” “the awakening of new peoples or the reawakening of ancient, dormant peoples.” Ethnic solidarity was already undermining Europe’s control of Africa, Papon observed, but it paled in comparison to “a greater solidarity, more complex and more mystical: that of colonized and formerly colonized peoples. It draws together the African and his Asian brothers. It silently nurtures what may be the conception of the next century—in less than 50 years now—that of the union between Asia and Africa.” This “conception” would come about despite their diversity because of their common and enduring differences with the West. Chinese communists were still Confucian, Muslims were learning the tactics of Mahatma Gandhi, and all harbored grievances against Europeans. The solidarity of Asia and Africa would not only transform colonists into minorities, the independent countries were capable “of changing the face of the world. These perspectives,” Papon grimly concluded, “can only convince European nations to abandon their petty squabbles, short of which they will not even be left the choice of the sauce with which they will be eaten.” If Europeans failed to take their African domains in hand and form a united bloc, “Eurafrica,” their disappearance was “inscribed in the evolution of the world.”<sup>62</sup>

Three years later, Papon became prefect of police in Paris, where he ruthlessly put down protests against the war to retain Algeria. But he is now best known as the most senior Vichy official ever to be tried for complicity in the Holocaust—he had organized the deportation of Jews, even orphaned children, while secretary general of Bordeaux. In 1955, Papon was still just a rising star in the French administration, but he provides a striking reminder that all policymakers of his generation had a past, all came of age before the Cold War could have frozen their mindsets. Similarly, his memorandum is significant not because of its influence or the originality of its ideas—just the opposite. It is significant because of what it was influenced *by*: ideas that were important precisely because, by the 1950s, they had become so commonplace.

Even before demographic trends turned against them, Europeans and Americans had begun to imagine a global race war in much the same way. From Hermann Knackfuss’s famous painting of *Die Gelbe Gefahr* (1895) through American “Yellow Peril” novels, non-whites were depicted as a faceless, nameless mob that threatened to submerge Western civilization—a *Rising Tide of Color*, as Lothrop Stoddard

<sup>61</sup> For a survey and analysis, see Arthur Herman, *The Idea of Decline in Western History* (New York, 1997).

<sup>62</sup> “Perspectives Géopolitiques: Destin de l’Europe,” n.d. [c. early 1952], AN, Papiers de René Mayer, 363 AP32, dossier 4, Correspondance.

titled his 1921 screed.<sup>63</sup> The correlation of race and class and the potential for new media to unite impoverished masses—as they were already linking national elites—led observers to imagine the convergence of ethnic and economic unrest. “The less well endowed classes, the residue of ‘uncivilizables,’” the French anthropologist Georges Vacher de Lapogue told the International Eugenics Congress of 1923, “reproach their superiors for having created a civilization which multiplies their desires beyond the possibility of their satisfaction. An immense movement has started among races and inferior classes . . . against civilization itself. Class war is the real race war.”<sup>64</sup>

Paul Valéry was only the best known of a number of French writers who foresaw the relative decline of Europe, wondering if it would “become *what it is in reality*—that is, a little promontory on the continent of Asia?”<sup>65</sup> In North America, popular works like E. A. Ross’s *Standing Room Only?* predicted that demographic growth in poor areas would require raising a “Great Barrier of the peoples of Europe, the Americas, and Australasia against those of Africa and Asia.”<sup>66</sup> As anticolonial unrest swept East Asia, Africa, and the West Indies in the 1930s, Oswald Spengler warned that “[t]he battle for the planet has begun,” castigating Europeans for their infertility in the face of “a colored world-revolution.”<sup>67</sup>

In short, the worldviews of Cold War-era policymakers were shaped at a time in which concerns about demographic trends and international race war were pervasive in both Europe and the United States. This helps explain why, when Americans began to contemplate a confrontation with the Soviets, they reflexively typed Russians as Asiatic. Thus, in September 1945, Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal opposed sharing atomic bomb secrets with Moscow based on U.S. experience with Japan, explaining that “the Russians, like the Japanese, are essentially Oriental in their thinking” and therefore untrustworthy.<sup>68</sup> Harry S. Truman imagined Joseph Stalin as an heir to Genghis Khan, as “Eastern hordes” once again imperiled the peace. Secretary of State Dean Acheson compared the threat they posed to Europe to “that which Islam had posed centuries before.”<sup>69</sup> It

<sup>63</sup> William F. Wu, *The Yellow Peril: Chinese Americans in American Fiction, 1850–1940* (Hamden, Conn., 1982), 30–46. The standard work on the subject in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is Heinz Gollwitzer, *Die Gelbe Gefahr* (Göttingen, 1962). See also Christopher Thorne, *The Issue of War: States, Societies, and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941–1945* (London, 1985), 27–32; and John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1986), 156–64, which survey this theme through the onset of World War II.

<sup>64</sup> Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay M. Winter, *The Fear of Population Decline* (Orlando, Fla., 1985), 52.

<sup>65</sup> Paul Valéry, “The Crisis of the Mind,” in *The Collected Works of Paul Valéry*, Denise Folliot and Jackson Mathews, trans., Vol. 10, *History and Politics* (New York, 1962), 31 (emphasis in the original). See also Albertini, *Decolonization*, 11–12.

<sup>66</sup> E. A. Ross, *Standing Room Only?* (New York, 1927), 93–98, 341. See also Warren Thompson, *Danger Spots in World Population* (New York, 1930), 327–28.

<sup>67</sup> Oswald Spengler, *The Hour of Decision*, Part 1: *Germany and World-Historical Evolution*, Charles Francis Atkinson, trans. (New York, 1934), 227.

<sup>68</sup> Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), 95–96. Similarly, in his famed long telegram of 1946, George F. Kennan attributed to the Soviets an “Oriental secretiveness and conspiracy.” Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston, 1967), 547–59. On typing Russians as Asiatic, see Dower, *War without Mercy*, 309.

<sup>69</sup> Monte M. Poen, ed., *Strictly Personal and Confidential: The Letters Harry Truman Never Mailed* (Boston, 1982), 145; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), 490, quoted in Hunt, *Ideology*, 156–57.

should therefore be no surprise that when Asian and Muslim peoples themselves appeared to challenge Western power, Americans and Europeans viewed it, *a fortiori*, as a reprise of these ancient rivalries. Although few besides Papon took the trouble to update the "Yellow Peril" in such a systematic fashion, his preoccupation with population growth, fear that all non-whites could and would unite against the West, and vision of Eurafrica as the answer made up the imaginative framework that underlay many of his contemporaries' discussions of decolonization and possible North-South conflict.

Yet it is important to note that Westerners' perceptions of the racial and demographic dimensions of international relations could lead them to appease or at least spare Third World peoples. Even during what John Dower has called the "War without Mercy" against Japan, Americans had sought to placate what they perceived as anti-white sentiment in order to prevent Tokyo from uniting Asia against Western colonialism.<sup>70</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt, for instance, "was concerned about the brown people in the East," as he put it. "[T]here are 1,100,000,000 brown people . . . Our goal must be to help them achieve independence—1,100,000,000 potential enemies are dangerous."<sup>71</sup> Although some have argued that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were racially motivated, this impression helped deter a recurrence in the 1950s. When Dwight D. Eisenhower's advisers considered using nuclear weapons to save the French at Dien Bien Phu, he exclaimed, "You boys must be crazy. We can't use those awful things against Asians for the second time in less than ten years. My God."<sup>72</sup>

Eisenhower's remark shows how he could view Cold War crises through a lens ground from racial anxieties, rather than the other way around. This is not to deny that anticommunism was the more immediate concern, especially in his first term, nor that it led him and his secretary of state to be cautious about decolonization. "[T]here are plenty of social problems and unrest which would exist if there were no such thing as Soviet communism in the world," Dulles acknowledged in testimony before Congress in 1953. "[B]ut what makes it a very dangerous problem for us," he insisted, "is the fact that wherever those things exist . . . the forces of unrest are captured by the Soviet communists."<sup>73</sup>

Similarly, Eisenhower wrote, "in some instances immediate independence would result in suffering for people and even anarchy." But in the same breath, he suggested that attempting to preserve the status quo would lead to the same result. Shortly before his inauguration, he rejected a proposal by Winston Churchill to unite to preserve Western control of the colonies: "In the present international complexities, any hope of establishing such [a] relationship is completely fatuous," he concluded. "Nationalism is on the march."<sup>74</sup>

While opposing a precipitous withdrawal, both Eisenhower and Dulles insisted

<sup>70</sup> Dower, *War without Mercy*, 160–78; Thorne, *Issue of War*, 177–89. See also Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941–1945* (London, 1978), 7–9, 157–58, 172–75, 191, 359–60, 539.

<sup>71</sup> Gary R. Hess, *Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War* (Boston, 1990), 29.

<sup>72</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, Vol. 2: *The President* (New York, 1984), 184.

<sup>73</sup> Egya Sangmuah, "The United States and the French Empire in North Africa, 1946–1956: Decolonization in the Age of Containment" (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 1989), 349.

<sup>74</sup> Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York, 1981), 223.

on pro-active reforms leading to greater political autonomy, especially for colonies that exported critical resources. Otherwise, the president worried that “even the so-called enlightened areas of Western Europe, Britain, the United States, and other English-speaking peoples, will by stubborn adherence to the purpose of achieving immediate gain, actually commit suicide.”<sup>75</sup> Similarly, as early as 1949, Dulles told the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, that Africa’s “vast resources” could compensate for Western Europe’s loss of access to the East and Asian colonies as long as the two regions engaged in “friendly collaboration.” But if the West dealt with colonial questions “in a manner that excites a Moslem holy war or race war of black against white, then the foundation of North-South development would disappear.”<sup>76</sup> In this way, discussions of vital questions about industry and trade were bounded by a limited repertoire of cultural representations that allowed for *either* a hierarchical relationship of tutelage *or* an atavistic struggle between races and religions.

Like the race-war theorists of the interwar period, the president and his advisers often conflated or confused the political, economic, and cultural aspects of anticolonialism. They pictured Third World movements as a force of nature, often using the imagery of a flood, a tide, or a wave. Thus, in urging Churchill to make decolonization his crowning achievement, Eisenhower wrote, “there is abroad in the world a fierce and growing spirit of nationalism. Should we try to dam it up completely, it would, like a mighty river, burst through the barriers and could create havoc. But again, like a river, if we are intelligent enough to make constructive use of this force, then the result, far from being disastrous, could redound greatly to our advantage, particularly in our struggle against the Kremlin’s power.”<sup>77</sup> While demeaning to anticolonial movements, portraying decolonization as taming nature made it part of modernization and coded counter-insurgency as unenlightened, even primitive. What, then, was to be done with an ally that continued to insist on confronting Third World nationalism head-on?

While Churchill finally relinquished power the following year, the French in North Africa appeared ready to fight to the bitter end. Since 1950, the State Department had adhered to a “middle-of-the-road” policy in the region—supporting Paris in public and especially at the United Nations while privately urging political reforms. Yet this policy had aroused French suspicions of the Americans’ motives without sparing them the enmity of North African nationalists and their growing band of supporters.<sup>78</sup> In April 1955, the world’s first Afro-Asian conference

<sup>75</sup> Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 245.

<sup>76</sup> Quoted in Ronald W. Pruessen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power* (New York, 1982), 425.

<sup>77</sup> Quoted in Gregory A. Olson, “Eisenhower and the Indochina Problem,” in Martin J. Medhurst, ed., *Eisenhower’s War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership* (East Lansing, Mich., 1994), 98.

<sup>78</sup> On North Africa in Franco-American relations, see Matthew Connelly, “The French-American Conflict over North Africa and the Fall of the Fourth Republic,” *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer* 84 (June 1997): 9–27; Pierre Mélandri, “La France et le ‘jeu double’ des Etats-Unis,” in Jean-Pierre Rioux, ed., *La guerre d’Algérie et les Français* (Paris, 1990), 428–50; Egey N. Sangmuah, “Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956–1960,” *Middle East Journal* 44 (Winter 1990): 76–91; Irwin M. Wall, “The United States, Algeria, and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic,” *Diplomatic History* 18 (Fall 1994): 489–511.



in Bandung, Indonesia, issued a ringing endorsement of North Africa's right to independence.<sup>79</sup>

Three months later, when nationalist unrest spread to the French protectorate of Morocco and appeared to endanger American Strategic Air Command bases, Dulles ordered the consul general in Tangier, Julius Holmes, to conduct a secret review of U.S. policy. The secretary complained that the American approach to North Africa had for too long been dominated by a concern for France and insisted that "the issues at stake for the United States in North Africa are much broader." It was dangerous, not only in North Africa but also in similar areas, to consider policy solely, or even mainly, in terms of relations with the European powers. According to Dulles, the United States thereby risked alienating "the great mass of mankind which is non-white and non-European."<sup>80</sup>

Holmes's report also expresses a view of decolonization as a matter of managing race relations between separate and increasingly unequal populations. Regarding North Africans and French policies toward them, Holmes was "struck by the homogeneity of the former and the diversity of the latter." Twenty-five million Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians, united—according to Holmes—by a common language, culture, and religion, were increasing by 500,000 each year. The French could not therefore "ignore the march of history as expressed by the wave of nationalism that has swept the former colonial world since the end of the war." When united, as at Bandung and the UN, it was "a powerful force with which Europe and America must reckon to an ever increasing degree."<sup>81</sup> Holmes's conclusions appeared to be confirmed in September, when the Afro-Asian states succeeded in placing Algeria on the UN General Assembly's agenda, provoking a French walkout. While the debate raged, Holmes wrote to Dulles that, in the face of the "riptide of nationalism in Africa and Asia," the United States should work to preserve the area for the West. Only self-government could "counteract the attractions of Pan-Arabism and the 'Brotherhood' of Islam." But he was scathing in his assessment of the French capacity for evolution, judging them "allergic to change."<sup>82</sup>

In fact, even as he wrote these words, the French government was moving to grant independence to Morocco—and for the very reasons cited by Holmes and Eisenhower before him. Aspirations to self-government, Prime Minister Edgar Faure argued in the National Assembly, "in a country like Morocco, cannot be

<sup>79</sup> *L'année politique, 1955* (Paris, 1956), 383–86. This conference was particularly troubling to Dulles, who considered the possibility of organizing a "reverse Bandung"—a conference that would demonstrate "a community of interest across racial lines and a slowing down of the racially conscious antipathy now developing in non-white areas"; Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, N.J., 1980), 83.

<sup>80</sup> "On the other hand, premature independence may be snatched away by extremists—usually Communist inspired," Dulles added in his own hand; Dulles to Holmes, July 13, 1955, Dulles Papers. At this point, he was still undecided as to whether the greater danger lay in supporting independence or the status quo. By 1957, his conversion to the cause of accelerated decolonization—at least for North Africa—would be complete.

<sup>81</sup> Julius Holmes, "Report on French North Africa," July 29, 1955, USNA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00.

<sup>82</sup> Holmes memo for Dulles, September 29, 1955, FRUS, 1955–57, XVIII, 105, 108–09. American diplomats often depicted their French allies as diseased or sickly, although the imagery of Franco-American relations lies beyond the scope of this article. See Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance since World War II* (New York, 1992).

denied, nor broken, and we must divert it towards cooperation with France.”<sup>83</sup> Faure was defeated in the next round of elections, but Guy Mollet’s new government took up this policy of diverting the force of nationalism around Algeria by accommodating moderates in Morocco and Tunisia, too. They conceded “independence within interdependence” to the protectorates, calculating that French aid and advisers could limit their autonomy by maintaining cultural, commercial, and military ties. As Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury explained it to Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon in February 1956, this was “a struggle between Middle Eastern Islamic fanaticism and Western-oriented moderate nationalism.”<sup>84</sup>

In its most ambitious formulation, this policy envisioned striking a deal with secular nationalists in Algeria itself. Four days after the new government’s investiture, Foreign Minister Christian Pineau told Dillon that, “if [the] problem could be limited strictly to Algerian nationalist aspirations, [the] government felt confident that [a] solution could be reached,” since they were “prepared to make far reaching concessions. However if [the] problem became one of Islam versus the French, partaking the aspects of a holy war, it was clear that the French could never find a solution and [the] eventual results were impossible to foresee.”<sup>85</sup>

Dividing North Africans into categories opposing “moderate nationalists” to “Islamic fanatics” was a discursive as well as a political strategy. It helped the French to imagine Algerian proteges and argue for U.S. support. “Far reaching concessions” would unite everyone who was “Western-oriented” and mark off a shared space in which all results were possible to foresee, averting a contest—“Islam versus the French”—that France might actually lose. Ironically, it was the fanaticism of French settlers that sabotaged this strategy. Two days after the Pineau-Dillon meeting, rioting mobs of *pieds noirs* forced Mollet to install a hard-liner, Robert Lacoste, as his government’s representative in Algiers.

The new resident minister relished the idea of civilizational combat. Lacoste’s first “General Directive” asserted, “The war we are waging in this country is that of the Western World, of civilization against anarchy, democracy against dictatorship.”<sup>86</sup> Interestingly, while relegating the FLN to the realm of the unredeemable “other,” this directive did not refer to, or even allude to, the Soviets. The prime minister himself believed that pan-Islamism had all but eclipsed the Soviet threat. “The present period will be decisive for the future of the world,” Mollet told British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. “After having contained the offensive of pan-slavism, the West must now confront that of pan-Islamism, which conspires with Soviet pan-slavism. Colonel Nasser, in his writings, has made his objective known: to recreate the empire of Islam around Egypt.” Mollet insisted that there was “only

<sup>83</sup> *L’année politique, 1955*, 73.

<sup>84</sup> Dillon to Dulles, February 25, 1956, USNA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00. For other examples of this view, see Dillon to Dulles, February 17, 1956, 751S.00; Dillon to Dulles, March 2, 1956, USNA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 651.71; “Note: Réflexions préliminaires sur le problème marocain” (unsigned), February 1956, Archives de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris (hereafter, FNSP), Alain Savary Papers, SV9, Dr2.

<sup>85</sup> Dillon to Dulles, February 4, 1956, USNA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00.

<sup>86</sup> “Directive Générale,” May 19, 1956, AOM, Affaires Algériennes, Echelons de Liaison, Sections Administratives Spécialisées, DOC.SAS 1.

one game which is being played out in the Near East as in North Africa: that of the expansion of pan-Islamism.”<sup>87</sup>

As we have seen, Egypt did indeed provide propaganda support to North African nationalists, not to mention covert shipments of arms and ammunition. But even aside from the absurd notion that Nasser, a sworn enemy of the Muslim Brothers, intended to create an Islamic empire, the French grossly overestimated his influence. Indeed, they were preparing to strike at Nasser and “pan-Islamism” just as the FLN was rejecting both Egyptian influence and religious nationalism.<sup>88</sup> When the FLN’s leadership met secretly in the Soummam valley later that year, they criticized “the Arab states in general and Egypt in particular” for their limited and inconsistent support—inconsistent because Nasser had manipulated the weapons supply to induce France to limit support for Israel.<sup>89</sup> Similarly, the Soummam platform stressed the “national, political, and social” nature of the revolution, explicitly repudiating colonial propaganda that portrayed it as a “fanatical religious movement in the service of panislamism.”<sup>90</sup> Of course, that did not settle the question.<sup>91</sup> Yet to the extent that the French succeeded in representing their struggle as a race war or *jihad*, they hurt themselves more than the Algerians. The image of an anarchic and implacably antiwestern Algeria—ever present in Western perceptions—only undermined their argument that it could be pacified, prosperous, and remain an integral part of France.

Dulles and Eisenhower were loathe to join any crusade against Islam, although they did hope to isolate Nasser. After failing to broker a peace settlement with Israel, Eisenhower complained that “the Arabs, absorbing major consignments of arms from the Soviets, are daily growing more arrogant and disregarding the interests of Western Europe and of the United States in the Middle East region.”<sup>92</sup> When the United States and Britain withdrew from the Aswan High Dam project in July 1956 and Nasser, buttressed by Soviet support, retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal, the “occidental” and “oriental” coalitions would appear to have been complete. After all the water imagery and worries about an Afro-Asian union, it was altogether fitting that the crisis came to a head over a dam and that the two sides lined up along the canal dividing the two continents. But Mollet feared that the Americans would shrink from an all-out clash of civilizations, warning

<sup>87</sup> Memcon Mollet-Eden, March 11, 1956, *Documents diplomatiques français*, 1956, I (Paris, 1988), No. 161 (hereafter, DDF with year and volume). This was not an isolated view. That same month, the respected former president Vincent Auriol called Algeria “today’s center of Islamic aggression”; Dillon to State Department, March 2, 1956, USNA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00.

<sup>88</sup> Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever, *Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie. 1954–1962* (Paris, 1982), 103.

<sup>89</sup> Matthew Connelly, “The Algerian War for Independence: An International History” (PhD dissertation, Yale University, 1997), 221–26.

<sup>90</sup> Tripier, *Autopsie de la guerre d’Algérie*, 599–600. See also Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: Mirage et réalité* (Paris, 1980), 174.

<sup>91</sup> The FLN did use religious names and symbols, and among the *mujahadeen* there were certainly those who fought to defend Islam; see Muhammad Muru, *Al-Jaza’ir ta’udu li-Muhammad* (Algiers, 1992), 101–02. See also Charles-Robert Ageron, “Une guerre religieuse?” *Les Cahiers de l’Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent* (October 9, 1988): 27–29; Jacques Frémeaux, *La France et l’Islam depuis 1789* (Paris, 1991), 248–50.

<sup>92</sup> Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 318–19.

Ambassador Dillon that “the US was embarking on the same course of error by appeasement that had been followed toward Hitler in the 1930’s.”<sup>93</sup>

In fact, U.S. policymakers also interpreted Nasser’s action as racial and religious fanaticism aimed at “reducing Western Europe literally to a state of dependency”—as Dulles put it—rather than as a bid for national political and economic independence.<sup>94</sup> Yet sharing a discourse did not exclude differences between governments and may even have exacerbated them. When Eisenhower had met with his advisers to decide the American response, CIA director Allen Dulles warned that the military action envisioned by the allies “would arouse the whole Arab world. The President enlarged this to the whole Moslem world.” Eisenhower remarked that Nasser “embodies the emotional demands of the people of the area for independence and for ‘slapping the white Man down,’” and worried that joining in an attack on Egypt could “array the world from Dakar to the Philippine Islands against us.” The “mighty river” of Arab and Islamic nationalism he had long feared was now threatening to overflow its banks. This was no time for gunboat diplomacy.<sup>95</sup>

So when Britain, France, and Israel colluded in an attack on Suez, Washington forced them to withdraw by withholding economic support and leading the diplomatic opposition.<sup>96</sup> Eisenhower then resolved to seek congressional authorization to extend aid to Middle Eastern allies and, if necessary, deploy American forces against “overt armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.” As H. W. Brands has argued, the administration sold the Eisenhower Doctrine as anticommunism, but it was really aimed at Nasser, who had grown even stronger as a result of Suez.<sup>97</sup> At the time, some in the State Department were even entertaining the idea of a Middle Eastern entente with the Soviets. In a January 1957 briefing for Dulles’s eventual successor, Christian Herter, one official suggested the possibility of “a deal with the Russians which would involve our refraining from a military buildup in the area in return for the Soviets refraining from encouraging instability.”<sup>98</sup>

In fact, in the course of 1957, Soviet-Egyptian relations grew increasingly tense. Moscow was no less disturbed than Washington when, in January 1958, Nasser merged Egypt with Syria as the United Arab Republic. The authors of a National Security Council study concluded that the United States could not “close the door firmly to the possibility of any conceivable understanding with the Soviet Union.” “We have not defined, on an area basis, with any precision the degree of Soviet presence and influence in a country which we would be prepared to tolerate.” Although the rest of the paper expresses a conventional East-West view, the fact that the authors considered acquiescing in Soviet expansion indicates they could

<sup>93</sup> Dillon to Dulles, July 31, 1956. FRUS, 1955–57, XVI, 74–77.

<sup>94</sup> Memcon Eisenhower, Dulles, *et al.*, with congressional leadership, August 12, 1956, FRUS, 1955–57, XVI, 189–92.

<sup>95</sup> Memcon Eisenhower, Dulles, *et al.*, July 31, 1956, 63–64; Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 331.

<sup>96</sup> There is a vast and growing literature on the Suez crisis, but the best general history remains Keith Kyle’s *Suez* (London, 1991). On the economic aspects, see also Diane Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991).

<sup>97</sup> H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism*, 282–89.

<sup>98</sup> “Guidelines for Review of US Foreign Policy,” January 7, 1957, USNA, RG 59, PPS, Lot 67D548, Box 119, Foreign Policy, 1957–60.

imagine something even worse.<sup>99</sup> Dulles himself noted in March 1958 that “Soviet plots” were nowhere in evidence in Indonesia, North Africa, or the Middle East—then the major trouble spots and all Islamic areas, as Irwin Wall has noted—while Ike took “vigorous exception” to the idea that others were acting on Moscow’s behalf.<sup>100</sup>

Thus, by 1958, the Eisenhower administration had come to view Arab and Islamic nationalism as a force in its own right, though one the Soviets might use to turn the Western flank from the south. That same month, Dulles told French Foreign Minister Pineau that “the prospect of seeing the hostilities spread beyond North Africa from Algeria to the Persian Gulf—with the communists providing logistical support and armed aid” was “terrifying” to him.<sup>101</sup> The French position in Algeria had not only continued to deteriorate after Suez, they were poised to expand the conflict by attacking FLN bases in Tunisia. After they bombed a Tunisian border town and ignited an international uproar, Dulles tried to force them to the negotiating table, once again exploiting U.S. economic leverage. The secretary told the French ambassador, Hervé Alphand, “it is indispensable that you look for a political solution while there is still time.” More specifically, he said, “whatever may be the French determination to continue the fight . . . financial conditions could, at some point, stand in their way,” adding that certain senators had asked him to renege on an earlier loan.<sup>102</sup>

Dulles ought to have been concerned about domestic criticism of his “middle-of-the-road” policy on Algeria. In July 1957, even before the crisis, John F. Kennedy had condemned U.S. support for France in a Senate speech. But the secretary seems to have been more preoccupied by the effects on North-South relations. In the midst of the Tunisian crisis, he repeated for a French newspaper correspondent his vision of North Africa “as a kind of pool of raw materials for Western Europe like the Western states were for the thirteen colonies during the formation of our republic.” Yet he feared that the war was leading to “grave dissension between the West and Islam.”<sup>103</sup> Eisenhower backed his efforts, declaring that there was “no solution to the North African problem except a political settlement which would give Algeria a chance for independence.” Most important, he was prepared to “accept considerable risks as far as France’s role in NATO was concerned in an effort to try to get France to take such a position.”<sup>104</sup>

In April 1958, the French government bowed to American pressure to settle the border conflict with Tunisia. The following month, amid rumors of a “diplomatic Dien Bien Phu,” *pieds noirs* in Algiers once again took to the streets and, with the support of the army, succeeded in returning Charles de Gaulle to power. While Le Général was in a stronger position to demand U.S. support, his backers did not

<sup>99</sup> NSC 5801 Staff Study, January 16, 1958, DDEL, White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security, NSC Series, PPS, Box 23. On the Soviets and the UAR, see Gerges, *Superpowers*, 90–96.

<sup>100</sup> Wall, “United States, Algeria,” 491.

<sup>101</sup> Memcon Dulles-Lloyd-Pineau, March 12, 1958, DDF, 1958, I, No. 179.

<sup>102</sup> Alphand to Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, March 5, 1958, MAE, Direction Amérique 1952–63, États-Unis—Algérie, dossier 33 (provisoire). Regarding American economic diplomacy, see Connelly, “French-American Conflict.”

<sup>103</sup> Alphand to Pineau, April 25, 1958, MAE, Série MLA, dossier 24 (provisoire).

<sup>104</sup> Memcon Eisenhower-Dulles, April 3, 1958, FRUS, 1958–60, XIII, 841.



realize that he opposed assimilation. "The Muslims, have you gone to see them?" he asked Alain Peyrefitte, a Gaullist deputy. "You've looked at them, with their turbans and their djellabas? You can see that these are not Frenchmen!" "Do you believe that the French body could absorb ten million Muslims, who tomorrow will be twenty million and the day after that forty? . . . [H]ow would we prevent them from coming to settle in the metropole, where the standard of living is so much higher. My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées!"<sup>105</sup>

De Gaulle would not, however, concede Algeria independence, hoping instead that it would become part of a larger confederation—the Communauté—which would ensure continued French influence in Africa and repair relations with the Arab world. Ironically, as de Gaulle moved to grant Algeria greater autonomy and appease Egypt, the Americans headed for a confrontation with Nasser. Blaming him for the fall of the pro-Western government in Iraq in July 1958, Eisenhower grew alarmed over "the struggle of Nasser to get control of these [petroleum] supplies—to get the income and the power to destroy the Western world. Somewhere along the line we have got to face up to that issue." If confronted with an embargo, the president had already said he would go to war to break it.<sup>106</sup>

De Gaulle opposed British and U.S. plans to land troops in support of friendly regimes in Jordan and Lebanon, predicting that it would be perceived as "an Occidental intervention." "[T]hey don't distinguish much between us," he told Dulles, "and they are quite right not to."<sup>107</sup> Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish the Eisenhower administration's approach to the Arab world during the Lebanon crisis from that of the French before Suez. Vice-President Richard Nixon insisted that "we could not allow a wave of mob emotionalism to sweep away all our positions in the Near East." Similarly, Dulles advised that "we must regard Arab nationalism as a flood which is running strongly. We cannot successfully oppose it, but we can put up sandbags around positions we must protect."<sup>108</sup>

Yet the secretary had lost credibility on the issue, admitting that "the Iraqi government fell because Iraq was in an unnatural association . . . in the Baghdad Pact"—an anticommunist alliance with Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan that he himself had supported.<sup>109</sup> By now calling it "unnatural," he tacitly accepted that Arab unity was a more "natural" organizing principle of international politics. In an apparent rebuke to Dulles, Eisenhower concluded in the next National Security Council meeting that, "Since we are about to get thrown out of the area, we might as well believe in Arab nationalism." He withdrew U.S. troops from Lebanon and

<sup>105</sup> Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle* (Paris, 1994), 52, and see also 54–55. Discerning de Gaulle's original intentions is extremely difficult as the general himself gave widely varying accounts, but he is quoted as saying much the same thing on a number of other occasions; see Xavier Yacono, *De Gaulle et le F.L.N. 1958–1962: L'échec d'une politique et ses prolongements* (Versailles, 1989), 20–21. For an analysis of his Algeria policy, see Connelly, "Algerian War," 347–59.

<sup>106</sup> Memcon with Vice President, July 15, 1958, FRUS, 1958–60, XI, 244; Kaufman, *Trade and Aid*, 90–91.

<sup>107</sup> Memcon Dulles-de Gaulle, *et al.*, July 5, 1958, USNA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 611.51.

<sup>108</sup> 373rd Meeting of the NSC, July 24, 1958, DDEL, Ann Whitman File (AWF), NSC Series; memcon Dulles-Eisenhower, *et al.*, July 23, 1958, FRUS, 1958–60, XII, 98. Nixon spoke as an authority on mobs, having almost been killed by one in Caracas two months earlier.

<sup>109</sup> 373rd Meeting of the NSC; Gerges, *Superpowers*, 27.

accepted a compromise settlement, deciding to work with Arab nationalism and particularly with Nasser in view of his support among “the great mass of Arabs.”<sup>110</sup>

In the meantime, de Gaulle had grown disgusted with Washington’s disregard for traditional French interests in the Levant. On September 14, he invited Konrad Adenauer to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises for a “man-to-man” talk.<sup>111</sup> De Gaulle declared that France was no longer menaced “except by the danger that comes from the East”: “This is all the more reason to bring Europe together against Asia. We must extend the peace toward the East, toward Poland for example which must not remain within Asian hands. This is also true of Czechoslovakia, of Hungary, and even—why not?—of European Russia.” He argued that Europeans should unite to resist becoming an instrument of the United States. They had to unite all of Europe, he warned, or there would be no Europe.<sup>112</sup>

Thus, like Papon before him, de Gaulle believed Europeans risked extinction if they did not unite and pursue a larger ambition under French leadership, ultimately forming a power bloc—Eurafrica—to compete with the superpowers and withstand Asia’s resurgence. Yet the Algerian War had to be settled first, and he believed that the FLN could never be forced to accept less than complete independence as long as Washington did not give France a free hand in North Africa.<sup>113</sup> Later that month, de Gaulle therefore presented Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan with a memorandum arguing that NATO was ill-adapted to the global nature of the Soviet challenge. What was needed was an entirely new organization joining the United States, Britain, and France in strategic decision-making and dividing the world into their respective spheres of influence. He concluded by emphasizing that this tripartite organization was “indispensable,” and that France “subordinates to it as of now all development of its present participation in NATO.”<sup>114</sup>

Despite this threat, in December the United States abstained instead of voting with France’s supporters against an Afro-Asian General Assembly resolution that recognized the Algerians’ right to independence. De Gaulle was furious. Eisenhower and Dulles had never complained about his handling of Algeria and had often expressed their admiration. Moreover, while there were several areas of contention in Franco-American relations—especially de Gaulle’s refusal to allow the stationing of American nuclear stockpiles on French soil—he had been

<sup>110</sup> Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 175.

<sup>111</sup> Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, Vol. 2: *Le politique, 1944–1959* (Paris, 1985), 636.

<sup>112</sup> Memcon de Gaulle-Adenauer, September 14, 1958, DDF, 1958, II, No. 155. It is interesting to note that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were the first East European states admitted to NATO.

<sup>113</sup> Connelly, “Algerian War,” 371–75, 398–402, 412–15. On de Gaulle and Eurafrica, see also Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (forthcoming).

<sup>114</sup> De Gaulle to Eisenhower, September 17, 1958, FRUS, 1958–60, VII, Part 2, 81–83. Alphand told the British ambassador to Washington that the memorandum was prompted by a lack of U.S.-French cooperation in North Africa; see Caccia to Lloyd, October 31, 1958, Public Record Office, Kew, London (hereafter, PRO), PREM 11/3002; see also Connelly, “Algerian War,” 380–86, and Irwin Wall, “Les relations Franco-Américaines et la guerre d’Algérie,” *Revue d’histoire diplomatique* 110 (1996): 78–80. For differing interpretations, see Maurice Vaisse, “Aux origines du mémorandum de septembre 1958,” *Relations internationales* 58 (Summer 1989): 253–68; and Trachtenberg, *Constructed Peace*, chap. 6.

unfailingly loyal in opposing Nikita Khrushchev's ongoing attack on allied rights in Berlin.<sup>115</sup>

How is the American attitude to be understood? While Dulles began to express regret in the last months of his life that decolonization was proceeding too rapidly and that the General Assembly had grown to be unmanageable, he still preferred risking relations with France to confronting the Third World.<sup>116</sup> Thus he opposed the tripartite proposal not so much because of the vehement opposition of the other NATO allies but because it might offend the countries of Africa and the Middle East. By 1958, he and Eisenhower wanted to avoid being identified with colonialism at all costs. De Gaulle's return had not reduced Algeria's status as the anticolonial struggle par excellence—indeed, it attracted even more attention to it.<sup>117</sup>

In March 1959, de Gaulle ordered the French Mediterranean fleet to withdraw from NATO command.<sup>118</sup> “[T]he basic cause of this,” Ambassador Alphand explained, “had been the profound personal shock to General de Gaulle of the US abstention in the UN debate on Algeria.”<sup>119</sup> In addition, Paris reiterated its opposition to the stationing of nuclear stockpiles unless it received satisfaction on the tripartite proposal, Algeria, and American assistance to France's nuclear program. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt compelled to withdraw nine American squadrons and begin planning the redeployment of U.S. forces from France.<sup>120</sup>

By August, the Joint Chiefs were insisting that Washington “get off the dime” and back de Gaulle in Algeria. But in a National Security Council meeting, Eisenhower dismissed the very idea: “To support the French would be to run counter to everything we have done in the past . . . To stand up with the colonial powers would be to cut ourselves from our own moorings; it was an adventurous idea.” Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. representative to the UN, pointed out that Algeria “had become a symbol in the Arab countries and in the Muslim world as a whole.” While Eisenhower understood “why military men could take the position that NATO was more important than Algeria,” he insisted that “we had to continue to take a somewhat cagey position.”<sup>121</sup>

Even though the president did not explain this “cagey position,” it appears to have precluded providing what the French would have considered full and

<sup>115</sup> On de Gaulle's reaction, see Hervé Alphand, *L'étonnement d'être: Journal, 1933–1973* (Paris, 1977), 301. For a particularly effusive example of Dulles's praise for de Gaulle's Algerian policy, see Alphand to Couve, October 17, 1958, MAE, MLA, dossier 24 (provisoire), Action Extérieure, Etats-Unis, Janvier 58–Juin 59, Cote ML 4. For a list of U.S.-French differences, see Merchant to Herter, November 28, 1958, FRUS, 1958–60, VII, Part 2, 124–26, though the author notes de Gaulle was “stout” vis-à-vis the Soviets.

<sup>116</sup> Jebb to Lloyd, October 2, 1958, PRO, PREM 11/3002; Alphand, *L'étonnement*, 291.

<sup>117</sup> Caccia to Lloyd, October 25, 1958, PRO, PREM 11/3002. On this point, see also Caccia to Lloyd, October 17, 1958; and memcon Dulles-Lloyd, October 19, 1958, PREM 11/3002.

<sup>118</sup> Herter to Paris, March 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958–60, XIII, 650.

<sup>119</sup> Memcon Herter-Alphand, March 3, 1959, USNA, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1957–1961, Lot 67D548, Box 136, France. Three days later, de Gaulle's foreign minister confirmed that “France was motivated in this move entirely by French reasons, the Algerian situation”; Lyon to Herter, March 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958–60, VII, Part 2, 185–86. See also Memcon Debré-Herter, *et al.*, May 1, 1959, FRUS, 1958–60, VII, Part 2, 195–203.

<sup>120</sup> Memcon Herter-Eisenhower, May 2, 1959, FRUS, 1958–60, VII, Part 2, 203–07; editorial note, 234–35.

<sup>121</sup> 417th Meeting of the NSC, August 18, 1959, DDEL, AWF, NSC Series.

forthright support, no matter what policy they proposed. Even when, the following month, de Gaulle announced that Algerians would have the right to choose independence in a referendum, Eisenhower still would not vote with France's supporters at the UN. Interpreting the proposed National Security Council policy, the president stated that "a solution 'in consonance with U.S. interests' meant that we should avoid the charge that we were one of the colonial powers." The solution itself was secondary; it was avoiding the charge that mattered—and to Eisenhower it mattered a great deal.<sup>122</sup> Earlier that year, he had told the National Security Council that population growth had become "a constant worry to him and from time to time reduced him to despair." Now he complained that American aid had focused excessively on the communist threat: "we have had a narrower view than we should have. The real menace here was the one and a half billion hungry people in the world."<sup>123</sup>

EISENHOWER AND HIS ADMINISTRATION sometimes had a narrow view, but it is remarkable how far-reaching their vision could be. Historians who assume that they were blinded by a "Cold War lens," on the other hand, have been unable to explain their focus on the emerging Third World. "Why would US leaders, at a time when the power of the United States was at its historic zenith, have been driven to such a degree by their sense of danger, fear, and vulnerability," Robert McMahon asks. "If, as appears almost certainly the case, US interpretations of the Soviet threat in the Third World—and elsewhere—were vastly exaggerated, then how do we account for such exaggerations?"<sup>124</sup>

As long as we assume that U.S. leaders only worried about the Soviets, it is indeed difficult to account for their policies. This analysis has explored their fears of North-South conflict to explain their willingness to jeopardize NATO in order to appease Third World sentiment about the Algerian War—even when they agreed with the French position. But it may also illuminate other aspects of American

<sup>122</sup> Of course, de Gaulle had given the Americans grief in a number of other matters, but it does not appear that Eisenhower used the Algerian issue opportunistically. He was sympathetic to the general's position on NATO and nuclear sharing, asserting that "these difficulties can be ironed out. Algeria is the main problem." Memcon Eisenhower-Luns-Spaak, September 3, 1959, FRUS, 1958–60, VII, Part 1, 480–84.

<sup>123</sup> 408th and 417th Meetings of the NSC, May 28, 1959 and August 18, 1959, DDEL, AWF, NSC Series. In 1958, Eisenhower had instructed General William H. Draper to take up the population question in his blue ribbon committee on U.S. foreign aid. An internal document titled "The Population Explosion" predicted "international class war" if nothing were done. The committee's 1959 report called for U.S. assistance to control population growth although Eisenhower felt it was politically impossible to back them. However, after leaving office, he joined with Truman to serve as co-chairmen of the Planned Parenthood Federation; Oscar Harkavy, *Curbing Population Growth: An Insider's Perspective on the Population Movement* (New York, 1995), 35–37; Donald T. Critchlow, "Birth Control, Population Control, and Family Planning: An Overview," *Journal of Policy History* 7 (1995): 10.

<sup>124</sup> Robert McMahon, "The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of the Soviet Threat, 1955–1956," *International History Review* 18 (August 1996): 616–17. After his massive study of the Truman administration, Melvyn P. Leffler is left pondering the same mystery: "For prudent men to have attributed so much importance to the periphery, for them to have possessed such exaggerated notions of Soviet capabilities in the Third World . . . was foolish indeed." *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif., 1992), 511.

diplomacy in the period, such as foreign aid, along with domestic policy on civil rights and immigration.<sup>125</sup>

Determining how ideas and imagery of development and cultural difference shaped North-South relations requires much more research not only in state archives but also the papers of multinational corporations, foundations, and international organizations, which are all too often ignored in cultural studies.<sup>126</sup> In some cases, they may only confirm scholars' worst suspicions about how the rich and powerful have sought to limit other peoples' independence, but they show why an informed critique cannot rely on the public record. As Dulles confided to de Gaulle: "I've always felt that in every society since time began there were a few people who have exercised the controlling force. It all depends on how they do it. We must do it in a manner not to irritate the others. Those of us having greater responsibilities must exercise these powers. France too has great responsibility and must play her role. I feel that any too close association must be avoided in order to avoid offense to smaller nations." Historians have a responsibility of their own when confronted with this kind of evidence. It demonstrates why they cannot limit their work to recovering the voices of subalterns, since theirs is not the only silence that bespeaks hegemony. They must sometimes make *elites* speak—a task that can be no less difficult and no less vital.<sup>127</sup>

Yet once we examine how discourses operated in elite decision-making, we discover that they were hardly hegemonic. Dulles and de Gaulle could use the same language of development and civilizational conflict to argue forcefully for very different policies. Even when the French and the Americans deployed the same discourses to communicate the same approach, they still found it all too easy to avoid "any too close association." Indeed, Third World peoples could seize on these ideas and imagery to divide the allies and empower themselves, as the Algerians soon realized. We have already seen how they naturalized their struggle as part of the "normal course of the historical evolution of humanity." But as they neared negotiations, they also played on anxieties about a wider war along religious and

<sup>125</sup> For instance, how else can we explain why, of all the Cold War-era presidents, it was Eisenhower—a fierce deficit hawk, miserly even with his friends—who made increasing economic aid to the Third World a top priority? "I put not only my life's work, but my reputation and everything else, on the line in favor of this," he told one recalcitrant senator. As Burton Kaufman notes, for good or ill, his successors "merely built on the legacies that Eisenhower left them." Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 16, 376–81; Kaufman, *Trade and Aid*, 14, 103–12, 208. Regarding the foreign policy concerns that influenced administration policy on civil rights, see Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, 219–20, 244–46. On the other hand, under Eisenhower, as many as a million Mexicans were deported during "Operation Wetback." Juan Ramon García, *Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workers in 1954* (Westport, Conn., 1980), chaps. 6–9.

<sup>126</sup> Cooper and Packard's collection provides a model. "It is not hard to deconstruct the modes of discursive power," they note. "It is much harder to discover how discourse operates within institutions." Contributors agreed that, for all the critiques of development, little is known about how NGOs, the World Bank, and the like actually work. "Introduction," *International Development and the Social Sciences*, 28.

<sup>127</sup> Memcon Dulles-de Gaulle, *et al.*, July 5, 1958, USNA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 611.51. That Dulles had some success in concealing his role in the end of the European empires and the concomitant expansion of American power is indicated by his total absence from recent postcolonial studies of U.S. foreign relations; see Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, N.C., 1993); and Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham, 1998).



racial lines. When the foreign minister of the Provisional Algerian Government, Lamine Debaghine, suggested persuading the Arab states and China to threaten intervention, he was not motivated by the material contribution they could make. Instead, he wanted to raise the specter of "a confrontation between the West and the East . . . The final stage," Debaghine predicted, "will be China's intervention. This will lead the West to put a stop to the war in Algeria."<sup>128</sup> His successor, Belkacem Krim, was less subtle when he assured the Americans that he "did not want to suggest that volunteers would be trained for race warfare in black Africa."<sup>129</sup>

As the negotiations proceeded, the Algerians and their allies shaped opinion by encouraging both apprehensions about race war and hopes for a modern, multi-racial Algeria. So while Krim visited Peking and started rumors about enlisting Chinese volunteers, President Ferhat Abbas indicated that the *pieds noirs* would have a place in independent Algeria.<sup>130</sup> Similarly, at the same time Tunisian Premier Habib Bourguiba assured Paris that he would not admit the volunteers, he warned others that "'Chinese hordes' would soon trample across Tunisian soil."<sup>131</sup> As the future king of Morocco, Prince Moulay Hassan, declared, "We are Muslims and have the right to be bigamists. We can therefore marry ourselves to the East and to the West and be loyal to our two wives."<sup>132</sup> Thus North Africans mocked the us-them dichotomies with which the French and their allies wished to contain them, asserting their own identities and independence.

Indeed, this history shows how "discourses of power" often befuddled and enfeebled Western policymakers. We have seen how French ministers' tendency to think in terms of "civilization against anarchy" or "Islam versus the French" led to the disastrous expedition against Egypt, capital of their imaginary "empire of Islam." Eisenhower and Dulles were inhibited rather than incited by fears of civilizational conflict, but they, too, ignored the cleavages between Arab nationalism and Islamic reformism and exaggerated Nasser's influence in events like the 1958 revolution in Iraq. While describing anticolonial movements as a flood or a tide demeaned the individuality and conscious agency of colonized peoples, as Ranajit Guha argues, it also made resisting their advance seem irrational.<sup>133</sup> It led Eisenhower to perceive the "one and a half billion hungry people in the world" as powerful, whereas others, using the language of disease or contagion, might have portrayed them as pathetic, deserving a write-off rather than demanding appeasement.<sup>134</sup>

Exploring the multiplicity and mobility of discourses through specific institutions

<sup>128</sup> Debaghine to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (hereafter, GPRA), October 27, 1959, Centre National des Archives Algériennes, Algiers, Le Fond du GPRA, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, dossier 5.3; Debaghine report to the GPRA, November 17, 1959, Mohammed Harbi, ed., *Les Archives de la révolution algérienne* (Paris, 1981), 272–74.

<sup>129</sup> Walmsley to Herter, January 30, 1960, USNA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00. Westerners were particularly susceptible to this fear at a time when Belgian settlers were being raped and killed in the Congo.

<sup>130</sup> *L'année politique, 1960* (Paris, 1961), 284.

<sup>131</sup> Raoul Duval to Couve, November 17, 1960, MAE, Asie-Océanie 1956–1967, Chine, dossier 523.

<sup>132</sup> *L'année politique, 1956* (Paris, 1957), 207.

<sup>133</sup> Ranajit Guha, "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency," *Subaltern Studies II* (New York, 1983), 2–3.

<sup>134</sup> For a particularly striking example, see Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994): 44–76.

and policies allows us not only to discover their varied and paradoxical consequences but also to connect text and context, cultural practices and political economy, in a way that too often eludes postcolonial studies. Whether it signifies a historical era, a critical stance, or a political predicament, the very term “postcolonial” would signify nothing if it did not somehow refer to “the revolt against the West” and the reaction of the United States and its European allies. The connections between the emergence of post-colonialism as an intellectual project and what has been described here as the general crisis of the colonial world—a world that clearly encompassed both metropole and colony, Parisian intellectuals and Kabyle peasants—are still murky. But examining a particularly acute phase like the Algerian War can help reveal how and why people in the First and Third Worlds began to reject “us-them” dichotomies that no longer represented their lived experiences. If we do not attempt to study these experiences in all their diversity and all their specificity, we risk perpetuating a colonial/postcolonial dichotomy, as Anne McClintock has argued, encouraging the search for chimera like “the post colonial Other” and the neglect of more pressing questions about the real nature and extent of decolonization. If Stuart Hall is right in suggesting that this failing is related, in part, to a reaction against Marxist economic determinism, then a Cold War lens has also obscured the vision of postcolonial studies, diffracting it into political-economic and cultural categories.<sup>135</sup>

What would the international history of the last half-century look like if we were to take off this lens? To be sure, “there is no such thing as an immaculate representation,” as Fernando Coronil reminds us. Any new interpretation risks introducing new omissions and new distortions.<sup>136</sup> It would be particularly unfortunate if historians can recover neglected aspects of our recent past only at the cost of ignoring the profound importance of the Cold War and the increasingly sophisticated scholarship that it has occasioned. We will not—or at least *should* not—suddenly discover that discourses about North-South conflict altogether replaced concerns about the more overt, obvious confrontation with the Soviets, or that it was a steady progression from one worldview to another. This account has emphasized how these concerns interacted and were not mutually exclusive. The worst-case scenario, from the perspective of allied policymakers, was an international lineup pitting “the West against the rest” with Moscow in the lead. As a 1959 congressional report on foreign aid noted: “The simple assumption that communism flows from poverty is so widely accepted in America that it is almost an article of faith.”<sup>137</sup> So worries about Third World poverty and population growth—even when they were given higher priority than the direct confrontation with the

<sup>135</sup> Anne McClintock, “The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term ‘Post-colonialism,’” *Social Text* 31/32 (1992): 86–88. In what is otherwise a spirited defense of post-colonial studies against critics like McClintock, Ella Shohat, and Arif Dirlik, Hall acknowledges a “remarkable” neglect of political economy; “When Was ‘The Post-Colonial?’” 257–58. For a review of the debate over defining “postcolonial,” see Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman’s introduction to *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader* (New York, 1994), 1–20. The phrase “revolt against the West” is Geoffrey Barraclough’s, *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (New York, 1964), 148.

<sup>136</sup> Fernando Coronil, “Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories,” *Cultural Anthropology* 11 (February 1996): 73.

<sup>137</sup> Quoted in Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, 100.

Soviets—could be reconciled with an East-West, zero-sum approach to international politics.

Yet, before concluding, it is worth considering the kind of evidence that demonstrates how fears of North-South conflict undermined faith in the Cold War system—not only by dividing allies like the United States and France, already discussed, but also by leading some to reimagine international relations as race relations, or even as a “clash of civilizations.” Thus the Canadian representative to the UN—and later Nobel Prize winner—Lester B. Pearson wrote in 1955 that “the most far-reaching problems arise no longer between nations within a single civilization but between civilizations themselves.”<sup>138</sup> We have already seen how de Gaulle thought the East-West coalitions would break down along racial lines. His strategy of extending Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals” was based on an idea that ought by now to be familiar to the reader. As he explained in a November 1959 press conference:

No doubt Soviet Russia, in spite of having helped Communism to strike root in China, recognizes that nothing can change the fact that she is Russia, a white nation of Europe which has conquered part of Asia, and is, in sum, richly endowed with land, mines, factories and wealth, face to face with the yellow masses of China, numberless and impoverished, indestructible and ambitious, building through trial and hardship a power which cannot be measured and casting her eyes about her on the open spaces over which she must one day spread.<sup>139</sup>

Some Americans shared his conviction that the West could come to terms with Russians in contrast to “the yellow masses of China.” After the Cuban missile crisis, one of them sent a message to de Gaulle. He argued that there were no real differences between the United States and France in Europe because there was no longer a Soviet military threat. Nevertheless, he insisted that “the area where we would have problems in the future . . . was China”—especially if it obtained nuclear weapons.

This was the great menace in the future to humanity, the free world, and freedom on earth. Relations with the Soviet Union could be contained within the framework of mutual awareness of the impossibility of achieving any gains through war. But in the case of China, this restraint would not be effective because the Chinese would be perfectly prepared, because of the lower value they attach to human life, to sacrifice hundreds of millions of their own lives.

<sup>138</sup> Lester B. Pearson, *Democracy in World Politics* (Princeton, N.J., 1955), 82, cited in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996), 39. Similarly, in 1959, the Danish ambassador to NATO argued that “western nations must get ready for the obvious coming period when Russia will be their ally against China and when racial ties will be more important than ideological differences.” C. L. Sulzberger, *The Last of the Giants* (New York, 1970), 554.

<sup>139</sup> Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages: Avec le renouveau, Mai 1958–Juillet 1962* (Paris, 1970), 130.

The author was none other than John F. Kennedy.<sup>140</sup> Thus, even in the era of “The New Frontier,” conservatives and liberals alike continued to fear war along a North-South frontier, picturing it much as the Yellow Peril novelists did decades before—and as some foreign policy analysts do today.<sup>141</sup> This frontier is never defined solely by economic criteria and ideologies of modernization. Regardless of whether China is rich or poor, capitalist or communist, it somehow remains menacing in the Western imagination. Indeed, perhaps only the vague yet vivid imagery of racial and religious conflict can separate vast and otherwise meaningless geopolitical categories like North and South or East and West. But because these are “imagined geographies”—to adopt Edward Said’s phrase—their boundaries shift over time.<sup>142</sup> Compare, for instance, de Gaulle’s and Kennedy’s views with the rhetoric of the early Cold War, when Truman pictured Russians as “Eastern hordes.” By the 1960s, the USSR had reappeared as “a white nation of Europe” as “the West” began to expand east.

The reason we ought to remove the Cold War lens is not simply that the world needs a new prescription. It is that we need more than one way of looking at the world if we are not to be captive to categories like “the West” and “the rest.” Examining events like the Algerian War for Independence through different optics reveals how these categories are constructed and endowed with analytical and political power, patterning the way we think about international politics even after the demise of the Soviet Union. Yet if these categories are imaginary, they are not altogether arbitrary. The precise ways in which knowledge and power connect to form “the imperial edifice” referred to at the outset stem from specific and identifiable concerns, including disenchantment with “modernization” and the specter of civilizational conflict, which have a history that transcends both the Cold War and colonial eras. To recognize these connections, scholars must transcend their own imaginary categories, which somehow divide political economy from the cultural aspects of imperialism, categories that themselves reflect outdated concerns about reductionist Marxism. By taking off the Cold War lens, diplomatic historians and postcolonial scholars may finally recognize a common intellectual project and begin to illuminate the origins of the post-Cold War world.

<sup>140</sup> Quoted in Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1992* (New York, 1993), 232. In 1963, Kennedy actually sounded out the Soviets on the possibility of acting jointly to prevent China from developing nuclear weapons; Vladislav M. Zubok, “‘Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!’ Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1956–1963,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998): 159.

<sup>141</sup> See, for instance, Huntington’s lurid scenario of a civilizational war *circa* 2010, *Clash of Civilizations*, 307, 316.

<sup>142</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 54–55; and see also Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997).

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## “Western Civ” and the Staging of History in American Higher Education

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DANIEL A. SEGAL

The project of provincializing “Europe” refers to a history that does not yet exist.<sup>1</sup>

IN THIS ESSAY, I document and analyze the incorporation of social evolutionary thinking about humanity into history survey courses and textbooks—both “Western” and “World”—that have been taught at U.S. colleges and universities from the emergence of the “Western Civ” survey course in the 1920s to the present day.<sup>2</sup> In locating social evolutionary thinking in the undergraduate history curriculum, I seek to unsettle and rethink the conventional identification of this bundle of ideas as “Victorian anthropology”—a label that confines social evolutionary thinking to a completed past and a singular disciplinary tradition. Most generally, my concern is not with the fate of social evolutionary theory *within* the history of anthropology per se but with the dispersion of social evolutionary thinking across disciplines and with its circulation and accreditation in higher education. In one sense, then, this article participates in, and aims to promote, a history of the disciplines that is concerned with the division of labor between disciplines, as well as their existence as subjects in schooling.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” *Representations* 37 (Winter 1992): 20.

<sup>2</sup> As Gilbert Allardyce has documented, the teaching of “Western Civ” survey courses at the introductory level in colleges and universities became established only after World War I; see Allardyce, “The Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course,” *AHR* 87 (June 1982): 695–725. While more global variants of and alternatives to this course began as early as the 1940s, they have become much more prominent over the last quarter-century. For a fuller account of this history, beyond what it is provided below, see Daniel A. Segal, *Educated Pasts: The Accrediting of Race and Social Evolutionary States in “Western Civ” and “World History” Textbooks* (forthcoming).

<sup>3</sup> See also Pierre Bourdieu, “Systems of Education and Systems of Thought,” *International Social Science Journal* 19 (1967): 338–58; Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education*,



I begin by examining how the defining elements of the first cohort of "Western Civ" survey courses and textbooks came together before World War I in the writings and classroom teaching of James Harvey Robinson.<sup>4</sup> Whereas anthropologists in the Victorian era were much occupied by the overthrow of the biblical chronology of human existence, historians were not.<sup>5</sup> Yet, notwithstanding the lack of discussion of the long chronology by historians, "history" acquired a new meaning at this time. "History" came to be understood, in a narrow sense, as a relatively recent and brief period of human time, defined in opposition to its newly discovered precursor: "prehistory." In the early twentieth century, the long chronology, made up of these two qualitatively distinct periods, was explicitly and prominently affirmed in the "new history" championed by Robinson.<sup>6</sup> For the most part, scholars who have examined Robinson's "new history" have accorded little import to his discussions of the vastness of human time, almost certainly because these passages seem to belabor what was, even then, an already established finding of science.<sup>7</sup> By contrast, I argue that the long chronology was central to Robinson's thought and vision of history. For Robinson, the meaning of history came into view not by looking "close-up" but by stepping back, in order to see history in relation to the entirety of human time and, more specifically, in relation to prehistory. From the vantage afforded by the long chronology, declared Robinson, one saw with clarity that there was an overall and singular trajectory of human existence—a line of development. For Robinson, then, chronological time was developmental time. The long chronology was thus a standard of measure, or metric, of the civilizational status of "peoples" and, at the same time, the world's "peoples" were representatives of different developmental and chronological times. In addition, Robinson's sense of historical time as both brief and entirely recent made it a "surveyable" whole integrally attached to, rather than distant from, the present.

As a teacher, Robinson used this constellation of ideas to organize and give

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*Society, and Culture*, R. Nice, trans., 2d edn. (London, 1990); John Guillory, *Cultural Capital* (Chicago, 1993).

<sup>4</sup> Biographical sources on Robinson include Harry Elmer Barnes, "James Harvey Robinson," in *American Masters of Social Science*, Howard W. Odum, ed. (New York, 1927), 321–408; Luther V. Hendricks, *James Harvey Robinson* (New York, 1946); James T. Shotwell's obituary of Robinson in the *AHR* 41 (1936): 604–06; J. Selwyn Schapiro, "James Harvey Robinson (1863–1936)," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 1 (1936): 278–81; Harvey Wish, "James Harvey Robinson and the New History," intro. to the 1965 edition of Robinson's *The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook* (New York, 1965), v–xxix. Robinson's importance in the history of the Western Civ survey course is a central thesis of Allardyce, "Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course," 695–725. My account of Robinson's role in this history both draws on and, on points of evidence and interpretation, disagrees with Allardyce's.

<sup>5</sup> In researching this issue, I have looked only at English-language historians.

<sup>6</sup> For discussions of Robinson and the "new history" in the context of the history of disciplinary history, see John Higham, *History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), 104–16; Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, 1988), chap. 4; Robert Skotheim, *American Intellectual History and Historians* (Princeton, N.J., 1966), 66–82; Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (New York, 1991), 216, 313–14. The central text in Robinson's own efforts to claim and define the "new history" is *New History*; other relevant works in Robinson's corpus are discussed and cited below.

<sup>7</sup> Ross is an exception here; see *Origins of American Social Science*, 216, 313–14. In terms of my concerns with Robinson's relationship to the formation of the Western Civ survey course, it is important to note that Allardyce says nothing about Robinson's understanding or representations of human time.

narrative coherence to his famous graduate course at Columbia University, offering students a survey that traced the rise of rational thought, located in the West, from a baseline defined by prehistoric and non-European Others. In the years between the two world wars, the survey pioneered by Robinson was taken as a model for both courses and textbooks designed for broad undergraduate audiences. By the 1940s, Robinson's "new history" had been widely institutionalized in higher education, transposed into what has been known ever since as "Western Civ."

In the second half of this article, I jump forward in time for the purpose of examining, in the light of this historical account, the "Western Civ" and "World History" textbooks in use on U.S. campuses today. I argue that contemporary texts of both genres show fundamental continuities with the social evolutionary narrative and plot pioneered by Robinson and then adopted so widely as "general education." In today's texts, whether "Western" or "World," we find largely coincident divisions of time, development, and peoples. In these textbooks, as in their predecessors, history is both *post*-prehistory and the segment of time *ahead* of Others. Even when Otherness—the radically unfamiliar—is not crystallized in the specific figure of "the prehistoric," it is positioned as behind an already charted course of history or, alternatively, as contrary to the known trajectory of history. These textbooks thus provide a "grand narrative," in Dorothy Ross's sense of a story of all human existence, that provides students a highly circumscribed sense of both historical contingency and human possibilities.<sup>8</sup>

THE REPLACEMENT, IN THE LATE 1850s and the 1860s, of the biblical chronology of human existence by the secular or archaeological chronology involved a dramatic change in the scale of human time: from a few thousand years to many tens and even hundreds of thousands of years.<sup>9</sup> As Thomas Trautmann has written, "Time opened out indefinitely backward; we may truly say that the bottom dropped out of history."<sup>10</sup> Among the earliest of European and North American intellectuals to register and engage this "revolution in human time" were the relatively small number of scholars concerned with human global diversity. The new chronology rendered infeasible the ethnological and philological projects of reconstructing the history of the peopling of the earth in the aftermath of the Flood (Genesis 6–9). The vastness of the new archaeological timescale dwarfed the arboreal image of humanity's "physical history" that had been built on biblical teachings, while also disrupting the project of producing anything like a complete historical account of human existence, in the sense of a continuous narrative of events.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Dorothy Ross, "Grand Narrative in American Historical Writing: From Romance to Uncertainty," *AHR* 100 (June 1995): 601, esp. n. 2.

<sup>9</sup> George W. Stocking, Jr., *Victorian Anthropology* (New York, 1987); Thomas Trautmann, *Lewis Henry Morgan and the Invention of Kinship* (Berkeley, Calif., 1987). The phrase "the revolution in human time" is from Stocking.

<sup>10</sup> Trautmann, *Lewis Henry Morgan*, 221.

<sup>11</sup> On the ethnological and philological projects of tracing the human family tree back to the Flood and thus the very moment of human creation, see Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, chap. 2; and Trautmann, *Lewis Henry Morgan*, chap. 4. The phrase "physical history" is from the title of the classic work of pre-Victorian ethnology, James Cowles Prichard, *Researches into the Physical History of Man* (1813). See Prichard, *Researches*, George W. Stocking, Jr., ed. (Chicago, 1973).

As Trautmann and George W. Stocking have demonstrated, Victorian anthropologists filled in the immensely expanded scale of human time with hypothetical, or "conjectured," stages, arranged to form not a figure of a branching tree but a single line of development. In this anthropological vision, living contemporaries—non-European Others—were deployed as exemplars of the stages of human development that civilized Europeans, it was presumed, had passed through during the long-ago. This was the "comparative method," by which social evolutionary anthropology was known in its day. Differences in human lifeways were thus laid out along a reference line of both time and development; such differences were not understood in terms of myriad and unrankable cultures, as a subsequent anthropology would, with difficulties, propose. Overall, then, the emerging discipline of anthropology wedded a prior European discourse of the scale of civilization to both the new secular chronology and what was, in the Victorian era, a rapidly expanding body of "knowledge" about non-European Others.<sup>12</sup>

In the resulting body of social theory, the thesis of a single line of human development was grounded in the premise that a uniform human intellect (the "psychic unity of mankind") kept different transhistorical "peoples" on the same problem-solving pathway. At the same time, the scale of human time provided a ready idiom for stressing that different "peoples" were developmentally far apart and, as such, far apart in their propensity for development. Thus, as Stocking has concluded, despite both the "presumption of human psychic unity" and the "relative lack of explicit concern with racial differentiation, the impact of classical [social] evolutionism on the European image of man had perhaps less to do with reshaping thinking about the commonalities of human nature than with regrounding assumptions about human differences."<sup>13</sup> Indeed, one might even say that the social evolutionary figure of a vast timescale was deployed in ways that replicated many of the ideological effects of polygenist anthropology, even though the leading proponents of social evolutionary theory shared with their ethnological predecessors a disavowal of the doctrine of the independent creation of human races—though on secular, not biblical, grounds.

Finally, it is important to note the significant divergences between Victorian social evolutionary theory and Charles Darwin's theory of biological evolution, particularly since the two have often been conflated. In Darwinian theory, biological evolution led over time not to a single future but to speciation, that is, to a differentiation of biological populations. Furthermore, the mechanism of change in Darwinian theory was a combination of random variation and selection, rather than problem-solving directed by the intellect. In these important ways, social evolutionary theory was not Darwinian. What Victorian social evolutionary anthropology did take from Darwinian understandings of biological evolution was the image of a primate ancestor for modern humans, with the effect that the study of

<sup>12</sup> On Enlightenment discourses of civilization, see Lucien Febvre, "Civilisation: Evolution of a Word and a Group of Ideas," in Peter Burke, ed., *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre* (New York, 1973), 219–58; Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, chap. 1; Frank Manuel, *The Prophets of Paris* (New York, 1962), chaps. 1–2.

<sup>13</sup> Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, 326.

primates, the fossil record, and non-European “peoples” came to be identified alike as windows onto “early man.”<sup>14</sup>

THE NEW CHRONOLOGY and the social evolutionary understanding of it were not confined to disciplinary anthropology, however. Rather, these notions of human time entered broadly into secular knowledge. A key artifact and carrier of the secular and social evolutionary understanding of human time was a new distinction between two developmentally sequenced segments or periods of time: “prehistory” and “history.” The emergence and early circulation of this new binary can be tracked by turning to the first edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*.<sup>15</sup> The earliest citation for “prehistory” is from 1871; the definition given is “[the time] prior to *written* or *recorded* history.” In the entry for “prehistorian,” the earliest citation is from 1893, and the term is defined as “one who studies the *remains* . . . of prehistoric times.”<sup>16</sup> In this pair of definitions, what distinguishes the two periods of time is their association with qualitatively distinct artifacts—*writing* and *remains*. The division of human time was thus pegged to a striking difference in human activity, specifically the absence or presence of written records.

Yet even as this distinction entered the vernacular of educated speakers and writers of English, it is fair to say that the issue of human time did not become a central or even significant topic for disciplinary historians working in English during the last half of the nineteenth century. Examining both writings of prominent English-language historians and records of history course offerings at U.S. colleges and universities from these decades, I have found scant mention of either the vastness of human time or prehistory.<sup>17</sup> Such indifference was possible, in part, because even as the *signification* of “history” was altered by the new opposition with

<sup>14</sup> On the relationship between social evolutionary theory and both Darwin’s thought and the reception of Darwin, see Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology*, chap. 5.

<sup>15</sup> On the criteria for the inclusion of words and citations in the OED, see John Willinsky, *Empire of Words* (Princeton, N.J., 1994). The OED largely avoided terms that were restricted in their circulation to a technical, professional, or disciplinary sphere. On the emergence of the term “prehistory” within archaeology, see Alice B. Kehoe, *The Land of Prehistory: A Critical History of American Archaeology* (New York, 1998).

<sup>16</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*, 1st edn., s.v. “Prehistory” and “Prehistorian,” emphasis added.

<sup>17</sup> As something that is not present in the available record, the relative disinterest in the long chronology within disciplinary history prior to Robinson is not something that can simply be pointed to or demonstrated. Some indications can nonetheless be identified. In Herbert Baxter Adams’s exhaustive report, *The Study of History in American Colleges and Universities* (Washington, D.C., 1887), we find only one mention of either the long chronology or prehistoric time. Adams tells of a singular “experiment” at Johns Hopkins to provide beginning undergraduates a “course of introductory lectures on the Origin of Civilization”; *Study of History*, 201. In England, such figures as William Stubbs, Edward Augustus Freeman, and John Richard Green appear not to have grappled with, or had their historical vision greatly disturbed by, the “revolution in human time.” Philippa Levine reports evidence of a friendship between Freeman and E. B. Tylor in her study of shifting relations between antiquarians, historians, and archaeologists, and she recognizes explicitly the importance of the long chronology for the emergence of a disciplinary divide between archaeology and history. It is thus striking that she does not discuss any reactions of Victorian historians to the long chronology. See Levine, *The Amateur and the Professional: Antiquarians, Historians, and Archaeologists in Victorian England, 1838–1886* (Cambridge, 1986), esp. 26, chap. 7; for other relevant accounts of historians at this time, which by their own silence on the topic register the lack of a strong reaction to the long chronology within disciplinary history, see Rosemary Jann, *The Art and Science of Victorian History* (Columbus, Ohio, 1985); J. R. Hale, *The Evolution of British Historiography* (London, 1967), 262–300.

prehistory, the term's *referential* meaning remained largely what it had been: the years comprising "history" were much the same whether "history" was understood as the entirety of human time in the biblical chronology or as the brief segment after prehistory in the new secular chronology. Similarly, the definitional contrast drawn in the OED, between a time of "remains" and a time of "writing," affirmed the most characteristic methodological delineation of historical scholarship of this era, even as the long chronology shaped anew the meaning of "documents" and "writing." Finally and most generally, the new scale of time simply did not disrupt any ongoing research program in the emerging discipline of history. Under these circumstances, the fact that "the bottom dropped out of history" was not immediately disturbing to historians.

By contrast, roughly half a century later, and some three decades after the publication of the most exemplary works of social evolutionary anthropology, the long chronology appeared prominently in the work of James Harvey Robinson.<sup>18</sup> Without suggesting that Robinson was the first historian to affirm or reflect on the long chronology, I do want to propose that Robinson's engagement with it was without precedent in disciplinary history.

A professor of history at Columbia University from 1895 to 1919, Robinson was enormously influential through his own writings, his training of graduate students, and his service on a host of professional committees concerned with history education in the United States.<sup>19</sup> For Robinson, what made the long chronology both visible and something to grapple with was a commitment to "the unity of knowledge."<sup>20</sup> More specifically, Robinson's faith in the authority of science meant that, for him, the legitimation of historical knowledge required that it be of a piece with the established doctrines of the sciences. Given this intellectual commitment, the long chronology had particular salience for Robinson as a historian.

When representing and discussing the long chronology, Robinson made repeated use of a dramatic—though for us, hackneyed—rhetorical device; he plotted all of

<sup>18</sup> Consider the original dates of publication of the following works of social evolutionary anthropology: E. B. Tylor, *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* (1865); *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom* (1871); Lewis Henry Morgan, *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family* (1871); *Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization* (1877).

<sup>19</sup> On Robinson's forging of the "new history" as a "movement," see Higham, *History*, 111, as well as the biographical sources given in note 4. Robinson's students included Harry Elmer Barnes, Carl Becker, Will Durant, Dixon Ryan Fox, J. Selwyn Schapiro, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Preston Slosson, and Lynn Thorndike. For fuller lists, see Barnes, "James Harvey Robinson," 338; and Richard Hofstadter, "The Department of History," *A History of the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University* (New York, 1955). Robinson's service on committees concerned with the teaching of history included but was not limited to the Committee of Five of the American Historical Association of 1911 and the Committee on the Social Studies of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education appointed by the National Educational Association. On Robinson's service on professional committees, see Hendricks, *James Harvey Robinson*, 52–64.

<sup>20</sup> For an account of the meaning and prevalence of this notion in Robinson's milieu, particularly between the turn of the century and World War I, see George Haines and Frederick H. Jackson, "A Neglected Landmark in the History of Ideas," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 34 (1947): 201–20. For Robinson's views on the relationship of history to other disciplines, see his *New History*, 70–100. See also the comments of Preserved Smith, a Robinson student: Smith, "The Unity of Knowledge and the Curriculum," *Educational Review* 45 (1913): 339–45.



human existence onto the twelve hours visible on the face of a clock or watch. For example:

In order to understand the light which the discovery of the vast age of mankind casts on our present position, our relation to the past and our hopes for the future, let us . . . imagine the whole history of mankind crowded into twelve hours, and that we are living at noon on the long human day. Let us, in the interest of moderation and convenient reckoning, assume that man has been upright and engaged in seeking out inventions for only two hundred and forty thousand years. Each hour on our clock will then represent twenty thousand years, each minute three hundred and thirty-three and a third years. For over eleven and a half hours nothing was recorded. We know of no persons or events; we only infer that man was living on earth, for we find his stone tools, bits of his pottery, and some of his pictures of mammoths and bison. Not until twenty minutes before twelve do the earliest vestiges of Egyptian and Babylonian civilization begin to appear. The Greek literature, philosophy, and science of which we have become accustomed to speak as "ancient," are not seven minutes old. At one minute before twelve Lord Bacon wrote his *Advancement of Learning* . . . and not half a minute has elapsed since man first began to make the steam engine do his work for him.<sup>21</sup>

Figured and understood in these terms, the vastness of human time contributed in at least three ways to Robinson's "new history":

First, by providing Robinson a basis for placing historical events in a *very* long term perspective, the secular chronology made it possible for him to perceive and affirm that there was an overall, and thus a singular, direction to human history. Paying attention to the vastness of human time allowed Robinson to make out a prevailing plot of "progress," for it made it possible to figure events that were refractory to that plot as proportionately insignificant, that is, as no more than minor perturbations relative to the long-term human project of "building civilization." Ironically, then, Robinson's famous presentism—his insistence that history should be written and taught so as to explain "this morning's newspaper"—was grounded in a panoramic view of time that also brought the very distant past prominently into view.<sup>22</sup> For Robinson, moreover, making humanity's long-term trajectory available for inspection was also a means of contributing to it. By revealing that "progress" was invariably due to rationality and its exemplar "science," the teaching of history could promote their use and wider social authority. As a subject of study, history could thereby help humanity to proceed ever more steadily on the path of progress. In addition, it could identify, for the purpose of elimination, irrational survivals, including various "traditional" beliefs.<sup>23</sup> Disciplinary history thus had the noble, though decidedly secular, mission of aiding the further "building of civilization."

Second, in Robinson's "new history," the perception of progress over the long

<sup>21</sup> Robinson, *New History*, 239–40, see also 26, 55–59; James Harvey Robinson, *An Outline of the History of the Intellectual Class in Western Europe* (New York, 1915), 3–4. Ross identifies Lester Frank Ward as Robinson's source for this image; *Origins of American Social Science*, 313, n. 29. For a variant of this rhetorical figure also used by Robinson, see *New History*, 22.

<sup>22</sup> James Harvey Robinson and Charles A. Beard, *The Development of Modern Europe: An Introduction to the Study of Modern Europe*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1907–08), 1: iii.

<sup>23</sup> See Robinson, *New History*, 24, chap. 5. Among the "traditional" beliefs that Robinson subjected to some scorn was Christianity; for a student's remembrance of this, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, *In Retrospect: The History of a Historian* (New York, 1963), 34–35.

chronology of human existence supported a broadening of historical research beyond, and a shift away from, a narrowly "political history." Relative to the context of the long chronology, even the most durable states and dynasties were fleeting, and the building of "civilization" involved the transmission of human achievements over the ages, as states rose and fell. In addition, Robinson's perception of civilization's prehistoric past located the beginnings of human progress even prior to state formation.

Yet Robinson's disdain for "political history" was not solely a result of his affirmation of the long chronology. Fashioning himself as an iconoclast, Robinson cast "reason" as the opponent of both convention and authority. "Reason" was thus located neither in the state nor in the governing elite but in what Robinson termed "the intellectual class." Here is a key contrast between Robinson and the "historico-political" scholars of the previous generation. Unlike such figures as John W. Burgess and Herbert Baxter Adams, Robinson never conceived of his role as a professor of history to be training young men to take up the administrative reins of the state.<sup>24</sup> Rather, he saw the purpose of teaching history, at the undergraduate and graduate levels, to be the fostering of a vanguard—if not somewhat avant-garde—intellectual class, as part of the larger project of advancing human civilization.

In Robinson's writings, the flip side of the turn away from "historico-politics" was a wide-ranging movement into intellectual and cultural history, as well as into the history of science and technology.<sup>25</sup> Even beyond these areas, Robinson's commitment to showing that the works of "the intellectual class" had yielded benefits for all humanity led him to promote, though not really practice, social history. In sum, Robinson's deep concern with melioration over human time made him an energetic proponent of a vast expansion of historical inquiry, even into areas that some historians today might still regard as novel. In a 1936 essay titled "The New History, Twenty-Five Years After," Crane Brinton wrote that Robinson and his followers "have always insisted . . . on the dullness and triviality of lists of kings and battles, [and] on the interest and significance of underclothes, dime novels, and whiffletrees."<sup>26</sup>

Third, Robinson's understanding of the long chronology figured "history," in a narrow sense, as but a subset or segment of human time. As Robinson apprehended it, this segment was seamless and singular over its course, possessed of a demonstrable and recent beginning, and located at the "contemporary," or

<sup>24</sup> For this view of the practitioners of "historico-political science," see Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 68–72.

<sup>25</sup> Overall, it would not be too much to say that Robinson's "new history" figured science as central to "history" and thus made it a topic for historians. This strand of Robinson's "new history" is extended significantly by his student, Lynn Thorndike, a founding figure of disciplinary history of science.

<sup>26</sup> Crane Brinton, "The New History: Twenty-Five Years After," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 1 (1936): 134–47. Of the items on Brinton's ironic list of what might best be termed "the exotic-ordinary," the whiffletree is, today, particularly obscure. For the record, a whiffletree is a "pivoted swinging bar to which the traces of a harness are fastened and by which a vehicle or implement is drawn"; *Webster's Tenth New Collegiate Dictionary*. Brinton similarly captured and ironized the expansiveness of the "new history" in the title of a subsequent essay, "The New History and the Past Everything," *American Scholar* 8 (1939): 144–57.

unfolding, end of humanity's long existence. The rest of human time was, by contrast, prior to and outside of history.

In the context of the long chronology, for example, Robinson found it "obvious" that "those whom we call the ancients—Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hipparchus, Lucretius—are really our contemporaries," and similarly that "Bacon, Newton, and Darwin are but the younger contemporaries of Thales, Plato and Aristotle." In these formulations, "the ancients" are located not close to the beginning of human time but in "our" time. The foundation for this conclusion, Robinson stressed, was the secular chronology of human existence: "However remote [the ancients] may have seemed on Archbishop Usher's plan of the past, they now belong to our own age." History in its entirety was thus something both contemporary and contemporaneous. Embracing this general view with fervor and without qualification, Robinson dismissed as "highly artificial" any division of "history," whether into the established tripartite scheme or any other. "Unity and continuity," declared Robinson, were fundamental properties "of history." In support of this broad doctrine, which he highlighted in many contexts, Robinson authored a pair of lengthy and tendentious essays that maintained that neither the Fall of Rome nor the French Revolution involved any but superficial discontinuities.<sup>27</sup> In sum, historical time had two key properties for Robinson: it was a seamless whole, and its earliest moments ("those whom we call the ancients") were still quite recent. Construed in this way, history was something that could be surveyed.

Robinson's perception of "the unity" of history tied together more than just temporal moments, however. It also mapped out, and thereby congealed, a generalized place or "region." In speaking of such figures as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle on the one hand and Bacon, Newton, and Darwin on the other as "our contemporaries," Robinson placed (ancient) Greece, (early modern through Victorian) England, and North America (of the present day) all within the big tent of the first person plural pronoun—"our."<sup>28</sup> While in other passages, Robinson also included examples from other sites within "Western Europe" as components of "history" and as "contemporaries," he never brought places outside Europe and North America into this unified whole. History as a segment of human time was thus linked discursively to geography in Robinson's writings, with the specific effect of affirming a historical consciousness that tied America of the present day to a past that was distributed widely throughout Europe and extended back to the very dawn of history.<sup>29</sup> In sum, when particularized and filled in, the "unity and continuity of history" was also the unity and continuity of the West's civilizational lineage—a

<sup>27</sup> Robinson, *New History*, 240, 58, 240, 154; *History of Western Europe*, 4; James Harvey Robinson, "'The Fall of Rome,'" in *New History*, 154–94; "'The Principles of 1789,'" in *New History*, 195–235.

<sup>28</sup> On the kinds of social acts that can be performed with pronouns, see Michael Silverstein, "Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description," in *Meaning in Anthropology*, Keith Basso and Henry Selby, eds. (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1976), 11–56; Pauline T. Strong, "Exclusive Labels: Indexing the National 'We' in Commemorative and Oppositional Exhibitions," *Museum Anthropology* 21 (1997): 42–56. On the ways cultural notions of time and persons constitute such relational groupings as "predecessors" and "contemporaries," see Clifford Geertz, "Person, Time, and Conduct," in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, 1973), chap. 14.

<sup>29</sup> On the prevalence of exceptionalist understandings of the American nation and its past among social scientists and other historians of this same moment, see Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*; and Ross, "Grand Narrative in American Historical Writing." We should keep in mind that even when the exceptionalist discourse opposed "American" and "European," there was also a strong sense that

lineage that had been neither settled nor self-evident to Robinson's disciplinary predecessors.<sup>30</sup>

Finally, for Robinson, "the unity and continuity of history" was supported, somewhat paradoxically, by a perception of a single rupture in human time, located at the very beginning of "history." In Robinson's figuring of the long chronology, let us recall, "nothing was recorded" during the first "eleven and a half hours" of human existence. In this formulation, there is no possibility of extending historic knowledge into the first "eleven and a half hours." It is not merely that we lack records from those hours, but that no records were produced in that Other time. The divide between prehistory and history is thus figured not as contingent, or as an artifact of the current state of knowledge, but as an objective and unalterable difference. Indeed, says Robinson, "we only infer that man was living on earth, for we find his stone tools, bits of pottery"—which is to say, we find only *remains*. And among the remains of prehistory that Robinson recognizes are "the simplest tribes today." Consistent with this, Robinson's entry on "Civilization," written for the 1929 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, explicitly endorsed the "ingenious analogies" drawn by "anthropologists" between "Tasmanians, Australians, Eskimos, etc." and "the Neanderthal race."<sup>31</sup> Yet Robinson, as a historian, was not interested in using the comparative method to reconstruct the stages of human development in prehistory; for Robinson, the comparative method was instead a means to establish a baseline for and a beginning of history, in the guise of a generalized "prehistory." Adapting Trautmann's formulation, we might say that, for Robinson, prehistory and its living representatives were a means of "re-bottoming" history while maintaining a clear allegiance to the scientific fact of the long chronology.

IN HIS 1936 ESSAY, CRANE BRINTON OBSERVED that the ideas of Robinson and his allies "have probably penetrated into the consciousness of more men and women . . . than those of any other group of American historians, past or present." "In college and university," Brinton added, "their triumph is almost . . . complete."<sup>32</sup> It is worth tracing just how the "new history" passed from the realm of scholarship into the undergraduate curriculum, and specifically into the introductory level Western Civ survey course.

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(unmarked) Americans and Europeans shared an encompassing racial identity; there was, in short, a racialized limit to the exceptionalist divide.

<sup>30</sup> That the now familiar, if not clichéd, narrative of the West's civilizational lineage was not established as a disciplinary object or school subject prior to this period is suggested, in particular, by the evidence in Adams, *Study of History*; for a discussion of what we find there in the absence of courses on "Western Civ," see Segal, *Educated Pasts*, chap. 2. On the notion of "the West" and its civilizational lineage at this time, see Christopher GoGwilt, "True West: The Changing Idea of the West from the 1880s to the 1920s," in *Enduring Western Civilization*, Silvia Frederici, ed. (Westport, Conn., 1995), 37–62; see also Thomas Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization* (New York, 1997).

<sup>31</sup> *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th edn., s.v. "Civilization" (London, 1929); this entry was preprinted as a separate work and provided "as a fitting token" to "the Founder Subscribers of the new Britannica"; see James Harvey Robinson, *Civilization* (London, 1929), 7. See also Robinson, *New History*, 145.

<sup>32</sup> Brinton, "New History: Twenty-Five Years After," 144.

Robinson himself never taught introductory level courses for undergraduates at Columbia, although he did produce two textbooks that were widely used in such courses during the first two decades of the twentieth century.<sup>33</sup> Yet, in contrast to his essays, these textbooks neither used nor discussed the long secular chronology of human existence. In addition, as Robinson recognized with some discomfort, the temporal framing of his textbooks was in tension with his avowed rejection of the division of historical time into the three conventional “periods,” for his texts were defined precisely in these terms.<sup>34</sup> In short, Robinson’s own textbooks did not offer “surveys” of human, or even historical, time—no doubt because Robinson, as a textbook author, conformed to the existing market as defined by the courses then being taught at U.S. colleges and universities.

One teaching venue into which Robinson did introduce his understanding of human time was a popular and influential graduate course, which he taught from 1900 through 1915 under a variety of titles.<sup>35</sup> When Robinson first offered this course, the temporal-geographic coverage was restricted to Medieval Europe. But as he revised the course from year to year, he extended its temporal frame by moving forward to study “the modern scientific spirit” and backward to “the ancient world” and, ultimately, to a generalized baseline identified as the “primitive reasoning of man.”<sup>36</sup> Thus, as the course took on an increasingly panoramic view of human time, it achieved coherence through a plot: the rise of rational thinking from prehistory to the present. To support this plot—as in his later *Britannica* entry “Civilization”—Robinson deployed the “comparative method” characteristic of social evolutionary theory: “primitive intellectual life,” he declared on the course outline of 1915, “can be deduced from archaeological survivals and from the study of contemporaneous savages.”<sup>37</sup> In terms of its geographic coverage, the temporally extended version of the course located “prehistory” as global before historic time and as exclusively outside of “the West” in the present. By contrast, in its much more extensive coverage of “history,” the course mapped out and stayed within the transatlantic “West.” Beginning in Greece, it moved generally to the west and north as it moved forward in time and ended, geographically, by spanning the North Atlantic. In sum, between 1900 and 1915, Robinson’s graduate course became a chronologically sequenced survey of the rise of rational thought, located in the West, starting from a developmental baseline defined by Others who lived either in prehistory or outside the West.

Along with recognizing the novelty and subsequent influence of Robinson’s 1915 syllabus, Gilbert Allardyce—writing in these pages in 1982—identified two subse-

<sup>33</sup> Robinson’s *Introduction to the History of Western Europe* (New York, 1904) covered “medieval and modern” history, and *The Development of Modern Europe*, co-authored with Charles Beard, covered just the modern period. Richard Hofstadter reports that Robinson’s single-authored text sold 250,000 copies in its first edition; “Department of History,” 224.

<sup>34</sup> For Robinson’s discomfort over this, see, for example, Robinson, *History of Western Europe*, 4.

<sup>35</sup> The earliest title was “Development of European Culture”; the final title at Columbia was “History of the Intellectual Class in Western Europe.” For recollections of this course from Robinson’s students, see Barnes, *American Masters of Social Science*, 375; Hofstadter, “Department of History,” 223–24. For the final syllabus at Columbia, see Robinson, *History of the Intellectual Class*. See also Allardyce, “Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course,” 704–05.

<sup>36</sup> Robinson, *History of the Intellectual Class*, 3, 40.

<sup>37</sup> Robinson, *History of the Intellectual Class*, 3.



quent courses at Columbia as keys to "the rise" of the Western Civilization survey course: first, the U.S. Army's "War Issues Course," taught to student officers at Columbia in 1918, and, second, the university's own "Contemporary Civilization" course, which was introduced and made a requirement for freshmen in 1919.<sup>38</sup> Although there is no question that these two courses played an important role in the history of the "general education" movement in the United States, their connections to the Western Civilization survey course are more tenuous than Allardyce's narrative indicates. The War Issues Course at Columbia extended back in time only as far as the late nineteenth century, and its "issues" were about the war and the war's immediate causes. It was not, in short, a sweeping survey of the West's civilizational lineage.<sup>39</sup> As for Contemporary Civilization of 1919, its syllabus consisted of three units or "divisions." The first—titled "Civilization and Its Basis"—contained readings in social theory, most of them from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Only the second unit, "Historical Background of Contemporary Civilization," offered students a historical narrative, although its temporal coverage began not with "prehistory" or "the ancients" but with the Old Regime of the eighteenth century. The third and final segment of the course was "The Insistent Problems of Today," and it drew heavily on social-scientific studies of the early twentieth century, primarily from economics, sociology, and political science.<sup>40</sup> Simply put, at its inception in 1919 at least, Columbia's Contemporary Civilization does not fit its assigned role in Allardyce's narrative as "the mother of Western Civ."<sup>41</sup>

Where one can, by contrast, find both close connections to Robinson's 1915 syllabus and evidence of the movement—or more precisely, the transposition—of its basic narrative into undergraduate teaching is in the publication, beginning in 1926, of a cluster of textbooks that were as remarkably novel (relative to their predecessors) as they were alike (relative to each other).<sup>42</sup> These new works had at least four distinctive traits. First, they prominently affirmed the long chronology and, with few exceptions, included accounts of prehistory as part of their overall narratives. By contrast, the long chronology and prehistory were absent from earlier

<sup>38</sup> Allardyce, "Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course," 703–06.

<sup>39</sup> For evidence of the general form and local variants of the War Issues Course, see Frank Aydelotte, *Final Report of the War Issues Course of the Student Army Training Corps* (Washington, D.C., 1919).

<sup>40</sup> Contemporary Civilization staff, *Introduction to Contemporary Civilization: Syllabus*, 2d edn. (New York, 1920). Allardyce writes that Robinson's 1915 "class syllabus forecast the outline of the Contemporary Civilization course," and then in a note directs readers to compare the two documents; yet, as I have indicated, the comparison betrays his claim here. Allardyce, "Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course," 705, esp. n. 31. My own account, like Allardyce's, relies on a syllabus published in 1920; I tried unsuccessfully to locate a 1919 edition of this document, and presume that Allardyce's use of the 1920 text indicates that he too was unable to obtain an earlier version.

<sup>41</sup> Allardyce, "Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course," 703.

<sup>42</sup> Lynn Thorndike, *A Short History of Civilization* (New York, 1926); Harry Elmer Barnes, *The History of Western Civilization* (New York, 1935); Barnes, *An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World* (New York, 1937); A. E. R. Boak, Albert Hyma, and Preston Slosson, *The Growth of European Civilization* (New York, 1938); William Bossenbrook and Rolf Johannsen, *A History of Western Civilization*, 2 vols. (1939), 1; Wallace K. Ferguson and Geoffrey Bruun, *A Survey of European Civilization* (Boston, 1939); Preserved Smith and Lynn Case, *A Short History of Western Civilization* (1940); John Geise, *Man and the Western World* (New York, 1940); Arthur Watts, *A History of Western Civilization* (New York, 1941); Edward McNall Burns, *Western Civilizations: Their History and Their Culture* (New York, 1941).

history textbooks, including works of “universal” and “general” history published after the overthrow of the biblical chronology and used on U.S. campuses in the late nineteenth century.<sup>43</sup> Second, whereas by the beginning of the twentieth century, courses and texts on “universal” or “general” history had lost favor to courses and texts that were more limited in their temporal scope and defined by the received tripartite periodization of history, the new textbooks of the 1920s and 1930s brought ancient, medieval, and modern history all into a unified narrative, written to fit the dimensions of the academic year.<sup>44</sup> Third, in contrast to exceptionalist understandings of U.S. history that were then prevalent, these new texts figured America of the present day as continuous with, and as carrying forward into the future, a European heritage that extended back to the very beginnings of history. Fourth, these textbooks ranged beyond political, military, and diplomatic affairs, highlighting instead intellectual, cultural, scientific, and even social history.<sup>45</sup> Although Robinson himself did not participate in writing any of these new textbooks, many of them were (wholly or in part) by his students or junior colleagues who had taught “civilization” survey courses in the 1920s and 1930s, following their departure from Columbia for positions at other institutions. These formed the first generation of Western Civ texts as we know them today.<sup>46</sup>

Uniformly, it was in their opening pages that these texts affirmed both the long secular chronology and the primary division of human time into prehistory and history, corresponding to states of savagery and civilization respectively. Even though this constellation of notions had been absent from undergraduate history textbooks and teaching before the 1920s, it became the standard way of initiating the Western Civ textbook. As illustrations of this early generic practice, consider these excerpts from the opening sections of two of the Western Civ texts published in the 1930s. The first is from a textbook published in 1938 that was an “outgrowth” of a course taught at the University of Michigan. Known as “the History of Western Civilization,” the course had been introduced in 1930, in large part through the efforts of Preston Slosson, who had received his PhD at Columbia under Robinson and who co-authored the 1938 text.<sup>47</sup> In paragraph one of Chapter 1, this text told its student-readers:

We know that human beings have inhabited the world for a time so long that it can only be estimated roughly in terms of geological periods covering some hundreds of thousands of

<sup>43</sup> For the period prior to 1887, we can turn to Adams, *Study of History*, for a comprehensive account of what textbooks were in use for history courses; for the first decades of the twentieth century, Hendricks provides a list of widely used textbooks covering either “European” or “general” (or “universal”) history, in the course of discussing Robinson’s role as a textbook author; see *James Harvey Robinson*, 68–69, 74–75.

<sup>44</sup> On the narrowing of the scope of courses, see Allardyce, “Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course,” 700–03.

<sup>45</sup> This was the feature of these new textbooks that had been most anticipated in the earlier textbooks authored or co-authored by Robinson.

<sup>46</sup> On the texts listed in note 42, the one that departs most from a straight Western Civ narrative is the earliest work, Thorndike’s *Short History of Civilization*. In its extensive accounts of the history of science, Thorndike’s text emphasizes the importance of Islamic centers of learning between the Fall of Rome and the end of the fifteenth century. The absence of any comparable geographics digressions from textbooks after Thorndike suggests how quickly the Western Civ genre was codified.

<sup>47</sup> Arthur Cross, “The Department of History,” *The University of Michigan: An Encyclopedic Survey* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1944), 619–20.

years. For all but a small fraction of this time, men have lived as savages or barbarians, and only at the end of a slow process did they acquire the mastery over their environment and their own savage instincts that laid the foundations for civilized life.<sup>48</sup>

The second example is from *The History of Western Civilization*, one of two textbooks written in the 1930s by Harry Elmer Barnes, also one of Robinson's students at Columbia:

The history of Western civilization cannot be confined within the older historical chronology. It is now realized that man has been on earth for at least a million years . . . From the standpoint of time and culture alike, the whole civilization of man in the West since ancient Egyptian days is "modern" in character.<sup>49</sup>

In both these texts, as in Robinson's "new history," the representation of the long chronology of human existence is densely packed with a coincident division of time, peoples, and developmental stages: between a drawn-out prehistoric past and a quite recent historical period, between Others and peoples of the West, and between primitive life and civilization. Because the distinctions were presented as structurally homologous, the corresponding terms of each pair were, in effect, symbols of each other. To put this slightly differently, in these texts, to speak of "the prehistoric" is to invoke not just a time but also a developmental stage ("savagery," "primitive life"), as well as certain places and peoples. Similarly, to speak of "the West" is to invoke not just a place and its people but also a particular segment of time ("history") and a developmental stage ("civilization").<sup>50</sup>

As an illustration of how this constellation of associations was articulated in these narratives, let us take Barnes's text as an example and follow its exposition. *The History of Western Civilization* begins with two chapters that together discuss "early man." In these chapters, Barnes cites two types of evidence: "physical remains" from the Old and New Stone Ages, and ethnographic reports of non-Western "primitives." Explaining the relevance of these reports, Barnes professes, though does not name, the comparative method that had been so central to social evolutionary anthropology:

[P]rimitive or less civilized peoples existing today . . . supply us with our knowledge of the social life of early man. We make the assumption that such present-day primitive peoples preserve the traits and institutions of an early stage in civilization which our own primitive ancestors passed through and left behind them.<sup>51</sup>

Geographically, Barnes's examples of "present-day primitive peoples" were drawn from around the globe, from Australia to Africa to North America to Oceania. In using this material, however, Barnes did not so much illustrate "primitive life" with exemplary cases of named and located peoples (much less persons) as fashion a composite portrait that effaced all particularities of both place and time. Barnes thus departed markedly in these initial two chapters from the conventions of historical narration.

<sup>48</sup> Boak, Hyma, and Slosson, *Growth of European Civilization*, v, 5.

<sup>49</sup> Barnes, *History of Western Civilization*, v-vi.

<sup>50</sup> For a broader discussion of the use of constructions of time in the constructions of Others, see Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York, 1983).

<sup>51</sup> Barnes, *History of Western Civilization*, 42-43.

What shapes Barnes's composite image of "primitive man" is largely antithesis with, and specifically the absence of, "civilization" and its most emblematic features: writing, government, and material accumulation.<sup>52</sup> Figured as the two endpoints of human time, these contrasts offer, at the very outset of the text, a guiding overview or map of the overall course of human existence. For example, in one passage, Barnes defines "primitive thinking" as the systematic opposite of "the mentality of a well-trained modern scholar, such as Bertrand Russell or John Dewey."<sup>53</sup> Barnes thus tells the reader that whatever might have happened between these endpoints—whatever odd course history may have taken from time to time—human existence over the long term is a story of the rise of rational thought, here epitomized by two leading figures of "modern scholarship"—one from each side of the Atlantic. However, the seeming obviousness of this line of development depends on the depiction of "prehistory" as lacking what is known to be present in modernity. Because it is characterized in terms of absence and emptiness, the initial ordinal position of human time—the point of (human) origin—is, in effect, assigned the value of zero. Figured in relation to this initial reference point, the present appears as indisputably developed, given how fully it is populated with recognizable, because familiar, products of human ingenuity and labor. Thus the imaginary of a largely empty time prior to history and civilization establishes a point of origin that flattens the multidimensional complexities and discontents of history onto a one-dimensional scale, which can be nothing other than a metric of development.

Following the two chapters on "early man," Barnes's text continues with three chapters on the transition between primitive life and civilization, thereby bridging the poles of this binary. In these chapters, the comparative reconstruction is more specific, both geographically and temporally. The examples are now from a limited set of named places: "the Near Orient," "Mesopotamia," and "West Asia." Similarly, this transitional stage is located temporally with greater specificity, using both dated archaeological materials and historical sources. Yet the narrative's characterization of these places and their "peoples" is not restricted to the span of time defined by these dates. Rather, by indicating that the peoples of these three places did not, on their own, develop beyond the "transition" to civilization, the text associates these peoples with this transitional stage. This linkage is encapsulated in Barnes's recurring phrase, "ancient Oriental times." As Barnes uses this expression, it is as if "ancient times" were the cultural property of a generalized Orient and its "peoples," and vice-versa, as if this Orient occupies this time, even in the present day. In sum, rather than dates preempting or disrupting an essentialist construction of Oriental "peoples," the dates serve instead to locate in time a characteristically Oriental stage of development. The peoples of "the Near Orient," "Mesopotamia," and "West Asia" are, in short, rendered exemplars of a dated developmental stage, just as living "primitives" are rendered exemplars of the chronologically less specific stage of "early man."

<sup>52</sup> On the use of opposition and negation in the construction of Others, see Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Totemism*, R. Needham, trans. (Boston, 1963); and Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1979), esp. 45–49.

<sup>53</sup> Barnes, *History of Western Civilization*, 68.

The rest of Barnes's textbook, some forty-four chapters, focuses geographically on "the West" and temporally on "history," roughly the most recent three to four thousand years of time. Overall, Barnes's text maps three sequenced segments of human time onto three sequenced developmental statuses and three broad groupings of people. History is itself thus fit into a developmental scheme. Indeed, although history is explicitly figured as a series of documented events, and not in conjectural or generalized terms, here, too, in the narration of history, the comparative method rules. What establishes its operation beyond question is that the absence of Others from historical time in Barnes's text cannot be attributed to a simple choice of subject matter. After all, Barnes ranges all over the map when representing the human past prior to the most recent few thousand years. What keeps Others out of history is that, in accord with the comparative method, Others have been located before historical time—in the first five chapters of the text and only there. To put this slightly differently, it is not simply that Barnes has taken the West's history as his topic, as one among many histories that might be told, if in other textbooks for other courses. Rather, in Barnes's text—as in others of its ilk—the larger narrative of human time renders the West's civilizational lineage as universal *history*, just as it renders various Others as universal precursors to history and civilization. In the case of history, the universal remains singular ("Western") precisely because Others lag behind.

INTO WHAT CONTEXT OR CONTEXTS should Barnes's text and its peers be placed? What, more broadly, was the historical context of the transposition and circulation of Robinson's model into the undergraduate curriculum? In accord with the narrative it offered, Allardyce's 1982 article in the *AHR* attributed the introduction and rapid spread of the Western Civ survey to a "patriotic purpose" that "swept campuses" in response to U.S. military involvement in Europe. "The war," he argued, "vitalized an interpretation of history that gives the United States a common development with England and Western Europe."<sup>54</sup> In its general contours, this view of the origins of the Western Civ course has been widely circulated in recent years, no doubt in part because the linkage of Western Civ to U.S. militarism seems a self-evident truth to those of us living in the shadow of the 1960s.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Allardyce, "Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course," 706.

<sup>55</sup> For two prominent examples of the wider circulation of this view, see Donna J. Haraway, *Modest\_Witness@Second\_Millennium.FemaleMan©\_Meets\_OncoMouse™: Feminism and Technoscience* (New York, 1997), 116–17; and Lawrence Levine, *The Opening of the American Mind* (Boston, 1996), 57. To Levine's credit, although he accepts Allardyce's overall narrative, he astutely recognizes the logical inadequacy of Allardyce's analysis, noting that the widespread adoption of the Western Civilization survey course was not an immediate response to the war but took place throughout the 1920s and 1930s. "It would be a mistake," Levine concludes, "to attribute the attraction of Western Civ primarily to international factors." Strikingly, Allardyce's view has even made its way into a contemporary Western Civ textbook. In its preface, *The Challenge of the West* tells students: "Many American universities introduced Western civilization courses after World War I. Their intent was to explain what the United States had in common with its western European allies, that is, to justify American involvement in a European war." Lynn Hunt, Thomas R. Martin, Barbara H. Rosenswein, R. Po-chia Hsia, and Bonnie G. Smith, *The Challenge of the West: Peoples and Cultures from the Stone Age to the Global Age* (Lexington, Mass., 1997), vii.



Yet Allardyce's account of Western Civ's emergence at Columbia in the midst of and immediately after the war is a dubious piece of goods. Moreover, the authors of the new textbooks themselves speak neither of contributing to a patriotic (or nationalist) project nor more specifically of providing, by way of the West's civilizational lineage or anything else, an account of what American soldiers had fought for overseas. Rather, the claim made most often by these authors was that they had written their texts to guide the rebuilding of "civilization" in light of evidence of its dissolution at the very sites, and in the very midst, of progress. For these authors, in other words, Robinson's claims about the proper use of history had been made newly and intensely salient by evidence—beginning with but not limited to World War I—of the outbreak of "barbarism" and "savagery" in the homelands of "civilization," geographic Europe and the West more broadly.<sup>56</sup>

It was just such concerns that Lynn Thorndike, also a student of Robinson's, identified as the *raison d'être* of his 1926 text, *A Short History of Civilization*, which was the first of the new textbooks:

When the world war broke in 1914, I determined to do what little I could to keep civilization alive. This volume is a contribution in that direction. I have written the book because I think it is needed . . . [S]o far there has been no adequate presentation of the main thread of the story of civilization between the covers of a single volume.<sup>57</sup>

Fifteen years later, with World War I less immediately in view, Barnes wrote in a similar vein about his purpose in writing *An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World*: "For the first time in human history, mankind is directly confronted with a compulsory and relatively expeditious choice between utopia and barbarism . . . It is hoped that this book will contribute very directly to . . . [an] intelligent choice."<sup>58</sup> Much the same story can be told about Edward McNall Burns's singularly successful text, which appeared first in 1941 and which, in a twelfth edition, remains in print today.<sup>59</sup> A member of the Rutgers University faculty from 1928 until his retirement in 1962, Burns married in the spring of 1936 and promptly left on a honeymoon to Berlin and Moscow, destinations chosen so that he could examine in person "the two isms" (see Figure 1).<sup>60</sup> Distraught by what he found, when Burns returned to New Brunswick he commenced the writing of *Western Civilizations*. Burns proceeded without an advance and with much less certainty of a financial

<sup>56</sup> See Harry Liebersohn and Daniel A. Segal, "Introduction," in *Crossing Cultures: Essays in the Displacement of Western Civilization*, Daniel Segal, ed. (Tucson, Ariz., 1992), xi–xix. On the importance more generally of anxieties and doubts about the civilizational status of Europeans for discourses of civilization, see Alice Bullard, *Exile to Paradise: Savagery and Civilization in Paris and the South Pacific, 1790–1900* (Stanford, Calif., 2000).

<sup>57</sup> Thorndike, *Short History of Civilization*, v.

<sup>58</sup> Harry Elmer Barnes, *An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World*, preface to the rev. edn. (New York, 1941), ix.

<sup>59</sup> Burns authored eight editions of *Western Civilizations* before his death in 1972 at seventy-five; the publisher, W. W. Norton, subsequently lined up two new authors, Robert Lerner and Standish Meacham, to revise the book. Standish Meacham, interviewed by the author by telephone, September 2, 1997. Donald Lamm, discussions with the author, autumn 1998, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. Lamm served for a time as Burns's editor at Norton and was Norton's chief executive from 1978 to 1996.

<sup>60</sup> Eleanor Burns Larson (daughter of Edward McNall Burns), interviewed by the author, tape recording, the former home of Edward McNall Burns in Santa Barbara, California, November 30, 1997.



FIGURE 1: The passport photo of Edward and Marie Burns, obtained for a honeymoon trip in 1936 to travel to Berlin and Moscow, sites chosen in order "to study the two isms." Photograph reproduced courtesy of Eleanor Burns Larson.

pay-off than do authors today. For Burns, *Western Civilizations* was unquestionably a calling.<sup>61</sup>

Locating these textbooks, and thus the emergence of the Western Civ survey course, in the context of interwar anxieties about civilization's fate illuminates elements of these texts and courses that have gone undetected, or at least unmentioned, in recent curricular debates. To begin with, in seeking to write/right civilization, the authors of these texts urged a steadfast allegiance to a lineage of rationality, science, and civilization that (in their view) transcended contemporary strife, particularisms, and inhumanity. As a rule, these texts were avowedly internationalist, cosmopolitan, and secular.<sup>62</sup> Burns himself, for instance, had once joined an organization that advocated a single world government as the most rational approach to resolving human conflicts; in introducing the first edition of his text, he declared that "all progress . . . has resulted from the growth of intelligence

<sup>61</sup> No biography of Burns exists. The narrative given here is based primarily on my interview with his daughter. It is also informed by my discussions with Don Lamm, the extant correspondence between Burns and his editors at Norton (which are housed in the W. W. Norton collection, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University), and a telephone interview in August 1997 with Henry Winkler (who was a colleague of Burns's at Rutgers), as well as my examination of Burns's published writings.

<sup>62</sup> On the increased "cosmopolitanism" and secularism of American intellectuals from the 1930s through the 1960s, see David A. Hollinger, *Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-Twentieth-Century American Intellectual History* (Princeton, N.J., 1996).

and tolerance, and . . . therein lies the chief hope for a better world in the future.”<sup>63</sup> Moreover, while the authors of these works were oblivious to ways their cosmopolitanism, internationalism, and secularism were exclusionary and local, they offered a vision of North America’s past that was, within specific limits, more inclusive than that of contemporary nativist and exceptionalist narratives. For example, by virtue of its marked secularism, Western Civilization in these texts was something other than, and something displacing of, Christian Civilization. It was inclusive of North American and European Jewry, though notably in a manner that placed religion in the background, in contrast to the emerging notion of a “Judeo-Christian tradition.”<sup>64</sup> In addition, these textbooks presented “civilization” to students as the product of a long tradition of rational inquiry that, through education, they could join; in these texts, civilized status was thus not a privilege of birth and blood.<sup>65</sup> In both these ways, the grand narrative of these textbooks offered a welcoming tale for the first-generation college students whose numbers were swelling enrollments at and bringing religious and (limited) social class diversity to U.S. colleges and universities between the world wars.<sup>66</sup>

None of this is to deny that these texts were saturated by Eurocentrism. It is instead to suggest that their Eurocentrism, rather than being a self-evident expression of U.S. patriotism or any similarly simple reflection of “power,” was itself a historical phenomenon possessed of meanings and motives that are easily lost in retrospect.

THAT WE HAVE LOST SIGHT OF our own recent disciplinary history does not necessarily mean that this past is past, however. Today’s textbooks do not speak of “contemporaneous savages,” and they carefully avoid proclaiming that “the West” has a monopoly on either “history” or “civilization,” yet how much has really changed? Do the successors to the first generation of Western Civ texts deploy the long chronology, the distinction between prehistory and history, and the “comparative method” to convey a grand narrative of social evolutionary development? Do they inscribe coincident distinctions between time, development, and peoples? To judge this fairly, one must look beyond Western Civ texts and consider “World History” textbooks as well; for, in the last quarter-century, this latter genre has emerged as a vehicle for overcoming “Eurocentrism.”<sup>67</sup> At least at the most obvious level,

<sup>63</sup> Burns, *Western Civilizations* (1941), xix.

<sup>64</sup> Mark Silk, “Notes on the Judeo-Christian Tradition in America,” *American Quarterly* 36 (1984): 65–85.

<sup>65</sup> On the distinctiveness of this aspect of these textbooks, relative to previous accounts of civilizational progress, see Daniel A. Segal, “Civilization without Kinship” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Philadelphia, Pa., December 1998).

<sup>66</sup> In 1910, less than 5 percent of the college-age population went beyond secondary education; for 1920, the accepted figure is just over 8 percent; for 1930, it is over 12 percent; and for 1940, it is nearly 16 percent; see Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, *The Shaping of Higher Education: The Formative Years in the United States, 1890 to 1940*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 6537 (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), fig. 2. On the arrival of Jewish students on U.S. campuses in the decades prior to World War II, see Hollinger, *Science, Jews, and Secular Culture*, esp. 67.

<sup>67</sup> Attempts to produce and market a work that would be like a Western Civ text but more global go back at least as far as T. Walter Wallbank and Alastair Taylor’s *Civilization: Past and Present* (Chicago, 1942). Yet it is really only in the last quarter-century that a significant number of

"World" texts both pluralize the civilization concept and bring Others into historical time.<sup>68</sup>

Starting with their opening passages, both *Western Civ* and "World History" texts in various ways identify the proper subject of historical inquiry as "civilization," as distinct from the entire human past. It is, moreover, "World" textbooks—those that have committed themselves in geographic terms to universal coverage—that are most direct and insistent about this. To give one example, the section heading of one "World" textbook states the point with telegraphic boldness: "History as the History of Civilization."<sup>69</sup> Another tells students: "No world history includes everything, or even most things, about the past. It focuses on the activities of human civilizations, rather than human history as a whole. No world history would be manageable if this distinction were not kept in mind."<sup>70</sup> In this passage, the need to restrict one's attention, to avoid being overwhelmed by the plenitude of human experience, becomes a charter for including the "civilized" and excluding the "noncivilized." That there are alternative principles of selection and focus for historical inquiry is not even mentioned, just as there is no question in the text about the legitimacy of this principle as a basis for exclusion from its pages.

Consistent with such definitions of historical inquiry, contemporary texts of both genres narrate, in their first few pages, the emergence of "civilization" as an empirical occurrence, one located chronologically in the recent past: "The human race was already ancient by the time civilization first appeared around 3500 years before the traditional date of the birth of Jesus."<sup>71</sup> Another reads: "For several million years . . . , human beings lived in small communities, seeking to survive by hunting, fishing, and foraging . . . Then suddenly, in the space of a few thousand years, there was an abrupt change in direction . . . Historians call this process the beginnings of civilization."<sup>72</sup> In sum, uniformly in these contemporary textbooks, "civilization" is restricted as an empirical phenomenon to historic time, and vice-versa, the much vaster expanse of prehistoric time is characterized as a time "Before Civilization"—to quote a phrase that is used as a section heading in more than one.<sup>73</sup> That this phrase has provoked no known controversy—at a moment

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undergraduate-level "World History" textbooks have been written. Prior to 1984, there were only five such textbooks, but between then and 1999, thirteen have been published. For a fuller discussion of the publishing history of these two genres of textbooks, including a catalog of works and their editions for both genres, see Segal, *Educated Pasts*.

<sup>68</sup> For a list of "Western Civilization" and "World History" textbooks published in the 1990s that I have examined, see the Appendix. By my best calculations, during the 1990s some 300,000 copies of these works were in use by undergraduates per year, with 170,000 being "Western Civ" texts and the remainder, "World History" texts. For these calculations, see Segal, *Educated Pasts*.

<sup>69</sup> Stanley Chodorow, MacGregor Knox, Conrad Schirokauer, Joseph R. Strayer, and Hans W. Gatzke, *The Mainstream of Civilization*, 6th edn. (Fort Worth, Tex., 1994), xviii.

<sup>70</sup> Peter N. Stearns, Michael Adas, and Stuart B. Schwartz, *World Civilizations: The Global Experience* (New York, 1992), xxviii.

<sup>71</sup> Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, and Patricia O'Brien, *Civilization in the West*, 2d edn. (New York, 1995), 4. The cognate sentence in Kishlansky *et al.*'s "World History" text ends with "appeared," thereby removing the reference to "Jesus," presumably to make the sentence less particularistic; see Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, Patricia O'Brien, and R. Bin Wong, *Societies and Cultures in World History* (New York, 1995), 2.

<sup>72</sup> William Duiker and Jackson Spielvogel, *World History* (Minneapolis, 1994), 4.

<sup>73</sup> See, for examples, Hunt, *et al.*, *Challenge of the West*, prologue; Kishlansky, Geary, and O'Brien, *Civilization in the West*, 4–7.



when the use of “savagery,” “barbarism,” and “uncivilized” would be contentious—demonstrates how fully the idiom of the long chronology is today a legitimate metric of human difference for “the educated person.”<sup>74</sup>

In these texts, prehistoric time and pre-civilized life are identified, more concretely, with a generalized social type: “hunter-gatherers.” In order to illustrate this prehistoric and pre-civilized type, the texts present both archaeological and contemporary ethnographic evidence.<sup>75</sup> One textbook tells us: “Stone Age humans gave up their former ways of life reluctantly and slowly. In fact, peoples such as the Bushmen of Southwest Africa still follow them today.”<sup>76</sup> Here, living “Bushman” are included within the set of “Stone Age humans” by virtue of “still” following “their ways of life.” Similarly, in another text, a color photograph of a !Kung woman is presented as an illustration of the “paleolithic era.”<sup>77</sup> In short, late twentieth-century persons who hunt and gather (or who are imagined to do so) are figured as *remains* of “prehistory,” rather than as living in “history.” To put this slightly differently, persons who hunt and gather, regardless of when in dated time they are living, are collapsed together into a superseded stage of social evolutionary time: “prehistory.” Such an approach is, of course, profoundly ahistorical: distributing coeval human beings to different segments of a vast timeline masks the interaction between, say, twentieth-century states and twentieth-century forms of hunting and gathering.

Even though the textbooks use specific peoples (and even photographed persons) as illustrations of prehistoric and pre-civilized life, their overall characterization of it relies extensively on received stereotypes of primitiveness. Humans at that “early stage,” the textbooks tell students, lived without modifying the world around them: “the economy of Paleolithic peoples was limited to what nature provided . . . Paleolithic hunter-gatherers did little to manipulate nature.”<sup>78</sup> The legend beneath the photograph of the !Kung woman similarly suggests an absence of human agency in prehistory: “This woman . . . exemplifies the only way human beings could support themselves before the invention of agriculture.”<sup>79</sup> In this view, hunting-gathering is a matter of necessity, while other modes of production are, by contrast, matters of human preference. What is obscured in these accounts is, first, the substantial body of evidence testifying to the productivity of gathering and hunting modes of production; second, the extent and ways gathering and hunting practices

<sup>74</sup> For the concept of “the educated person,” see Bradley Levinson, Douglas Foley, and Dorothy Holland, eds., *The Cultural Production of the Educated Person* (Albany, N.Y., 1996).

<sup>75</sup> The notion that hunting and gathering is an objectively distinct mode of production that characterizes a distinct human type and distinct “peoples,” such as the “Bushman,” has increasingly been called into question. See Alan Barnard, *The Kalahari Debate: A Bibliographic Essay* (Edinburgh, 1992).

<sup>76</sup> Stearns, Adas, and Schwartz, *World Civilizations*, 15, see also 189.

<sup>77</sup> Hunt, *et al.*, *Challenge of the West*, xxxix. The credits at the end of *Challenge of the West* give the photographer as Marjorie Shostak, author of *Nisa: The Life and Words of a !Kung Woman* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). The woman who appears in the photograph is not identified. Thomas Martin, the author with primary responsibility for this section, told me he suggested the use of this photograph to “the art person hired by the publisher . . . based on having seen it in anthropology texts.” Thomas R. Martin, interviewed by the author by e-mail, July 9, 1996. That many of today’s textbooks use the !Kung to illustrate prehistory and the time “before civilization” is indicative of the significant circulation of materials from Harvard’s multi-year Kalahari project.

<sup>78</sup> Chodorow, *et al.*, *Mainstream of Civilization*, 6.

<sup>79</sup> Hunt, *et al.*, *Challenge of the West*, xxxix.



alter, often purposefully, the environments in which they occur; and third, the documented record of the heterogeneity, rather than uniformity, of responses to agricultural practices on the part of persons engaged in gathering and hunting.<sup>80</sup>

In accord with these images of primitiveness, the texts characterize prehistoric social relations in terms of the absence of "modern" institutions. For example, the narrative that follows the photograph of the !Kung woman tells readers that "hunter-gatherers lacked laws, judges, and political institutions in the modern sense."<sup>81</sup> The final four words here create an important ambiguity. "In the modern sense" might be read as meaning "in any real sense" or "of any real worth," in which case the sentence would convey that hunter-gatherers had no laws, judges, or political institutions of any real significance. Alternatively, "in the modern sense" might be read as meaning "of a sort particular to modernity," in which case the sentence would convey that hunter-gatherers did indeed have these things, though of a variety unfamiliar to "us." But for this relativizing meaning to be sufficiently robust to eclipse the social evolutionary meaning, the text would have to provide some substantive sense of what the laws, judges, and political institutions of (some) "hunter-gatherers" were like, rather than just describing those laws, judges, and institutions in terms of absence and "lack." Given that no such positive account is provided, the relativizing meaning is present only for those predisposed to read the text in this way—which is perhaps sufficient to allow the final phrase to operate as a shield against the charge of ethnocentrism. The final four words thus illustrate a significant difference between contemporary textbooks and their 1930s predecessors: contemporary textbooks exhibit much more anxiety about the possibility that they will be criticized for being ethnocentric.

I have focused so far on the beginnings of these textbooks, but it would be a mistake to think that social evolutionary notions are absent thereafter, as if deleting the prefaces and initial accounts of prehistory would excise these ideas. On the contrary, these ideas are present throughout, even in "World" textbooks. To understand how social evolutionary constructions of human difference circumscribe historical forms of narration even when (some) Others are brought into historical time, we need to consider more fully the implications of social evolutionary theory for the very notion of "the historic." From a social evolutionary perspective, for any given transition between stages, there are numerous "cases." The first of these is, however, unlike all the others: it is "historic," for it is something that has never before occurred. To invoke the common terms of this discourse, the first "case" is a "discovery" or a "revolution" or an "invention." By contrast, all "cases" that come after, whether they are second or last, are non-historic. In the social evolutionary scheme of things, they are replays of an already achieved achievement. They are, as the saying goes, merely acts of "reinventing the wheel," and thus located outside of history.

<sup>80</sup> For a discussion of the productivity of gathering and hunting, and for a critique of the view that they are distinctively constrained by necessity, see Marshall Sahlins's definitive essay, "The Original Affluent Society," in *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago, 1972), 1–39; for a study that documents the way hunting and gathering actively intervene in and shape "nature," see William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York, 1983); on the complexity of responses to agriculture on the part of hunters and gatherers, see, for example, Roy Grinker, "Images of Denigration: Structuring Inequality between Foragers and Farmers in the Ituri Forest, Zaire," *American Ethnologist* 17 (February 1990): 111–30.

<sup>81</sup> Hunt, et al., *Challenge of the West*, xl.

As an illustration of how such a notion of “the historic” gives a social evolutionary plot to contemporary textbooks, whether “Western” or “World,” consider the way texts of both genres represent, and fail to represent, the histories of people who, over the last 500 years, have lived by hunting and gathering. Texts of both genres opened by depicting the abandonment of gathering and hunting as a developmental transition made by “humanity” as a whole some 5,000 to 10,000 years ago. From this social evolutionary perspective, all subsequent struggles to sustain gathering and hunting ways of life count as nothing more than a rerun of an already concluded *development*. In the same way, when textbooks of both genres narrate moments of “first contact” between various hunting-gathering peoples and European colonizers, they uniformly present the outcome of this “contact” as fully and immediately present in the initial moment. In no case does a narration treat this “contact” as if it had temporal extension or duration, or as if it were, in at least some aspects, without final closure. In these accounts, hunting and gathering modes of production disappeared instantly, which is to say automatically, in the face of a superior way of life. It is as if, following the moment of “first contact,” there were no long-term and contingent struggles to sustain gathering and hunting ways of life, no complex syncretism between hunters and gatherers and those who have encroached upon them. It is, most succinctly, as if such “contact” was without *history*. In this view of things, cultures do not cross, they fall in line—a social evolutionary line, to be specific.

The coverage of Native American histories in “World History” textbooks provides a further illustration of the ways social evolutionary thinking shapes an understanding of “the historic.” Taking three of these texts, I have used their indexes to locate the passages in each text that concern Native Americans (see Tables 1–3). Listing these indexed passages in chronological order, I have identified the point in time (column 1), geographic site (column 2), and specific topic (column 3) for each passage. In effect, these tables extract from the textbooks the plot of the story that each tells about Native Americans. Put slightly differently, these tables show which specific moments, out of the overall and continuing history of Native Americans, are privileged as sufficiently important to merit coverage in these surveys of world history. The pattern of selection of these moments is strikingly uniform in these three textbooks and, indeed, in all the contemporary “World History” textbooks I have examined.

Characteristically, when first presented, Native Americans are located in “pre-history” and generalized as “hunter-gatherers.” Native Americans next appear as peoples who, prior to any contact with Europeans, were at the threshold or initial stage of civilization, as evidenced by the “invention” of agriculture. In these passages, too, Native Americans are grouped with others as instances of a common developmental stage more than they are represented with any historical or cultural specificity. For example, in a discussion of the New Stone Age, one text comments, “Certainly the Chinese and the Native Americans invented agriculture on their own.”<sup>82</sup> This formulation credits both “peoples” with building the first steps of civilization “on their own”; yet the credit is bestowed in a fashion that figures

<sup>82</sup> Chodorow, *et al.*, *Mainstream of Civilization*, 7.

**TABLE 1**  
**A Chart of the Date and Place Coordinates for Indexed Passages about Native Americans in**  
*The Mainstream of Civilization* by Chodorow, Knox, Schirokauer, Strayer and Gatzke (1994)

CHRONOLOGICAL LOCATION	SPATIAL LOCATION	TOPIC(S)	PAGES
prehistory and roughly 5000 B.C.E.	the Americas	the transition from the Old Stone Age to the New Stone Age	7
"After 1493..."	the Americas	diseases	612
1519-1566; brief mention of demography through 1793	Mexico	forced labor	455-57
1580s through 1600s	Roanoke Island, Virginia and British North America	North American colonization	500-501
1752-1755	North America	French and Indian War	568, 578

agriculture in the Americas and China as two cases of a single developmental transition, thereby affirming the notion of a universal developmental pathway for humanity, just as the premise of “independent invention” supported this figure in Victorian anthropology.

Another text, *Civilization: Past and Present*, similarly generalizes Native Americans as a stage while depicting them as “emerging” from prehistory.<sup>83</sup> Chapter 8 of this work groups Native Americans with the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa; it is titled “Emerging Civilizations in Sub-Saharan Africa and America to 1492.” By contrast, the next chapter turns to Europe and is titled “The Patterns of European Civilization, 500–1500.” The multiple contrasts between these chapters and their titles are worthy of note. While sub-Saharan Africans and Native Americans share a chapter, Europeans get their own; while sub-Saharan Africans and Native Americans have “*emerging* civilizations,” Europeans have “civilization” without any qualification; and while sub-Saharan Africans and Native Americans are placed into a time span with no definite beginning and an endpoint determined by the arrival of Columbus in America, the European chapter is tied to a finite and specific period of time determined by factors the text locates within “Europe” itself.<sup>84</sup> In sum, Europe is distinguished as being fully civilized, fully historical, and an autonomous agent of history, rather than its passive object.

Returning to the plot extracted from these textbooks in Tables 1–3, we find that, following passages that locate Native Americans prior to civilization, the textbooks next discuss Native Americans at moments and sites of “first contact.” Three of these moments of “contact” appear with the most regularity: 1492 in the Caribbean, the early sixteenth century in Mexico, and the early seventeenth century in New England. Significantly, after the last of these, Native Americans all but disappear. The major exception involves the so-called French and Indian Wars, in which Native Americans are represented as having made an impact on intra-European conflicts and thus on “history.” But otherwise, Native American histories do not continue past the selected moments of “contact.” Indeed, Tables 1–3 show that there is not a single indexed passage discussing Native Americans at any time after 1800. In these world histories, this is the temporal vanishing point of Native Americans.<sup>85</sup> The devastating assaults on, and confinement of, Native Americans by the U.S. government during the nineteenth century are not, for these textbooks, of world historical importance.

In sum, the history of Native Americans is foreshortened: it is compressed toward and into moments of “contact.” After contact, their history disappears into “the Mainstream of Civilization,” to quote from the title of one of these works.<sup>86</sup> The textbooks thus establish closure on the history of Native Americans: Native Americans are placed into a past that is complete—a past that is over and done

<sup>83</sup> T. Walter Wallbank, et al., *Civilization: Past and Present*, 8th edn. (New York, 1996).

<sup>84</sup> Wallbank, et al., *Civilization: Past and Present*, chaps. 8, 9.

<sup>85</sup> *The Heritage of World Civilizations* is distinctive among “World History” textbooks in that it does include a brief discussion of the relationship between Native Americans and the U.S. state during the nineteenth century, although on the whole the text does not depart from the pattern of coverage of Native American histories that I have outlined here. Albert Craig, et al., *The Heritage of World Civilizations*, 4th edn. (Upper Saddle River, N.J., 1997), 784.

<sup>86</sup> Chodorow, et al., *Mainstream of Civilization*.

**TABLE 2**  
**A Chart of the Date and Place Coordinates for Indexed Passages about Native Americans in**  
***World Civilizations* by Stearns, Adas, and Schwartz (1992)**

CHRONOLOGICAL LOCATION	SPATIAL LOCATION	TOPIC(S)	PAGE(S)
prehistory	Central and South America	"Human adaptation and the potential for Civilization"; "small human groups hunt game and gather fruits and vegetables in the jungle without altering the forest environment"	77-78
ca. 20,000 B.C.E.-ca. 1400 C.E.	North America	"diverse cultures and early civilizations in the Americas"	186-206
ca. 4000 B.C.E.	the Americas	"the long isolation of Amerindian peoples from the centers of civilization in Africa, Asia, and Europe"	23
ca. 1500 B.C.E.	the Americas	a "somewhat later" instance of the emergence of civilization, following the same general pattern as earlier instances in Egypt and Mesopotamia	5
before 1492	the Andes and Mesoamerica	pastoral peoples and pastoral nomadism in the Americas	81
1000-1500	Central America and Peru	"The Americas on the Eve of Invasion"; accounts of Aztec and Inca societies	380-98, 485
16 <sup>th</sup> century	Central America and Peru	conquest of Indian societies	569-72, 577-78
17 <sup>th</sup> century	Central America and Peru	identity categories in colonial societies	584-85
17 <sup>th</sup> and 18 <sup>th</sup> centuries	Eastern part of North America	British and French North America; "The spread of Western values...was...facilitated by the relatively slight ongoing impact of American Indians in these...areas."	538-41



**TABLE 3**  
**A Chart of the Date and Place Coordinates for Indexed Passages about Native Americans in**  
***Civilization: Past and Present* by Wallbank, Taylor, Bailkey, Jewsbury, Lewis and Hackett (1996)**

CHRONOLOGICAL LOCATION	SPATIAL LOCATION	TOPICS	PAGE(S)
ca. 40,000 B.C.E.–ca.1500 C.E.	the Americas	origins and “emerging civilization” of Amerindians	233, 249-63
1492–early 1500s	the Caribbean and Mexico	effects of Iberians on Amerindian societies	416-17
1500s	Mexico and Central America	European conquest	421-23
after 1492–1650	Iberian America	“Iberian Effects upon Amerindian Life”	425-30
early through mid-1600s	New Amsterdam; Nova Scotia	relations with Dutch and French settlers	437
after 1600	Europe	precious metals from Aztecs and Incas; trade in cocoa, described as having been an “Aztec sacred drink”	434
1607–1630s	Jamestown, Virginia	Jamestown	439
before 1650	Caribbean islands	“fierce attacks” on Europeans by “warlike Caribs”	438, 440
from 1730 until the American Revolution	North America	“sporadic” wars between the English and the French	494
1763–1766	“northwestern colonial frontier” of North America	Pontiac’s War	564
1700–1800	British North America and U.S.	“abandonment of human rights” by settlers and “disintegration” of “Native American cultures”	573
“Since the arrival of white settlers...”	North America	long-term demographic decline	730-31

with—in contrast to "peoples" whose histories continue fully into the present. Here, we see one of the characteristic effects of social evolutionary understandings of human difference. Precisely because all humanity is held to be traveling along the same developmental path, cultural crossings are always an encounter between "backwardness" and "development," and their outcome is figured as predestined and fated: "the backward" inevitably and automatically, but not *historically*, gives way to "the developed."

In a similar fashion, social evolutionary constructions of "the historic" shape the narrations of global industrialization in these textbooks. In each case, social transformations in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England are given extensive coverage. By contrast, subsequent moments at other locales are treated, in a variety of ways, as additional and derivative instances of the same or universal phenomena. They are replications and extensions, more or less successful, not other pathways that leave open a plurality of futures. The fundamental issue here is thus not the obvious—and often decried—fact of the texts' disproportionate coverage of some parts of the world (their "Eurocentrism"); rather, the fundamental issue is their *en-case-ing* of particularities in a universal sequence. Disproportionate coverage is merely the characteristic diagnostic sign of this social evolutionary uniformitarianism. To respond only, or even primarily, to this symptom is an act of misrecognition.<sup>87</sup>

From these observations about these texts and their narratives, it follows that the distinction between civilization and noncivilization inscribed in their opening passages is not an exogenous element that has somehow been grafted onto histories and narratives otherwise innocent of it. These introductions are no mere formalities. Rather, the civilization/noncivilization binary that introduces these textbooks encapsulates and exemplifies a systematic principle of exclusion through the determination of "the historic"—a principle that proceeds according to the logic of the "comparative method" of Victorian anthropology and that, in effect, is a corollary or variant of it. To sum up the effects of this principle, even when the coverage of these texts is broadened from the West to the World, Otherness is collapsed into *pre-history* in their opening pages, and then left outside of the subsequent narrative on the basis of being *behind* history, that is, behind "history" as staged by social evolutionary thinking.

Further evidence of the reduction of human histories to a social evolutionary scheme is to be found by considering the means by which a number of publishers produced new "World History" textbooks in the 1990s. Starting with an already published Western Civ text, they pursued additional profit from their prior investment by adding chapters about other places and histories, thereby assembling a work they marketed as a "World History" text. But what, primarily, did they add? The answer is indicated by the areas of expertise of the authors hired to write the

<sup>87</sup> One important strategy for displacing this entrenched sequencing and emplotment of "the industrial revolution" has been to construct narratives that highlight the dependence of the English and European experiences on various elsewhere, thereby representing industrialization as globally dispersed, rather than as national or continental "cultural goods." See Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1982); Sidney Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York, 1985); Kenneth Pomeroy, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, N.J., 2000).

new material. For example, the cover of *Civilization in the West* lists three authors, all historians of Europe; the cover of the “World History” sibling of this work, *Societies and Cultures in World History*, lists one additional author, a professor of East Asian history. Similarly, if one compares *Western Civilization* with its sibling work, *World History*, the additional author is also a professor of East Asian history. As these two examples suggest, the retrofitting of Western Civ texts as “World History” texts involves a consistent and highly limited displacement of Western Civilization. The primary component of the supplement is “the Orient,” that is, the non-European Other that, for some time, has been identified as a “civilization”—albeit “ancient” and “stagnant”—much more so than any other part of the world outside the West. By contrast, the histories of non-European persons who have not similarly been associated with their own “civilization” are much more fully marginalized in these same *world* history texts. In simple and concrete terms, the texts contain many fewer pages about them. Thus, while the world-ing of history brings in “the Orient,” it ascribes anew the division of humanity into civilizations and “peoples without history.”<sup>88</sup>

Consistent with this, in both “Western Civ” and “World History” texts, comparisons with “Europe” are made primarily with “Asia.” For example, a number of these textbooks instruct students to think about why “Europe” rather than “Asia” discovered “America,” or why “England” rather than “Japan” or “China” had an industrial revolution.<sup>89</sup> Such comparisons are used to identify the qualities that made “Europe” and its exemplary “nationalities” uniquely the vanguard of history. It is as if “Asia” is imagined as being the nearest rival to “Europe” in a race across epochs to a single goal line, thereby allowing “Asia” to serve as a foil for identifying the crucial difference that made “Europe,” so to speak, “Europe.” The absence of other Others from these comparisons appears to result from the view that these Others are too different—which is to say, too far behind—to serve this comparative purpose.

Concomitantly, even the most global of these “World” texts systematically lack relativizing and historicizing comparisons that would aid students in apprehending the contingency of familiar institutions and practices. Instead, examples of radical

<sup>88</sup> To see the pattern of who is added as an author when publishers produce a “World” text from a previously published “Western” ones, compare Kishlansky, Geary, and O’Brien, *Civilization in the West*, 2d edn., with Kishlansky, Geary, O’Brien, and Wong, *Societies and Cultures in World History*; and compare Jackson J. Spielvogel, *Western Civilization* (Minneapolis, 1991), with Duiker and Spielvogel, *World History*. The Kishlansky *et al.* “World History” volume is listed as authored by Kishlansky, Geary, O’Brien, and Wong “with” five additional authors. Of these, one contributed additional material on China, two contributed material on the Middle East, another contributed material on Africa, and the last contributed material on Latin America. The lesser billing given to these authors indicates accurately the lesser attention given to these additional parts of the world, and of course, the patterns of coverage and exclusion are complex. One needs to consider, for example, the uniform absence from these texts of contributors with expertise about Oceania or Native Americans, as well as the selection of topics within, say, African or Latin American history. For an insightful discussion of the exclusion of African histories from “world history” in the works of a number of major historians, see Steven Feierman, “African Histories and the Dissolution of World History,” in *Africa and the Disciplines*, Robert Bates, V. Y. Mudimbe, and Jean O’Barr, eds. (Chicago, 1993), 167–212. The phrase “people without history” was, of course, famously ironized by Eric Wolf; *Europe and the People without History*.

<sup>89</sup> For examples, see Daniel Segal, “Discovery in the Text: The Making of ‘Races’ in the Undergraduate ‘Western Civ’ and ‘World History’ Textbook,” in *Commemoration and Critique: Essays on the Politics of Historical Representation*, Pauline T. Strong, ed. (Durham, N.C., forthcoming).

and potentially destabilizing difference are bounded off as evolutionary dead ends or, what is equivalent, as inferior social forms. To cite one example, in *World Civilizations*, Aztec tribute exchange is said to have "interfered with the normal function of the market and created a peculiar . . . economy."<sup>90</sup> The text does not ask students to consider the possibility that in some times and places of human existence, something other than commodity exchange might, in fact, have comprised (and in the future, might again comprise) "the normal functioning of the market." Here, difference is "condemned to play the role of bad example."<sup>91</sup> As a result, the capitalist world familiar to our students is rendered not as historically contingent but as something inevitable in the course of human development.

This is not to say that these texts unequivocally exalt "progress." Indeed, to various degrees, they call attention to the "ills of civilization" and express nostalgic desires for "earlier" times. The "grand narratives" of these textbooks are social evolutionary in character not because they valorize everything about a familiar modernity but, rather, because they situate history within a larger developmental sense of human time and figure a singular sequence of transitions and a singular modernity as the standard and common heritage/fate of all humanity. To borrow Dipesh Chakrabarty's formulation, these textbooks steadfastly avoid provincializing "the West" and the modernity it signifies—even when they present themselves as covering "the world."

IN CONTRAST TO THE ACCOUNT I have presented here of the perdurance of social evolutionary theory in undergraduate history textbooks, American cultural anthropologists are fond of telling themselves and their students a triumphal story of the overthrow of social evolutionary theory by Franz Boas and the Boasians nearly one hundred years ago. The key elements of the Boasian critique are worth recalling, even more so if social evolutionary thought remains to be grappled with in our own time and classrooms, as I have argued is the case.

In his influential 1896 essay, "On the Limitations of the Comparative Method," Boas began with the observation that the unilinear schemes and "comparative method" of social evolutionary theory logically require that like institutions in different historical or geographic locations must have like antecedents. But contrary to this logical entailment of social evolutionary theory, there was copious evidence, Boas argued, that like institutions from different social orders often had unlike antecedents. In addition, social evolutionary anthropologists had not taken sufficient care to demonstrate that multiple cases of a like "invention" were truly independent of each other: by failing to establish "independent invention," they risked counting the same piece of data more than once in support of their generalizations. Boasian anthropology contributed at least one other key argument to the formation of a cultural anthropology set against social evolutionary theory. Through painstaking linguistic analyses, Boas and his students concluded that the languages of supposed primitives were as complete, complex, and capable of

<sup>90</sup> Stearns, Adas, and Schwartz, *World Civilizations*, 387.

<sup>91</sup> Sahlins, "Original Affluent Society," 1. The quotation is taken from Sahlins's brief discussion of a quite similar pattern of dismissing difference in economics textbooks and "treatises on development."

abstract and logical expression as their own. Cross-cultural differences in language and thought were not trivial, but were not scalable matters of “development” either.<sup>92</sup> By this evidence, there were no primordial, or even “early,” peoples living on earth.

Building on these tendencies in the Boasian tradition, in 1934, at the very moment when many campuses were establishing Western Civ survey courses, Ruth Benedict argued that the spread of “Western Civilization” was due only to “historical circumstances” and did not represent a developmental trajectory. It followed for Benedict that “the West” needed to be understood as one particularity among many, rather than as the exemplary case of sociocultural development. “The understanding we need of our own cultural processes,” wrote Benedict, “can most economically be arrived at by a *détour*”—specifically, a detour by way of a robustly comparative study of humanity that eschews any exclusionary distinction between civilized and noncivilized peoples.<sup>93</sup>

Yet while Benedict’s *Patterns of Culture* demonstrates that there were intellectual alternatives to the grand narrative of Western Civ textbooks at the very moment of their ascendancy, it would be greatly misleading to suggest that the Boasians succeeded in removing social evolutionary thinking from anthropology or even their own work, much less from secular knowledge considered more broadly. One difficulty for their critique was its origin primarily in a single disciplinary tradition, while social evolutionary thinking, by contrast, had salience and sources of renewal outside of anthropology, both within and beyond the academy. This is, I would suggest, a general condition of work in the human sciences. With scant exceptions, our concepts are always already in wider circulation. Moreover, the illusion of the defeat of a given theory within a disciplinary tradition may provide cover for its ongoing reproduction in scholarship itself: a scholar who knows that social evolutionary theory is a “dead horse”—a “Victorian” one at that—will likely be inattentive to its ongoing circulation and its many faults. In this sense, I offer my readings of contemporary textbooks, both Western and World, as a cautionary tale that warns us that social evolutionary thinking remains in secular knowledge and schooling, notwithstanding the discrediting of it as a named theoretical position within disciplinary anthropology.

Indeed, encapsulated in the distinction between prehistoric and historic times, social evolutionary understandings of human difference have been dispersed into the very division of scholarly labor that shaped—and shapes—both anthropology and history. To express the matter in this fashion is not the same as saying that social evolutionary ideas traveled from anthropology into history. James Harvey Robinson and his successors certainly made use of social evolutionary anthropology, and it seems fair to say that they were even influenced by it. Yet more than it represents the influence of Victorian anthropology, the crystallization of social evolutionary thinking in the “new history” and subsequent “civilization” textbooks reflects and furthered an academic division of labor that distinguishes “anthropology” and “history” along the lines of the binary division of the long chronology into

<sup>92</sup> For an exemplary and highly influential text in this strand of Boasian anthropology, see Franz Boas, “On Alternating Sounds,” *American Anthropologist* 2 (1889): 47–51.

<sup>93</sup> Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (1934; Boston, 1959), 5, 56.



"prehistoric" and "historic" times. This division of academic labor between the two disciplines, as evidenced by their perduring associations with particular sets of "world areas" and "peoples," means that both disciplines have been, and remain, located in what might be termed a social evolutionary complex.<sup>94</sup>

At the same time, also important for the perdurance of social evolutionary theory has been its movements across genres and levels of historical writing, from Robinson's scholarly essays into undergraduate textbooks. However much historical and anthropological scholarship is shaped by location within a "social evolutionary complex," it is also the case that scholarship in both disciplines contains powerful resources for unsettling social evolutionary thinking. At the very least, if our textbooks were held to the same standards as monographs or articles in refereed journals, there is a greater likelihood that robust critical reflection about these ideas would enter into the texts themselves. A second major source of the perdurance of social evolutionary ideas thus lies in the protection afforded them by the contemporary separation of scholarship from teaching and, more specifically, by the pervasive condescension in the academy toward the work of producing and teaching these textbooks.

But are there, one might ask, alternatives to the social evolutionary plot of these textbooks? Is it not simply a fact that "we today" live more "civilized" or "evolved" lives than did the earliest homo sapiens, however much we may dislike the allegorical uses of social evolutionary narratives?<sup>95</sup> No one can deny, of course, that "we today" live very different lives than did the "first humans," even given how little is really known about those very distant ancestors. Yet let us note how much the apparent truth of human social evolution—of "progress," in some sense of the word—depends not on immersing ourselves in history but in stepping back from it, so as to replace our perception of history's complexity with a clear line drawn between two pre-scripted points or staged moments: "human origins" and "modernity." Consider, for instance, how much less self-evident social evolution appears if we identify humanity's origins not with the absence of all the institutions and things that are familiar to us, and on which we are so dependent, but with complexities largely unknown to us.<sup>96</sup> Or alternatively, consider how much less self-evident is this line if we shift, even slightly, the latter-day site that we select as exemplary of "modernity": Who among us would be comfortable with the claim that the earliest homo sapiens lived less civilized, or even less "evolved," lives than did people in

<sup>94</sup> In effect, I am suggesting that disciplinary history has been defined, at least in part, as the study of historic time and its contents, as distinct from prehistoric time and its contents. By contrast, a more established view tells us that disciplinary history was founded not on a particular understanding of human time but on the increased use of "documentary materials and source criticism," to quote Doris Goldstein. The alternative I am proposing situates disciplinary history more in relation to the coeval division of academic labor between disciplines and less in relation to antecedent work by so-called amateur historians. For the more established view, see Goldstein, "The Professionalization of History in Britain in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *Storia della Storiografia* 3 (1983): 3–27; Jann, *Art and Science of Victorian History*, epilogue.

<sup>95</sup> The position that my overall argument falls apart in the face of the "undeniable" fact that "we today" live more "civilized" lives than did the earliest human ancestors was cogently argued by one of the anonymous reviewers for this journal; I thank that reviewer for her/his willingness to engage views that s/he found so patently wrong-headed.

<sup>96</sup> For an example of such an attempt, see Lévi-Strauss's comments on human "origins," in "The Concept of Primitiveness," in Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore, eds., *Man the Hunter* (Chicago, 1968), 351.

Nazi Germany? Or, to displace and pluralize our sense of “modernity” in a different way, what about persons living today in Amazonia who find eroded and eroding further their liberty to live by gathering, hunting, and swidden agriculture? Must they, too, concede the undeniability of human social evolution at this moment in history? And more to the point here, must their views be excluded from the “world history” we teach our students?<sup>97</sup>

To resist their exclusion does not require that we adopt the romantic view that Others’ lives are better than ours, any more than vice-versa. All that is necessary is that we recognize the contingency of any and all historical outcomes and, in response, that we robustly bracket our sense of already knowing the trajectory of human existence. Some thirty years ago, while convening an international conference on “hunters and gatherers,” Richard B. Lee and Irwen DeVore observed that whether industrialization will “end up” being a long-term trend in human existence or a momentary exception is not something we can know in advance of a future that has yet to be made:

It is still an open question whether man will be able to survive the exceedingly . . . unstable ecological conditions he has created for himself. If he fails in this task, interplanetary archaeologists of the future will classify our planet as one in which a very long and stable period of small-scale hunting and gathering was followed by an apparently instantaneous efflorescence of technology and society leading to rapid extinction.<sup>98</sup>

But it is not just uncertainty about the future that should motivate us to stop giving our students narratives that privilege one history among many as the universal history of humanity. After more than a century of “Victorian anthropology”—circulating in a great many forms of knowledge—we have ample evidence that much harm is done to real people by presenting as signifiers of “prehistory” images of contemporary, darkly pigmented persons living in Africa. It is time, then, to reject these textbooks.

To adopt this position is not to call for an impossible inclusiveness, as if we could somehow narrate all human histories. Rather, it is to call for experimentation with alternative narrations of human difference in time, based on other principles of exclusion and inclusion. More specifically, my analysis calls for textbooks that tell students that, whatever point in time we select as a point of departure for our narratives of the human past, we are never ever outside of history. All of human existence, and not just a privileged subset of it, must be treated as historical, in the important senses of involving both contingency and agency, and requiring, on our part as historians, attention to context.<sup>99</sup> To adopt such a view will, moreover, destabilize any sense we have that we know how to tell history “from the beginning” and thus “in full.” It will thereby re-open for us the question of just how far back

<sup>97</sup> For how one such group, the Pajonal Ashéninka, view *civilarse* (“civilization”), see Hanne Veber, “The Salt of the Montaña: Interpreting Indigenous Activism in the Rain Forest,” *Cultural Anthropology* 13 (August 1998): 384. According to Veber, the Pajonal Ashéninka represent an unusual case of effective organizing by Amazonian peoples to sustain indigenous practices of production while engaging civilization.

<sup>98</sup> Richard B. Lee and Irwen DeVore, “Problems in the Study of Hunters and Gatherers,” in Lee and DeVore, *Man the Hunter*, 2.

<sup>99</sup> On this point specifically in relation to Africa, see Joseph C. Miller, “History and Africa/Africa in History,” *AHR* 104 (February 1999): 9.

in time we need to go in the pursuit of particular educational and scholarly projects. The analysis I have presented suggests, as well, that we need textbooks that do not divide and diminish humanity by parsing it into the "civilized" and "pre-civilized"; textbooks that encourage students to examine, rather than presume, this violent binary of modernity; and textbooks that deploy comparison to highlight the contingency of the familiar and to historicize, rather than naturalize, generalized social types and the social orders we encase within them. And finally, in keeping with all these points, let us not forget that we need textbooks that locate the lives of twentieth-century people who gather and hunt in chapters on the twentieth century, rather than in chapters on the time "before civilization." The scholarly and intellectual resources to begin such experiments in textbook writing are available to us today. The challenge is to use these resources to produce a robust marketplace of ideas in textbook publishing, so as to overcome the dreary uniformity available to our students now.

See Appendix Next Page

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## Appendix

### Textbooks Published in the 1990s Examined for This Study

Chambers, Mortimer, Raymond Grew, David Herlihy, Theodore K. Rabb, and Isser Woloch. *The Western Experience*. 6th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995.

Chodorow, Stanley, MacGregor Knox, Conrad Schirokauer, Joseph R. Strayer, and Hans W. Gatzke. *The Mainstream of Civilization*. 6th edn. Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt Brace, 1994.

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*AHR Forum Essay*  
**The Century as a Historical Period**

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*Periodization is a primary tool of historians. Marking off chunks of time as distinctive eras with some kind of internal coherence or characteristic quality is a fundamental way we organize the past. Periodization schemes also provoke constant debate and contention. They are always subject to revision. This AHR Forum Essay tackles the difficult but critical issue of periodization by proposing ways to think about whether or not the recently ended twentieth century should constitute a separate historical epoch. **Charles S. Maier** frames the discussion by analyzing various narratives that can be used to demarcate the twentieth century as a historical period. He also suggests the implications of narrative choices for our understanding of the century and of periodization itself. Maier invites responses to his argument.*

*And so do we. This Forum is the third installment of a format in which we solicit comments from readers rather than commission responses to be published along with the essay. This time, we take advantage of the new online AHR to open the discussion even further. We will to host a moderated electronic discussion between Maier and those who wish comment on his essay. The discussion will take place September 4–18. Participants can send questions or comments of up to 700 words. Guidelines will be posted on the discussion sign-in page. Our primary goals for the discussion are to make the exchanges as open and useful as possible and to ensure that they comply with the established standards of the AHR. The discussion site can be found in the electronic version of the June 2000 issue at <http://www.historycooperative.org/>. After the discussion has concluded, the exchanges will become a permanent part of the electronic version of this Forum Essay. Questions about the Forum can be sent to the American Historical Review, 914 E. Atwater Ave., Bloomington, IN 47405 or to our e-mail address: [ahr@indiana.edu](mailto:ahr@indiana.edu).*

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*Forum Essay*  
Consigning the Twentieth Century to History:  
Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era

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CHARLES S. MAIER

HOW WILL HISTORIANS ANALYZE THE CENTURY that has just concluded? What narratives or interpretations will they construct to make sense of the last hundred years? A century of world wars, of political violence, of modernization? Will the twentieth century cohere as a historical epoch? For historians and the reading public alike, centuries provide a ready-made chronological framework for large-scale history. Nevertheless, I believe that the idea of twentieth-century history will serve us as a temporal framework only in very selective ways. It may remain as the shorthand designation for what I discuss below as one or another “moral narratives.” It will not, though, serve us as well for demarcating economic development or large-scale institutional change, what we can call “structural narratives.”<sup>1</sup> These structural narratives, this essay will argue, involve trends that have unfolded in a tempo independent of the twentieth century. What follows is an effort to juxtapose these two chronological perspectives—structural and moral narratives, and of one structural narrative in particular—with their respective claims about historical significance and historical periodization.

The problems that a twentieth-century history presents do not arise just because of ragged beginning and end points, such that 1914 and 1989, rather than 1900 and 2000, are envisaged as opening and closing the political story, at least of Western history. Neither does the difficulty result from the fact that internal caesuras—whether, above all, the defeat of fascism and the end of the world wars in the case of the European narrative or the achievement of decolonization with respect to the Asian, Middle Eastern, and African history—are so profound that the 1900s as a whole retain little “structural” unity. Instead, I would urge, to focus on the “twentieth century” as such obscures one of the most encompassing or fundamental sociopolitical trends of modern world development, namely the emergence, ascendancy, and subsequent crisis of what is best labeled “territoriality.” Making the case for the significance of territoriality is a principal objective here. Insofar as the case

<sup>1</sup> See Reinhart Koselleck, “Representation, Event and Structure,” in Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, Keith Tribe, trans. (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 105–15, for the emptiness of natural chronology, the establishment of diachronic structures inherent in the narrative flow of perceived events, and “structures,” which are non-narrative concepts designed to make sense of the medium or long-term—and which have no less “reality” than events within a narrative framework (pp. 111–12).

is persuasive, the landmark dates of the twentieth century become less compelling for periodization.

Territoriality means simply the properties, including power, provided by the control of bordered political space, which until recently at least created the framework for national and often ethnic identity.<sup>2</sup> Despite our taking it as a given for so long, territoriality has not been a timeless attribute of human societies. It is a historical formation, and its political form was also historical, that is, it has a beginning and an end. But it has not followed the trajectory of the century through time, providing rather the spatially anchored structures for politics and economics that were taken for granted from about 1860 to about 1970 or 1980 but that have since begun to decompose. Hence this article constitutes a plea for historians to envisage a historical era that took shape in the second half of the nineteenth century and, just as important, effectively unraveled in the two to three decades before the century formally ended.

Why privilege territoriality as a key for periodizing modern history? If focusing on processes, why not emphasize industrialization, or the rise of nationalism and nation-states, the great ideological confrontations of Left and Right, whether fascism and communism or democracy and authoritarianism more generally, or just the recourse to mass political violence? If focusing on collective protagonists, why not changing class structure or transformed gender roles? I am not claiming that any one sort of transformation is prior to all the others, although territoriality is

<sup>2</sup> My interest in the politics of space and territory followed an investigation of "the politics of time" and goes back to the cycle of the SSRC-ACLS Joint Committee on Western Europe in the early 1980s, chaired by Philippe Schmitter, whose ideas on questions of governance and scale helped prod my own. This article is a revised version of my plenary session presentation to the American Historical Association Meeting in January 2000, Chicago; it was also read at the American Academy in Berlin, and a variant on the issue of frontiers and territoriality was presented to the International Security Studies workshop at Yale University, February 2000. I first developed the concept of territoriality as a key to periodization in a paper presented to the Italian Society for the Study of Contemporary History (SISSCO) in May 1996, published as "Secolo corto o epoca lunga? L'unità storica dell'età industriale e le trasformazioni della territorialità," in *'900: I tempi della storia*, Claudio Pavone, ed. (Rome, 1997), 29–56. I outlined contrasting moral histories in my lecture to the Mulino association in Bologna in November 1999, since published as "Il Ventesimo secolo è stato peggiore degli altri? Un bilancio storico alla fine del Novecento," *Il Mulino* 48, no. 386 (November–December 1999): 995–1011. This article is an effort to refine and confront these two interpretive categories. In general, geographers and social theorists rather than historians (exceptions cited below) have tended to thematize the issue. See especially Jean Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville, Va., 1973); Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge, 1986); Ivo D. Duchachek, *The Territorial Dimension of Politics: Within, Among and Across Nations* (Boulder, Colo., 1986); Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of System, Boundaries, and Territoriality," *World Politics* 39 (1986): 27–52; David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); and John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47 (1993): 139–74; John Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory," *Review of International Political Economy* 1 (1994): 53–80; Peter J. Taylor, "The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World System," *Progress in Human Geography* 18 (1994): 151–62; Bertrand Badie, *La fin des territoires: Essai sur le désordre international et sur l'utilité sociale du respect* (Paris, 1995); Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock, "Debordering the World of States: New Spaces in International Relations," *New Political Science*, no. 35 (Spring 1996): 69–106. Immensely stimulating, but less about bounded spaces than the social creation of spatiality, is Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Donald Nicholson-Smith, trans. (Oxford, 1991; French edn. 1974). In the notation that follows, I have attempted to indicate my reliance on work from other disciplines as well as identify direct sources, but, unlike the case for many of the articles in this journal, I have not provided bibliographical orientation for the historical sequences I suggest. These involve vast literatures that I cannot pretend to have read.

caught up with the others and does offer an encompassing variable. Just as crucial, territoriality appears to be evaporating in many ways before our eyes, a process partially and rather ahistorically captured by the notion of globalization. The contemporary dissolution of a structural order allows researchers to glimpse trends formerly so ubiquitous they had not been perceived as issues for historical investigation. G. W. Hegel's famous owl of Minerva takes wing at dusk. Territoriality has been so pervasive a principle for organizing societies that only as it has begun to dissolve have social scientists and historians come to fathom its role. Epochs of world history hinge not only on the rise and fall of great powers or the successive struggles among mobilized social groups but on the attributes of political space, whether weakened or strengthened or rescaled into larger or smaller commanding units.

Arguments about periodization remain meaningful only because they represent claims as to what constellations of events should be accorded major significance for defined communities of actors. Periods—whether defined by actual units of time (a decade, a century) or by a figurative span that covers some related events (the Renaissance, Late Antiquity)—stipulate the extension across time of developments that seem to have some relationship to each other and as a group contrast with earlier or later sequences. Historians understand that many designations of periods are descriptive, not causal concepts: the Enlightenment as such never caused skepticism about organized religion or the social benefit of torture. Historical periodization is an effort to interpret more than to explain; that is, to assign a meaning to historical phenomena by relating them either to sequential chains of other events or to webs of relationships, including institutions, social groups of one sort or another, or even mentalités that endure across a significant length of time.

It remains ambiguous whether periodization implies an inherent unity to events, a sort of unavowed *Zeitgeist*, or, when applied to cultural products, an overarching style. Krzysztof Pomian has written:

Every periodization belongs to the sort of operation that establishes ties between the visible and the visually inaccessible: the invisible, the reconstructible, the observable, or, if one wishes, between the factual and the conceptual. But within that family of operations it has a particular position by virtue of the status it gives to time: to construct a periodization is to admit that the succession of facts or objects is not just a simple appearance, that it reflects something real. The realities inaccessible to view are presupposed as continuous, aligned, separated by zones of rupture that nonetheless leave something that endures, and [they are] arranged in the order of succession, in brief, inscribed in time and endowed each one, with a temporal thickness.<sup>3</sup>

Most Anglo-American historians would probably find this view somewhat mystical. All sorts of potential connections might be discerned among different classes of chronologically bounded events: a persuasive periodization alerts us to select one

<sup>3</sup> Krzysztof Pomian, *L'ordre du temps* (Paris, 1984), 161. The discussion concludes a long section on the concept of historical epochs. Pomian emphasizes the use historians make of concepts of epoch to orient values about the present or the future. I have presented some ideas about periodization in general as "I paradossi del 'prima' e del 'poi': Periodizzazioni e rotture nella storia," *Contemporanea* 2 (October 1999): 715–22. (English version by e-mail on request.)

set and, just as critical, to overlook the evidence of others. To periodize is to dismiss evidence as much as to gather it.

That is one reason why debates over periodization usually follow a predictable and sometimes dreary course. Historians deploy two sorts of argument. The first type entails a series of claims that a development hitherto taken to mark one era—the renewal of humanistic learning, for example, or the onset of decisive economic transformation, or the emergence of bureaucratic organizations, or the cultural markers of modernity—can be observed in an earlier one and has just been overlooked. Significant developments thus seem to creep backward through time. The counterargument is that the earlier appearances are scattered and do not make enough of a difference to characterize an era until they achieve a certain frequency. At stake is the familiar issue, namely, when do disparate intellectual products, technological innovations, social and national conflicts, and institutional transformations become the shaping forces of public life? Or, as Marxists liked to ask, when do changes in quantity become changes in quality?

Two different questions tend to overlap here: first, the question of when it makes sense to talk of a new historical era (how much change has accumulated?), and second, the question of whether such a new era ordinarily begins with a historical rupture or “saltation,” that is, with nonlinear change. As development of the calculus formally demonstrated in mathematics, incremental changes as well as major upheavals can produce large-scale transformations. Nonetheless, perhaps influenced by the radical shifts in world politics during 1989–1990, historians seem more receptive at present to models of sudden transformation. *Histoire événementielle* no longer refers to events as mere “surface disturbances, crests of foam,” atop the *longue durée* as Fernand Braudel’s stratified model suggested; rather, events can be interpreted as themselves constituting or catalyzing “deeper” transitions, which means even profound change can take place suddenly.<sup>4</sup> To account for these rapid shifts, some historians borrow the idea of “punctuated equilibrium” from paleontology; others have been tempted to cite such mathematical models as René Thom’s “catastrophe theory” of the 1970s, or appeal to partially digested versions of “chaos theory,” which stress its doctrine of indeterminacy from initial conditions but not its large-scale effort to establish ranges of predictability. Few historians are qualified to participate in discussions of “dynamical systems theory,” which envisages not predictable events but ranges of nonlinear processes. In any case, these mathematical branches have so far offered the historian only analogies and metaphors.<sup>5</sup> Since

<sup>4</sup> Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II*, Sian Reynolds, ed., vol. 1 (New York, 1975), “Preface to the First Edition,” 21. See also Braudel, *Écrits sur l’histoire* (Paris, 1969), 75–81, for a more subjective or pragmatic invocation of *la longue durée*.

<sup>5</sup> For a sample of some of the work under way, see Melanie Mitchell, James P. Crutchfield, and Peter T. Hrabér, “Dynamics, Computation, and the ‘Edge of Chaos’: A Re-Examination,” and James P. Crutchfield, “Is Anything Ever New? Considering Emergence,” both in *Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Realities*, George A. Cowan, David Pines, and David Meltzer, eds., *Proceedings*, Vol. 19, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity (Reading, Mass., 1994), 497–533; for difficulties for social-science application, see the general discussion, “What Are the Important Questions?” 651–60. On catastrophe theory, see the discussion by its advocate, René Thom, *Paraboles et catastrophes: Entretiens sur les mathématiques, la science et la philosophie*, Giulio Giorello and Simona Morini, eds. (Paris, 1980), 59–113 (which unfortunately yields little for any historian of politics and society). For a positive response to the utility of chaos theory, see Stanley J. Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia* (Berkeley, Calif., 1996), 294–96.



postmodern historiography often contents itself with illumination rather than explanation, such insight may seem an adequate goal. Increasingly, historical works are praised for qualities akin to metaphorical suggestiveness rather than traditional causal analysis. To insist on the latter is sometimes disdained as an old-fashioned vestige of nineteenth-century positivism.<sup>6</sup>

The increasing value placed on the metaphorical capture of historical truth will assure that the twentieth century remains an important historical referent. My argument is not that it cannot serve as a meaningful historical period but that it retains importance for interpretive or moral but not analytical or structural narratives. Centuries have always claimed a canonic status as historical divisions. Given the Latin language inheritance, it was easy to slip from "age" to "century," as did Voltaire, when writing of four great *siècles* of human cultural and political attainment.<sup>7</sup> What metaphoric truths, then, are captured by the twentieth century? Both Henry Adams at the beginning of the century and Reinhart Koselleck three-quarters of the way into it claimed that the acceleration of historical time itself was what made contemporary history special: "Our modern concept of history has initially proved itself for the specifically historical determinants of progress and regress, acceleration and delay."<sup>8</sup> But acceleration is not a sufficient criterion for ascribing some epochal quality to the century. Instead, centuries often form the chronological boundaries for what might be called moral narratives. We associate cultural innovation or business cycles with decades (the prosperity of the "twenties"

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Popularized presentations appear in James Gleick, *Chaos: Making a New Science* (New York, 1988); and Mitchell M. Waldrip, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (New York, 1992).

<sup>6</sup> Perhaps the best short description of the qualities postmodern history seems to prize is found in Walter Benjamin, "Über den Begriff der Geschichte," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, 6 vols. in 12 (Frankfurt am Main, 1974–85), 1, 2, pp. 695–98. That fragment stresses history as a retrospective glimpse of cumulative social wreckage. But Benjamin elsewhere allowed for a history that entailed a future politics, as if dreams prefigured action upon awakening: "dialectical thought is the organ of historical awakening." *Das Passagen-Werk*, Rolf Tiedemann, ed., 2 vols. (Suhrkamp, 1983), 1: 59, and the more sustained reflections, 490–92. I use the term positivism but in a way similar to what Ian Hacking terms scientific realism in *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science* (Cambridge, 1983); Hacking admits to a "realism" in connection with imputed scientific constructs such as quarks but suggests that others, such as lines of force, are just constructs—if so, they are the analogs to historical periods. It might be more natural to call such a common-sense approach positivism, but Hacking reserves that for a skepticism about statements concerning entities behind the descriptions (pp. 40–57). The metaphoric quality may be enabling rather than disabling, for metaphor might justifiably appear as the characteristic mode of cognition of twentieth-century social and even natural science. Compare Peter Galison, *Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics* (Chicago, 1997), 19–40, and his metaphors of communication, 46–63. I would even argue that metaphor has increasingly become the characteristic mode of scientific cognition (including the social sciences) since the late nineteenth century. But if so, how do we impose any restraints? For a recent example of an extreme recourse to metaphor and illumination, see Roberto Calasso, *The Ruin of Kasch*, William Weaver and Stephen Sartarelli, trans. (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 182–83. For extended arguments that metaphor remains central to historical and political representation, see F. R. Ankersmit, *History and Topology: The Rise and Fall of Metaphor* (Berkeley, Calif., 1994); and Ankersmit, *Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy beyond Fact and Value* (Stanford, Calif., 1995), chaps. 5–6.

<sup>7</sup> Voltaire, *Le siècle de Louis XIV*, as cited by Pomian, *L'ordre du temps*, 123–24.

<sup>8</sup> Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (New York, 1931), 489–97, 501; Reinhart Koselleck, "History, Histories, and Formal Structures of Time," in *Futures Past*, 102. See also "'Space of Experience' and 'Horizon of Expectation': Two Historical Categories," 283–84. On the cultural receptivity to such *fin-de-siècle* reflections as Adams's, see Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).

or the ideological confrontations of the “thirties” or the “sixties,” the conformism of the “fifties”), whereas centuries serve for the natural span of moral progress or regression. Most indelibly, the twentieth century has come to symbolize or encapsulate the narratives of moral atrocity that continue to transfix intellectuals and the public alike. For Western intellectuals, the twentieth century does not refer primarily to a strictly chronological unit. Rather, it constitutes a moral epoch, a dark historical passage characterized by ideological conflict, dehumanization, wholesale political killing, unmeasured cruelty to civilians in war, and genocide. Thus the twentieth century remains inscribed, as Isaiah Berlin summarized it, as “the worst century there has ever been.”<sup>9</sup>

Given this moral characterization, the historian faces the question of how to relate the period to the epoch, that is, the structural narrative to the moral narrative, the century as a time span in which a complex set of institutional changes take place to the century as an era in the moral history of humanity. Is there any relationship between the narratives of moral atrocity, which presuppose that the twentieth century forms in some sense a coherent if metaphorical epoch (for example, the Century of Auschwitz or of Totalitarianism), and the sociopolitical story that I believe should be based on a different time span? Are the sociopolitical analyses and the moral narratives nonsynchronous?

Most frequently, the major effort to link the two has invoked the concept of “modernity,” to which has been attributed an ambiguous impact, suggesting, on the one hand, possibilities of emancipation and, on the other, resources for domination. This now familiar critique represents a prevalent moral narrative, according to which the development of the physical and the social sciences at least facilitates, if it does not specifically drive, projects for dehumanization and genocide. For Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, technological rationality produced the threat of fascism and the manipulative banality of the culture industry; for Michel Foucault, modern knowledge and carceral control increased apace; for Zygmunt Bauman, modernity made possible the Holocaust.<sup>10</sup>

Nonetheless, their ambiguous modernities hardly constituted a rigorous chronological period. There are in fact more determinate linkages between moral and structural narratives, and instead I will attempt to establish a different sort of interplay between time span and moral narrative in the third part of this article. Intellectuals and historians have developed not just one but two or even three narratives of moral atrocity for the twentieth century. While not mutually exclusive, they emanate from different constituencies; and, revealingly, their relative persuasiveness depends on the time periods chosen to make historical sense of the modern era. Their relative persuasiveness and impact depend, in fact, on the rise and fall of territoriality proposed here as an alternative chronology to that of twentieth-

<sup>9</sup> Cited by Michael Ignatieff, *Isaiah Berlin: A Life* (New York, 1998), 301.

<sup>10</sup> Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, John Cumming, trans. (New York, 1972); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Alan Sheridan, trans. (New York, 1977); Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); and compare Omer Bartov, *Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation* (Oxford, 1996), 67–70, for the Holocaust as “the culmination . . . of a process begun in the late eighteenth century and still continuing.” Despite the popularity of the connection, I believe the attribution of the Holocaust to modernity far too diffuse a causal model to advance historical comprehension.

century history. The periodization proposed here for sociopolitical development thus makes sense of the respective claims between these moral narratives. Finally, in way of a brief conclusion, I will suggest that these differing narratives of moral atrocity have different implications for the contemporary epoch—one warns us against ambitious political agendas, while the other cautions us against abandoning politics in our contemporary enthusiasm for the market.

WHEN CITED BY HISTORIANS, CENTURIES are like Procrustes' famous bed: the Greek innkeeper either stretched his guests if they were too short or chopped them down if they were too long for the sleeping accommodations that were offered. By and large, historians of the West have stretched the 1800s into the "long nineteenth century," extending until World War I. Europeanists, at least, have conceived of it as the century marked by industrial development, the triumph of the modern nation-state, the advent of mass democracy (although in this respect, Arno Mayer has certainly dissented with his insistence on the persistence of the power of agrarian elites), the partition of much of what would later come to be called the Third World, and finally by its supreme confidence in economic and moral progress. As a pendant to this "long nineteenth century," finally terminated by World War I, Eric Hobsbawm's concept of a "short twentieth century" starts in 1914 and concludes in 1989. Essentially, Hobsbawm's twentieth century spans the rise and fall of the socialist project, including its Soviet incarnation, justified finally by having helped to rescue, then stabilize, liberal capitalism.<sup>11</sup>

Even if these dates were proposed only to periodize European history, debate would be possible. The trajectory of nationalism and fascism make the years from 1870 or 1890 to 1945 a plausible epoch. Developments in science and art as well as the international crises and the reappearance of revolution might suggest 1905 as the century's curtain raiser. Certainly, Hobsbawm's dates must serve the chronology of African and Asian histories far less well. Historians who have comparative ambitions must ask, are there caesuras and epochs that encompass world historical development? Theorists of capitalism as a transnational economic system, propelling European, American, and non-Western societies through turbulent cycles of social and political upheaval, believe there are, and Giovanni Arrighi has proposed a "long twentieth century" that itself climaxes three hegemonic phases of historic capitalism—Dutch, British, and American—each of which has imposed a different type of economic inequality and increasingly dissolved the prerogatives of sovereign nation-states.<sup>12</sup>

But there is little gained by clinging to either a short or a long twentieth century as the strategic temporal framework. I would propose instead that a coherent epoch

<sup>11</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York, 1994); Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York, 1981).

<sup>12</sup> Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London, 1994). Arrighi and the theorists he cites (Terence Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein, *et al.*) view hegemony as a continuing form of domination under the international capitalism of the last four centuries. It is questionable, however, whether hegemony in a general sense flows from economic power alone, nor is it clear that international economic systems are always characterized by the presence of a clear hegemon even in the restricted sense used by political economists.

of world development began in the sixth and seventh decades of the nineteenth century—say, for the sake of simplicity around 1860—and that its technological, cultural, and sociopolitical scaffolding began to corrode and fall apart in the late 1960s, initiating a process of profound transformation that continues today. In a work that has fallen into undeserved oblivion, the historian Robert Binkley took account of this global transition sixty years ago, when he pointed out that political territories or national units had undergone a great crisis of confederal organization, abandoning, in a process of widespread civil wars, their traditional decentralized structures of politics for more administratively and territorially cohesive regimes.<sup>13</sup> In the United States of the Civil War era, in Meiji Japan, in the German Confederation and the states of Italy, in the emerging halves of the Habsburg empire, in Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Thailand, and elsewhere, national societies were reformed in a rapid and often violent transformation. To varying degrees, depending on prior state capacity, economic advance, exposure to powerful foreigners, and development, these changes, first of all, strengthened central government institutions at the expense of regional or confederal authority; second, required that internal as well as external military capacity be continually mobilized as a resource for governance; third, coopted the new leaders of finance and industry, science, and professional attainment into a ruling cartel alongside the still powerful but no longer supreme representatives of the landed elite; and, fourth, developed an industrial infrastructure based on the technologies of coal and iron as applied to long-distance transportation of goods and people and the mass output of industrial products assembled by a factory labor force. Even where change was less encompassing, significant reform took place: Great Britain reorganized its party system, expanded its suffrage, professionalized its army, and transferred public education from the church to the state. Russia eliminated serfdom and sought to expand limited representative institutions.

Not all regimes dared consistently to combine all these elements. Imperial rulers sought to control a reform process they required for viable governance but that might easily work to undermine their own supremacy: Alexander II of Russia arrested liberalization after it threatened to escape control. The British carried through limited rationalization of their Indian domain after the 1857 Mutiny, enhancing public British control, promising to invite Indian participation, but unable to give power so completely as demanded by the local economic and political entrepreneurs they helped indirectly to encourage. In China, the Qing Restoration may have been a remarkable effort at dynastic recovery, but it endeavored to remain within the limits of Confucian legitimacy. The Ottoman clock towers of the 1870s remained monuments to a partial and unsatisfactory modernization. These imperial systems contained too many restive subjects to risk fully mobilizing their diverse indigenous energies. Territorial vastness in these cases still remained as much a source of vulnerability as of control.

<sup>13</sup> Robert C. Binkley, *Realism and Nationalism, 1852–1871* (New York, 1935). Recently, Michael Geyer and Charles Bright have highlighted the same period in their discussion, “World History in a Global Age,” *AHR* 100 (October 1995): 1034–60, esp. 1045–47. On nations and spatiality, see Peter J. Taylor and Colin Flint, *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State, and Locality*, 4th edn. (Harlow, England, 2000); Colin Williams and Anthony Smith, “The National Construction of Social Space,” *Progress in Human Geography* 7 (1983): 502–18.

Glancing over a longer time frame, it is apparent that several such epochs of territorial rescaling on a global scale have punctuated the early modern and modern eras. Imperial structures have been hard to keep vital, at least without a fundamental contest with entrenched elites, for more than two or three centuries in any case. Between the sixteenth century and mid-seventeenth century, the rather perforated or weakening jurisdictions of the then great empires—Spanish Habsburgs and Ming, Aztec and Inca (the turn of the Ottomans and Mughals came a bit later)—lost ground to new dynasties or to the more cohesively organized territorial states that refined the concept of sovereignty and often firmed up their frontiers with elaborate fortifications. In the second half of the nineteenth century, another era of rescaling took place. Territories were reconfigured, as new political energy and technological resources were applied to the consolidation of what historians describe as nation-states. During the last two or three decades, societies throughout the world have been undergoing a third reconfiguration of territoriality. But in contrast to earlier epochs, what may be at stake is not merely a change in the scale or level of decisive political or economic power, not just a shift, say, from the national to supranational, as in Europe. Rather, territory itself fades in importance as a political or economic resource—a fundamental transformation of institutional life that too close a focus on the 1900s must obscure, since the key developments in question crystallized as early as the second third of the nineteenth century and effectively unraveled in the two to three decades before the twentieth century formally ended.

Why were so many societies reformed in the decades from 1850 to 1880? A simple diffusionist model will not work; countries on different sides of the world underwent the same changes at the same time. To argue that each one was caught up in its own internal or local history is trivially true, but it begs the issue. Any rational observer taking stock of so many similar transformations in individual societies at the same time must reasonably infer that some overarching impulses were at work; the probability of such multiple coincidences is low indeed. Can we establish some common causal pattern? To be sure, the events of the 1860s had their own prehistory. Signs of crisis for the respective old regimes were visible from the 1820s through the 1840s: in the West, the inroads of market capitalism, the percolation of French revolutionary values, and—in southeastern Europe or Latin America—of independence movements. While early socialists perceived the transformation wrought by the factory system, the more widespread agitation gripped the countryside with the creation of vast national markets in land as waves of church properties were nationalized by liberal coalitions in Catholic societies, settlement was thrust west and south in the Americas (helping to augment boom-and-bust price cycles in land and cotton), and the south China countryside was wracked by a massive peasant revolt. Under way, in short, was a profound worldwide deterioration of what in Europe was envisaged as the Restoration social equilibrium, so precariously reestablished after 1815, whose premise (as that of stability elsewhere) had been the maintenance of firm rural hierarchies. In effect, land was escaping the control of its traditional rulers, its value fluctuated wildly, its population was on the move, and the belief systems that had legitimated its unequal distribution had been profoundly challenged.



But not all crises produce so vigorous and widespread a reorganization of power and economy. Not all such periods of ferment are resolved by masterly programs of reform “from above” such as marked the middle third of the nineteenth century in so many of the world’s societies. In effect, most major countries attempted in a patchwork manner the program that was most coherently carried out in Meiji Japan: a renegotiation of social order, including the pacification of a volatile countryside, as newer and older elites overcame their earlier disputes and jointly exploited the new technological resources that enhanced national power and controlled national territory, above all the dramatic inventions that overcame spatial dispersion, such as steam power, the railroad, and the telegraph. Thanks to these technological possibilities, programs of conservative renewal could be achieved by changing the geographical scale of political control. Such a change of scale would serve the organization of social stability—not, as noted, in all sprawling domains where diverse ethnicities aspired to autonomy and technology remained underdeveloped—but in most of the industrial countries through the next century. It would later facilitate the growing assimilation of the new urban masses and working classes.

Historians and political scientists have tended to take for granted until recently that common to all the successful national reorganizations was an enhanced concept of territory, defined here as a bounded geographical space that provides a basis for material resources, political power, and common allegiance. “Territoriality for humans,” one of its theorists summarized a decade and a half ago, “is a powerful geographic strategy to control people and things by controlling area.”<sup>14</sup> Territory is not just a background factor in history; it assures a stable sense of community only when “identity space”—the unit that provides the geography of allegiance—is congruent with “decision space”—the turf that seems to assure physical, economic, and cultural security. To emphasize the historical significance of territory is not a plea to return to geopolitics. Advocates of geopolitics in the early twentieth century argued that territoriality was an immutable variable for deciding mastery of a world whose nations were locked in perpetual struggle. In fact, these doctrines were themselves a product of the intensification of territoriality; the diagnosis was part of the symptomology, and it makes little sense to redeploy geopolitical ideas when the relationship of geographic space to identity and to security is in question, as it is today.<sup>15</sup>

As bounded space, territory involves two components: the frontier at the edge and the lands within. Historians have traditionally focused on the role of boundaries, and contemporary scholars, now including literary critics and anthropologists, have emphasized their role for the Roman Empire or in the context of the post-Westphalian, seventeenth-century state system. The religious and state rivalries of seventeenth-century Europe, as well as the resources claimed by the

<sup>14</sup> Sack, *Human Territoriality*, 21, 32.

<sup>15</sup> For some recent discussions of geopolitics and its contemporary applications, see George J. Demko and William B. Wood, eds., *Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century* (Boulder, Colo., 1994); Taylor and Flint, *Political Geography*, 49–104; and the diverse articles in *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22 (June–September 1999). For a useful guide to the diverse applications of geographical studies, consult Ian Douglas, Richard Huggett, and Mike Robinson, eds., *Companion Encyclopedia of Geography: The Environment and Humankind* (London, 1996).

so-called military revolution, secured the principle of sovereignty and renewed the preoccupation with fortified frontiers that had marked antiquity; indeed, one French historian refers to "the invention of the frontier" to characterize the epoch that ran from Jean Bodin to Sébastien Vauban. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries comprise the great epoch of enclosure: enclosure of common lands within the villages of Britain and western Europe, enclosure of state borders. As Ewan Anderson has summarized, with the Peace of Westphalia, "it was acknowledged that boundaries drawn around territory circumscribed a single political and legal unit over which the state had sovereignty. The idea of zonal frontiers between core areas of control was rejected and from then, individuals owed allegiance to a specific territory which linked them to sovereign control."<sup>16</sup> Early modern history in the West was, in effect, the history of frontiers and the resources needed to establish them, nor did this preoccupation really fade until very recently. Western (and not only Western) statesmen and publics of the late nineteenth century believed that they must reinforce the frontiers anew.<sup>17</sup> Something there was that must have loved a wall . . . For not only geographical frontiers: social and class upheaval at home as well as renewed international competition compelled an obsession with social enclosures of all sorts: the boundaries that separated nation from nation, urban from rural, and the zones within cities, the conceptual frontiers that divided church from state, public from private, household from work, alleged male from reputed female roles—social and political order was conceivable only through spatial partition.

Decisively renewed in the nineteenth century, as new nations were consolidated and new boundaries created in war, the fixation with frontiers lasted until very recently. Europeans extended it outward from their own states, refitted with new borders in the 1860s and 1870s to the large areas they penetrated in Asia and Africa. Overseas empires became increasingly seen not as a network of shipping rights and supply stations, nor just of extraterritorial enclaves and zones of coastal penetration. Preferably, for the invigorated and industrialized Europeans of the late nineteenth century, overseas jurisdictions would be transformed into cloned territories offshore that must themselves be clearly bounded. As one of the greatest celebrants of this sort of empire, Lord Curzon could still announce as of 1907, "frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which are suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of life or death to nations." Indeed, he might have repeated the judgment through 1990.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Ewan W. Anderson, "Geopolitics: International Boundaries as Fighting Places," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22 (June–September 1999): 127. On frontiers in the seventeenth century, see also Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, Calif., 1989); and Michel Foucher, *L'invention des frontières* (Paris, 1986).

<sup>17</sup> See Peter C. Perdue, "Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia," *International History Review* 20 (June 1998): 263–86; and—emphasizing the nineteenth rather than the eighteenth century—Charles P. Giersch, Jr., "Imperial Geography, Local History, and Changing Notions of Territory in Modern China," presented at the Yale University International Security Studies Conference on Geography and International History, February 2000.

<sup>18</sup> George Lord Curzon of Kedleston, *Frontiers: The Romanes Lecture of 1907* (1908; rpt. edn., Westport, Conn., 1976); cited in Anderson, "Geopolitics," 128. On boundaries, see also J. R. V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* (London, 1987); Stephen B. Jones, "Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time," and Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries,"

NONETHELESS, TO UNDERSTAND THE MODERN CONCEPT OF TERRITORY, and thus of state and even nation, indeed of international order, borders are not enough. Beginning with the programs of enlightened monarchs and then profoundly transformed by the resources of industrialization, a new quality of territoriality will emerge as important. It is a product of what is happening within the borders. The area within will no longer be construed as a passive enclosure to be policed and kept orderly; it will be a source of resources, livelihood, output, and energy. Territory is envisaged not just as an acquisition or as a security buffer but as a decisive means of power and rule.<sup>19</sup> What were the assets of territoriality? First, simply physical extent; and, if limited by nature or neighbors, by the end of the century territorial ambitions encompassed overseas empires, while geopolitical theorists divided over whether maritime or landed extension offered more power. Population was obviously a resource; so, too, was economic development, a concept developed by early mercantilist theorists, then carried forward from the late eighteenth century by writers as diverse as Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, and thereafter discussed in close association with strategic capacity by such commentators as Ivan Bloch.<sup>20</sup>

For a sense of what is at stake, it is revealing to consider the testimony of physical science. Every historical era tends to keep its political institutions and its images of the physical world in some sort of congruence. Both testify, I believe, to an overarching spatial imagination that will persist for decades, or even centuries, but can change rapidly when it finally gives way. In 1861 and 1862, while Abraham Lincoln's inexperienced armies found themselves mauled as they sought to reestablish control over just a few northern reaches of insurrectionary Virginia, and again in 1864 as these now more seasoned soldiers discovered how costly it was to attack even an exhausted enemy in swamps and trenches, James Clerk Maxwell tried to explain what he (and earlier Michael Faraday) meant by "physical lines of force." Prior to Faraday, electrical, magnetic, and gravitational force presupposed action of one body over another at a distance. But Faraday's experiments as elaborated by Maxwell's field theory implied that space itself was potentially energized—that every point in space could be assigned a quantity and direction of force, which might leave its traces in the iron filings scattered on a paper above a magnet. As the armature of a generator rotated, it bent and broke through such

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both in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 49 (1959): 241–55 and 269–82. For Antiquity, see Derek Williams, *The Reach of Rome: A History of the Roman Imperial Frontier, 1st–5th Centuries AD* (London, 1996).

<sup>19</sup> The prerequisite for utilization of territorial resources was mapping. The history of mapping has by now become a significant scholarly specialty, paradigmatic for the creation of orderly rule and empire. See Roger J. P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent, *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: A History of Property Mapping* (Chicago, 1992). For an exemplary study, see Matthew H. Edney, *Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–1843* (Chicago, 1990); also Tongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu, 1994); Alan K. Henrikson, "The Power and Politics of Maps," in Demko and Wood, *Reordering the World*, 49–70; and compare James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, Conn., 1998), 87: "All the state simplifications that we have examined have the character of maps."

<sup>20</sup> See Jean de Bloch (Ivan Blioch), *The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations* (Boston, 1899), an English abridgement of the six-volume Russian edition, for a discussion of the aggregate cost of general war and the weakness of the Russian resource base in particular.

lines of force. In effect, Maxwell explained, empty space could be filled with potential and kinetic energy; a set of differential equations could establish the total of these energies, attributed to electrical and magnetic fields, for every point.<sup>21</sup> Maxwell's laws, moreover, were represented by vectors; that is, they had a direction. So, too, territories had a center, the national or regional capital from which political and economic energy radiated outward and products flowed inward from a "tributary" countryside. (In contrast, today's metropolises are wired to each other, not their national hinterland, and conceived of as suspended in a world network of capital and labor.)<sup>22</sup>

I cite Maxwell to suggest that at the very moments he was writing, an analogous conception of energized space was transforming the organization of global territoriality. The lines of force posited in the laboratory were matched by the lines of force knitting together the new world. In the same decade that Maxwell puzzled over the physical interpretation of his differential equations, the coalitions of modernity strung telegraph lines and later oceanic cables and telephone lines and crisscrossed their territories with railroad lines and the seas between them with steamship lines. Maritime routes and rail lines, the French geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache would write by 1921, formed a global network: "By virtue of their regions' intimate penetration, of this universal contact that so few can still escape, everywhere there is cargo to collect, transactions to carry out, needs to satisfy. Thus a new activism arises and animates every part of the globe."<sup>23</sup> But the new lines of force divided as well as connected. No culture obsessed more about borders than the one taking shape by the mid-nineteenth century, insisting on national, racial, gender, and class lines. The modern world was gripped by the episteme of separation. When the boundaries were transgressed or could not be stabilized, social orders degenerated. Liberals and revolutionaries as well as expansionists shared the conviction that tribal peoples lacking territorial structures must succumb to modern states. In the most architectonically conceived artwork of the age, when the boundaries that separated brother from sister, gods from men, and the values of gold from those of blood were transgressed, Valhalla itself perished.

Even as a new class of political leaders believed they must establish frontiers anew, they also emphasized that national power and efficiency rested on the saturation of space inside the frontier. National space was to be charged with "energy" throughout, like the ether. "As sure as a fact yields only to fact," August Ludwig von Rochau argued, "so it is sure that neither a principle nor an idea nor an agreement will unite the dispersed German energies, but only a superior energy which swallows up the others." A. E. Schäffle proposed that national economic

<sup>21</sup> Jed Z. Buchwald, *From Maxwell to Microphysics: Aspects of Electromagnetic Theory in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 1985), 22 and following; L. Pearce Williams, *The Origins of Field Theory* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1980), 121–37, which dates early decisive statements to late 1855 and early 1856.

<sup>22</sup> Contrast the nineteenth-century vision of "tributary" cities—spatially centered in a surrounding land mass (as theorized in 1826 by Johann Heinrich von Thünen's isolated state)—in William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York, 1991), 43–54, with Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton, N.J., 1991), 168–91. Is Cronon's peroration about the interdependence of city and country (pp. 384–85) still relevant for the postmodern urban order?

<sup>23</sup> Paul Vidal de la Blache, *Principes de géographie humaine* (Paris 1995), 268.

energies must flow freely throughout a territory.<sup>24</sup> Territory would be pervaded with prefectures and subprefectures, post offices, railroads and infrastructure, mass-circulation newspapers, telegraphic communication, and the possibilities of electrical power in general. Territorial consciousness now meant that no point inside the frontiers could be left devoid of the state's control, just as no point within a field was devoid of physical force. Administrative energy in the form of primary schools, prefectures, and railroads would pervade and "fill" the nation's space.

The telegraph, steamboats, and the railroad meant that far more points within the state's territory could be supervised by administrators, opened for economic exploitation, mobilized for national purposes. In Hungary, the liberal nationalist István Széchenyi pleaded for railroad development; in Italy, Camillo Cavour wrote that the railroad would especially assist the backward countries: "For such nations railways will be more than a means of self-enrichment; they will be a powerful weapon with the help of which they will succeed in triumphing over the retarding forces that keep them in a baneful state of industrial and political infancy." The railroad in the judgment of Carlo Cattaneo would "rapidly correct the evils of history and geography."<sup>25</sup> Mastery of its techniques allowed the movement of troops on which national power politics rested, as the Northern victories in the American Civil War or the Prussian humiliation of France demonstrated. At the end of the 1860s, Americans had traversed the North American continent with a rail link; control of the new railroads in the American South helped unite the post-Civil War ruling elites. The Canadian Pacific line was driven to the Pacific during the 1880s, in effect extending the Dominion westward along its dorsal spine. As the Left secured control of the French republic in the same decade, it carried through two major projects: Jules Ferry's secularization of primary education and Charles-Louis Freycinet's national railway web, radiating outward from Paris to modernize the interior of the country so that the national domain might truly be integrated. With the railroads went roads, telegraphic service, commerce, use of the postal service, or as one French commentator quoted: "the railroad—infusion of life."<sup>26</sup>

Everywhere, the material results were impressive. Railroad lines tended to quadruple in the advanced states across the middle three decades of the nineteenth century. The United States went from 6.3 kilometers of track per 1,000 square kilometers in 1860 to 34 in 1890 to 84 in 1920; Britain's tracks had already jumped from 7.6 in 1840 to 46 in 1860 to 89.6 to 134; France from 17 in 1860 to 62 to 70.<sup>27</sup> Finally, by the end of the century, Count Sergei Witte had engaged Russian energies on the huge Trans-Siberian project. The railroad was the worldwide foundation of economic development, peopling hitherto remote areas, providing the transport infrastructure for commerce, creating a new demand for iron and steel manufacturers and machinists, beckoning with a representation of moral and

<sup>24</sup> See Theodore S. Hamerow, *The Social Foundations of German Unification, 1858–1871* (Princeton, N.J., 1969), for German sources.

<sup>25</sup> Cavour's memo on railroads cited by Mack Walker, *Plombières: Secret Diplomacy and the Rebirth of Italy* (New York, 1968), 47; Cattaneo cited by Raffaele Romanelli, *L'Italia liberale (1861–1900)* (Bologna, 1979), 69.

<sup>26</sup> Citation from Ardouin-Dumazet, *Voyage en France*, in Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, Calif., 1976), 209.

<sup>27</sup> Peter J. Huggill, *World Trade since 1431: Geography, Technology, and Capitalism* (Baltimore, 1993), 174.



political progress, supplying a tangible image of energy radiating through the national space, interlacing the national territory with specimens of the lines that were demarcating private and public, national and transnational spheres. British geopolitician Halford Mackinder, who celebrated the strategic resources of the vast heartland of "Eurasia"—an imagined spatial identity if ever there were one—insisted that the mobilization of territory depended on the railroads: "Nowhere can they have such effect as in the closed heartland of Euro-Asia."<sup>28</sup>

Railroads were not the only means for saturating space. Anthony Giddens rightly links them with the enhanced resources of administrative power more generally (although his account of a continuous development from improved eighteenth-century transportation to modern electronic information storage elides the critical discontinuities of the mid-nineteenth century and late twentieth).<sup>29</sup> Government bureaucracies grew far more massive—perhaps sextupling in France during the nineteenth century—although many officials were just the employees of such state enterprises as railroads or gas works.<sup>30</sup> Centrality, Henri Lefebvre writes, is the critical thrust of bourgeois society. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,

centrality aspires to be *total*. It thus lays claim, implicitly or explicitly, to a superior political rationality (a state or "urban" rationality). It falls to the agents of the technostucture—to the planners—to provide the justification for this claim . . . Despite countervailing forces, some subversive, some tolerable—and tolerated on various grounds (liberalization, flexibility, etc.)—the centre continues effectively to concentrate wealth, means of action, knowledge, formation and "culture." In short, everything . . . Space is marked out, explored, discovered and rediscovered on a colossal scale. Its potential for being occupied, filled, peopled and transformed from top to bottom is continually on the increase.<sup>31</sup>

Reflecting on the end of the century, Henry Adams was preoccupied by force and power: "the amount of force controlled by society had enormously increased," although he could neither exert it nor explain it.<sup>32</sup>

Consider more generally the industrial technology of the century from the 1860s to the 1960s. First, it is designed to move physical objects. It transports masses of people by railroad and ship, then by plane and jet. It digs huge amounts of earth, as in Panama, or piles up vast amounts of water behind large concrete barriers. Size counts. The great expositions of the era celebrate the massive machines that become ever huger: the steam engines at the Centennial Exposition of 1876 would seem small next to the forty-foot turbine that led to Henry Adams's epiphany at the Paris Exhibition of 1900.<sup>33</sup> Second, this economy is designed to produce vast

<sup>28</sup> See Geoffrey Sloan, "Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22 (June–September 1999): 15–38, esp. 21.

<sup>29</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Cambridge, 1985), 172–97. See also Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. 2: *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (Cambridge, 1993). Both efforts suffer, I think, from over-determination in their respective ambitions to account for the totality of modern European development. For a related effort that remains more rooted in national and period specificity, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 4 vols. (Munich, 1987–).

<sup>30</sup> Eugene N. Anderson and Pauline R. Anderson, *Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, Calif., 1967), 167.

<sup>31</sup> Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, 332, 334.

<sup>32</sup> Adams, *Education of Henry Adams*, 388–89.

<sup>33</sup> Adams, *Education of Henry Adams*, 380–81. His mentor Langley was preoccupied by the new form

numbers of objects, relatively undifferentiated (any color so long as it's black, as Henry Ford said of the Model T). It brings workers by the hundreds to machines and subjects them to their discipline. An industry's efficacy is deemed proportional to its size. Control emanates from the center, and, as Frederick W. Taylor argued, firms should separate the control and planning centers of the enterprise and the unquestioning physical execution of labor. The relationship across space is clearly hierarchical. The headquarters of an enterprise or of government are in the capital; the other branches are subsidiaries. Authority flows "outward" or "down"; output moves "up" from the mine or factory or "in" from abroad. Although firms plant branches abroad and aspire to international activity, they are clearly rooted in a home country, and their domestic business is protected by national tariffs and other legislative measures. The nations of the West remain enchanted with this model through the 1950s, and Communist economic planners cling to it until the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>34</sup> Between the wars, governments and electrical industry executives coordinate grids designed to provide adequate power over their national territories. Hydroelectric projects are celebrated for mastering an unruly and wasted landscape, not contested for environmental degradation. This paradigm of industrial output, so wedded to territorial development, triumphs with the prodigious feats of German, American, and Soviet production for World War II, and in the next decade captures the imagination of planners and the public with the concept of the integrated steel mill, an installation critical for Jean Monnet's plans for modernizing postwar France, for the Thyssen firm's ambitions to rebuild their fortunes in postwar Germany, for the Italian technocrats working with the para-state agencies for industrial reconstruction, for planners in India and the emerging postcolonial world—all hypnotized by the vision of molten metal moving from crushed ore at one end of the furnaces and extruded at the other end in bars, wires, and sheets.

I cite these concepts—more precisely, motivating images—because they proved fundamental to the collective organization of economic resources and political power for the hundred years or more extending from the 1860s to the 1970s. The era of economic nationalism and protective tariffs starting in the 1870s, of the subsequent drive to annex overseas territory, of the formation of long-term alliances during peacetime and the ratcheting up of the arms race that preceded the First World War, of the ideological polarization between a Marxian Left and a

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of force recently observed, radioactivity, which was to have a future in the twentieth century. The historian "turned at last to the sequence of force; and thus it happened that, after ten years' pursuit, he found himself lying in the Gallery of Machines at the Great Exposition of 1900, his historical neck broken by the sudden irruption of forces totally new" (p. 382).

<sup>34</sup> Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., is the preeminent historian of the rise of the multidivisional corporation, which he sees as the "central institution in managerial capitalism," and traces originally to the organizational challenges presented by extensive territory and rail and telegraphic communication. See Chandler, *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); and *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); and three decades later, after Chandler became familiar with German enterprise, *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), esp. 53–89, for the geographical incentives to enlarge firm size. For the argument that such a trajectory of development was contingent and hardly inevitable, see Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity* (New York, 1984); and Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization," *Past and Present* 108 (1985): 133–76.

militarist Right, thereafter between communism and fascism, and finally between Soviet power and the Atlantic alliance, all represented stages of historical development within this long era of territoriality. Marxist ideology envisaged a transnational alliance of the proletariat but never divorced the implantation of socialism from the control of territory. Common to all the transformations of politics and permutations of states from the 1860s through the 1980s—the struggles for hegemony over Europe and in the Pacific, the encompassing ideological confrontations of the first three quarters of the twentieth century, which enlisted so many fervent adherents on different sides, the efforts to restructure international relations by the League of Nations or the United Nations—hence persisting across the admittedly fundamental divides of 1914 and 1945, the territorial premise of collective life remained fundamental: namely, that a nation's "identity space" was coterminous with "decision space," that the territories to which ordinary men and women tended to ascribe their most meaningful public loyalties (superseding competing supranational religious or social class affiliations) also provided the locus of resources for assuring their physical and economic security.

But the once-reassuring congruence between identity space and decision space has weakened. Bounded space no longer appears a decisive resource; it is a problematic basis for collective political security and increasingly irrelevant to economic activity. When and why did the territorial imperative loosen its grip? The frameworks for political and economic coordination created in the 1860s began to dissolve in the late 1960s and continued to do so in the capitalist democracies through the decade of the 1970s and then in the state socialist bloc during the 1980s—a transitional quarter-century that will, I believe, be apprehended as one of the axial crises of the modern era, as the territorial order became caught up in a process that social scientists endeavored to grasp then as "interdependence" and more recently as "globalization."<sup>35</sup> The processes that undermined the earlier epoch of territoriality were marked by a succession of worldwide difficulties: the weakening of the hierarchical collective discipline that both sides in the Cold War had successfully invoked for the sake of postwar reconstruction and their mutual rivalry; the reappearance of distributive social conflicts and the breakdown of relatively easy collaborative industrial relations in the capitalist democracies; the United States involvement in the Vietnam War and the protests it unleashed; likewise the American unwillingness to continue upholding the international monetary regime it had financed since World War II, usually associated with Bretton Woods; the emergence of new economic contenders, whether through industrialization or the exploitation of their hold on world oil supplies, in Europe

<sup>35</sup> For a sampler of the more effusive efforts to describe the impact of globalization on international order, see Gearóid O Tuathail, "Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Geopolitical Imagination and Beyond," and Timothy W. Luke, "Running Flat Out on the Road Ahead: Nationality, Sovereignty, and Territoriality in the World of the Information Superhighway," both in O Tuathail and Simon Dalby, *Rethinking Geopolitics* (London, 1998), 16–38 and 274–94; also such basic statements as Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, 1996); Manuel Castels, *The Rise of the Information Society* (Oxford, 1996); Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World* (New York, 1996); Lee Boon-Thong and Tengku Shamsul Bahrin, eds., *Vanishing Borders: The New International Order of the 21st Century* (Aldershot, 1998). For a lurid survey from the geographers' point of view, see R. J. Johnston and Peter J. Taylor, eds., *A World in Crisis?* 2d edn. (Oxford, 1989).

and the Americas; and, shortly thereafter, the emergence of militant social movements among students, women, and nuclear protesters. The gradual renunciation of conscripted military forces, whether formally or through widespread forms of alternate service, dissolved one of the key institutions by which the defense of identity space was built into the life cycle of male citizens.

Finally, the clamorous collapse of state socialism and planned economies during the 1980s can be seen as the most spectacular political consequence of the weakening of territorial politics. The state socialist regimes, after all, had committed themselves to controlling politics, economics, and ideology on the basis of territory and frontiers (most tangibly in East Germany). They were also most heavily invested in the aging processes of heavy industry that had characterized the territorial era. They were among the most faithful to the idea of the individual as a long-term producer durably rooted in a continuing workplace and most resistant to his or her decomposition into a virtual wardrobe of multiple roles.<sup>36</sup>

For, just as a qualitative change of technological possibilities for mastering space and its extension had facilitated the political transformations of the century after 1860, so the very technological transformations of the last thirty years have tended to make physical space a less relevant resource. The age of coal and iron, and then, too, of hydrocarbon chemistry, of oil and electricity, of aluminum and copper as well as steel—all still epitomized as late as the 1950s and 1960s by the giant integrated steel mill—was overlaid in fact, and in the public imagination, by the technologies of semiconductors, computers, and data transmission, with a new accepted basis for the creation of private wealth. The concept of hierarchically organized Fordist production based on a national territory was supplanted by the imagery, if not always the reality, of globally coordinated networks of information, mobile capital, and migratory labor. The result has been to transform the major political division of our times into one that separates those who envisage their future prospects based on non-territorial markets or exchange of ideas from those who insist that territoriality can be reinvigorated once again as the basis for economic and political security—whether by means of provincial regionalism, or supranational organization, or by harsher measures of ethnic homogeneity. Of course, there are sites of fierce territorial conflict—Kosovo, northern Sri Lanka—where ethnic groups still insist on political hegemony over their province or on subordination of their rivals' sacred sites. But the contenders aspire to a status they have not hitherto enjoyed and which they understand usually would be viable only if cosseted in a larger framework that would provide economic assistance.

The question that remains open is whether territory loses its institutional role in general or whether we are just in one of the eras of rescaling territorial resources, as in the transition from Habsburg to French power, or Dutch to British commercial

<sup>36</sup> Sack, *Human Territoriality*, 5. It is true that the Marxist Left sought to challenge the premises of territoriality and appeal to a revolutionary internationalism. In fact, however, Communists achieved power only by accepting the premises of territorial power and development and building socialism within individual countries or by virtue of a new sort of imperial organization. Social Democrats emerged from their interwar defeats convinced that the nation-state offered an appropriate fulcrum for democratic emancipation. They benefited from the fact that even in the greater part of the world where Communist ideology did not prevail, the social basis of the nation-state had to be enlarged, such that by the 1940s representatives of the industrial working class were coopted into the power-sharing arrangements from which they had been largely excluded before.

strategies in the late seventeenth century, or from the province and the land to the national state and the metropolis after 1860. Perhaps territory will prove effective on the scale of the European Union or NAFTA. But while these have territorial designations, decisive resources will not be those of space but of networks and interaction, regardless of the area over which they take place. In this respect, they are akin to the organization of the great imperial networks that preceded the emergence of Westphalian sovereignty and territoriality. An argument can be made either way, just as it is possible to maintain that states can still protect their populations against the harsh effects of globalization.<sup>37</sup>

Even so, the transformations must be profound. The fundamental transitions historians associate with modern history were based on the consolidation of a territoriality that cannot continue in the form familiar to those who took part in public life before 1970. The particular hundred-year span familiar to those who are at least middle aged took shape deep in the 1800s and began to decompose a generation ago. "The present epoch," Michel Foucault wrote in 1967, "will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity; we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersections with its own skein."<sup>38</sup> Sometime between the mid-1960s and the end of the 1980s, beset by doubts and uncertainty about even the viability of democracy and capitalism, we lived through our own *fin de siècle*.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, as I proposed at the outset, will remain with us nonetheless, if only as an epoch of moral history, a chronological framework for moral narratives. Admittedly, the concept of moral narrative needs some exposition, if not justification. It is to be sought less in the practice of professional history than in the orientation that intellectuals and commentators expect from history. In this sense, most of them remain Crocean to the core, turning to history as a sort of liberation or exit strategy from the past: "We are products of the past, and we live immersed in the past that presses on us from all sides. How can we move on to a new life, how can we act anew without exiting from the past and getting beyond it? . . . There is only one way out, that of thought, which doesn't rupture the relationship with the past but rises above it through ideas and converts it into consciousness. It is necessary to look the past in the face and without metaphysics reduce it to a mental problem or resolve it into a truth statement that will serve as

<sup>37</sup> For this argument, see Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, eds., *States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization* (London, 1996). See the claim, too, that it is wealthy and strong states that have pressed globalization forward as part of the logic of center-periphery territorialization, in Jean-Michel Hoerner, *Géopolitique des territoires: De l'espace approprié à la suprématie des états-nations* (Perpignan, 1986), 217–52. The issue, however, is not, as so often claimed, whether states must decline in age of globalization. No such claim is made here. The question is to what degree political jurisdictions can use the resources of territoriality to assure economic security—and that cannot be answered either by counting states or citing their legislative competences.

<sup>38</sup> Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," Jay Miskowicz, trans., in *Diacritics* (Spring 1986): 22, cited by Edward S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1998), 298.



the intellectual premise for new action and new life.”<sup>39</sup> Despite the antique ring to this program, probably most narrative constructions still represent this sort of endeavor, and the century becomes the chosen temporal unit for such a moral reflection. Whereas the nineteenth century served as the tablet on which historians of the time, and those of our own era, inscribed stories of progress, the twentieth-century story emphasizes narratives of moral atrocity or moral struggle.

In fact, there are at least two divisions of the dominant narratives of moral atrocity, perhaps three, if we count Left and Right variants of the Western or Eurocentric story as separate. The Western narrative, retold by historians and philosophers, museum curators, film producers, and legal experts, focuses on the Holocaust and/or Stalinist Communist political killing as the culminating historical experience of the century, sometimes stressing their differences and sometimes their kinship under the rubric of totalitarian terror. Regardless of how one judges the issue of similarity and distinctiveness, the insistence on connecting these episodes—to argue that the Communist massacres whether in Russia, China, or Cambodia were as horrendous as the Nazi exterminations—usually reflects a belated reckoning with left-wing terror, that is, within the context of what François Furet almost called “the passing of an illusion.”<sup>40</sup> As a result, most ink has been spilled on the respective ideological sources, the political intentionality, the categories targeted, and even the body count of these horrendous episodes.

But to many observers from outside the Atlantic world, such a debate seems parochial. Their moral-atrocity narrative maintains that the domination of the West over the massive societies of what once could be called the Third World established the preeminent historical scaffolding of the century. And even as they often focus on the episodes in which formal colonial rule was contested and gave way, their metanarrative continues to emphasize the abiding economic discrepancies between core and periphery, between developed and less developed societies, as its continuing legacy. Likewise, the endemic warfare in Asia and Africa since 1945 and much of the violence in Latin America or the Middle East are also interpreted as legacies of imperial rule or neo-colonial domination. There is no simple agreement within this story: a new generation of researchers stresses the scope for agency on the part of the colonized and exploited and, in fact, the way in which the Europeans’ dominion abroad defined hierarchies at home. Still, in this perspective, imperial

<sup>39</sup> Benedetto Croce, *La storia come pensiero e come azione* (Bari, 1969), 33–34.

<sup>40</sup> François Furet, *Le passé d’une illusion: Essai sur l’idée communiste au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1995), where the author admits (p. 15) that the illusion was also part of his own past, which, however, he refuses to repudiate. For a similar recent assessment, compare Robert Conquest, *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* (New York, 2000). For the political passions aroused by the historical comparison of Nazi and Communist crimes, see the French controversy over Stéphane Courtois, et al., eds., *Le livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, répression* (Paris, 1997), which divided its very contributors. It is also indicative of shifting political orientations that Horst Möller, the director of the prestigious Munich Institut für Zeitgeschichte, a leading research center whose original agenda was confronting the Germans’ own Nazi past, should publish a collection of debates about the “red Holocaust,” *Der rote Holocaust und die Deutschen: Die Debatte um das “Schwarzbuch des Kommunismus”* (Munich, 1999). For a recent work that implicitly contests these views and separates the terror of civil war (and aggravated by foreign war) from the administered bloodshed of the Great Purges, see Arno J. Mayer, *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions* (Princeton, N.J., 2000). Still the critical starting point for reflections on terror is Hannah Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951).

power and inequality on a world scale remain the key for understanding world history.<sup>41</sup>

Both narratives claim current relevance, and they are often intertwined—with good reason. Historians cannot simply divide European from Asian and African genocides: the massive loss of life in the Chinese Communist consolidation of power, in imposing the Vietnamese revolution, and in the Pol Pot episode in Cambodia emanated from party leaders who had absorbed revolutionary Marxism from the West.<sup>42</sup> Recent interpretations of the Holocaust stress its continuity with genocidal practices in the colonies (for instance, the suppression of the Herero in Africa) as much as with specific anti-Semitism. They point to the power of Social Darwinist concepts of racial extinction in both arenas. Students of American slavery or South African apartheid have found the experience of German and European Jews extremely relevant for insisting on the moral horror of the experiences they are committed to studying. Conversely, analysts of what seems like murderous ethnic or “communal” violence that despairing observers attribute to collective psychopathology (or sometimes “ancient hatreds”) can attribute the outbreaks to the legacies of division that former colonial rulers encouraged and perpetuated. In short, the causation for these varying stories of moral atrocity is often intertwined. Indeed, the most powerful and original, if sometimes misleading, analysis, Hannah Arendt’s *Origins of Totalitarianism*, treated this innovation of the twentieth century as a single phenomenon and imperialism as one of its preparatory stages. Exponents of the Holocaust narrative claim that it teaches general lessons about genocide and ethnic cleansing, citing Bosnia and sometimes Rwanda (also claimed as instructive for the imperialist narrative), but they remain vague as to what underlying reasons these should be attributed. Not surprising, since the publicists of the Holocaust or Communist atrocities also have a stake in claiming the unique awfulness of their respective atrocities. In fact, the first narrative (now considering the history of Nazi and Soviet terror as one) tends to maintain its power less because of current horrors than by the attention it pays to judicial trials, negotiations over monetary reparation, and debates about suitable historical commemoration. For all the claims of relevance, the first narrative, therefore, has achieved a certain closure.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> For an introduction to what is now a huge literature (which this author makes no claim to have mastered), which seeks agency among the colonized and indeed attributes much of the Europeans’ self-conceptions of gender, citizenship, and historical achievements in general to the interactions with colonial subjects, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for Indian Pasts?” *Representations* 37 (1992): 1–26; Gyan Prakash, “Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism,” *AHR* 99 (December 1994): 1475–90; Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York, 1988); Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, N.J., 1993); for emphases on gender, Julia Clancy Smith and Frances Gouda, eds., *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism* (Charlottesville, Va., 1998); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and from a different disciplinary vantage, James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, Conn., 1985).

<sup>42</sup> For an instructive discussion of the limits (and possibilities) of comparison, with citation of the relevant literature, see Patrick Raszelenberg, “The Khmers Rouges and the Final Solution,” *History and Memory* 11 (Fall–Winter 1999): 62–93.

<sup>43</sup> No effort will be made here to cite the massive interpretive literature on the Holocaust and comparative genocide. For the range of interpretations and sources, see Omer Bartov, “Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust,” *AHR* 103 (June 1998): 771–816. For a

In contrast, the second narrative has become increasingly actual or contemporary for many intellectuals in Europe and North America, though not for those convinced that Nazism or Stalinism and Maoism remain the culminating evils of the century. "It is ironic," Edward Said has argued,

that descriptions of the new form of imperialism have regularly employed idioms of gigantism and apocalypse that could not have as easily been applied to the classical empires during their heyday. Some of these descriptions have an extraordinarily dispiriting inevitability, a kind of galloping, engulfing, impersonal, and deterministic quality. Accumulation on a world scale; the world capitalist system; the development of underdevelopment; imperialism and dependency, or the structure of dependence; poverty and imperialism: the repertory is well-known in economics, political science, history, and sociology, and it has been identified less with the New World Order than with members of a controversial Left school of thought.<sup>44</sup>

One obvious reason is that the imperialist narrative always had a central economic component, and the story of economic exploitation has continuing appeal. Those who insist that irrevocable differences of culture (by which they sometimes mean worthiness) explain economic outcomes will remain doubtful; nevertheless, for the last thirty years, different versions of the story that attributes Third World poverty to First World wealth have found a receptive audience, whether the "dependency" theory of the 1960s, the analyses of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the 1980 Brandt report, *North-South: A Program for Survival*, or the critiques of International Monetary Fund policies in the recent Asian crises. The growing inequality of incomes within the United States during the recent decade of prosperity also prompts a receptivity for the second narrative, which focuses, after all, on the continuing discrepancy of life chances and rewards. The global segmentation of the world economy finds itself replicated in the spatial segmentation and ethnically based class structure of the modern metropolis.<sup>45</sup> Add to the unease about inequality the influential voice of postcolonial theory within the university, which essentially has refurbished the imperialist story and made it fundamental for literature and criticism, along with related tropes of diasporas, border crossing, and migration—and one finds a renewed attention to the second narrative. "Where once the transmission of national traditions was the major theme of a world literature, perhaps we can now suggest that transnational histories of migrants, the colonized, or political refugees—these border and frontier conditions—may be the terrains of world literature."<sup>46</sup> And of world history too, but by supplementing, not displacing, the earlier terrains.

Which brings us back, in fact, to the periodization proposed above for social and political development. For is it not the very decomposition of traditional territoriality, of the presumed identity between decision space and identity space, and the very newness of post-territoriality in the last three decades that help renew the

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recent survey of debates over commemoration in Germany, Peter Reichel, *Politik mit der Erinnerung: Gedächtnisorte im Streit um die nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit*, rev. edn. (Frankfurt am Main, 1999).

<sup>44</sup> Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993), 283.

<sup>45</sup> Sassen, *Global City*, 245–319.

<sup>46</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London, 1994), 12.

persuasiveness of the imperialist narrative? Caught up since the 1980s in an age of so-called globalization, or at least a second wind for market regulation of political economy (and a second wind, too, for U.S. superpower status after the faltering of the 1970s), the non-celebrants have insisted on the continuing relevance of economic inequality, labor migration and exploitation, the power of Western capital, and the division of hegemonic and subaltern classes.

Of course, the Holocaust and the Gulag remain powerful stories; we remain in the grip of their memories, which are still compelling. But they grip us precisely as memory. They have left historians and witnesses to retell familiar events in the trials of octogenarians now hard to imagine as callous officials and killers. They have bequeathed controversies over memorials and museums and historical accounts, a sophisticated reflection on "representation" (see the journal *History and Memory* as well as *Representations*), and the renewed, now urgent, claims for payments to victims—all of which are fiercely debated in a context of universal agreement that the events at their origin were a *non plus ultra* of brutality and evil. The fact that these issues have not faded in intensity, despite predictions that after half a century or more they must, helps to keep vivid the obsessive violence of the era when territorial control seemed the basis of world politics. And they remain as a prick to conscience in the episodes of ethnic cleansing that we intervene to inhibit so belatedly. But as a narrative of annihilation, the Holocaust is hard to apply to political challenges that seem to fall short of its horror.

NO READER SHOULD BELIEVE THAT THE WANING OF TERRITORIALITY does not have profound political implications. Insofar as territory loses its role as a resource for political action, it reappears as a sort of elegiac enclave, transmuted from the site of policy contention to a landscape of memory. It is not coincidental that the intense interest in historical museums, sites of mourning, evocations of old battlefields or even of neighborhoods becomes intense at a moment when territoriality weakens as an option for politics. The apparent thirst for history as a public pursuit, as a source for successful movies, or as a staple for television presentations may come at a price—an attitude of passive surrender to history itself that Lutz Niethammer and others have termed "Posthistoire."<sup>47</sup> With its "moving chords of memory," the locations of history tug at our heartstrings and allow us to debate endlessly over museums and memorials while accepting—whether realistically or from exhaustion, depending on the perspective of the observer—the continuing limits on public-policy responses to social problems.

The waning of territoriality means further that culture or civilization replaces space as the stake of international or community conflict. Whether by virtue of direct migration or competitive economic exchange, the well-off and educated residents of the West are fated to live in proximity to, and without territorial protection from, peoples of other traditions. Even if far away and not just across town, the collapse of spatiality makes them virtual neighbors. Without the protection of territory, are we not destined, then, so it is suggested, for a continuing

<sup>47</sup> Lutz Niethammer, *Posthistoire: Ist die Geschichte zu Ende?* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1989).

conflict of civilizations and cultures? Does not culture become the explanatory trope for all group frictions—and one that suggests they can never really be transcended?<sup>48</sup>

Finally, the moral narratives for the twentieth century arrive with profound implications for current politics. It is not the task of the historian to suggest which choices should be made but to illuminate how different historical interpretations suggest differing current options—that is, to point out the political freight respective interpretations may bear. Is it just coincidence that many of those for whom the combined narrative of Holocaust and Gulag, Nazism and Communism, retains priority have emerged with a profound distrust of transformative politics? They have drawn the lesson from ideological murder that all political projects are suspect and that modernity is best entrusted to the market or the institutions of civil society with a minimum of state intervention. Whereas the conclusion drawn by those who give priority to the imperialist or neo-colonial narrative is precisely the opposite: they argue that society must deploy political regulation to control international capital and unbridled market forces, just as local economic misfortunes must continue to be mitigated by the welfare state.

Does the twentieth-century history I have sketched offer any guidance in this confrontation? It does suggest, I think, that those who aspire to use political resources to mitigate market inequalities will have to do so on a post-territorial basis or, at the least, on different scales of territorial space and with a different combination of local and supranational resources than they did before the 1970s. The capacity of traditional territorial units, nation-states, conceived as they were in the nineteenth century, to keep their peoples from being buffeted by globalization has drastically diminished, and it seems fruitless to aspire to revive the Keynesian reformism of the 1930s and 1940s and even the 1960s successfully. Social democracy, as conceived in the interwar and early postwar period, applied in one country in an era of highly mobile capital means stagnation. Perhaps the emerging supranational agglomerations, such as the European Union, will provide a viable territorial base for political intervention, often by helping the success of local developmental strategies, whether in Ireland, Flanders, or Bavaria. The experiment is under way. But those efforts that promise economic success aim at development, and development tends ultimately to draw in non-local inhabitants. Consequently, reaffirming a territorial strategy to control economic destiny may involve diminishing cultural cohesion. Carinthia or Catalonia might choose to be rich or ethnically homogenous, but not both. In any case, to abjure political intervention is also risky. If advocates of liberalization will not heed the unequal costs entailed by the transition, at least, to a global economic order, they will not confront just disquieted environmentalists and labor leaders concerned with exploitation of workers at home and abroad. They will also encounter the populist advocates of closing frontiers, controlling migration, and ultimately bashing dissent. Look at the electoral returns in Austria or even Switzerland. A populism built on the longing for

<sup>48</sup> Contemporary diagnoses have oscillated between such neo-Spenglerian analyses as Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996), and the optimistic scenarios of market-democracy convergence: Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, 1992).



a politically effective identity space and the control of frontiers may be archaic, but not everyone will draw the conclusion that it is hateful. History can recur as catastrophe as well as farce. Already two decades into what is really the new century, we cannot predict the surprises it undoubtedly has in store.

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*Review Essay*

Bringing the Peasants Back In:  
Agrarian Themes in the Construction and Corrosion of  
Statist Historiography in Rwanda

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DAVID NEWBURY and CATHARINE NEWBURY

A: Each group tells a different story. They all say "My ancestor was shaykh of the land." . . .

B: Perhaps you could present several versions, each one from a different source, and not say "this one is true; that one is false."

A: No way! . . . If I present different versions, they will accuse me of sowing discord. They will say, "He just wants to make problems." That's a sure thing. Besides, there is truth; there is lying. How can I treat all sources equally? By God, it would bring disaster.

Conversation with a Jordanian local genealogist.<sup>1</sup>

After a while the truth of old tales changed. What was true before became false afterward.

A Kuba elder.<sup>2</sup>

THE GENOCIDE THAT BEGAN IN APRIL 1994 marks an infinitely sad watershed in Rwandan history. It also marks a potential watershed in Rwanda's historiography, for such a rupture with the past raises necessary questions on the ways in which this past will be seen in the future. In the wake of the genocide, many people were drawn to comment on Rwandan society. They began with all good intentions, but too often these observers had little or no background on the country. Their introduction to the society and its people was through the genocide alone, and their intellectual experience often drew heavily on the models of previous genocides elsewhere. So the themes they chose to focus on—ethnicity, violence, and the state—were those most obvious to the genocide itself. But Rwandan history—and its historiography—as well go far beyond the issues raised in the genocide. In fact, we argue, the relation between history and the genocide, as portrayed in many

We wish to thank our colleagues in the 1997–1998 Program in Agrarian Studies at Yale University and in particular its director, James C. Scott, for their invaluable comments on an earlier version of this article.

<sup>1</sup> Andrew J. Shyrock, "Popular Genealogical Nationalism: History Writing and Identity among the Balqa Tribes of Jordan," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37 (1995): 334.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in Jan Vansina, *Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples* (Madison, Wis., 1978), 19.

recent accounts, needs to be reversed. Instead of seeing history exclusively through the genocide (as many did, misleadingly referring to “500 years of tribal warfare”), one can only understand the genocide through an understanding of Rwanda’s history.

Therefore, although this article is not about the genocide, this may be an appropriate time to pause and review some aspects of Rwandan historiography. We especially want to explore an aspect of the historiography by which politics have often been removed from rural life and agricultural practices separated from political life. This disjunction of rural actors and formal politics has been characteristic of many writings on the genocide, which tend to focus on elite politics and central actors alone, but it is also characteristic of broader Rwandan historiography as well. Rather than attempting to provide a new integrated reinterpretation of the Rwandan past, our intent is to inquire into how this separation of peasants from politics occurred, asking how Rwandan history came to be understood and interpreted in the manner that it was. This is an essay in historiography, not history.

The dominant vision of Rwanda’s history emphasized political homogeneity, ethnic distinctions, and the power of the state. In so doing, it sublimated alternative visions, which expressed regional particularity, diverse forms of identity (based on kin, class, occupation, and friendship networks), and the interaction of local agency with elite policy. We start by noting both the content and the silences of these conversations on history—both what the presentation of Rwanda’s history includes and what it omits. We then address the question of why incorporate peasants within an established elite history, and we present various neglected themes that, by their very nature, tend to transcend (and transform) the dominant historiographical patterns. Finally, we discuss several important works in Rwandan rural studies, exploring the ways by which their inclusion in the historiography might lead to broader historical understanding.

We have abbreviated many of these discussions, and undoubtedly will have omitted some observers’ “favorite” topics and sources.<sup>3</sup> But our intent is not to provide a complete inventory of sources on Rwandan history.<sup>4</sup> Instead, we seek to raise neglected issues and to provide an intellectual grounding on how such themes might reshape an understanding of Rwandan social dynamics. Such an approach compels one to move from a static, statist vision to a complex consideration of the forms of peasant participation that pervaded the history of this society. What we have tried to do is indicate the possibilities of a rural dimension to conventional

<sup>3</sup> Rwanda provides one of the most extensive bibliographies of any region of Africa of comparable size; the authoritative bibliography of published written works (to 1980) includes over 5,500 entries in the social sciences alone: Marcel d’Hertefelt and Danielle de Lame, *Société, culture, et histoire du Rwanda: Encyclopédie bibliographique*, 2 vols. (Tervuren, 1987).

<sup>4</sup> Preferring to concentrate on more foundational sources, we have omitted from explicit consideration several recent historical surveys: Roger Heremans, *Introduction à l’histoire du Rwanda* (Kigali, 1988); Jean Rumiya, *Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat Belge* (Paris, 1992); Ferdinand Nahimana, *Le Rwanda: Emergence d’un état* (Paris, 1993); Jean-Népomucène Nkurikiyimfura, *Le gros bétail et la société rwandaise: Evolution historique des XII<sup>e</sup>–XIV<sup>e</sup> siècles à 1958* (Paris, 1994); Antoine Nyagahene, *Histoire et peuplement: Ethnicités, clans, et lignages dans le Rwanda ancien et contemporain* (Paris, 1997); Bernard Lugan, *Histoire du Rwanda* (Paris, 1997); C. M. Overdulve, *Rwanda: Un peuple avec une histoire* (Paris, 1997).

history and a historical dimension to rural experience. In short, we seek ways to bring Rwandan peasants into the understanding of politics and politics into the understanding of rural society.

TO DO SO, WE DRAW ON WIDER INTELLECTUAL PARADIGMS. While in this essay we do not present peasants acting, we nonetheless hope to pry open a few cracks in the monolith through which subalterns can find a place in their own history. Our analysis draws on two analytic approaches that have gained some prominence over the last several decades, roughly coinciding with Africa's postcolonial historiography: peasant studies and subaltern studies.

Peasant studies became one of the principal themes of postcolonial historiography in Africa for two related reasons: the general absence of peasants from the colonial literature and the development of methodologies that allowed rural subjects to be included in historical inquiry.<sup>5</sup> In general, however, the recent features of African peasantries differ from those of other global regions. First, while peasant models from elsewhere tend to privilege tightly knit villages, in Africa peasants often lived dispersed across the land in interacting networks, not residential communities.<sup>6</sup> Second, African peasants constituted a substantial proportion of the population (differentiating them from many Latin American models), and they often retained some autonomy in relation to the state (differentiating them from many Asian models). The combination of these two elements meant that, though not unchanged, African peasantries have endured through time well into the postcolonial period, when in other areas they have been more fundamentally transformed.<sup>7</sup> Third, historical methods to study peasants in Africa developed mostly through the use of qualitative data (testimony) rather than quantitative data (statistics); the disciplinary gap remained wide between those who

<sup>5</sup> For a comprehensive overview of studies on peasants in Africa, see Allen Isaacman, "Peasants and Rural Protest in Africa," *African Studies Review* 33 (1990): 1–120 (also reproduced in Cooper *et al.* cited below). Among many other works on African peasantries, see Martin Klein, *Peasants in Africa* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1980); Stephen Bunker, *Peasants against the State: The Politics of Market Control in Bugisu, Uganda, 1900–1983* (Chicago, 1987); Jonathan Barker, *Rural Communities under Stress: Peasant Farmers and the State in Africa* (Cambridge, 1989); Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison, Wis., 1990); Sara Berry, *No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison, 1993); Colin Bundy, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* (Berkeley, Calif., 1979); William Beinart and Colin Bundy, *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa* (Berkeley, 1987); Charles van Onselen, *The Seed Is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper, 1894–1985* (New York, 1996). For general studies of peasants and peasants in areas outside Africa, see Frederick Cooper, Allen F. Isaacman, Florencia E. Mallon, William Roseberry, and Steve J. Stern, *Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America* (Madison, 1993); James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven, Conn., 1976); Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, 1985); William Roseberry, *Anthropologies and Histories: Essays on Culture, History, and Political Economy* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1984); Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley, 1995); Steve J. Stern, *Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World* (Madison, 1987).

<sup>6</sup> This point has been made convincingly by many observers; for one statement, see Elizabeth Colson, "The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights," in Victor Turner, ed., *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960, Vol. 3: Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule*, (Cambridge, 1971), 193–215.

<sup>7</sup> For a Latin American perspective on such issues—differing from that adopted here—see Michael Kearney, *Reconceptualizing the Peasantry: Anthropology in Global Perspective* (Boulder, Colo., 1996).

sought to understand social process through oral sources and those who sought knowledge through statistical figures.<sup>8</sup> Thus, despite significant differences among peasants within Africa, peasantries in Africa differed from peasantries elsewhere in their relation to the state and in the disciplinary approaches by which peasants were studied.

A second important postcolonial school of inquiry has been that of subaltern studies, developed principally through the work of South Asian scholars who sought to move beyond elite-centered analysis.<sup>9</sup> In exploring the interaction of elite and subaltern classes, these scholars sought to reveal the forms of intellectual dominance of those in power and to portray rural residents as competent historical actors with their own goals, ambitions, resources, and defenses.<sup>10</sup> For the most part, however, such approaches were not new to historians and anthropologists working in Africa. From the late 1950s, these analysts had moved beyond the history of colonial actors to inquire into the experiences, initiatives, and exploitation of rural Africans. To account for the importance of local initiatives as well as external power, they privileged voices from below—voices outside the hegemonic script, the

<sup>8</sup> While there have been some exceptions (notably in Kenyan studies), in general the legacy of Chayanov has not been prominent in African studies, nor have African examples been represented in the premier journal of the field, the *Journal of Peasant Studies*, in proportion to their historical importance. The significance of Chayanov's studies for the *Journal of Peasant Studies* was reconfirmed in the symposium "Aleksandr Chayanov and Russian Berlin," Frank Bourgholtzer, ed., *Journal of Peasant Studies* 26 (1999). For Chayanov's work, see Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay, and R. E. F. Smith, eds., *A. V. Chayanov on the Theory of Peasant Economy* (Madison, Wis., 1986).

<sup>9</sup> For an introduction, see Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., *Selected Subaltern Studies* (London, 1988); Ranajit Guha, ed., *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986–1995* (Minneapolis, 1997); and the journal *Subaltern Studies*. The term "Subaltern Studies" derives from a concern with the issue of how elite classes came to define the culture, including the vision of history, of the non-elite classes of society. See Guha, "Introduction," *A Subaltern Studies Reader*, xiv–xvi. The first attempt to probe these questions systematically was Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. (New York, 1971). While Gramsci's entire project to some extent dealt with the problems of defining and deciphering subaltern histories, these issues were most explicitly addressed in the chapter "Notes on Italian History: History of Subaltern Classes: Methodological Criteria," 52–55. Gramsci of course was mostly concerned with class dynamics in an industrializing Italy; nevertheless, his observations provide useful methodological insights for the study of peasants in colonial and postcolonial contexts. In particular, it is worth noting Gramsci's acknowledgment of the challenges of such analysis: "the history of subaltern groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic . . . Subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up . . . even when they appear triumphant the subaltern groups are merely anxious to defend themselves." And finally he warns us (p. 55): "This kind of history can only be dealt with monographically and each monograph requires an immense quantity of material which is often hard to collect." Further discussion on these issues is found in the three contributions to the *AHR Forum* cited in note 10, and (among many others) in David Arnold, "Gramsci and Peasant Subalternity in India," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 112 (1989): 155–77; and T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," *AHR* 91 (June 1985): 567–93.

<sup>10</sup> The most explicit application of the subaltern studies paradigms to Africa is Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking African Historiography," *AHR* 99 (December 1994): 1516–45. This was part of a larger forum on subaltern studies, including Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism" on South Asian historiography, and Florencia Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," *AHR* 99 (December 1994). In a recent analysis of the history of Nyabingi healers in northern Rwanda and southwestern Uganda, Steven Feierman notes that, in many cases, a concern with hegemonic power has led analysts to depreciate and undervalue the continuing importance of local initiatives. He proposes an approach to historical reconstruction that can unveil subaltern discourses and practices rendered "invisible" by the changes of colonialism and capitalism: Feierman, "Colonizers, Scholars, and the Creation of Invisible Histories," in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999), 182–216.



dominant intellectual and cultural patterns of thought and behavior. In order to do so, they developed a new set of methods—drawing on oral sources, archaeology, linguistics, ethnography, botanical analysis—and proceeded to submit these unconventional source materials to historical critique through a new set of analytic tools. Historians referred to these paradigms as “social history,” to distinguish this approach from earlier histories of political elites and to move beyond the formal institutional histories that dominated colonial historiography.

Thus scholars working on Africa have long focused on the recipients of state power. They have drawn on colonial documents by reading critically, accounting for the ideological assertions or the outright fictive reconstructions that pervaded colonialist discourses. They have looked for the dialectics at the intersection of hierarchical power and the moral economy of the oppressed. And they were aware that colonialist discourses could be drawn on not only by the European powerholders but also by local actors in circumstances where these promoted their particular goals. During the colonial period in Rwanda, for example, politically dominant groups adopted colonial hegemonies and drew on colonial force to extend their power well beyond the effective administrative reach of the precolonial monarchy. Analogies with European concepts of feudalism, portraying clientship as a “social glue” that pervaded social intercourse at all levels, gave the appearance of political homogeneity to Rwandan culture; at different times, members of different politico-ethnic factions, both Tutsi monarchists and Hutu counter-elites, had recourse to colonialist paradigms of the racial foundations to social stratification (which we discuss below).<sup>11</sup>

Like subaltern studies, therefore, social history in Africa was counter-hegemonic in its conceptualization, and, like the subaltern practitioners, social historians in Africa “read against the grain” of colonial documentation and explored the silences of history produced by elites. Nonetheless, these studies differed from South Asian applications because the research context—and the sources—differed from South Asia, as did the lived experiences of political actors. Today, social history, like subaltern history, is seen as too complex to be folded into a single rubric. But the principles and goals that animated these fields of scholarly research were shared by analysts in Africa and South Asia. In Rwanda, however, historians were slow to focus their attention on peasants, whose histories were effectively sublimated within the history of the state and seen as part of a society that was culturally homogeneous, even if politically stratified. In most accounts, the image of Rwanda overpowered the ethnographic realities. It is to that image that we now turn.

<sup>11</sup> In the 1950s, Rwanda’s population was classified into three principal social categories: Hutu constituted about 85 percent of the population, Tutsi about 14 percent, and Twa less than 1 percent. Strong racial, cultural, and historical stereotypes were associated with each of these categories, stereotypes we discuss below. Although these categories existed from precolonial times, their political salience changed during colonial rule, with the establishment of a clear ethnic hierarchy in the minds of Belgian administrators. Early accounts clearly show great regional variability and temporal flexibility among these categories, yet these images of “ethnicity” came to be accepted even by many within Rwanda, and by the end of colonial rule ethnic stratification had become a strong feature of Rwandan social reality. For a discussion of this process for one region of Rwanda, see Catharine Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860–1960* (New York, 1988).

LOCATED NEAR THE GEOGRAPHIC CENTER OF AFRICA (just south of the equator and not far from the mid-point between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans), Rwanda held the allure, for many observers, of the paradigmatic precolonial African state: centralized, stratified, ethnicized, and “feudal.”<sup>12</sup> Like all stereotypes, each of these characteristics fit uncomfortably with the historical record. But popular lore is powerful, and European lore postulated for Rwanda an “ancient” history marked by exotic origins. (Egypt, Ethiopia, or an early Judaic “tribe” were all candidates.) Heroic migrations and military conquest added to the allure of this historical drama played out in the highlands of Central Africa—a landscape combining open plains in the east, stunning volcanoes in the west, and, in between, the beauty of a thousand hills in infinite variation, all garnished with the splendor of a luxuriant tropical “natural garden.” To European observers, Rwanda was “le pays des milles collines,” the “Switzerland of Africa.”<sup>13</sup>


But most of all, what attracted outside observers (and produced one of the largest bibliographies of precolonial Africa) was the people. For this tiny, densely packed country of 10,000 square miles (about the size of Vermont), with a current population of more than 7.5 million (compared to Vermont’s 600,000), was most renowned for its ethnic configurations, which were heavily idealized in popular lore. From the legacy of early twentieth-century observers, these ethnic groups took on dramatic distinctions: in these views, ethnicity was supposed to pervade all aspects of Rwandan culture, from personal capacities to political stratification. So pervasive was this assumption that, without empirical evidence, the three principal ethnic groups—Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa—were seen as entirely separate: separate in their cultures, histories, and racial origins.

The precolonial aristocratic lineages, which were Tutsi, were celebrated by European observers for their physical characteristics—tall and slender, with

<sup>12</sup> Many works portray Rwanda in these terms, but the most prominent among them is Jacques-Jean Maquet, *Le système des relations sociales dans le Ruanda ancien* (Tervuren, 1954). The intellectual premise of this study was constructed in the late 1940s; for commentary on the research strategies and assumptions behind this work, see Alexis Kagame, *Le code des institutions politiques de l’ancien Rwanda* (Brussels, 1952), 12. Kagame notes that Maquet drew up his list of informants at the central court and designed his questionnaire with Kagame’s guidance. It is therefore not surprising that Kagame noted that Maquet’s results “validated” his own. (Maquet, however, omits these details in his discussion of method). Translated into English as *The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda: A Study of Political Relations in a Central African Kingdom* (London, 1961) at a time of the efflorescence of British structural-functional anthropology in Africa, and with the imprimatur of the International African Institute, Maquet’s work became one of the iconic works of Anglophone scholarship in Africa. Even fifty years after the research on which this book was based, many today still uncritically accept this as a valid source for Rwandan society and history. That is analogous to scholars of the 1960s drawing on intellectual frameworks dating from before World War I: such a lapse would be inconceivable in most fields, since the methods, data, and conceptual understanding of African research have seen as profound a transformation over the last fifty years as in the previous fifty. For a critique of Maquet, see C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, chap. 1. On Kagame’s broader role in the construction of a hegemonic historiography, see notes 38 and 56 below.

<sup>13</sup> Not all general commentaries on Rwanda share the popular imagery noted here, but most concentrate on ethnicity, kingship, conflict, and clientship as fixed historical categories. In doing so, they ignore much of the research of the last thirty years, which presents important new contours to historical understanding; for an early overview, see Chubaka Bishikwabo and David Newbury, “Recent Research in the Area of Lake Kivu: Rwanda and Zaire,” *History in Africa* 7 (1980): 23–35. Especially prominent among the general histories of Rwanda were Alexis Kagame, *Un abrégé de l’ethnohistoire du Rwanda*, vol. 1 (Butare, 1972); and Kagame, *Un abrégé de l’histoire du Rwanda*, vol. 2 (Butare, 1975).

## Rwanda Topographical



## Rwanda Precolonial Subcultures



aquiline noses and fine hair: “black Europeans” some called them.<sup>14</sup> Although these characteristics were associated primarily with members of the aristocratic class, they came to be applied to all Tutsi. In fact, however, there are significant physiological variations within this social category, and even at the apogee of the precolonial monarchy, the political classes—those who wielded power—accounted for less than 10 percent of all Tutsi.<sup>15</sup> In other words, by the assumptions of “corporate ethnicity,” there was a near universal tendency among outsiders to apply the dramatic physical features of the ruling lineages indiscriminately to all Tutsi and to assume that all Tutsi were members of the political elite; the reality was significantly different.

Similarly, “Hutu,” a social classification that included the vast majority (about 85 percent) of the population, were assumed to be invariably short, sturdy, and dark. And physical features were taken as indicators of invariable intellectual and cultural features: while all Tutsi in this racial matrix were seen as “refined” and “born to rule”—as befit the “governing classes”—all Hutu were seen as “naive,” “stalwart,” and “easily duped”—as befit the laboring classes, in this sociological-cum-racial wonderland. Nonetheless, here again, as with the Tutsi model, the perceptions of “corporate ethnicity” were inaccurate; “Hutu” were never a homogeneous group, not in historical, social, or cultural terms.<sup>16</sup> Despite the differences among Hutu, however, the “dual colonialism” of central court administrators, under the suzerainty of first German and then Belgian rule, brought an awareness of shared exploitation within the expanding powers of the state.<sup>17</sup> During the 1950s, within a rapidly changing political climate (in which the colonial power, the Catholic Church, and the United Nations all had important roles), Hutu leaders responded to widespread rural discontent and organized a political movement that eventually overthrew the monarchy and led to the formation of a republic under Grégoire Kayibanda (1962). While not unique, the fact that this “revolution” was one of the

<sup>14</sup> The idealized description of Rwandan aristocratic classes frequently drew on racial terminology. For a notorious example of such glorified imagery, see Paul del Perugia, *Les derniers rois mages* (Paris, 1978). In a manner typical of the early works on Rwandan history, Louis de Lager describes Tutsi in the chapter “Les Batutsi, une branche des couches kouschites, éthiopiens, ou hamites.” Absent any empirical data, he—like so many others of his day—conjoined race, culture, and history, drawing on selective physiological traits to postulate a sweeping historical narrative encompassing thousands of miles and thousands of years. De Lager notes that the Greeks, Romans, and Arabs all described these “Hamites,” and continues: “Arriving in Rwanda from upper Egypt or the Abyssinian highlands, one recognizes [the Tutsi] immediately. One had already seen these men of tall stature, . . . with slender bodies and long lanky limbs, well-proportioned features, and a noble, serious, and haughty demeanor. These are the brothers of the Nubians [in Sudan], the Galla [Somalia], the Danakil [Eritrea]. They have Caucasian features and resemble the Semites of Asia Minor. But their coloring is black, sometimes bronze or olive; their hair is curly . . . Before becoming black, these men were bronze in color.” He then traces their emigration from Kush on the upper Nile to Egypt and then Ethiopia. Subsequently, he notes the presence of a “continuous pastoral avenue” from Ethiopia to Lake Kivu, which allowed these people to migrate to the Great Lakes region “without having to leave their ecological milieu.” De Lager, *Le Ruanda* (1939; Kabgayi, 1961), 56–57.

<sup>15</sup> On the reasoning behind these figures, see Helen Codere, *The Biography of an African Society: Rwanda, 1900–1960* (Tervuren, 1973), 70.

<sup>16</sup> For a consideration of regional differences, see below. For sources, see notes 23–26 and 43–45.

<sup>17</sup> For an elaboration of the concepts of dual colonialism and local agency under colonial rule, see C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*; and Jean-Baptiste Rushatsi, “Monarchie nyiginya et pouvoirs européens: Le nord et le nord-ouest du Rwanda sous un double colonisation, 1894–1916” (PhD dissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1994).

few meaningful social transformations to accompany decolonization in Africa added yet another layer to the aura of Rwanda.

A third social category, "Twa," was composed of people whom Westerners associated with pygmies; popular imagery portrayed them derisively as "pygmoid": shorter still of stature, dark, and "powerfully built," with short legs and round heads. As a social category, however, the Twa were composed of disparate groups showing diverse characteristics. Some were attached to the royal court (at least one serving as an important notable under the late nineteenth-century king Rwabugiri); others were more on the margins of state-defined society. Twa were often exempted from state obligations, and, though individually renowned for their strong personalities, as a group they were often disregarded as well as disdained in state politics. Because of their numbers (less than 1 percent of the Rwandan population), cultural diversity, and economic marginality, Twa were not often accounted for in political analyses; instead, they were usually relegated to the status of exotic appendages to Rwandan society. Nonetheless, their presence was fully a part of the Rwandan social matrix.<sup>18</sup>

Such were the alluring features of Rwandan social imagery. But postcolonial work on Rwanda has moved beyond the late nineteenth-century racial assumptions and the early twentieth-century whiggish paradigms of earlier representations. By contrast, postcolonial studies stress the social diversity, individual agency, and historical transformations that have been central to Rwandan social processes, in precolonial as well as colonial times. The social groups noted above did not "arrive" as corporate groups, or with their current labels; instead, more recent social identities emerged as part of the larger processes of social flux, individual action, and political power. There was a great deal more individual mobility and interchange than any static model of some collective "Rwandan past" can account for. The state was not "created" by a single culture hero or even by a single group. Power and ethnicity did not coincide originally; they took shape and salience in relationship to each other, not in confrontation with each other. Before the mid-eighteenth century—and in some contexts, long after—region was more important than royalty in defining identity, and ecology more influential than ethnicity in molding people's lives.<sup>19</sup> In short, there was much more individual confrontation, social contestation, and local effervescence than normally ascribed to historical process in this region.

In what follows, we will first trace the general contours of precolonial historiography, stressing the local orientation of the early accounts and their transition to an emphasis on royal history. We then examine the broader factors that influenced this

<sup>18</sup> For commentaries on the Twa, see José Kagabo and Vincent Mudandagizi, "Complaintes des gens de l'argile: Les Twa du Rwanda," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 14 (1974): 75–87; de Lacger, *Le Rwanda*; Jean-Claude Desmarais, "Les Twa du Rwanda: Du social au biologique," *L'informatriceur* 8 (1975): 62–64. Classic sources on the Twa include Paul Schebesta, *Les Pygmées du Congo belge* (Brussels, 1952); Peter Schumacher, "Die expedition des P. P. Schumacher zu den Zentralafrikanischen Kivu-Pygmäen in Ruanda," *Anthropos* 22 (1927): 289–90, 530–49; 23 (1928): 395–435.

<sup>19</sup> These themes have been considered in greater detail in David Newbury, "The Invention of Rwanda: The Alchemy of Ethnicity" (paper presented at the African Studies Association, Orlando, 1995); David Newbury, "Rwanda and Burundi: A Precolonial Overview" (paper presented to the conference on Central African History, Oxford University, July 1995); and David Newbury, *Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island and the Lake Kivu Rift, 1780–1840* (Madison, Wis., 1991).





An example of the modern-day landscape in western Rwanda, showing terracing, crop variety, and hilly terrain. Photograph by Danielle de Lame, courtesy of the Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, Belgium.

transformation, and the way in which the writing of Alexis Kagame came to incorporate the one within the other, sublimating local data to central court perspectives. But postcolonial work came to challenge some of the centrist historiography of the colonial period; our next section surveys some of the available

documentation on rural transformations. Finally, we explore more recent trends that have addressed the postcolonial crisis of the rural areas and given voice to rural actors. Still, the rural concerns of local peasants and the centrist agendas of state administrators have largely been kept autonomous in the historiography, we argue, as rural transformations have been viewed as “technical” issues, while centrist policies have been seen as “political” processes, independent of local influence. Rethinking Rwandan historiography, therefore, requires giving central place to the dialogue that existed between these two domains—and challenging the premise that Rwandan history was royal history alone while local agency only became significant when incorporated into the state. Since these assumptions were especially prominent in precolonial historiographies, we turn to a consideration of how these histories were forged and framed.

THE FIRST HISTORIES—oral histories—were local histories; and of course local histories still exist in profusion, though they are often relegated to the shadows of irrelevance.<sup>20</sup> During the colonial period, however, what came to be seen as salient was state history, the history of the elites, the features important to outsiders. But history as process can only be understood as the interaction of local agency with external influences—through commercial, ecological, and social contacts with others. Consequently, with the development among Western historians of methodologies of oral history from the 1960s, postcolonial work has come to consider oral sources as essential to the reconstruction of Rwandan history.<sup>21</sup> In the process, postcolonial historians have done much to return a sense of diversity, fluidity, and confrontation to history, to broaden the range of social classes and intellectual themes included, and to introduce a much richer understanding of colonial rule and colonial culture to the written historical accounts.<sup>22</sup> Yet, despite the breadth of new

<sup>20</sup> Some exceptions include Pierre Smith, *Le récit populaire* (Paris, 1975); Luc de Heusch, *Rois nés d'un cœur de vache* (Paris, 1982); Codere, *Biography*; and especially the massive collection of transcribed texts of Jan Vansina, “*Ibiteekerezo: Historical Narratives from Rwanda*” (Chicago, Center for Research Libraries).

<sup>21</sup> The point of departure was Jan Vansina, *L'évolution du royaume Rwanda des origines à 1900* (Brussels, 1962); the methodological premises were first laid out in Vansina, *De la tradition orale: Essai de méthode historique* (Tervuren, 1961). For other studies drawing extensively on oral sources, see (among other examples) Claudine Vidal, “Economie de la société féodale rwandaise,” *Cahiers d'études africaines* 14 (1974): 52–75 (on labor and ethnicity); Alison Des Forges, “Defeat Is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1906–1931” (PhD dissertation, Yale University, 1972), on colonial rule and court politics; C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, on clientship, colonialism, ethnicity, and the state; Jim Freedman, *Nyabingi: The Social History of an African Divinity* (Tervuren, 1984), on local religious practices; Codere, *Biography*, on biographies, including women's biographies; and Danielle de Lame, *Une colline entre mille ou le calme avant la tempête: Transformations et blocages du Rwanda rural* (Tervuren, 1996), a comprehensive cultural study of a local community, with a focus on political economy. For a general overview and assessment of social research over the first twenty years of postcolonial Rwanda, see Bishikwabo and Newbury, “Recent Research.” On the development and debates of oral historiography in Africa, David Newbury, “Contradictions at the Heart of the Canon: Oral Historiography in Africa 1960–1980” (paper presented to the conference on Oral Historiography in Africa, Bellagio, February 1997).

<sup>22</sup> Surveys of colonial Rwanda that emphasize these themes include René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (London, 1970); Ian Linden with Jane Linden, *Church and Revolution in Rwanda* (Manchester, 1977); Filip Reyntjens, *Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda* (Tervuren, 1985); Rumiya, *Le Rwanda*.

knowledge and revisionist understanding such approaches allow, local data have been largely marginalized from the conventional historical accounts.

The earliest written accounts on the Rwandan monarchy reflected those of the earlier oral accounts: they often stressed the regional roots to historical knowledge and emphasized the complicated combination between the penetration of royal power and the sometimes superficial character of royal rule. From these accounts, it is clear that local dynamics were often local as well as dynamic, and that regional particularities were often more prominent than the broader cultural generalizations extended to the entire society. The German writings make this especially clear; in the early years of colonial rule, for example, Jan Czekanowski underscored the importance of regional particularities, especially contrasting the north and northwest of the country with the royal court norms that characterized the central and southern regions.<sup>23</sup> Later historical writings, even through the 1930s, continued to highlight regional cultural characteristics—and the tendencies toward regional autonomy from the court.

Père Albert Pagès published the first great classic on Rwandan dynastic history, *Un royaume hamite au centre d'Afrique*, only in 1933. But because this work represented the fruit of over twenty-five years of observation and involvement with Rwanda, it captured some of the flavor of earlier accounts deeply rooted in local sources.<sup>24</sup> Even while this account celebrates the ruling social stratum and the royal line and focuses on Rwandan culture heroes (especially the epic kings Ruganzu Ndori and Kigeri Rwabugiri), the events associated with them are often presented in very localized fashion; their heroism is shown in local—and sometimes humble—events.

Similarly, the two-volume study by Père Louis de Lacger, *Ruanda* (1939), is an important transition work in this regard. It includes both local and statist viewpoints, although they are kept chronologically separate: local elements are most prevalent in his presentation of the precolonial period, statist perspectives in the colonial section.<sup>25</sup> Throughout his presentation of precolonial history, de Lacger stressed the regional differences and historical autonomy of the different areas that eventually became “Rwanda.” Presenting the expansion of the Nyiginya central court on the model of the extension of French royal power from an “Île de France,” de Lacger gave full credit to the cultural integrity and political autonomy of the various communities conquered by (and to varying degrees absorbed into) the larger monarchical state—factors omitted in later works.

Nonetheless, turning to the colonial period, de Lacger celebrated the “Hamitic” rulers, and he presented a much more homogenized, less conflictual image, focused particularly on the march of Christianity and the preeminence of Catholicism. Not long before de Lacger’s book was published, the Belgian administration had

<sup>23</sup> Jan Czekanowski, *Forschungen im Nil-Kongo-Zwischengebiet* (Leipzig, 1917). Such perspectives were also present in the important work of Peter Schumacher, “P. Schumachers Aufzeichnungen: Ruanda,” *Micro-Bibliotheca Anthropos*, vol. 28A, 1958, Anthropos-Institut, St. Augustin bei Bonn, Germany. Also see Richard Kandt, *Caput Nili* (Berlin, 1921); on Kandt in Rwanda, see Reinhart Bindseil, *Ruanda und Deutschland seit den Tagen Richard Kandts* (Berlin, 1987).

<sup>24</sup> Albert Pagès, *Au Ruanda, sur les bords du lac Kivu (Congo belge): Un royaume hamite au centre de l'Afrique* (Brussels, 1933).

<sup>25</sup> De Lacger, *Ruanda*.



Rwandan royalty. Center right, Musinga, the king of Rwanda from 1896 to 1931, surrounded by four of his wives; to his right is Kanjogera, the queen mother. On Kanjogera's lower legs, note the *ubutege* anklets, a product acquired through the Lake Kivu regional trade network. Copyright Africa-Museum Tervuren (Belgium).

deposed the king (Musinga), citing his opposition to "European civilization."<sup>26</sup> Shortly thereafter, Musinga's successor Rudahigwa—carefully selected by Belgian authorities in consultation with the principal Catholic prelates—was to dedicate the country to Christ the King. In celebrating this success story of the Catholic Church in Rwanda, de Lacger lost sight of the diversity, heterogeneity, and lines of contestation that marked the earlier sections of his book. But his approach also reflected more fundamental changes in Rwandan historiography at about the time of his research, from full attention to the regional disparities in the earlier works to a concentration on the royal court and the homogenization of Rwandan society in later colonial works.

As part of the principles of the *Missionnaires d'Afrique*, the earliest Catholic order in Rwanda, the missionary priests (also known as the "White Fathers") had been encouraged to study local customs and were required to learn the local language; thus much of the early written historiography was the work of Catholic priests.<sup>27</sup> In the early years of European presence in Rwanda, because of their

<sup>26</sup> On the deposition of Musinga, see de Lacger, *Ruanda*, 525–42; Des Forges, "Defeat Is the Only Bad News," chaps. 8–9, esp. 349–54; Ferdinand Nahimana, *Le blanc est arrivé: Le roi est parti* (Kigali, 1987); Rumiya, *Le Rwanda*, 169–89. The Catholic prelate of the day, Mgr. Léon Classe, had a powerful influence on the decision to depose Musinga, who was rusticated in part for his "anti-Christian" and "amoralistic" views; de Lacger, *Ruanda*, 525.

<sup>27</sup> "Les Missionnaires d'Afrique" is the formal title of the order. But members of the order are



involvement in local issues, the perspective of the White Fathers differed from the views of the secular authorities. From the beginning, German administrative policies extended the power of existing elites tied to the royal court, in both Burundi and Rwanda.<sup>28</sup> But German colonial authorities were few: for example, in 1913 in Rwanda (a territory of more than a million people at the time), there were five German administrators compared to forty-one missionaries (thirty-four of them Catholics). So the German colonial administration depended on mission personnel for local contacts. Following World War I, when Belgium took over Rwanda, this civil dependence on ecclesiastics increased dramatically. The Belgians were new to the area, preoccupied first with the war and subsequently with boundary issues with Britain; because of these factors, they felt pressure to assert greater effective administrative presence than Germany had done. In this endeavor, they turned to their Catholic co-religionists—and found them to be willing cohorts.

The Catholic missionaries were well placed. The strategy of the court had been to situate missions in regions distant from the central court, areas recalcitrant to the authority of the Rwandan Nyiginya dynasty; often, these were areas of outright resistance to court rule.<sup>29</sup> In ten years, nine missions were established, seven of them in outlying areas, to varying degrees resistant to court control. Such placement by the king was intended to remove missionaries from any meaningful involvement in the activities of the court, but it also meant that early missionary writings took full account of regional cultural distinctions and local social action. The missions were thus suitable as institutions advancing hegemonic expansion for the court as well as for providing intelligence reports to the administration.<sup>30</sup> So the Catholic

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commonly referred to as the “White Fathers,” after the long white cassock that characterizes their dress code, modeled on the Muslim attire of North Africa where the order was founded. On the development of the Missionnaires d’Afrique and on mission guidelines, see François Renault, *Le Cardinal Lavigerie: L’église, l’Afrique, et la France* (Paris, 1992). We lack a comprehensive history of the Missionnaires d’Afrique, but on the early writings of the White Fathers in Rwanda, see R. Heremans, A. Bart, and F. Bart, “Agriculture et paysage Rwandais à travers des sources missionnaires (1900–1950),” *Cultures et développement* 14 (1982): 3–39; Roger Heremans and Emmanuel Ntezimana, eds., *Journal de la Mission de Save (Rwanda), 1899–1905* (Ruhengeri, 1987). On broader aspects, see François Renault, *Lavigerie, l’esclavage, et l’Europe*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1971); and Roger Heremans, *L’éducation dans les missions des Pères Blancs en Afrique centrale, 1879–1914* (Brussels, 1983).

<sup>28</sup> German policy was first forged in Burundi. But the attitudes adopted there were applicable with even greater force to Rwanda, because in the late nineteenth century Rwanda was much more centralized and the royal court had much more power within its central sphere of influence than was true for Burundi. For Burundi, see Joseph Gahama, *Le Burundi sous administration Belge* (Paris, 1984); Hans Meyer, *Les Barundi* (Paris, 1984); and Pierre Ryckmans, *Une page d’histoire coloniale: L’occupation allemande dans l’Urundi* (Brussels, 1953), 6: “Our policy must aim at upholding the authority of the chiefs so that they will be convinced that their well-being . . . depends on their loyalty to the German government.” On Rwanda, see Des Forges, “Defeat Is the Only Bad News”; Rumiya, *Le Rwanda*; Nahimana, *Le blanc est arrivé*.

<sup>29</sup> For example, of the five Catholic missions established between 1900 and 1903, four were in areas of opposition to Nyiginya royalty: in addition to Save, not far from the royal court (1900), later missions included Zaza (Gisaka, in the southeast, 1900); Nyundo (Bugoyi, in the northwest, 1901); Rwaza (Mulera in the extreme north, 1903); and Mibirizi (Bukunzi, in the extreme southwest, 1903). Similarly, three of the next four missions were located outside the areas of firmly established court dominance. Because of the conditions of their founding and the requirement of the order that the missionaries keep a daily diary, these accounts often serve as rich sources for local history; see Heremans and Ntezimana, *Mission de Save*; Heremans, Bart, and Bart, “Agriculture et paysages”; and P. Schumacher, “Aufzeichnungen: Ruanda.”

<sup>30</sup> Alison Des Forges, “Kings without Crowns: The White Fathers in Rwanda,” in Daniel McCall,



Church provided many benefits the incoming administration lacked: personnel, familiarity with the languages, cultures, and histories of the different regions, and strategic spread.

But the shift from German to Belgian rule after World War I was also a shift from a predominantly Protestant to a primarily Catholic power. To the Catholic missionaries in a period of intense sectarian competition, this represented a welcome change. After all, in the course of religious wars during the 1880s in Buganda (a kingdom on the north shore of Lake Victoria, not far from Rwanda), the White Fathers had been driven out by the Muslim faction. They had taken refuge at the south end of Lake Victoria, converted the exiled king, and returned to take power in Buganda, only to be defeated again by the Protestant faction—which had benefited from the timely arrival of British arms and advice.<sup>31</sup> Subsequently, Baganda Catholics had been placed in what the missionaries saw as a secondary status (to Protestants) in the colonial structures of Buganda. Therefore, in Rwanda, the White Fathers were happy to participate in a colonial administration favorable to the creation of a Catholic state; indeed, the guidelines of proselytization for the order were to work through the existing political elite.<sup>32</sup> In addition, the Belgian administration eventually found an ambitious leader to work with, one eager to participate in a catalytic role: Père Léon Classe, the vicar-general of the order. The infrastructure for forging an orthodox—or in Pierre Bourdieu's terms, a doxic—history was thus firmly in place: it was composed of an alliance of ecclesiastics and administrators.<sup>33</sup>

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Norman Bennett, and Jeffrey Butler, eds., *Eastern Africa History* (New York, 1975), 176–207; Des Forges, “Defeat Is the Only Bad News”; Linden and Linden, *Church and Revolution*. While the perceptive quality and the interest in local people and events varied with each observer, the diary of daily events kept at each parish nonetheless provided a valuable window on local events during the early colonial period. Copies are available at the White Fathers archives in Rome. For a published example, see Heremans and Ntezimana, *Mission de Save*. Also, when used critically and evaluated in context, published works by missionaries such as Albert Pagès, Louis de Lacger, Léon Delmas, Félix Dufays, Marcel Pauwels, and Peter Schumacher provide ample testimony to the value of such observations.

<sup>31</sup> For the religious wars of Buganda at the end of the nineteenth century, see Michael Wright, *Buganda in the Heroic Age* (Nairobi, 1971); C. C. Wrigley, “The Christian Revolution in Buganda,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (1959): 33–48; Christopher Wrigley, *Kingship and State: The Buganda Dynasty* (Cambridge, 1996); John M. Gray, “The Year of the Three Kings in Buganda, 1888–89,” *Uganda Journal* 14 (1950): 15–52; M. S. M. Semakula Kiwanuka, *A History of Buganda to 1900* (London, 1971); D. A. Low, “Conversion, Revolution and the New Regime in Buganda, 1860–1900,” in Low, *Buganda in Modern History* (London, 1971), 13–54; Low, *Religion and Society in Buganda, 1875–1900* (Kampala, n.d. [1957]); John Rowe, *Lugard at Kampala* (Kampala, 1969); Michael Twaddle, *Kakungulu and the Creation of Uganda* (London, 1993).

<sup>32</sup> For histories of the Catholic Church in Rwanda, see Linden and Linden, *Church and Revolution*; Roger Heremans, “L’arrivée des Pères Blancs au Rwanda,” *Dialogue*, no. 57 (1976): 72–83; Heremans, *L’éducation dans les missions des Pères Blancs*; Gamaliel Mbonimana, “L’instauration d’un royaume chrétien au Rwanda (1900–1931)” (PhD dissertation, Louvain la Neuve, 1981); Gamaliel Mbonimana, “Christianisation indirecte et cristallisation des clivages ethniques au Rwanda (1925–1931),” *Enquêtes et documents d’histoire africaine* 3 (1978): 125–63; Justin Kalibwami, *Le catholicisme et la société rwandaise 1900–1962* (Paris, 1991); Paul Rutayisire, *La christianisation du Rwanda (1900–1945): Méthode missionnaire et politique selon Mgr. Léon Classe* (Fribourg, 1987).

<sup>33</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *Towards a Theory of Praxis* (Cambridge, 1976). More than an “orthodox” history—which implicitly accepts the possibilities of alternative viewpoints—Bourdieu’s concept of “doxic” hegemony presumes the delegitimation (or absence) of meaningful alternative visions. It is in this sense that we see the power of the hegemonic view of Rwandan history, which came to combine the Rwandan political elite with the ecclesiastical authorities. Other viewpoints were dismissed as

However, while these were the internal features to the colonial historical drama, it was an external conflict that, through an alliance of ecclesiastics and administrators, sparked a transformation of the colonial historiography of Rwanda. World War I had a significant impact on Africa. At enormous cost to the local populations, Britain and Belgium had mobilized their colonial subjects to fight the Germans in East Africa. In the case of Rwanda, many men were mobilized as soldiers and porters, but a severe famine in the northwest, resulting directly from the hostilities, took the lives of many as well.<sup>34</sup> The political effects following the war were no less significant. After the war, the two victorious European allies sought to divide the territorial spoils whose acquisition had disrupted the lives of so many Africans. Britain sought to annex the areas immediately west of the Kagera River, areas they claimed were particularly well suited for the construction of the Cape-to-Cairo railway.<sup>35</sup> They premised their demands on the claim that much of this area had formed the kingdom of Gisaka, until recently politically autonomous of the Nyiginya royal court of Rwanda. Without going into the details of this diplomatic struggle, it is enough to note that such claims directly affected the internal consolidation of colonial rule.<sup>36</sup> Most important for our current interests, a shared reaction to the British claims helped consolidate an emerging alliance between the three parties noted above: the Belgian colonial authorities, the central court of the Rwandan monarchy, and the Catholic Church. They countered with the claim that the Rwandan central court armies had conquered Gisaka (a claim contested by many in Gisaka) and therefore had extended its territorial dominion to the Kagera River. Any deviation from this position was considered treason to Belgium, subversion against the king, and (since Britain was seen as a Protestant power) near heresy to the Catholic Church.

Whatever their other differences, these three factions agreed on the threat that British claims posed to the integrity of the state. The royal court saw a threat to its ideological and material bases, for the eastern areas in dispute were particularly important to the monarchy, both symbolically and materially. These were the areas where the Nyiginya monarchy claimed its origins. Although in the eighteenth century, the center of the monarchy had moved to the west, vast areas of this region nonetheless continued to serve as the principal pasturage of the royal cattle herds.

The church saw this region as important because of the possibility it presented for the intrusion of Protestant missions to a Catholic domain—a possibility they wished

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“politically motivated” or simply “local” histories, and therefore not worthy of consideration; the history of rural areas, and of peasants, was simply not considered important.

<sup>34</sup> Bernard Lugan, “Causes et effets de la famine ‘Rumanura’ au Rwanda, 1916–1918,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 10 (1976): 347–56; Rumiya, *Le Rwanda*, 59–74; Nahimana, *Le blanc est arrivé*, 121–28.

<sup>35</sup> For a discussion of this dispute, see Rumiya, *Le Rwanda*, 81–131. This had not been the only boundary dispute in question. Areas in the west (Ijwi Island) and in the north (Bufumbiro, originally referred to by some as “British Rwanda”) were also contested, as parts of the precolonial dynastic domain. William Roger Louis, *Ruanda-Urundi: 1884–1919* (Oxford, 1963), esp. 41–92; Elizabeth Hopkins, “The International Boundary as a Factor in the Extension of Colonial Control,” in Daniel F. McCall, Norman R. Bennett, and Jeffrey Butler, eds., *Eastern African History* (New York, 1969), 208–45; Donald Denoon, ed., *A History of Kigezi in South-West Uganda* (Kampala, 1972).

<sup>36</sup> Louis, *Ruanda-Urundi*; David Newbury, “The Rwakayihura Famine of 1928–1929: A Nexus of Colonial Rule in Rwanda,” in *Histoire sociale de l’Afrique de l’est* (Bujumbura, 1991), 269–85.

ardently to thwart. Although German Protestants had been established in Rwanda since 1907, the Church Missionary Society (CMS), based in Britain, was seen as the greater threat; it was backed by the diplomatic clout of a major colonial power, the financial might of an industrial state with a strong tradition of missionary expansion in Africa, and the resources and experienced personnel of one of the largest and most established missionary orders in the region. In fact, during the British occupation of this area after World War I, a semi-autonomous evangelical faction of the CMS had established a mission—in Catholic eyes, a “beachhead”—in this region.<sup>37</sup>

The Belgian authorities saw such claims to the area west of the Kagera River as a threat for three reasons. It was a slight to their colonial integrity and national pride. Furthermore, they relied on the monarchical institutions (as their administrative grid) and on the Catholic Church (for carrying out social policy); they hardly wanted to offend their allies in the administration of Rwanda. Moreover, the Belgian administration feared that, through the railway scheme, British financial penetration to this area could also draw off labor from this presumed “colonial labor reserve,” which had been a central element in colonial thinking on Rwanda and Burundi. Before the late 1920s, Belgian administrators had directed Rwandan labor toward the mines in Katanga and elsewhere in the Belgian Congo; they saw the emigration of Rwandan workers to British territories as detrimental to their own economic aspirations.

The primary response to the British claims, therefore, was to assert the hegemony of the royal court in this region. And the principal respondent was Monseigneur Classe. But this debate was not simply a series of diplomatic niceties carried on behind closed doors. It was a debate that raged at the League of Nations, and it was well publicized in both missionary circles and the popular press. In the process, it transformed the nature of Rwandan historiography. Instead of the earlier emphasis on (or at least recognition of) regional autonomy and regional distinctions, the written works now focused almost exclusively on royal ascendancy; this shift promoted a centralized view of “Rwandan” history. In sum, in responding to this perceived external threat, the new “doxic” vision of Rwandan history consolidated the administrative, court, and missionary perspectives into a single secular narrative, one later to be taught in the schools, promulgated in the press, legitimated in academic works, and “confirmed” in diplomatic handbooks.

The essential elements of this vision stressed the homogeneity of the society, the power of the monarchy (including ethnic stratification), and the longevity of the kingdom. Rwanda was portrayed as a unitary and enduring society, completely consolidated internally and clearly demarcated from its neighbors. To be sure, both these points contradicted much of the earlier written and oral historiography of this region. Nonetheless, this historical image of a unitary “Rwanda” became as central as its claims to chronological longevity, and there was a connection between the two. In this context, “longevity” was a powerful factor in legitimizing “the

<sup>37</sup> David Newbury, “Augustinian Models in Rwanda: Religious Movements and Political Transformation,” *Svensk Missionstidskrift* 3 (1995): 16–34; Patricia St. John, *Breath of Life* (London, 1971); Joe E. Church, *Quest for the Highest* (Exeter, 1981); John V. Taylor, *The Growth of the Church in Buganda* (London, 1958).

state”—the claim to time depth implicitly projected the colonial assumptions of “the traditional monarchy,” unchanged, into the distant past. From this, there developed an image of a highly centralized, rigidly stratified, and ancient state. From the 1930s, political issues came to focus not on regions but on royalty, social issues focused not on ecological distinctions but on ethnicity, and historical issues focused not on local initiatives but on external origins.

In this schema, the state was seen to have been established 500 years before.<sup>38</sup> And while full of conflict (often within the royal line or between the Rwandan monarchy and other competing Tutsi dynasties), Nyiginya dynastic history proceeded undeterred. The only major change was in its inexorable expansion; even internal changes—coups d'état and dynastic shifts—were masked behind the ideology of unbroken continuity.<sup>39</sup> Most important, the linkages with the broader population, as expressed through such institutions as clientship and army organization, were portrayed as static and unchanged over 500 years. The Nyiginya state institutions of the late nineteenth century, seen as the “traditional” institutions of Rwanda, were assumed to have been characteristic of the state since its founding at a particular moment in time: the state, it was argued, was created whole.

The proponents of this centrist view of history were responding to an external stimulus, the boundary dispute on the Kagera River. As is often the case, the external context came to define the contours of a new historical imagery. This revised internal historical understanding was produced to address external political issues; the facts had to conform not to local evidence but to regional agendas. Like many ideologies, this vision was based on a “truncated empiricism”; “facts” were cited without being placed in context, without consideration of alternative data, without internal critique, and without reference to the contentions of historical process: the events simply “happened.” The manipulation of the ambiguous and controversial claims of Nyiginya court presence in areas just west of the Kagera River provides an example of this truncated empiricism, an approach that removed ambiguity and contradiction and denied the possibility of multiple histories. In fact, the Nyiginya lineages that became the political core to the royal dynasty had had influence, varying over time, in the disputed area. At issue was not whether they had a presence there, but what sort of presence, how that had changed over time, and what effect this had had on people's identities. In lived history, such concerns were central; in the context of larger political debates, however, such issues were easily elided.

To assert the vision of a consolidated Nyiginya monarchy, the writers advancing

<sup>38</sup> The starting point for the chronology of Rwandan dynastic history is Alexis Kagame, *La notion de génération appliquée à la généalogie dynastique et à l'histoire du Rwanda des X<sup>e</sup>–XI<sup>e</sup> siècles à nos jours* (Brussels, 1959). For elaboration, see Kagame, *Ingunji Karinga* (Butare, 1959 [1943; 1947]); *Un abrégé*, vol. 1; and “La chronologie au Burundi dans les genres littéraires de l'ancien Rwanda,” *Etudes rwandaises* 12 (1979): 1–30. The most important reassessments of Kagame's proposals include Vansina, *L'évolution*; Keith Rennie, “The Precolonial Kingdom of Rwanda: A Reinterpretation,” *Transafrican Journal of History* 2 (1972): 11–53; and Jean-Népomucène Nkurikiyimfura, “La révision d'une chronologie: Le cas du royaume du Rwanda,” in Claude-Hélène Perrot, Gilbert Gonnin, and Ferdinand Nahimana, eds., *Sources orales de l'histoire de l'Afrique* (Paris, 1989). For a broader critique of the official chronology—and of the dynastic genealogy—see David Newbury, “Trick Cyclists? Recontextualizing Rwandan Dynastic Chronology,” *History in Africa* 21 (1994): 191–217.

<sup>39</sup> Vansina, *L'évolution*, chap. 3, makes this point convincingly; see also D. Newbury, “Trick Cyclists.”

the Belgian view against British claims ignored the local sources (which were more ambiguous on such questions) in favor of Nyiginya royal accounts alone. Such historical accounts irrevocably associated with "Rwanda" any region attacked by armies of the Nyiginya court and any areas inhabited by people of "Rwandan culture": there is a powerful irredentist streak to Rwandan royal history.<sup>40</sup> One example is in the treatment of the history of Gisaka, the area in question during the dispute with Britain after World War I. Dynastic Rwandan sources claim Gisaka as "Rwandan" from the time of Rujugira (1675–1741 in the "official" royal chronology) or from Ruganzu Bwimba (1312–1345).<sup>41</sup> Yet Gisaka was still being fought over throughout the nineteenth century, and even after the "conquest" of the Gisaka royal family in the late nineteenth century, the population remained "rebellious" (that is, independent) well into the colonial period. Nonetheless, colonial histories of Gisaka ignore these "rebellions"; in this fashion, the presentation of local history was restructured to conform to Nyiginya royal accounts.<sup>42</sup> One problem evident from this example relates to the treatment of regional diversity. Rather than being seen as an essential dimension to national history, regional histories were seen as opposed to national history.<sup>43</sup> In the view of the central court, to focus on a region, and especially to privilege local initiatives, was a threat to the dominant paradigm. Thus "history" was presumed to adhere to nationality; in this case, "Rwandan history" could only belong to "Rwanda," and true historical actors could only be members of the royal court.

But these historiographical issues were not limited to Gisaka. Within the area now referred to as Rwanda, one can cite a score of historical polities of varying sizes and characteristics, from extensive kingdoms of the east (such as Gisaka, Ndorwa, Bugesera, Mutara) to the smaller autonomous political organizations of the west. The latter were based on one of two models. The "forest polities" included several thousand people, often a mobile population that engaged in trapping and gathering as well as agriculture and livestock. Indeed, several of these polities—Busozo, Bukunzi, Kingogo, and Bushiru—continued as independent units into the 1920s.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Vansina, *L'évolution*, 74–76; D. Newbury, "Alchemy of Ethnicity." For a more recent case of such claims, see David Newbury, "Irredentist Rwanda: Ethnic and Territorial Frontiers in Central Africa," *Africa Today* 44 (1997): 211–22.

<sup>41</sup> Kagame, *Un abrégé*, 1: 58–59, 138–39.

<sup>42</sup> A. d'Arianoff, *L'histoire des Bagesera, souverains du Gisaka* (Brussels, 1952); but for commentary on how central court perspectives defined d'Arianoff's presentation, see also D. Newbury, "Trick Cyclists," 193–95.

<sup>43</sup> An early anthropological work to focus on a region was Marcel d'Hertefeldt, "Huwelijk, familie en aanverwantschap bij de Reera van noordwesterlijk Rwaanda," *Zaire* 13 (1959): 115–47, 243–85. Other early regional works include Marcel Pauwels, "Le Bushiru et son muhinza ou roitelet Hutu," *Annali del Pontificio Museo Missionario Etnologico* 31 (1967): 205–322, and many other of his publications; Félix Dufays and Vincent de Moor, *Au Kinyaga: Les enchainés* (Brussels, 1938); d'Arianoff, *L'histoire des Bagesera*; Pagès, *Un royaume hamite*, 634–701.

<sup>44</sup> On these polities, see Pauwels, "Le Bushiru"; Ferdinand Nahimana, "Les bami ou roitelets Hutu du corridor Nyabarongo-Mukungwa," *Etudes rwandaises* 12 (1979): 1–25; Nahimana, *Le Rwanda*; Emmanuel Ntezimana, " Coutumes et traditions des royaumes hutu du Bukunzi et du Busozo," *Etudes rwandaises* 13 (1980): 15–39; and Ntezimana, "L'arrivée des Européens au Kinyaga et la fin des royaumes hutu du Bukunzi et du Busozo," *Etudes rwandaises* 13 (1980): 1–29. For discussion of the historical similarities of these polities with political organizations west of the Rift Valley (in what is now eastern Congo), see D. Newbury, *Kings and Clans*, chap. 2; and Richard Sigwalt, "Early Rwanda History: The Contribution of Comparative Ethnography," *History in Africa* 2 (1975): 137–46. For a discussion of royal court (Nyiginya) attitudes toward the cultures of this area, see David Newbury,



A second general model differing from that of the Nyiginya dynasty was associated with the densely populated and sedentary social formations in the far north of what is today Rwanda. These were based on a form of segmentary kinship structures, without centralized political functions or territorial ritual focus.<sup>45</sup> In sum, within the area now referred to as Rwanda, there were numerous regional variations: one can identify at least nine distinct cultural zones, with their own (politically autonomous) histories, before the eighteenth century, and often with important cultural connections reaching beyond current Rwandan state boundaries. For several, their autonomy continued well into the nineteenth century and, for some, even into colonial times.<sup>46</sup> Though not often present in the historiography, therefore, regional differences are part of the ongoing story of Rwandan history.

THUS "CONVENTIONAL" HISTORY has privileged royal over local sources—or rather, it has obscured and silenced local sources. It also privileged written over oral accounts—or rather, privileged early written accounts (based largely on speculation) over later written accounts (based more often on local narratives). Consequently, it may be worth looking briefly at the development of this conventional history. Aside from the speculation of ancient Greeks, the first written accounts for

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"Bunyabungo: The Western Rwandan Frontier, 1750–1850," in Igor Kopytoff, ed., *The African Frontier* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986), 162–93.

<sup>45</sup> D'Hertefelt, "Huwelijk, familie en aanverwantschap"; Jim Freedman, "Principles of Relationship in Rwandan Kiga Society" (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1974); May Edel, *The Chiga of Western Uganda* (New York, 1957); Denoon, *History of Kigezi*; Paul Ngologaza, *Kigezi and Its People* (Kampala, 1969); Benoni Turyahikayo-Rugyema, "The History of the Bakiga of Southwestern Uganda and Northern Rwanda" (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1974); Elizabeth Hopkins, "The Nyabingi Cult of Southwestern Uganda," in Robert Rotberg and Ali Mazrui, eds., *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (New York, 1970), 258–336; Hopkins, "The Ethnography of Conquest," in Christine Ward Gailey, ed., *Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in Honor of Stanley Diamond*, Vol. 1, *Civilization in Crisis: Anthropological Perspectives* (Gainesville, Fla., 1992), 137–65. For other examples of identities and dynamics that reach beyond state structures, see David Newbury, "Lake Kivu Regional Trade in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal des Africanistes* 50 (1980): 6–31; Antoine Nyagahene, "Les activités économiques et commerciales du Kinyaga dans le seconde partie du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle" (Thèse de Licence, UNR-Butare, 1979); Njiga Bihakaheka and Nsibula Kirhero, "Nyangezi dans ses relations commerciales avec le Rwanda, le Burundi, et le Bufulero," *Etudes rwandaises* 14 (1981): 89–98; Luc de Heusch, *Le Rwanda et la civilisation interlacustre* (Brussels, 1966); Iris Berger, *Religion and Resistance: East African Kingdoms in the Precolonial Period* (Tervuren, 1981); Berger, "Fertility as Power: Spirit Mediums, Priestesses, and the Precolonial State in Interlacustrine East Africa," in David Anderson and Douglas Johnson, eds., *Revealing Prophets: Prophecy in Eastern African History* (London, 1995), 65–82; Freedman, *Nyabingi*; Feierman, "Colonizer, Scholars, and the Creation of Invisible Histories"; Jean-Pierre Chrétien, "La fermeture du Burundi et du Rwanda aux commerçants de l'extérieur (1905–1908)," in Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Alain Forrest, eds., *Entreprises et Entrepreneurs en Afrique*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1983), 25–47.

<sup>46</sup> Any firm enumeration of "cultural zones" in this region, of course, is an arbitrary exercise, as these shade into each other in a complex pattern of overlapping regional and local identities; for analytic purposes, however, while one can argue over the lines of demarcation, the general point of such differentiation remains important. Regional studies that privilege local dialogue with state power include C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*; de Lame, *Une colline*; Pierre Gravel, *Remera: A Community in Eastern Rwanda* (The Hague, 1968); Jean-Pierre Chrétien, "La révolte de Ndungutse (1912): Forces traditionnelles et pression coloniale au Rwanda allemand," *Revue française d'Outre-Mer* 59 (1972): 645–80; Freedman, "Principles"; Alison Des Forges, "The Drum Is Greater Than the Shout: The 1912 Rebellion in Northern Rwanda," in Donald Crummey, ed., *Banditry: Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1986), 311–31; Nahimana, *Le Rwanda*; Rushatsi, "Monarchie nyiginya et pouvoirs européens."

this general region were by late nineteenth-century European travelers. John Hannington Speke was the earliest; he visited Karagwe and Buganda (east of Rwanda) in 1862. Speke's book included an entire chapter on his vision of the history of the region. A migrant himself, he saw the history as one of migration: "In Abyssinia a pastoral clan from the Asiatic side took the government of Abyssinia from its people and have ruled over them ever since. It may be presumed that there once existed a foreign but compact government in Abyssinia which becoming great and powerful sent out armies on all sides of it."<sup>47</sup> Subsequently, one of these "armies" was "lost sight of in the interior of the continent and crossing the Nile close to its source, discovered the rich pasturage of Unyoro [today part of western Uganda] and founded the great kingdom of Kittara, where they lost their religion, forgot their language, extracted their lower incisors like the natives, changed their national name to Wahuma, and no longer remembered the names of Hubshi or Galla."<sup>48</sup> Thus Speke's self-defined "theory of ethnology" is apparently a history of lost religion, lost language, lost incisors, and lost identity. (In other words, it lacks any empirical indication of Abyssinian origin.) And with little evidence to go on, Speke concludes: "So much for ethnological conjecture."<sup>49</sup> Yet despite the absence of any empirical basis for the historical scenario he proposed, Speke's self-defined "conjecture" provided a convenient paradigm for others uncritically to follow.

Later accounts were associated with the establishment of colonial rule. One of the most influential of these was by Sir Harry Johnston. As a British colonial administrator, he had arrived in East Africa in the aftermath of a long civil war in Buganda, in which his administrative predecessor, Frederick Lugard, had played an instrumental role. In the wake of conflict, Johnston saw conquest as a key element to the history of the region, just as Speke, as a migrant, had seen migration as the key to history. But Johnston was also responsible for British negotiations with the elite to emerge from the Buganda civil wars—an elite that had twice overthrown the king. His aim was stability at minimal cost to Britain, and the Buganda Agreement of 1900 had three principal results: the recognition of Britain as the "protective power," the definition of the administrative elite to rule Buganda supervising the infant royal successor, and the introduction of freehold land tenure as the material foundation of the newly established Baganda elite. But in Johnston's eyes, legitimating the claims of this Protestant, pro-British elite also required legitimizing the history of this neo-monarchy. Consequently, Johnston was active in promoting a view of history that validated the new order; he was joined in this by members of the ruling elite, who published many works in Luganda as well as in English.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>47</sup> John Hannington Speke, *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (New York, 1868), 242. Speke had also previously traveled in the Horn of Africa and was accompanied by a Somali aide-de-camp. In a sense, then, Speke's historical scenario mirrored his own travels.

<sup>48</sup> Speke, *Journal*, 242.

<sup>49</sup> Speke, *Journal*, 243.

<sup>50</sup> Harry Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate* (London, 1902). (Johnston was also an intellectual polymath, the author of influential works on linguistics, botany, and zoology, as well as history.) Foremost among the Baganda elites constructing a hegemonic royal history was Apolo Kagwa, for forty years the Katakira (or prime minister) of Buganda; among other works, see *Ssekabaka by'e Buganda* (Kampala, 1901), translated as *The Kings of Buganda* (Nairobi, 1971). John Rowe and Michael Twaddle have explored aspects of Ganda "subaltern historiography"—histories excluded from the mainstream writings: Rowe, "Myth, Memoir, and Moral Admonition: Luganda Historical Writing, 1893–1969," *Uganda Journal* 33 (1969): 17–40, 217–19; Rowe, "Erieza Kintu's *Sultani Anatoloka*: A Nineteenth

Twenty years later, a process analogous to that in Buganda was to occur in Rwanda. The development of this aspect of Rwandan historiography, however, needed a third important step—beyond migration and conquest—in this complex history of histories. It was supplied through the work of Père Julien Gorju, who worked in his early years in western Uganda before being appointed bishop to Burundi. He was well placed to transpose Anglophone “ethnological theory” into Francophone intellectual paradigms, and, as he was working within an extremely tightly knit cohort of influential Catholic intellectuals, the regional interpretations he applied to Burundi became influential in Rwandan circles as well. Writing in the 1920s, Gorju worked at two levels: he drew on local traditions of western Uganda, but he fit them firmly within the broad regional framework sketched out by Speke and his successors in Uganda.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, Gorju wrote in French, he wrote with the authority of the church, and he wrote in a period when racial parameters were the principal features of history, culture, and identity, all seen as intertwined. So he was well situated to serve as the linchpin between Anglophone works in Uganda and an emergent Francophone corpus in Central Africa (including Rwanda), presenting a case for a broad history of this “interlacustrine” region of eastern Africa.<sup>52</sup> In this history, migration, conquest, and “racial” stratification were all of a piece.<sup>53</sup> Social stratification became the indicator of groups of different origins, in a hierarchy established by conquest. Culture internal to an ethnic group was seen as static because it was tied to race. Change, on the other hand, came from outside; cultural contact between two unchanging groups invariably meant conflict. In this region, social stratification was seen as the inevitable result of contact between two irreconcilable groups; it was also the proof of their incompatible racial differences. In other words, this was history in which all the important parameters were external: different racial origins, migration, and conquest were the operative factors that produced social stratification.

It is curious that, throughout this intense consolidation of “official history” in Rwanda, there remained an acknowledgment of local integrity. Nonetheless, since official history was based on a written tradition and local history on oral traditions, these were seen as parallel but separate phenomena: the former was “history,” the latter was “legend.” Only after World War II did these two approaches to history begin to be brought together. In the 1950s, acknowledging that royal ideology was insufficient in dealing with local problems, the Belgian administration assembled

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Century History Memoir from Buganda,” *History in Africa* 20 (1993): 313–19; Rowe, “The Anti-Establishment Voice in Twentieth Century Buganda: Or, the Power of the Printing Press and How the Ruling Elite Lost Their Monopoly over It,” Makerere University History Department Seminar Paper (August 1991); Twaddle and Rowe, *War, Religion, and Revolution in Uganda: Six Dissident Discourses* (East Lansing, forthcoming); Twaddle, “On Ganda Historiography,” *History in Africa* 2 (1976): 85–101. In addition, see Wrigley, *Kingship and State*.

<sup>51</sup> Julien Gorju, *Entre le Victoria, l'Albert, et l'Edouard* (Rennes, 1920); later, for application specifically to Burundi and Rwanda, see Gorju, *Face au royaume hamite du Ruanda, le royaume frère du Burundi* (Brussels, 1938).

<sup>52</sup> Among Africanists, “interlacustrine” is the conventional reference to the region between Lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu, and Tanganyika on the west and Lake Victoria on the east. The societies within this geographical domain form a distinct cultural zone and share several important characteristics: centralized kingship, stratified social organization, and mixed agrarian-pastoral economies. Hence they are collectively referred to as the “interlacustrine” cultures.

<sup>53</sup> David Newbury, “Bushu and the Historians,” *History in Africa* 5 (1978): 131–51.

regional histories in a small booklet for use by its administrators.<sup>54</sup> Interesting in its content, this compilation, entitled *Historique et chronologie du Ruanda*, is even more important for its admission that useful history is local history—and for acknowledging the diversity of local histories, even while it still tended to privilege local elites. Furthermore, a collection of land surveys conducted in the late 1940s and 1950s demonstrated the enormous institutional variability and individual mobility within this supposedly heavily administered state and stable society.<sup>55</sup> So within some colonial circles, at least, local history was recognized; it just was not recognized as important to “History.”

Even more telling were the official royal court histories, mostly popularized in the voluminous work of Abbé Alexis Kagame. He was an energetic scholar who was both Catholic priest and court intellectual, with each role enhanced by the other: Kagame of the 1940s represented simultaneously the indigenizing church and the modernizing monarchy. To outsiders, he served as the essential link between “tradition and modernity,” between “custom and civilization.” As ecclesiastic, academic, and court interpreter (and as a prolific writer), Kagame was the single most influential actor in consolidating court historiography—and in turning court history into “Rwandan History.”<sup>56</sup> But though intensely and uncritically focused on advancing the hegemony of the royal court, Kagame’s works still illustrate the significance of local history. Many of his writings exude a mastery of local detail that would challenge the most ardent empiricist; one way he asserted his correctness was in the flood of undocumented “facts” that pervaded his writing. But despite his access to local detail, Kagame virtually neglected larger issues. While local data gave texture to central court history, in Kagame’s vision it was nonetheless central court contact that gave significance to local data. So even the plethora of local data seemed to reinforce statist history. In short, during this formative period of Rwandan historiography (1930–1960), alternative histories were not absent; they were just ignored (or absorbed). Postcolonial historiographies unveiled such alternative accounts.

FROM THE 1960s, A NEW METHODOLOGICAL FEATURE EMERGED. To move beyond colonial history in Africa, one needed to move beyond colonials: the history of Africans required understanding the visions of those affected by power as well as the intentions of the powerholders. How was power implemented, how was it received, and what were its effects? These were important issues—equally important to how power was conceived by the powerholders. To pursue these issues meant a return to the history of the local level. This shift differed from colonial hegemonic accounts in two ways. It introduced new topics and themes. More important, it introduced new conceptual understandings of old topics. Clientship,

<sup>54</sup> *Historique et chronologie du Ruanda* [Kabgayi, 1956].

<sup>55</sup> Ivan Reisdorff, “Enquêtes foncières au Ruanda,” unpublished manuscript (Butare, 1952).

<sup>56</sup> On Kagame, see Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Confronting the Unequal Exchange between the Oral and the Written,” in Bogumil Jewsiewicki and David Newbury, eds., *African Historiographies: What History for Which Africa?* (Newbury Park, Calif., 1986), 75–90, esp. 84–87; Claudine Vidal, “Alexis Kagame entre mémoire et histoire,” *History in Africa* 15 (1988): 493–504; Vidal, “Alexis Kagame,” in Vidal, *Sociologie des Passions* (Paris, 1991), 45–61; and D. Newbury, “Trick Cyclists.”

ethnicity, kingship, clanship, and royal ritual were all staples of colonial historiography. But for the most part, they had all been treated as fixed, unchanging, often primordial features of Rwandan society: they were presented as unhistoric in themselves, lacking internal transformation. The new historiography broke open these black boxes and saw these institutions as historical products embedded in multiple historical forces. They were no longer seen as just primordial features of the Rwandan social landscape: they were susceptible to history; they were testimony to change.<sup>57</sup>

By giving voice to an array of social groups with diverse perspectives on these issues, the new methodologies uncovered multiple versions of history. A historian's task was no longer that of selecting one "correct" version of history but of finding ways to account for plurality; empirical evidence was not just identifying the "correct" facts but accounting for and explaining multiple experiences. Institutions appeared different—they *were* different—when experienced from below. The critical factor was that the vision of social process moved away from the court to include the rural areas and away from elites to include peasants. But the real question here is not, "How are peasants treated in the historiography?" but, "How are peasants seen to participate in the historical debates?" There are two dimensions to this issue. First, in small-scale societies where face-to-face relations are important, history was always present in the public domain, whether in judging the boundaries between fields, tracing the genealogies of cattle clientship, negotiating marriage or divorce, succeeding to the role of head of household, or participating in a religious séance: the local community always included history in its public discourse.

On the other hand, local history that diverged from state paradigms was not easily retained in the wider sources. Even in conflicts among the elites at the central court, the hegemony of the state in Rwanda was powerful, and, in challenging the historical interpretations of the powerholders, the stakes were high. An example from court history illustrates this pattern in dramatic terms. It concerns Nkoronko, the son of one king, Gahindiro, and the brother of another, Rwogera. In the mid-nineteenth century, Nkoronko was killed because he was aware that Rwabugiri, Rwogera's successor, was not the legitimate heir to the throne. In fact, Nkoronko was killed on the orders of Rwabugiri. Since Rwabugiri was one of Rwanda's most autocratic warrior-kings, Nkoronko's execution in itself might not be surprising. But

<sup>57</sup> On clientship: C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*; and Catharine Newbury, "Ubureetwa and Thangata: Catalysts to Peasant Political Consciousness in Rwanda and Malawi," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 14 (1980): 97–111; Claudine Vidal, "Le Rwanda des anthropologues ou le fétichisme de la vache," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 9 (1969): 384–401; Nkurikiyimfura, *Le gros bétail*. On ethnicity, see Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity in Rwanda: The Case of Kinyaga," *Africa* 48 (1978): 17–28; Claudine Vidal, "Situations ethniques au Rwanda," in Jean-Luc Amselle and Elikia M'bokolo, eds., *Au coeur de l'ethnie* (Paris, 1985), 167–84. On kingship, D. Newbury, *Kings and Clans*; Richard Sigwalt, "The Early History of Bushi" (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975). On clanship, Marcel d'Hertefelt, *Les clans du Rwanda ancien* (Tervuren, 1971); David Newbury, "The Clans of Rwanda: An Historical Hypothesis," *Africa* 50 (1980): 389–403; Catharine Newbury, "Deux Lignages au Kinyaga," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 14 (1974): 26–38. On royal ritual, Marcel d'Hertefelt and André Coupez, *La royauté sacrée de l'ancien Rwanda* (Tervuren, 1964); David Newbury, "What Role Has Kingship? An Analysis of the Umuganura Ritual of Rwanda," *Africa-Tervuren* 27 (1981): 89–101; Richard Sigwalt, "Early Rwanda History: The Contribution of Comparative Ethnography," *History in Africa* 2 (1975): 137–46.



the drama went deeper, for in all likelihood Rwabugiri was also Nkoronko's biological son.<sup>58</sup> So the power of historical interpretation led not only to eliminating one's rivals, even one of the most powerful of the land, but to patricide. Historical knowledge was a cause of concern in other instances as well. In one case, even ritual leaders of the court were killed for asserting the legal rules of succession; and in many other cases, individuals were either driven off their land, or bound, mutilated, or killed for refusing to accede to claims on their land by incoming nobles.<sup>59</sup> In such contexts, power becomes an effective tool for molding historical thinking.

The preeminence of state authority over local knowledge is present even in recent times at such "mundane" levels as local production, where an agricultural officer often becomes a hegemonic authority. Several factors account for this. First, such agents often serve more as representatives of the state than as advocates for agriculturalists: their job is to enforce state directives in agricultural production. But they often have much less direct knowledge of their field (or others' fields) than those they are advising, for such officers are often chosen more on the basis of educational levels than agricultural experience. Furthermore, they are invariably males. Although women are the major rural producers, and often know more about local conditions than men (including the agricultural officer), relations between men and women are frequently strained in rural areas—male agricultural officers relate to women producers with difficulty. Finally, even for male cultivators, respect for an agricultural officer often marks this relationship as one of deference rather than dialogue. Consequently, an agricultural officer may arrive and ask to talk to the male head of household, yet the critical advice does not get to the actual (female) producers, nor does the critical knowledge of local conditions get to the agricultural officer. As a result, not only does "state agriculture" become a coercive field, but much local knowledge (local variations of crops, soils, pests, labor practices) is lost, in the name of standardizing and "rationalizing" agriculture.<sup>60</sup> Even the field of agrarian history, therefore, is subject to the state and often neglected by the state; in an analogous fashion, the same is true for intellectual fields such as "history," also seen as the prerogative of the state and its authorities.

<sup>58</sup> Kagame, *Un abrégé*, 1: 212–14; *Un abrégé*, 2: 2, 28–35; Alexis Kagame, *Les milices du Rwanda précolonial* (Brussels, 1963), 155–57. In fact, the story was much more complicated. Rwabugiri had been born to Nkoronko's wife—even though the official sources claim it was through her liaison with Rwogera, Nkoronko's brother and Rwabugiri's predecessor as king of Rwanda. Rwogera later proposed an exchange of sons with Nkoronko, and Rwabugiri (then named Sezisoni), Rwogera's adopted son (and supposed biological offspring?), then succeeded to the throne. Over the course of his reign, Rwabugiri not only condemned to execution his uncle (and biological father?) but his mother and his wife (the mother of his designated successor and co-regnant) as well; in addition, he had his cousin blinded. And these were not the only cases where members of the royal family were killed or maimed for knowing too much history. Shrewd actors attended carefully to hegemonic history.

<sup>59</sup> Among many examples, see Czekanowski, *Forschungen*; Albert Pagès, "Notes sur le régime des biens dans le Province du Bugoyi," *Congo* 19 (1938): 392–433; C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, chap. 7.

<sup>60</sup> Johan Pottier, "The Politics of Famine Prevention: Ecology, Regional Production, and Food Complementarity in Western Rwanda," *African Affairs* 85 (1986): 207–37; Johan Pottier, "'Three's a Crowd': Knowledge, Ignorance and Power in the Context of Urban Agriculture in Rwanda," *Africa* 59 (1989): 461–77; Pottier, "Taking Stock: Food Marketing Reform in Rwanda, 1982–89," *African Affairs* 92 (1993): 5–30. For analogous situations elsewhere, see Kathleen Staudt, "Agricultural Productivity Gaps: A Case Study of Male Preference in Government Policy Implementation," *Development and Change* 9 (1978): 439–58; Kathleen Staudt, "Women Farmers and Inequities in Agricultural Services," in Edna Bay, ed., *Women and Work in Africa* (Boulder, Colo., 1981), 207–24.

But there are ways to assert alternative views. One is through orality, often indirectly by allusion, occasionally by direct narrative. Another is through local newspapers or articles in local journals; during the 1950s in Rwanda, for example, a Rwanda-language newspaper, *Kinyamateka*, published alternative histories divergent from those of the dynastic oral traditions. They were extremely important in affecting political attitudes and mobilizing political action in the late 1950s, because of the inherent power of the articles themselves and because they articulated widespread, preexisting perceptions among rural Rwandans.<sup>61</sup> For more recent periods in Rwanda, radio programs sometimes served this purpose of representing perspectives that differed from those of the powerful. For example, in the 1980s, one of the most popular programs on Radio Rwanda consisted of interviews with youth and “people in the hills.” The opinions that aired on these shows were often critical of the state. Such outspoken views reflected more general discontent and contributed powerfully to the process of undermining the legitimacy of the government in the rural areas during the late 1980s. When handled sensitively and critically, these are the kinds of sources that are needed to transcend state hegemonies. They are the kind of “subaltern voices” that oral historiography has always dealt with—when it has moved beyond the oral narrative of the royal court. And it is the kind of knowledge that we must presume has always been present but to which historians have not always lent a ready ear.

Nonetheless, the question remains: do these alternative visions change our understanding of social process, or are they simply different ways of addressing the same topics? The answer is both. Where dynastic histories stressed the expansion of the state and the glories of the court, for example, local accounts stressed the brutal character of the internal state processes and the inequities of the system. Both perspectives addressed royal power, but one celebrated the power of the state while the other stressed the insecurity of the peasant. However, these divergent perspectives represent more than different constituencies being interested in different things and seeing different outcomes: these debates relate to divergent definitions of the state and represent differing understandings of state power. To trace power relations meant that one had to move beyond the conventional definition of state politics and address neglected themes of Rwandan rural history.

POSTCOLONIAL WRITINGS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED the narrow character of earlier work and sought to move beyond court perspectives. But in inquiring into the world of those outside the privileged elites, writings on Rwandan rural areas diverged, taking one of two pathways. Anthropologists, political scientists, and historians often applied the new methods and the new interest in rural peoples to questions relating to colonial or precolonial issues. They thus focused on the past, reassessing earlier presentations.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, many “development” studies addressed postcolonial rural life, but these were technical studies and tended to extract rural

<sup>61</sup> Emmanuel Ntezimana, “*Kinyamateka, Temps Nouveaux d’Afrique: L’évolution socio-politique du Rwanda (1954–1959)*,” *Etudes rwandaises*, Special Issue (March 1978): 1–29.

<sup>62</sup> Helen Codere, “Power in Rwanda,” *Anthropologica* 4 (1962): 45–85; Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*; Vidal, “Le Rwanda des anthropologues”; Vansina, *L’évolution*; C. Newbury, *Cohesion of*

areas from politics. In these perspectives the rural crisis was generated by rural realities—ignorance, population pressure, soil degradation: the state entered into these issues only to “solve” them. Thus these separate schools reproduced some of the same characteristics of the earlier historiography; they separated rural life from central politics, but they did so within a context marked by chronological segregation. Those who looked at peasants within a political matrix did so only with reference to the past, while those who looked at rural areas in the postcolonial period did so without accounting for power relationships.<sup>63</sup> Those who looked at the state in rural areas saw the rural residents as objects or victims, as recipients of state power, not as subjects, or actors in their own right.<sup>64</sup> One school removed peasants from power, displacing the focus of their work to earlier periods; another removed power from rural residents, by examining the technical aspects of the rural crisis without politics.<sup>65</sup> All parties addressed issues of conventional politics and the state—but some saw the state as a causal factor of class formation, while others saw it as a palliative to existing social differentiation.

Relations of power, however, were more complex than could be measured through policy issues alone. To move beyond such debates over the peasantry and the state, therefore, different themes needed to be explored. These have usually been neglected in general accounts but were often present in an unintended fashion in the technical accounts referred to earlier. Though many could be illustrated, five themes in particular seem important to Rwandan social process but have not been well represented in the official historiography: the uneven representation of regions; the congruence of the state boundaries with the historical unit; labor; gender; and ecology. As with rural historiography, these have not always been absent, but they have been sublimated, by their absorption into state-defined visions of history. To be sure, they are all interrelated. But disentangling them from state

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*Oppression*; Nahimana, *Le Rwanda*. Bishikwabo and Newbury, “Recent Research,” summarizes many of these works from the early postcolonial period.

<sup>63</sup> This conclusion is shared by Danielle de Lame, “Instantants Retrouvés: Rwanda, regards neufs au fil du temps,” in Patrick Wymers, ed., *Liber Amicorum Marcel d'Hertefeldt* (Brussels, 1993), 115–31.

<sup>64</sup> For one example, see République du Rwanda, *Résultats de l'enquête nationale agricole 1984*, vol. 1 (Kigali, 1985). Exceptions that explore the changing relations between peasants and the state include André Guichaoua, *Destins paysans et politiques agraires en Afrique centrale*, Vol. 1: *L'ordre paysan des hautes terres centrales du Burundi et du Rwanda* (Paris, 1989); Catharine Newbury, “Rwanda: Recent Debates over Governance and Rural Development,” in *Governance and Politics in Africa*, Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds. (Boulder, Colo., 1992), 193–219; de Lame, *Une colline*; Timothy P. Longman, “Christianity and Crisis in Rwanda: Religion, Civil Society, Democratization, and Decline” (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1995); Claudine Vidal, “Questions sur le rôle des paysans durant le génocide des rwandais tutsi,” *Cahiers d'études africaines* 38 (1998): 331–45. Also sensitive to rural transformations, though this is not the main focus of his study, is Filip Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi, 1988–1994* (Paris, 1994).

<sup>65</sup> For a critique of how development agencies ignored power dynamics in Rwanda, see René Lemarchand, “The World Bank in Rwanda: The Case of the Office de Valorisation Agricole et Pastorale du Mutara (OVAPAM)” (Bloomington, Ind., 1982); Jean-Pierre Godding, “Foreign Aid as an Obstacle to Development: The Case of Rwanda's Rural Development Projects,” in Michael Lipton, ed., *International Perspectives on Rural Development* (Sussex, 1984); Jean-Pierre Godding, “Grands projets et développement communal,” *Dialogue* 134 (1989): 3–15; Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, Conn., 1998). On the broader issues involved, see James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge, 1990); and Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, N.J., 1995).

parameters allows “hidden histories” to emerge. The examples below help illustrate the pattern by which these new intellectual configurations help conceptualize the diverse forms of historical agency, previously veiled within the elegant trappings of central court discourse.

First, as noted earlier, hegemonic historiographies emphasized central court narratives at the expense of local narratives—despite the “subliminal” presence of such data in several sources. After Rwanda’s independence (in 1962), some sought to redress the lack of local voices through the use of case studies; if peasants needed representation, their specific circumstances and goals needed clear articulation. Nonetheless, little was done to draw out the common themes or comparative processes among such local narratives. A second feature, related to, but distinct from, the first theme, concerns the insular nature of Rwandan history. In conventional historical inquiry, official state contours marked the only arena of historical action; political boundaries had come to define the historical unit. But such conventions largely neglected the flow of resources, commodities, people, ideas, ritual concepts, religious practices, friendship networks, and identities across the “inviolable” boundaries of the state—boundaries sometimes established, as we have seen, through the combined efforts of the Belgians, the Catholic Church, and the court. In fact, members of most of the nine subcultures mentioned earlier often maintained broad ties outside the colonial boundaries that were often as intense as those within the current state parameters. Moreover, these ties—in religion, marriage, commerce, and productive activities—helped define the regional characteristics of these subcultures, characteristics often mocked by or written out of Rwandan history.<sup>66</sup> Nonetheless, if official Rwandan historiography—or national hagiography—has arbitrarily cut Rwanda off from neighboring areas and treated “Rwanda” as a historical island, it behooves historians to reexamine the record and to explore these broader linkages.<sup>67</sup> To do so would represent more accurately the lived experience of Rwandan non-elites.

In addition to regional and cross-border dimensions to the history of the people of Rwanda, the remaining three related themes have been neglected as well. One is the issue of labor—curiously so, since one of the attractions of Rwanda to the colonial strategists was as a convenient labor pool for the mines in Katanga, the

<sup>66</sup> For precolonial examples of such interactions from western Rwanda and their neglect (or ridicule) in conventional historiography, see D. Newbury, “Lake Kivu Trade”; D. Newbury, “Bunyabungo”; Pagès, *Un royaume hamite*, 543–701; Nyagahene, “Les attitudes économiques et commerciales du Kinyaga”; Birhakaheka and Kirhero, “Nyangezi”; Chubaka Bishikwabo, “Histoire d’un état Shi en Afrique des Grands Lacs: Kaziba au Zaïre” (PhD dissertation, Louvain la Neuve, 1982).

<sup>67</sup> In part, the perpetuation of this insular character of official historiography comes from the colonial administrative traditions and postcolonial academic constructs. On the one hand, a language barrier separated Rwandan historians from East African scholarship, and the gap between Anglophone and Francophone traditions was reflected in different intellectual traditions, as well as simply in language. Furthermore, to the west, despite Belgian over-rule in each territory, as a League of Nations mandated territory and later a UN Trust Territory, Rwanda was administratively distinct from the Congo; indeed, Belgian administrators in Rwanda were not posted to the Congo. Consequently, Rwandan administrators and government personnel (Africans as well as expatriates) came to see themselves as culturally distinct from areas to their west (in the Congo) as well as to their east and north (Tanganyika and Uganda: British territories). Such perceptions drew attention away from the strong and lasting cultural connections between peoples within Rwandan state boundaries and others to their west, north, and east; colonial emphasis on the autonomy of Rwanda was reflected in the historiography as well.



European plantations in Kivu, and the production of cash crops from Rwanda. But what was justification for Belgian acquisition of colonial territory became invisible in Belgian representation of their rule. Rather than publicizing labor policy as part of the civilizing mission, colonial representation shrouded such policies with the veil of "traditional obligation."<sup>68</sup> Official historiographies—premised on the presence of an atavistic "feudal state"—emphasized clientship, especially *ubuhake* cattle clientship, as the essential mode of mobilizing labor. Rather than a form of forced labor, *ubuhake* was presented as based on "the premise of inequality," as a voluntary, benign institution—in which a client freely offered his labor in return for the usufruct of a cow; colonial apologists, reflecting royal court ideology, claimed that this incorporated the poor and bound Rwanda into a single social unit, transcending ethnic differences.<sup>69</sup> To structural-functionalist anthropologists, the beauty of this interpretation was that, as portrayed in this form, clientship appeared to resolve a fundamental contradiction in colonial thinking: that Rwanda was seen, on the one hand, as a single enduring, coherent society and, on the other, as a "caste" society, characterized by permanent, unchanging, cultural and racial differences. This portrayal reinforced the distinctions between ethnic categories while binding them together. In other words, the power of clientship preserved simultaneously two competing concepts of "tribe"—one applied to the "culture" as a whole, the other applied to an "ethnic" group alone. Within the anthropological discourse on *ubuhake*, these two coexisted.

Research since Rwanda's independence, however, has clearly established the ideological nature of such a vision.<sup>70</sup> These studies show that clientship was frequently driven by considerations of power: the "protection" received by the weak was often protection against the outright expropriation of their existing cattle—and sometimes of their personal safety as well. The "voluntary" aspect of this relationship, therefore, often consisted of a choice between losing one's life or losing control over one's labor. Furthermore, clientship evolved among many complex forms and was contextually defined: practices changed according to changing power relationships. Whereas formerly, cattle clientship was seen as the

<sup>68</sup> C. Newbury, "Ubureetwa and Thangata."

<sup>69</sup> De Lager, *Le Ruanda*, 50–55; Kagame, *Abrégé*, 1: 28–30; and especially Maquet, *Premise of Inequality*, 129–73. Maquet's interpretations were widely diffused to Anglophone anthropologists and others through the writings of Lucy Mair. See Mair, *Primitive Government* (Harmondsworth, 1962); Mair, *African Societies* (Cambridge, 1974), 166–81; and Mair, *African Kingdoms* (Oxford, 1977).

<sup>70</sup> The assumptions of court hegemony about clientship were challenged first by Codere, "Power in Rwanda." Codere's critique was then followed up by Vidal, "Le Rwanda des anthropologues ou le fétichisme de la vache"; and Claudine Vidal, "Economie de la société féodale Rwandaise," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 14 (1974): 52–74. Other studies that, like Vidal's, show clientship as ultimately embedded in political process and that trace the evolution of multiple forms of clientship and their interrelationships over time include C. Newbury, "Deux lineages"; C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 73–147; Gravel, *Remera*, 170–85; Joseph Rwabukumba and Vincent Mudandagizi, "Les formes historiques de la dépendance personnelle dans l'Etat rwandais," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 14 (1974): 6–25; Nkurikiyimfura, *Le gros bétail*. Some forms of voluntary clientship and friendship ties were present, of course, but they were not the only forms—indeed, not the predominant forms in Rwanda during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In particular, it is useful to distinguish *ubuhake* forms from *ubugabire* forms of clientship found in Burundi and elsewhere in the region; see, for example, Albert A. Trouwborst, "L'organisation politique et l'accord de clientèle au Burundi," *Anthropologica*, n.s., 4 (1962): 9–43; Adrien Ndikuriyo, "Contrats de bétail, contrats de clientèle, et pouvoir politique dans le Bututsi à la fin du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Etudes d'histoire africaine* 7 (1975): 59–76.



social glue connecting different classes and ethnic groups, the new data showed clientship to be a much more diverse phenomenon, with cattle clientship less important than land clientship in many areas.

Several factors emerged from postcolonial research that challenged the orthodox view of *ubuhake*, the iconic form of cattle clientship.<sup>71</sup> *Ubuha* clientship was infrequent in the precolonial period, not widespread—and certainly not universal—as the conventional understanding asserted. For example, at the end of the nineteenth century, at the height of precolonial state institutions, only 8 percent of family heads were involved in *ubuhake* ties at any time in their lives, according to a careful study carried out in south-central Rwanda, near the cultural heartland of the kingdom. Far from being universal, *ubuhake* was of very limited extent. Furthermore, according to the precepts of “modernization theory,” during colonial rule, as individuals are released from the responsibilities placed on them by archaic institutions, “feudal” institutions such as clientship would be expected to diminish in their extent. Yet the data suggest something else: over the first generation of colonial rule, *ubuhake* ties in this sample actually increased, almost doubling the percentage of family heads involved; therefore, clientship appears to have been extended and reinforced by colonial power. Finally, rather than serving to link Hutu and Tutsi in “voluntary” association, and thus binding ethnic groups, clientship ties in this area were primarily contracted among Tutsi with political positions: in empirical terms, *ubuhake* appears more important as an alliance among political elites than as a mechanism that brought all people into the political system. In light of these data, the conventional view of cattle clientship as a pervasive and voluntary form of “social glue” is untenable. It presumes as universal within Rwandan society an acceptance of the ideology of the central court—the “premise of inequality,” whereby clients willingly accepted subservience. We now know, instead, that such subservience commonly resulted from the routine use of political power on the part of the elites.

The ideology of clientship was so powerful that other forms of labor control were often not explored, even while recognized.<sup>72</sup> Yet labor relations extended far beyond clientship forms; they were tied to state power, to land access, to mobility factors, to local power relations, to the politics of kinship, and to power relations

<sup>71</sup> The case study from which these conclusions emerge is found in Jean-François Saucier, “The Patron-Client Relationship in Traditional and Contemporary Rwanda” (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1974). For an elaboration, see de Lame, *Une colline*, 223–25, 236–41. De Lame makes the important point that in Rwandan culture (now as in the past), there are diverse ways to obtain cattle outside the institution of *ubuhake*. She also shows (pp. 226–27) that in the local area she studied in the late 1980s, more than 50 percent of Hutu households had one or more cows, while only about 33 percent of Tutsi households had cattle. Those with the largest number of cattle (five to nine) were the “modern elites”—merchants or people with a salary.

<sup>72</sup> Some works that refer to labor issues include Codere, *Biography*; Philippe Leurquin, *Le niveau de vie des populations rurales du Ruanda-Urundi* (Paris, 1960); Audrey Richards, *Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labor in Uganda* (Cambridge, 1956); Belgium, Gouvernement Belge, *Rapport présenté par le gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Sociétés des Nations au sujet de l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi, 1924–1937* (Geneva, 1925–38); Belgium, Gouvernement Belge, Ministère des Colonies/Ministère du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, *Rapport présenté par le Gouvernement Belge au conseil de Tutelle des Nations Unies sur l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi, 1948–1959* (Brussels, 1949–60). A literary treatment of labor is found in Saverio Nyagiziki, *Mes trances à trente ans*, Vol. 2: *De mal en pis: Histoire vécue, mêlée de roman* (Astrida [Butare], 1955). For a scholarly study that did address labor issues, see Vidal, “Economie de la société féodale.”

within the residential unit: drought, commercial opportunities, marriage relations, and health all had an effect on labor. So did religion. Religious units sometimes had shared work patterns, and religious celebration was often seen as withdrawal of labor. One such incident occurred with the emergence in the mid-1920s of a cult for young women on the shores of Lake Mohazi. Although described as a process of celebrating the spirits of the lake, and as a means of assuring the later fertility of the women involved, it was opposed by many of the chiefs, since it had the effect of withdrawing labor from the chiefs' fields.<sup>73</sup> Labor was gendered in other ways as well. Men were drawn away on forced labor for portage (before the 1930s), for work on communal fields, for required cultivation, and by recruitment for mines and plantations. These various forms of male labor requisition of course meant added burdens on women for domestic production.<sup>74</sup>

Yet Rwandan historiography has virtually ignored gender issues—a fourth neglected theme of the literature.<sup>75</sup> An illustrative case is coffee production, the preeminent colonial crop that by the end of the 1950s represented more than 70 percent of the export earnings for Ruanda-Urundi.<sup>76</sup> Of the work that went into coffee production, 70 percent fell to women, by one postcolonial estimate.<sup>77</sup> But labor was gendered by exclusion as well as by inclusive demands: many Rwandan men left to work in the Congo and Uganda, sometimes for long periods of time; in their absence, all the burdens of agricultural work, including required crop cultivation and sometimes even *corvée* labor, fell to the wives left behind.<sup>78</sup> Yet domestic labor relations are one of the most “naturalized” of social functions; because these gender relations are portrayed as “normal,” the emphasis on state power obscures the political nature of such contradictory power contexts and economic fields of force.<sup>79</sup> “Official” histories of Rwanda have left labor relations to languish behind the veils of clientship, “development,” and the domestic domain, and historians have failed to bring gender into labor issues. Furthermore, just as labor is tied to gender issues, it is also tied to the question of borders and the concept of “insular Rwanda.” Large numbers of Rwandans were involved in quasi-capitalist labor relations, over long periods of time, in Uganda, Tanganyika,

<sup>73</sup> Des Forges, “Defeat Is the Only Bad News,” 340–42.

<sup>74</sup> Many testimonies in Codere, *Biography*, illustrate this. Also, C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 169. Our own interviews confirm this for eastern Rwanda.

<sup>75</sup> Some exceptions on postcolonial agrarian issues include Pierre Kabagabo, “Les programmes agricoles et la contribution de la femme,” *Session d'étude et d'information des cadres de l'action sociale tenue à Butare du 10 au 26 janvier 1966* (Kigali, 1966); Charles Ntakirutimana, “La femme rwandaise: Purgatoire ou libération?” *Le diaspason* 11 (1976): 63–68; Charles Ntampaka, “L'égalité de l'homme et de la femme dans la société rwandaise,” *Le diaspason* 11 (1977): 51–57; Odette Ubonabenshi, “Femme rurale et développement du pays,” *Dialogue* 133 (1989): 25–36.

<sup>76</sup> Gouvernement Belge, Ministère des Colonies, l'Office de l'information et des relations publiques pour le Congo belge et le Ruanda-Urundi, *Le Ruanda-Urundi* (Brussels, 1959), 253.

<sup>77</sup> United Nations Development Programme, *Rural Women's Participation in Development*, Evaluation Study no. 3 (New York, 1980), 81. Similarly for tea production, see Joseph Laure, *Des vivres ou du thé? L'alimentation et les conditions de vie de familles rwandaises* (Paris, 1986).

<sup>78</sup> On women forced to do *corvée* in the absence of their husbands, see C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 176–77; our interviews elsewhere in Rwanda confirm this pattern, as infrequent but not unknown. On the prevalence of work abroad, see also Codere, *Biography*.

<sup>79</sup> For an analogous case in Tanzania of state power reinforcing gender hierarchy, see Marjorie Mbilinyi, “Runaway Wives in Colonial Tanganyika—Forced Labor and Forced Marriage in Rungwe District, 1919–1961,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 16 (1988): 1–29.



Forced labor in colonial Rwanda. Church Missionary Society. Copyright Africa-Museum Tervuren (Belgium).

and the Congo.<sup>80</sup> But this occurred outside the boundaries of the Rwandan state; thus, though wage labor was in many cases a formative experience for Rwandan men, it tended to be excluded from “Rwandan” history because it was experienced outside the territorial domain. Once again, Rwandan history was misleadingly limited to the state boundaries.

Finally, the theme of ecology is as neglected as it is important in Rwandan history, for many of the same reasons noted above: the belief that Rwanda was a “homogeneous country,” that regions were not important, that state initiatives were the preeminent feature of Rwandan history, that the history of the country was embedded in the history of the royal court, and that colonial and postcolonial “development” progressively brought under control the capricious natural forces of the peasant’s world. Yet a great deal of colonial documentation was given over to such capricious forces, and, contrary to the official discourse, the major bulwark against ecological disaster was not the state—which over time extracted resources and expropriated pasture—but the knowledge and abilities of the peasants themselves. For the people of Rwanda, one defense against natural disasters was mobility—their access to different internal ecologies and their willingness to migrate across international boundaries, despite the vigorous attempts of the state to control such movement.<sup>81</sup> Official histories from the colonial period celebrated the required cultivation of “famine crops” (such as manioc), and indeed, these were important.<sup>82</sup> However, these same histories also systematically effaced (or misinterpreted) rural initiatives addressing ecological crises, since such initiatives (flight, cultivating marshes, killing livestock) were often seen as a threat to administrative control—especially by local (Rwandan) administrative elites; on the other hand, required cultivation, especially forced cultivation, could directly benefit these elites, who sometimes redirected such labor to their own benefit.

Understanding peasant ecology demands much more than describing the suffering experienced under dramatic crises or detailing the application of exogenous technology to rural production. Yet these were the major ways it entered colonial discourse. In Rwanda as elsewhere in Africa, colonial documentation privileged technical subjects such as climatological conditions, the suitability of different crops, and the carrying capacity of the land.<sup>83</sup> The dominant view of rural areas

<sup>80</sup> Richards, *Economic Development and Tribal Change*; Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Des sédentaires devenues migrants: Les motifs des départs des Barundi et des Rwandais vers l’Uganda,” *Cultures et développement* 10 (1978): 71–101; D. Newbury, “Rwakayihura Famine”; C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, chap. 8; Jim Freedman, “East African Peasants and Capitalist Development: The Kiga of Northern Rwanda,” in David H. Turner and Gavin Smith, eds., *Challenging Anthropology* (New York, 1979), 245–60.

<sup>81</sup> On rural responses to famine: Reisdorff, “Enquêtes foncières”; Chrétien, “Des sédentaires devenus migrants”; D. Newbury, “Rwakayihura Famine”; Anne Cornet, “Histoire d’une famine: Rwanda 1924–1930,” *Enquêtes et documents africains* 13 (1996); Leurquin, *Le niveau de vie*, 31–32.

<sup>82</sup> A revealing commentary by Jean Paul Harroy (the highest administrative official of Ruanda-Urundi during the late 1950s) glorifies the role of the state in reconfiguring rural production. See Bonaventure Habimana and Jean-Paul Harroy, “Instauration et abrogation des cultures vivrières obligatoires au Rwanda,” *Civilisations* 30 (1980): 33–66. But Leurquin, who worked in rural areas at the very time of Harroy’s administration, notes that in one “experiment,” it was announced that a community was allowed to plant what they wished; immediately, the fields of manioc (required cultivation) disappeared, after, he added, “30 years of ‘cultures éducatives’” (i.e., forced crops). *Le niveau de vie*, 72.

<sup>83</sup> See E. Everaerts, “Monographie agricole du Ruanda-Urundi,” *Bulletin agricole du Congo Belge* 30



assumed that poverty derived from problems of climate, soils, illness, and “la mentalité paysanne,” with rural producers characterized as ignorant or indolent. Therefore, solutions to poverty were also posed as technical—terracing, culling cattle, draining swamps for cultivation, or requiring the cultivation of “famine crops”—with little discussion of confrontation, conflict, or struggle in the countryside; politics and power were almost entirely absent.<sup>84</sup>

To be sure, under some circumstances, rural producers recognized the benefits of communal labor.<sup>85</sup> Nonetheless, resistance formed around the forced implementation of communal labor by chiefs or agents who often bent these colonial demands to their own advantage. Moreover, colonial demands often diverted labor from consumption crop production. Issues relating to struggles over the “commons” were also important.<sup>86</sup> These included access to pasture, deciding whose cattle were to be culled, rights to the resources of communal forests, and claims to farmland formed from swamps drained with communal labor. The peasants saw these as political impositions, not technical innovations, and many of these requirements worked against rural production patterns; what the state saw as simply “technical” issues, therefore, rural producers saw as eminently political. Technical rural studies often recognized many of these issues; what they failed to account for were the peasants who silently lined the roads in the late 1950s at the time of UN Trusteeship Council Visiting Missions, holding placards that read “Our Fields, If You Please!” (NOS CHAMPS S.V.P.!). Theirs were the political voices suppressed by the “anti-politics machine” of statistical tables.<sup>87</sup> And their placards—indeed, the entire rural effervescence associated with the “Rwandan Revolution”—prompted historians to

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(1939): 343–96, 581–663; and the annual reports of the Belgian government to the League of Nations and the United Nations. The viewpoints are epitomized in the report by the Belgian Ministère des Colonies, *Plan décennal pour le développement économique et social du Ruanda-Urundi* (Brussels, 1951).

<sup>84</sup> In this regard, Belgian agrarian policies in colonial Rwanda foreshadowed the kind of “development” strategies analyzed by James Ferguson in *The Anti-Politics Machine*, in which local knowledge is excised in the name of technical expertise. A particularly telling critique of state-centered planning based on “high-modernist ideology” is found in James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, Conn., 1998). For additional recent critiques of development discourses, see Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); Escobar, *Encountering Development*; Jonathan Crush, ed., *Power of Development* (New York, 1995). On Rwanda, see Lemarchand, “World Bank in Rwanda.”

<sup>85</sup> Leurquin notes that, when it was seen to be “in their proper interest,” communities had often undertaken unpaid collective work projects, such as constructing irrigation networks (“over considerable distances, traversing ravines in hollowed-out logs”), building bridges (sometimes using bricks made by public labor), and draining swamps. *Le niveau de vie*, 74. It would appear, therefore, that it was the forced nature of the work (and the question of to whom benefits accrued), not the work itself, that was opposed.

<sup>86</sup> The classic statement is Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” *Science* 162 (1968): 1243–48. However, for a devastating critique of such thinking applied to Africa, see Pauline Peters, *Dividing the Commons: Politics, Policy and Culture in Botswana* (Charlottesville, Va., 1994). For an introduction to a wider literature on the struggle for the commons, see preeminently E. P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters* (New York, 1975).

<sup>87</sup> For Tanzania, similar reactions are brought out in Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals*. For southern Africa, see, for example, William Beinart, “The Politics of Colonial Conservation,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15 (1989): 143–62; and William Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900–1960,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11 (1984): 52–83; Ian Phimister, “Discourse and the Discipline of Historical Context: Conservationism and Ideas about Development in Southern Rhodesia, 1930–1950,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 12 (1986): 263–75; Richard Grove, “Scottish Missionaries, Evangelical Discourses and the Origins of





Awaiting a UN delegation in the late 1950s, Rwandans protest in front of terraced fields. The placard on the left reads, "Our Fields, If You Please!" (NOS CHAMPS, S.V.P.!). In the center, the placard states, "Down with Tutsi colonialism. Democracy first, independence will follow. No immediate independence." (À BAS LE COLONIALISME TUTSI. DÉMOCRATIE D'ABORD, INDÉPENDANCE VIENDRA. À BAS L'INDÉPENDANCE IMMÉDIATE.) The placard to the right says, "Long live Rwanda, long live Belgium, long live the ONU." (VIVE LE RWANDA! VIVE LA BELGIQUE! VEVE [sic] L'ONU!) Copyright Africa-Museum Tervuren (Belgium).

revisit the available documentation, rereading it in a way that challenged the power of centrist history.

MANY OF THE POSTCOLONIAL SOURCES mentioned earlier were valuable not only for their critique of colonial historiography but also for opening possibilities for a new historiography—one that is inclusive of rural dynamics as well as state initiatives.<sup>88</sup> The lacunae of the historiography stemmed from the neglect of voices and sources that did not conform to the hegemonic vision. Such sources did indeed exist (as we discuss below), but the possibilities of exploring rural agency were not always seized upon. Therefore, the challenge to historians today is to draw from these sources an understanding of rural conditions, reading against the grain of statist assumptions and assessing the interaction of local initiatives with state policy. But to date, that

Conservation Thinking in Southern Africa, 1820–1900," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15 (1989): 163–87.

<sup>88</sup> These approaches were indicated in Bishikwabo and Newbury, "Recent Research."

has seldom been attempted. Because colonial documentation on rural areas was often of a technical, scientific nature, such sources have been almost entirely marginalized when drawn on by historians; at best, only bits and pieces have been utilized, and even then, this has been done in such a way as not to threaten the hegemonic contours of the dominant state paradigms. Consequently, in portraying rural issues, centrist assumptions were retained in a manner analogous to the way Alexis Kagame had mediated between local histories and central court hegemony in the context of political history.

However, recent studies of rural Rwanda have given greater prominence to local agency and to the particularities of rural communities.<sup>89</sup> Transitional in this regard was Philippe Leurquin's inquiry into rural living standards in Rwanda and Burundi during the mid-1950s.<sup>90</sup> Nonetheless, while this study broke through the separation of court and countryside, Leurquin's approach still preserved the characteristics of colonial discourse; as a "scientist," he avoided direct discussion of politics and rural class relations. Yet the empirical content of his study raised important questions and provided valuable data on rural poverty. For example, establishing that the principal variables in wealth were urban/rural, this work challenged colonial assumptions of ethnicity: Leurquin's data showed no significant differences between rural Hutu and Tutsi in income and access to food.<sup>91</sup> Tutsi households had slightly more access to cattle than Hutu, in part because of more frequent Tutsi ties to an urban population, and thus greater off-farm resources. But other differences were minor. No longer, concluded Leurquin, could one assume that all Tutsi were wealthy cattleowners, and all Hutu poor agriculturalists. To be sure, writing in the 1950s, Leurquin still operated within a mental framework of viewing Hutu and Tutsi as distinct but internally homogeneous groups—a thought pattern itself a product of colonial ideology. But this colonialist assumption in his work only lent greater credibility to his statistical findings, which cut against the grain of such thought paradigms; Leurquin's data disproved the centrist assumptions that royal aristocrats represented all Tutsi.

Leurquin's data on coffee production also made it possible to link rural economics to larger historiographical issues. Noting the huge expansion of coffee cultivation (some 62 million coffee trees had been planted in Ruanda-Urundi by the end of 1957), Leurquin argued that coffee production brought favorable returns to peasants. But even while praising the role of the state as an "entrepreneur," he deplored the high social cost of the way coffee cultivation had been expanded—by force.<sup>92</sup> Leurquin's study did not directly relate either to the history of agricultural production or to the rural politics of the 1950s, and thus he did not detail the constraints imposed along with coffee. But he raised the issue. Coffee growers were compelled to tend their trees according to prescribed rules and procedures—

<sup>89</sup> Gravel, *Remera*; C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*; D. Newbury, "Rwakayihura Famine"; de Lame, *Une colline*.

<sup>90</sup> Leurquin based his analyses on data collected from 1,240 households in central and southwest Rwanda and north-central Burundi over 12 months (1955–1956). Because of the difficulty of measuring "production," he focused his study on household budgets and food consumed: Leurquin, *Le niveau de vie*, 112, 131–34, 203–05, 209.

<sup>91</sup> Leurquin, *Le niveau de vie*, 204.

<sup>92</sup> Leurquin, *Le niveau de vie*, 75.

pruning, spraying, and mulching the trees at fixed intervals. More important, interplanting food crops among coffee trees was prohibited. By documenting the nature of state intervention in rural areas, Leurquin's writing unintentionally tied the technical aspect of state involvement to peasant political protest, which emerged in the late 1950s. From this technical document, there emerged an interpretation of political causality that transcended purely ethnic explanations.

Later work explored more directly the connection between forced production and rural politicization. On the basis of research carried out in the late 1970s, Learthen Dorsey argued that the colonial state penetrated into rural Rwandan society primarily through its policies of forced cultivation, including those for cash crops (predominantly coffee).<sup>93</sup> Rather than responding to the crisis of the rural areas, this argument suggests, the state was in fact part of this crisis. And although Dorsey omits agency and does not discuss peasant political action in depth, his work lays the foundation for understanding the grievances that led to such action. In its timing and significance, state penetration differed by region, and the effects of these policies varied by gender.<sup>94</sup> Nonetheless, such an analysis places the state directly in the production process.

The data derived from Leurquin and Dorsey suggest that ethnicity was not the primary causal factor of rural class differences. Data from other regional studies in Rwanda also subvert these earlier assumptions and reverse the cause-effect relationships. They indicate that, rather than resulting from "ethnic" differences, rural class differentiation preceded and served as a catalyst for ethnic identity. Economic insecurities, therefore, contributed to political mobilization along ethnic lines. Incorporating rural experiences and "bringing the peasants back in" to thinking on Rwandan history leads historians to read more broadly and thus to transcend the flawed conventions of statist historiography. In short, it helps provide more accurate historical explanation.

The 1950s were a turbulent time in Rwanda, and this turbulence forms another significant gap in the historiography—even more so as many post-genocide studies seemed to revert to colonial assumptions that the principal, indeed the only, factor of change was colonial power. They therefore tend to attribute the revolution of

<sup>93</sup> Learthen Dorsey, "The Rwandan Colonial Economy, 1916–1941" (PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, 1983).

<sup>94</sup> For differential tax rates by region during the early colonial period, see C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 172–74. Leurquin, *Le niveau de vie*, 251, notes that under colonial requirements, many men's tasks had been reduced, but women's tasks had increased. This was general to colonial work patterns in Africa. On gender and production patterns elsewhere in Africa, see (from an extensive literature) Janet Bujra, "Urging Women to Redouble Their Efforts: Class, Gender, and Capitalist Transformation in Africa," in Claire Robertson and Iris Berger, eds., *Women and Class in Africa* (New York, 1986), 117–40; Jane Parpart, "Women and the State in Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., *The Precarious Balance* (Boulder, Colo., 1988), 208–30; Jeanne Koopman, "Women and the Rural Economy: Past, Present, and Future," in Margaret Jean Hay and Sharon Stichter, eds., *African Women South of the Sahara*, 2d edn. (New York, 1995), 3–22; Iris Berger and E. Frances White, eds., *Women in Sub-Saharan Africa: Restoring Women to History* (Bloomington, Ind., 1999); Marcia Wright, "Technology, Marriage and Women's Work in the History of Maize Growers in Mazabuka, Zambia: A Reconnaissance," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 10 (1983): 71–85; Maud Shimwaayi Munteмба, "Women and Agricultural Change in the Railway Region of Zambia: Dispossession and Counterstrategies, 1930–1970," in Edna Bay, ed., *Women and Work in Africa* (Boulder, 1982), 83–103. See also the contributions to the symposium "Women, Family, State, and Economy in Africa," Bolanle Awe, Susan Geiger, and Nina Mba, eds., *Signs* 16 (1991).

1959–1961 exclusively to Belgian conniving. To be sure, Belgian policies were important. But they did not act in a vacuum; they were often responses to internal peasant grievances. By ignoring the rural experiences of late colonial rule and by effacing peasant political initiatives, such histories align themselves with a long pattern of earlier historiography. In doing so, they distort the historical record, for the late 1950s was a time of political ferment. Hutu activists and Tutsi progressives—those who sought alliances across ethnic lines—called for changes in the exploitative practices of the central court authorities. They advocated measures to address problems of poverty, inequality, insecure access to land, inadequate opportunities for education, and issues facing youth.<sup>95</sup> While Leurquin and Dorsey do not address these conflicts and debates directly, their studies nonetheless provide material that helps explain why the rural areas witnessed so much unrest during this period. Works like these provided an understanding of neglected rural realities; recent analyses have built on these insights, exploring the synergies linking material culture, political economy, and postcolonial crises.

FOR STUDIES FOCUSING ON THE POSTCOLONIAL PERIOD, scholarly discourses on rural Rwandans shifted from conventional historiographical concerns to “development studies.” The former had often privileged political features at the expense of economic features; the latter often privileged economic factors to the exclusion of political aspects. These temporal differences mirrored the sectoral distinctions of earlier writings. There, rural studies omitted politics, and political studies omitted rural actors, privileging agency associated with the central court. But exploring the roots of Rwanda’s postcolonial crisis forces an examination of rural politics and a reconsideration of colonial and precolonial relationships to include local agency as well as central court actors.

For these purposes, technical studies of the type Leurquin produced, though valuable, were timid. They were poor substitutes for ecological and agrarian understanding. More recent work has set out a new model, relating ecology to political constraints, conscious human activities, and the physical properties of a natural world itself in flux.<sup>96</sup> Jennifer Olson’s study of ecological processes in

<sup>95</sup> C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, and de Lame, *Une colline*, 45–79, detail the long-term evolution of rural grievances underlying the eventual transformations of 1959–1962. These aspects are brought out in other works as well: Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*; Donat Murego, *La révolution rwandaise* (Louvain, 1975); Linden and Linden, *Church and Revolution*; Reyntjens, *Pouvoir et droit*.

<sup>96</sup> There is a rapidly growing field of environmental history in Africa. Among many works, see for West Africa: James Fairhead and Melissa Leach, *Misreading the African Landscape* (London, 1993). For Central Africa: Robert Harms, *Games against Nature* (Cambridge, 1987). For East Africa: Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1977); and James Giblin, *The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeastern Tanzania, 1840–1940* (Philadelphia, 1992). For southern Africa: William Beinart and Peter Coates, *Environment and History* (London, 1995); Peters, *Dividing the Commons*; Elias Mandala, *Work and Control in a Peasant Economy: A History of the Lower Tchiri Valley of Malawi* (Madison, Wis., 1990); Terence Ranger, *Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History from the Matopos Hills* (Bloomington, Ind., 1999); and Megan Vaughan, *The Story of an African Famine* (Cambridge, 1987). For Africa more generally, see James C. McCann, *Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1999). Outside Africa, important early works of this type include William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York, 1983); Donald Worster, *Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas* (Cambridge, 1977); Donald Worster, ed., *The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern*



southern Rwanda provides an example.<sup>97</sup> Drawing on a “regional political ecology” framework, her work describes the intricacies of the agricultural system not in terms of abstractions, models, or norms but through specific economic activities and political relationships representative of many regions of Rwanda. She summarizes agrarian processes in terms of energy transfer between three fields of activity: uncropped fields served as pasturage, manure from cattle served as fertilizer in the cropped fields closer to the homestead, and the remains of food preparation went to the banana groves immediately surrounding the residence. In short, cattle and cultigens went together, as nutrients and energy were moved progressively from outlying areas to the homestead.

A mixed economy was essential to rural production.<sup>98</sup> But these features were susceptible to a variety of political forces. Policies of the European colonial state affected both labor and land issues. In many cases, Rwandan authorities, delegated by the central court but acting under colonial protection, influenced access to land, ownership of cattle, and domestic decisions over labor. And the policies of the postcolonial state continued to make farming families dependent on off-farm income in fragile economic circumstances.<sup>99</sup>

Colonial policies treated ecological issues as a series of discrete problems extracted from the larger agrarian context, and thus failed to address larger ecological relationships. When “overgrazing” was identified as a problem, draconian measures were taken to reduce cattle. When “idle” land was put into production or claimed by the state, this reduced other forms of land use: fallow, pasture, and sources of cut grass; when colonial officials assumed that rural people were underemployed, labor was drawn off for colonial projects. However, such policies were often carried out without regard to local equity. Each of these policies (culling cattle, reducing green manure, and extracting labor) threatened rural

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*Environmental History* (Cambridge, 1988); David Arnold, *The Problem of Nature* (Oxford, 1995); Richard Grove, *Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600–1860* (Cambridge, 1995); Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe* (Cambridge, 1986).

<sup>97</sup> Jennifer Olson, “Farmer Responses to Land Degradation in Gikongoro, Rwanda” (PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, 1994), 80. Although Olson’s work was carried out in southern Rwanda, her conclusions are independently confirmed for northwest Rwanda: Catherine André and Jean-Philippe Platteau, “Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap,” *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 34 (1998): 1–47. Elsewhere in the region, similar conclusions emerge. For Bwisha, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: James Fairhead, “Fields of Struggle: Towards a Social History of Farming Knowledge and Practice in a Bwisha Community, Kivu, Zaire” (PhD dissertation, University of London, SOAS, 1990). For Burundi: Barnabé Ndarishikanye, “Des identités ethnico-politiques forgées dans la violence,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (in press); for Buhaya: Priscilla Reining, “Social Factors in Food Production in an East African Peasant Society: The Haya,” in Peter McLoughlin, ed., *African Food Production Systems* (Baltimore, 1970), 41–91; and Marion Pratt, “Women Who Eat Men’s Money: Ecology, Culture, Gender Relations, and the Fishing Economy on the Western Shore of Lake Victoria” (PhD dissertation, State University of New York, Binghamton, 1995).

<sup>98</sup> Cattle have been present in Rwanda for more than 2,000 years and cultivation for more than 1,500—long preceding the attributed migrations of contemporary social categories. David Schoenbrun, *A Green Place, a Good Place: Agrarian Change, Gender, and Social Identity in the Great Lakes Region* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1998); David Schoenbrun, “We Are What We Eat: Ancient Agriculture between the Great Lakes,” *Journal of African History* 34 (1993): 1–31.

<sup>99</sup> Pottier, “Three’s a Crowd”; Olson, “Farmer Responses,” 125.



capacities to continue the energy transfers on which agrarian production was dependent.

Of these elements, labor demands were crucial. As we have indicated, labor was drawn off at a high rate, for the colonial state system in Rwanda was based on coerced labor: for portage, road construction, plantation or mine recruitment, “communal” (often chiefs’) fields, “traditional” work for chiefly authorities, and required cultivation. One spectacular demand for labor was terracing—by 1960, the colonial government estimated that 439,000 kilometers of erosion ditches (terracing) had been constructed, enough terracing in this tiny country to circle the globe eleven times; Leurquin estimated that, under the optimistic assumption that each person dug 10 meters of ditch a day, work associated with constructing and maintaining these ditches accounted for over 55 million work days. Other colonial policies—each one justified on its own technical terms—also intervened in the agricultural system. Burning fields was outlawed, complicating the maintenance of pasturage. Forced crops meant that cultivation spread to steeper slopes, aggravating erosion. Reforestation entailed planting eucalyptus trees, which, though quick to mature, were deleterious to the productive system: they draw off water, and the toxicity of their roots makes them unsuitable for intercropping. Productivity declined for many reasons, each “inconsequential” in itself—as cattle became scarce, labor was conscripted, fallow land decreased, new lands opened on steeper slopes, and mobility was reduced so that people no longer had access to valley or forest resources.

For the Gikongoro region, the contradictions of such policies became apparent during the famine of 1989–1990. A government report noted that, of those affected, 40 percent were in female-headed households (twice their proportion in the local population), 96 percent had farms of less than half a hectare, and 74 percent had less than one-quarter hectare.<sup>100</sup> Therefore, the report concluded, the famine was beyond the control of the government. To the peasants, however, increasing land inequalities and rising food costs were indeed a result of government policies. If poverty increased vulnerability to famine, then the government was deeply implicated. In peasants’ eyes, the state was denying its own responsibility in creating the preconditions for this disaster. This was another example of the contrast between statist perspectives and the views of those affected by state policy.

NOT UNTIL TWO DECADES AFTER INDEPENDENCE did academic researchers (Rwandan or expatriate) give much attention to peasants in postcolonial Rwanda.<sup>101</sup> To be sure, before the 1980s, technical reports by government agencies and donor-funded development projects provided information on the rural sector. But these tended to be focused on technical concerns rather than broader production processes within

<sup>100</sup> Olson, “Farmer Responses,” 141.

<sup>101</sup> For some exceptions, see Vidal, “Economie de la société féodale”; Victor Silvestre, “Différentiations socio-économiques dans une société à vocation égalitaire: Masaka dans le paysannat de l’Icyanya,” *Cahiers d’études africaines* 14 (1974): 104–69; Lydia Meschi, “Evolution des structures foncières au Rwanda: Le cas d’un lignage Hutu,” *Cahiers d’études africaines* 14 (1974): 39–51; Freedman, “East African Peasants.”

the rural political economy.<sup>102</sup> During the second half of the 1980s, however, Rwandan academics and intellectuals began to write openly about the difficult conditions faced by rural cultivators, the exploitative practices of merchants who purchased coffee and food from peasants, and the inadequacy of government programs to provide alternative markets for peasant production. Many such analyses were published in the Rwandan journal *Dialogue*, and these articles stimulated a lively debate among Rwandan intellectuals, sometimes joined by expatriates with long experience in the country.<sup>103</sup> By writing on such topics, Rwandan intellectuals identified the void in the earlier literature. They thus reminded others that Rwandan historiography is not some isolated domain. Instead, Rwanda's history over the 1990s reminds us that the political nature of writing history is intimately intertwined with the politics of the present.

However, behind the historiographical debate loomed economic crisis. Even as the government cut back on personnel and reduced social spending during the 1980s, the politically well-connected minority continued to build villas and lived a lifestyle modeled on that of the international jet set. Critics of such conspicuous consumption in the face of widespread poverty directed attention to a range of important issues. Prominent among them were the legal and cultural constraints to women's economic advancement, the excesses perpetrated by "moniteurs agricoles," and the general lack of peasant voices in the formulation and implementation of rural policies. Externally funded projects, which had proliferated during the Second Republic, also came under scrutiny. Rather than empowering rural producers, such programs, it was argued, benefited a small stratum of educated intermediaries, employees of the projects.<sup>104</sup>

Implicitly (but sometimes openly), these writings criticized the ideology of "planned liberalism," the approach to economic development adopted from the mid-1970s by President Juvénal Habyarimana's regime. This approach assumed that peasant living standards could be improved even while encouraging an unrestrained private sector and permitting rapid class differentiation. Yet the major sources of income for this privileged sector came from among peasant communities. Control over land, labor, transport, and local commerce—all tied to political power

<sup>102</sup> See, for example, République du Rwanda, *Résultats de l'enquête nationale agricole 1984* (Kigali, 1984).

<sup>103</sup> Some examples include Bernard Itangishaka, "Pour la défense du revenu du paysan," *Dialogue* 130 (1988): 26–36; Ubonabenshi, "Femme rurale et développement du pays"; Emmanuel Ntezimana, "Principes essentiels et conditions préalables à la démocratie," *Dialogue* 144 (1990): 33–49; Godding, "Grands projets et développement communal"; Pottier, "Politics of Famine Prevention"; Pottier, "Taking Stock"; Joachim Voss, "L'amélioration de la culture du haricot sur la base d'un diagnostic des contraintes de production, des pratiques et des potentiels des agriculteurs," in Augustin Nkundabashaka and Joachim Voss, eds., *Les projets de développement rural* (Butare, 1987), 37–46. As editor of *Kinyamateka* (the preeminent newspaper of Rwanda), the late André Sibomana contributed in important ways to these discussions; a peasant syndicate, Ingabo, was also catalyzed by these concerns. For an analysis of the debate over rural policies in Rwanda during the 1980s, see C. Newbury, "Recent Debates." On Sibomana, see André Sibomana, *Gardons espoir pour le Rwanda* (Paris, 1997); Hervé Deguine, *Rwanda: Enquête sur la mort d'André Sibomana* (Paris, 1998).

<sup>104</sup> André Sibomana was particularly eloquent on such issues; see C. Newbury, "Recent Debates," 208–12; on the effects of external aid projects, see Godding, "Foreign Aid as an Obstacle to Development"; Godding, "Grands projets et développement communal"; Lemarchand, "World Bank in Rwanda"; A. Hanssen, *Le désenchantement de la coopération: Enquête au pays des mille coopérants* (Paris, 1989).

constructs—were major sources of “wealth-generation” for the acquiring classes. In a 1985 article, Jean Rumiya, at the time a professor of history at the National University of Rwanda, analyzed the contradictory effects of planned liberalism. He acknowledged that the government could claim some positive results: Kigali, the capital, had grown significantly; paved roads had improved the transport system; the number of automobiles had increased; and the country was able to procure sufficient amounts of gasoline, construction materials, and food products. But few benefits from this growth reached the rural masses. And changes in values were creating a crisis in rural society. In the past, a man was considered wealthy if able to farm two hectares of land, own a bicycle and a radio, build a durable house, and provide education for his children. But in the mid-1980s,

with the appearance of fortunes acquired in the corridors of the administration and through trade . . . the symbols of wealth have changed: villa, automobile, bank account, salary, etc. . . . The prototype of the wealthy man is no longer the well-off peasant, respected by his peers, or the government official who returns to his hill, but the city dweller, preferably in Kigali, whose living standard attains an international level in the areas of leisure, transport, or lodging. This paradise has a strong attraction for youth . . . But in this type of competition, there are only a few winners.<sup>105</sup>

By arguing that government policies in postcolonial Rwanda had intensified rather than reduced social inequalities, Rumiya implicitly called into question an important pillar of the government's claim to legitimacy: such glaring inequalities belied the egalitarian ideals of the Rwandan Revolution of 1959–1962. A series of academic studies published in the second half of the 1980s proceeded to make this critique explicit. Writing in 1985 with reference to the First Republic, for example, Filip Reyntjens remarked: “Contrary to the egalitarian principles of the revolutionaries, the disparity between the revenues of politicians and peasants [after independence] was, and still is today, very great.” In his view, the disparity was probably no less than it had been under the prerevolutionary government. Nonetheless, such a situation “for a regime that came to power on the basis of support from the rural areas [was] serious.”<sup>106</sup>

Regional inequalities in the distribution of government development funds served as another focus of these critiques. Under Habyarimana's regime, Gitarama and Butare Prefectures in the center of the country (the political centers of the government overthrown by Habyarimana) saw the least government support; with about 20 percent of the country's population, they received about 1 percent of government funding. Furthermore, local administrators and the commercial class structures hindered peasant voices and the capacity of rural people to organize. André Guichaoua's research noted these trends and showed the extent to which strategic areas of economic and social life in the countryside (commercial outlets, agricultural supplies, consumer goods, credit, transport) were dominated by people outside the rural milieu (traders, absentee landlords, civil servants, and military

<sup>105</sup> Jean Rumiya, “Ruanda d'hier, Rwanda d'aujourd'hui,” *Vivant Univers* 357 (May–June 1985): 8.

<sup>106</sup> Reyntjens, *Pouvoir et droit*, 515.

personnel). The concentration of power and the polarization of wealth benefited only the elites in the capital.<sup>107</sup>

In a well-grounded economic analysis, Fernand Bézy issued a particularly scathing indictment. Citing the results of a government survey published in the mid-1980s, which estimated annual per capita expenditures for consumption among Rwanda's peasants at less than \$150 (U.S.), he condemned the "pauperization of peasants."<sup>108</sup> Writing in a prophetic vein in 1990, he argued that the problems were not just economic but political, with a risk of serious social conflict if current conditions continued. New approaches were needed, he concluded, to ensure food security for rural dwellers, protection from merchant exploitation, and the establishment of many small, labor-intensive industries in different regions of the country to provide employment and produce basic essentials. But achieving such a program would require nothing less than a reordering of current political structures, a "transformation of the society."<sup>109</sup> His advice went unheeded.

Critiques by Rwandan intellectuals and studies such as those of Guichaoua and Bézy delineated important facets of Rwanda's political economy in the 1980s. Combining economic analysis with sensitivity to power and politics, they showed how government policies, highly placed politicians, and others tied to the powerful were implicated in the reproduction of inequalities that permeated Rwandan society. But they were generalizing. A fuller portrait required more specific analysis of culture and consciousness, and a narrower focus on particular localities, to bring peasants back in to an understanding of the political and social processes of the state. A 1996 study by Danielle de Lame did just this, and demonstrated the value of such an approach. Focusing on a rural community in western Rwanda at the end of the 1980s, de Lame broadened the earlier concerns of Leurquin and others to include politics, gender, class relations, culture, conflict, and consciousness; she thus examined the local ramifications of the rural immiseration noted by analysts such as Bézy. By situating material process within the context of cultural values, she showed that dignity for rural dwellers is more than just a question of economic factors. Through the study of a single locale, her work revealed the strategies by which rural people tried to sustain culturally prescribed obligations, produce adequate food, and obtain an income sufficient to assure their children's well-being and their own participation in the community.<sup>110</sup> Sometimes, these requirements are very simple: salt, soap, decent clothing, and a new hoe; and even these were beyond the reach of some. But de Lame did not portray rural dwellers in Rwanda as an undifferentiated mass; delineating areas of both commonality and cleavage, she showed that rural immiseration did not affect all people equally. Access to products such as banana beer, for example, was unevenly distributed. Yet such access determined whether a peasant family could participate in customary circuits of exchange, marking processes of social inclusion and exclusion.<sup>111</sup>

While we cannot do justice here to the complexity of de Lame's comprehensive

<sup>107</sup> Guichaoua, *Destins paysans*, 1: 187.

<sup>108</sup> Fernand Bézy, *Rwanda, 1962–1989: Bilan socio-économique d'un régime* (Louvain, 1990), 32.

<sup>109</sup> Bézy, *Rwanda*, 54–56.

<sup>110</sup> De Lame, *Une colline*, esp. 297 and following.

<sup>111</sup> Vidal, "Questions sur le rôle des paysans," 339, also notes de Lame's attention to the economic diversity among peasants in Rwanda.

study, the conclusions are important. Despite the abundant literature on Rwanda, there are very few carefully grounded empirical studies that focus on the defined local community. De Lame's study does this. But it also does more, by showing how local dynamics were linked to larger issues. Society was in crisis, she suggested, because of the multiple tensions structuring rural social relationships, threatening cultural reproduction for many households.<sup>112</sup> Children sought income outside the home rather than working in parents' fields; young men and women found it increasingly difficult to acquire the requisite resources needed to marry; and money, education, or a salaried job (the paths to social mobility) were beyond the reach of most. These conditions had significant political ramifications. From 1988, de Lame observed many signs of the population distancing itself from the government—refusing to attend meetings called by the *bourgmestre*, not showing up for the hated communal labor, cutting down coffee trees. Many people openly expressed their class consciousness, using the word *umukungu* (rich person), for example, as a scathingly pejorative label for people they resented.<sup>113</sup>

Other recent work also illustrates the importance of addressing rural issues. Michelle Wagner analyzed the social preconditions to the political struggles that ravaged a community in southern Rwanda.<sup>114</sup> Catherine André and Jean-Philippe Platteau have shown the complex interaction of ecological factors with political violence in a community in northwestern Rwanda.<sup>115</sup> Timothy Longman delineated the diverse roles of churches and church leadership within the local politics leading to the genocide.<sup>116</sup> Focusing on rural producers, these studies all show the disastrous consequences of sharp changes in the economy of Rwanda at the end of the 1980s: the precipitous decline of the international commodity price for coffee, the famine that wracked central and southern Rwanda, the abrupt withdrawal of social services by the state, and the rapid erosion of legitimacy of the regime in

<sup>112</sup> On the character of increasing rural impoverishment elsewhere in Rwanda, see André and Platteau, "Land Relations under Unbearable Stress"; David Newbury, "Ecology and the Politics of Genocide: Rwanda 1994," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 22 (1999): 32–36; Olson, "Farmer Responses," chap. 5.

<sup>113</sup> De Lame, *Une colline*, 68.

<sup>114</sup> Michelle Wagner, "All the Bourgmestre's Men: Making Sense of Genocide in Rwanda," *Africa Today* 45 (1998): 25–36.

<sup>115</sup> André and Platteau, "Land Relations under Unbearable Stress." For another recent case study, see François Migeotte, *Une colline rwandaise à travers ses pratiques d'élevage* (Tervuren, 1997).

<sup>116</sup> Longman, "Christianity and Crisis in Rwanda"; Timothy Longman, "Genocide and Socio-Political Change: Massacres in Two Rwandan Villages," *Issue* 23 (1995): 18–21; Longman, "Empowering the Weak and Protecting the Powerful: The Contradictory Nature of Churches in Central Africa," *African Studies Review* 41 (1998): 49–72. Some of these issues regarding the roles of peasants in the genocide are discussed in Vidal, "Questions sur le rôle des paysans"; Danielle de Lame, "Ces années-là, les communautés rurales," intro. to François Migeotte, *Une colline rwandaise*, 9–23; de Lame, "Le génocide rwandais et le vaste monde, les liens de sang," in Stefaan Marysse and Filip Reyntjens, eds., *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 1996–97* (Paris, 1997), 157–77. For further scholarly analyses of the genocide and its ramifications, see (from a vast literature) Alison Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story": *Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, 1999); André Guichaoua, ed., *Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda, 1993–1994*, 2d edn. (Lille, 1995); René Lemarchand, "Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?" *African Studies Review* 41 (1998): 3–16; Uvin, *Aiding Violence*; Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 2d edn. (New York, 1997); Villia Jefremovas, "Contested Identities: Power and the Fictions of Ethnicity, Ethnography, and History in Rwanda," *Anthropologica* 39 (1997): 91–104; Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise*; Filip Reyntjens, *Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire* (Brussels, 1995); Jean-Claude Willame, *Aux sources de l'hécatombe rwandaise* (Brussels, 1995).



power. Such were the rural conditions that underlay the genocide;<sup>117</sup> they were neglected by historians, for the most part. But the genocide forces us to take notice; rural patterns of change provide an entry point for rethinking Rwandan history and Rwandan historiographies as well.

THIS SURVEY HAS HAD THREE GOALS. One was to provide familiarity with the conventional historiography of Rwanda—and with some of its lacunae and limitations. Another was to introduce work on rural areas and peasant realities, focusing on issues of inequality, agricultural productivity, and the crisis of reproduction. And a third was to suggest openings for future investigation, by which the literature on rural areas could be more effectively accommodated within historical paradigms. In the early years of the twentieth century, rural areas had been important to historians of Rwanda, and history used to be important to understanding rural areas. But today, these two are assumed to operate in different intellectual universes; peasants are barely visible in historians' scenarios, and history is barely audible within the discourses on rural society. We propose a reunion of these partners, too long separated: providing a rural dimension to conventional history and a historical dimension to rural studies, bringing politics into the understanding of peasants. "Social history" needs social actors as well as history, and it needs history as well as social actors.

In a country where 90 percent and more of the population is composed of rural producers, a focus on the peasantry brings people back into what has developed over the past sixty years as a history of institutions and ethnic categories. An analysis based on social agency would conform more closely to the empirical record. "Bringing the peasants back in" opens awareness to a range of new themes. It allows for cultural particularities and individual experience within Rwandan history. It encourages dialogue with other historiographies. It reinserts a critical dimension to understanding the nature of conflict—beyond simply "age-old" ethnic hostility and "tribal warfare."

However, considering broader social themes does not mean avoiding the topics that have served as the core of Rwandan historiography until now. If past history has focused exclusively on elites, the response is not to focus exclusively on peasants. Instead, one needs to incorporate peasants—to break down the separation of peasants from elites, not to reinforce such dichotomies. We are not arguing for the study of peasants in isolation but for the study of a Rwandan history that includes peasants. Bringing the peasants back in is not additive to Rwandan history,

<sup>117</sup> In several publications, we have tried to suggest that one cannot understand the genocide without understanding the political economy of Rwanda over the 1980s and 1990s, especially the complex social processes in operation in the rural areas. Catharine Newbury, "Background to Genocide in Rwanda," *Issue 23* (1995): 12–17; David Newbury, "Understanding Genocide," *African Studies Review* 41 (1998): 73–97; D. Newbury, "Ecology and the Politics of Genocide"; Catharine Newbury and David Newbury, "Death and Demos: Failed Democratization in Rwanda" (paper presented at the SSRC conference "Transitions in Africa: Violence and the Politics of Participation," Niamey, Niger, June 1996); Catharine Newbury and David Newbury, "A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views of Ethnicity and the Genocide in Rwanda," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (in press).

therefore, but transformative of Rwandan history. It forces us to revisit the conventional themes with a new vision.

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## Reviews of Books

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### METHODS/THEORY

DONALD R. KELLEY. *Faces of History: Historical Inquiry from Herodotus to Herder*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 340. Cloth \$37.50, paper \$17.00.

Carl Becker might have been speaking for thoughtful historians anywhere and anytime when he wrote in these same review pages over sixty years ago: "Now that I am old the most intriguing aspect of history turns out to be neither the study of history nor history itself but rather the study of the history of historical study" (*AHR* 44 [Oct. 1938]: 20). If Becker's extra-reflective turn of mind does not constitute the most urgent or visceral impulse for "everyman his (or her) own historian," his sage, ulterior perspective nevertheless remains salient and determinative of whatever we historians could possibly mean by invoking "true historical significance" and "longterm value." Judgments of this sort would be impossible or vacuous without just such an ulterior (but not ultimate) perspective provided by the history of history. It is a difficult, recursive vantage point that remains as rare and arduous as it is fundamental and indispensable.

It is a nearly stupendous feat to explore twenty-five centuries of Western historical practice in a vivid and coherent exposition. Donald R. Kelley's lucid study has accomplished this task quite convincingly and elegantly: it is amazingly synoptic, masterful, and thought-provoking, without lapsing into encyclopedic blandness or collapsing into its own fold-up Procrustean bed of overwrought theory. This truly impressive work might best be characterized as a kind of carefully crafted "metahistoriography"—a lucid yet impassioned rejoinder to Hayden White's "metahistory," along with all sorts of modern and postmodern relativisms of the first and second order.

Kelley affirms that there is an enduring "loose canon" of Western historical thought, which even hard-bitten deconstructive antinomians should be swayed to acknowledge. This porous tradition, extending from founding fathers through the eighteenth century, constitutes not so much a grand historiographical "metanarrative" (with fixed ground rules, deep ordering grammars, and pre-set cognitive competencies) as a polyvocal, multicultural "meta-interrogative"—a shifting set of major questions, which in

hindsight constitute a sustained conversation, albeit with major passages left out, distorted, or elided.

The author takes an erudite but robustly unpedantic view of this capacious historical tradition, whose internal complexities and short-comings he does not gloss over. Without intrusive theoretical teeth-grinding, Kelley sets out mindful of the interpretative predicament of all historians: most often we historians (including historians of historiography) are the outcome of what we are studying and we cannot aspire to any final fixity of original meaning, context, or audience. The work is philosophically informed (by the likes of Isaiah Berlin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reinhard Koselleck) in a deft, almost imperceptible manner, without wearing its theory on (or up) its sleeve.

The work's biographical framework qualifies it as historiography with a human face—a more lively and intensely focused successor to James Westfall Thompson, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Ernest Breisach. Kelley sets the stage with the predictable polar contrast between the two famous patriarchal progenitors, Herodotus and Thucydides, marking the inception of subsequent dialogue between reflective and pragmatic history, contemplation and action, impartiality and engagement. Subsequent chapters on medieval, Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment historiography are filled with new and perceptive insights, which stand forth in the elastic coherence of the larger tradition. The reader sees that the "discipline" of history has slowly and intermittently disengaged itself from myth, poetry, rhetoric, chronicle, philosophy, and more recently, the "harder" physical and proto-social sciences. Kelley sees in Western historiography not so much unilinear Whiggish progress as a multicultural and trans-epochal community of communication. In sum, the author offers among other bounties, a robust but even-tempered riposte to postmodern relativism and indeterminacy.

The reader will come to appreciate earlier incarnations—mostly long-forgotten—of more recent debates about perspectivity, linguisticity, textuality, and self-reflexivity in historical practice. The work offers compelling treatment of the long intellectual lineage behind the big "hands-on" working concepts of history, including the mainstays of purpose, meaning, reason, and cause. Without siding explicitly with the "an-

cients," Kelley is clearly disinclined to credit the more exorbitant modern claims of radical innovation in historical thinking. Indeed, many of the innovations of nineteenth-century and twentieth-century historical writing seem far less distinct when placed in their long-term development. Kelley punctures many of the modern parochialisms of both certitude and scepticism.

This work is obviously a labor of intense but tough-minded love over many years. Operating on several levels at once, it will stimulate specialists but will also serve as an eminently teachable classroom text for committed undergraduates. In conjunction with the author's companion anthology, *Versions of History from Antiquity to the Enlightenment* (1991), the present work offers a deftly compelling exposition of Western historical writing. One can only regret that the author apparently has no intention to press forward into the period of the "classical modern" history of the last two centuries. One could not ask for better preparation or a more stimulating guide.

MICHAEL ERMARTH  
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FRANCESCO BENIGNO. *Specchi della rivoluzione: Conflitto e identità politica nell'Europa moderna*. (Saggi: Storia e scienze sociali.) Rome: Donzilli Editore. 1999. Pp. xviii, 302. L. 38,000.

Historians examine revolutions by means of mirrors in which they commonly see themselves and the politics of their times. Only through disciplined effort can they sort out the reality of past crises from the illusions of self-perception. But they can do so. Thus reasoning, Francesco Benigno fills the space between a brief introduction and a briefer conclusion with four substantial essays on historiography concerning Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His topics are revisionism in views of the English and French Revolutions; the idea of a seventeenth-century crisis; the Fronde; and the Neapolitan rebellion of 1647–1648. The first two essays concentrate on summary and critique of competing positions. The second two move from criticism to rethinking of the events themselves. In snappy titles and energetic prose, Benigno provides clear judgments based on careful reading. An English translation would serve as a provocative text for many a course on early modern Europe.

Benigno wants to distance himself and his readers from two very different traps in the literature on his subjects: materialist reductionism that derives political actors' orientations, hence their actions, more or less directly from their social locations, and linguistic reductionism that denies the existence of institutions and interests outside of discourse and its mental residues. To do so, he concedes the influence of ideology, current politics, and national traditions on the interpretation of historical crises but then insists that major crises have genuine, analytically separable effects on subsequent historical events. Two very different forms

of revision, he complains, have left historians incapable of grasping the impact of the English and French Revolutions. On the Anglo-Saxon side, he argues, criticism since the heyday of Christopher Hill has left us with little more than a fortuitous concatenation of events in the seventeenth-century British Isles. "The classic social interpretation's crisis and the consequent abandonment of holistic or substantial views of society does not . . ." he concludes, "eliminate the need to explain the extraordinary social mobilization, the extent of political participation, and the significance of radical stirrings in the world of sects" (p. 58). There, Conrad Russell (featured in a section titled "Il regno di Lord Conrad Russell") figures ultimately as a destructive force. On the French side, Benigno deplores the reduction of the eighteenth-century revolution to language and ideology. Even less does he condone the facile appropriation of revolutionary historiography by political zealots, for example in the equation Vendée = genocide. In particular, Benigno portrays François Furet as having facilitated evasion of the fundamental explanatory problems set by the Revolution of 1789.

In the case of the seventeenth-century crisis, Benigno skillfully traces the formulation of that idea by British Marxists, its diffusion to the continent over considerable resistance, and its gradual disaggregation in the face of persistent historical criticism. Despite nods to R. H. Tawney, Maurice Dobb, and Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill figures as the principal initiator of that intellectual adventure. Benigno rightly sees the debate over the seventeenth-century crisis, however inconclusive in the long run, as an exceptional stimulus to fresh thinking and new research. For Benigno, the great historiographical moments do not arrive when ideology gives way to fact-gathering but when advocates of competing theories seek to explain genuine events.

Although Benigno's essays on the Fronde and the Neapolitan rebellion give sustained attention to historiography, they also illustrate his preferred program by sketching partial accounts of the events themselves. In the case of the Fronde, Benigno uses work by Christian Jouhaud, William Beik, and many others to demonstrate the extent of popular participation, the depth of cleavage, the agglomeration of previously distinct conflicts, and ultimately the implausibility of Roland Mousnier's top-down interpretation. In the case of Naples, Benigno stresses similarities in the popular grievances and anti-state mobilizations that underlay seventeenth-century rebellions in Italy, France, and Britain. More so than in the other cases, however, he treats the Neapolitan uprising as an identity-creating experience, as a deeply revolutionary moment. Masaniello, in Benigno's reading, embodied aspirations of a temporarily united and activated populace.

For all his historiographical sophistication, Benigno fails to recognize the broad intellectual coalition among Marxists, progressives, and liberals that formed in the 1960s around the populist program of history

from below, the effort to reconstruct ordinary people's experience of momentous events and processes. That coalition has long since shattered, but it produced some of the historical accomplishments Benigno most admires. We could plausibly read his analyses as a call for revival of history from below.

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RAY HUANG. *Broadening the Horizons of Chinese History: Discourses, Syntheses, and Comparisons*. (An East Gate Book.) Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. 1999. Pp. viii, 274. Cloth \$56.95, paper \$22.95.

This is a work by an eminent and venerable Chinese historian, a specialist by training in Ming history, but with a wider knowledge of Chinese and European history than most historians. Ray Huang also bridges many other worlds: those between popular history and specialist knowledge, between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and among British, American, and Chinese Sinology, among others. His many sides and vast learning are much in evidence in this volume, but the collection itself seems to represent a kind of mop-up operation. To be sure, there is a distinct macrohistorical thesis that Huang expounds with flair and persistence, but the collection is made up of essays, lectures, even outlines of lectures mostly written or presented originally in Chinese in the mid-1980s, and some from the early 1990s. The style is definitive, even strident; popular, with relatively few footnotes (although there are also parts of essays that plunge us deep into the arcane business of Ming taxation); chatty, with intimate reminiscences of the late Joseph Needham or of Huang's days in the Nationalist Army on the mainland; and deeply committed to the agenda of reform in the PRC. Perhaps, as the blurb suggests, it may be regarded as a sourcebook and a teacher's guide to Huang's *China: A Macro History* (1988).

The central thesis of the book, repeated in almost every chapter and often in the same words, is essentially Huang's response to why it was that Europe and not China made the breakthrough to capitalism and modernity. His argument is presented most succinctly, if schematically, in chapter five. The question is, of course, at least as old as G. W. F. Hegel, but Huang frames it in Needham's terms of how and why China was economically overtaken by Europe only in the last several hundred years. Huang uses the book to explore the historical stages of capitalism in Europe, because he is convinced that Chinese history can only be understood once the secret formula of the European capitalist breakthrough has been grasped. He comes up with the three principal conditions and even identifies a date—the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England—from which they begin to generate self-sustaining economic and social development. The conditions are the extension of credit, the institutionalization of impersonal management, and the pooling of

service facilities. Together they produce a range of social and cultural transformations that make society susceptible to “mathematical management”—by which he refers to the susceptibility of society to economic and organizational engineering (chiefly interest rates).

In Huang's view, China, particularly from the founding of the Ming state, could not and did not seek to develop these three conditions because the emperor and the bureaucracy were more interested in sustaining a low-level equilibrium. The bureaucratic order visualized an imperial economy of small peasant holders generating low surpluses and low revenues, an enormous state apparatus divorced from the promotion of economic enterprises or a symbiosis with mercantile capital, and a literati-dominated bureaucracy. The Qing brought no radical changes to this order. Only in the last hundred years did China seek to merge into Western civilization and finally become mathematically manageable—due in no small measure to Mao Zedong's mobilization of the population into the “manageable” communes. Given that it took Europe several hundred years to achieve this level of manageability, one hundred years should not be considered too long for China.

Deep and broad as is his knowledge, Huang's thesis appears to be out of sync with more recent scholarship, such as the work of William Rowe, Bin Wong, and many others who have shown us the dynamism of the late imperial Chinese economy. Note also Sucheta Mazumdar's work on technology and overseas trade, which reveals an economically vibrant regime of peasant rights in south China during the Qing (although these same peasant rights, she argues, ultimately limited full fledged capitalism). There are other grounds on which such an argument is not particularly defensible. Huang paints a rather rosy picture of capitalism and discounts the costs of the transition to “mathematical management”; in another context, however, he does not shy from enumerating the number of deaths arising from land reform in China (a “rationalizing” development) as between three to five million. Moreover, by seeking to substitute the primacy of Europe with that of China—or seeking to answer why it did not happen—we continue the same mode of linear historical inquiry that established Eurocentrism (to be replaced by Sinocentrism) and that represents an inheritance of the age of imperialism. New research on the history of capitalism reveals a complexly integrating global structure with different regions playing changing roles at different times. To emphasize one, such as Europe or China (especially without differentiating these continental spaces), is to return us to a very limiting narrative. And finally, perhaps the most limiting aspect of that narrative of “success” is the explicit judgment of a historical society in terms of what it was not. Our research agenda can hardly be meaningful if it is to be shaped by questions whose answers can only be found in the negative or the modified negative.

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MARIA TODOROVA. *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 257. \$19.95.

If we posit that the historian outraged at a stereotype read back into the past for political purposes can best respond by reading that stereotype properly and painstakingly forward, then Maria Todorova has largely succeeded. Her much-discussed volume responds superlatively to that challenge in its first five chapters on evolving perceptions of the Balkans there as well as in the West, and in the seventh chapter on what she considers to be the region's most distinctive historical feature: the Ottoman legacy. Todorova's indignation over contemporary issues predominates early in her introduction and throughout chapter six and the conclusion. She begins and ends with an indictment of George F. Kennan's preface to *The Other Balkan Wars*, a 1993 edition of the Carnegie Endowment's 1913 report on the two Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. To her, both preface and new edition stand for a particularly American disposition to view the Balkans as a hopeless, uncivilized whole. But just how representative Kennan's dismissal of "unruly" democratic strivings in the newly independent Balkan states even before the Balkan Wars is, given his preference for monarchic authority before 1914, should not detain us. Nor should the author's well-argued objections in chapter six to the idea of a "good" Central Europe, somehow minus Germany, that Czech, Hungarian, and Polish intellectuals advanced during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Todorova's enduring contribution is instead to lead us through earlier accounts of "the Balkans" with an erudition that any literary critic would envy and a postmodern commitment to analyzing each single text as a several-sided discourse among writer, reader, and written-about that serve this volume well. She acknowledges her debt to Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) but adds that his pioneering study of "otherness" as a rationale for domination did not deal with a clearly defined geographic area or with the response from the area. An initial chapter dates Western usage of "the Balkans" as a specific geographic designation from the 1880s but "balkanization" as a synonym for division and disorder only from the 1920s. Chapter two surveys the self-designation as Balkan that also spread from the 1880s. It was most widespread and least problematic in Bulgaria, where the Schwejk-like fictional hero Bay Ganyo Balkanski, crude but crafty, soon became a focal point for national self-analysis. In Greece, it competed within a hierarchy of multiple identities, and in Romania struggled against an "un-Balkan" aristocratic disdain for the peasantry.

The next three chapters take us from the nineteenth-century Western discovery of the Balkans as what Todorova dubs the "Volksmuseum of Europe," prompting either enchantment or rejection, and into the invention and classification of the region simply as a synonym for irrational hatreds and the dangerous subdivisions that multiply from them. Prior to 1900,

Todorova points out, "there was no common Western stereotype of the Balkans" (p. 115). Western accounts ranged from the fanciful "invention-tourism" of non-visitors like the German adventure writer Karl May to well-trained and travelled scholars like the German Felix Kanitz or the French Ami Boué. Russian attentions to Bulgaria in particular receive her highest marks, including a disclaimer for any geopolitical ambitions during the 1870s that is open to question. But then comes the reputation for untamable violence that Todorova traces first to coverage of terrorist acts in Ottoman Macedonia after 1900 and then to the Carnegie account of Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian army depredations against any "other" villages and civilians in the Balkan Wars. By the 1920s, blaming all of World War I on its Balkan beginnings combined with a Western upsurge in racist stereotyping to identify the region with "a peculiarly elemental and irreconcilable racial enmity," in the unconsciously ironic words of one widely read German volume (p. 124). As a further irony, Todorova notes, it was the German origin of the term "Southeastern Europe" and subsequent Nazi designation of the area as an economic hinterland that kept this more appropriate designation from emerging after World War II.

Rather than exploring Western perceptions comparably during that later period or returning to Russian connections across any of the long Soviet period, Todorova devotes her final substantive chapter to the region's Ottoman legacy, real rather than imagined. Although she faults the Ottoman Empire for discouraging political trust, social cohesion, or urban autonomy, she lauds its destruction of local aristocracies to the advantage of the peasant smallholder as an egalitarian legacy absent in the European empires to the north and west.

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NIALL FERGUSON. *The Pity of War*. New York: Basic Books. 1999. Pp. xliii, 563. \$30.00.

With its combat casualty lists of twenty million, its monetary costs of hundreds of millions of 1918 dollars, and its overwhelming social, political, and economic legacies, the 1914–1918 conflict certainly deserves to be remembered as the Great War. Niall Ferguson, in a book that has caused quite a splash in Britain and is now published in the United States, certainly agrees. But, he tells us, there is much in the historical canon with which he does not—and therein lies the tale of this defiantly revisionist work. He rejects the usual narrative format to explain the war and instead sets down a series of questions; in answering them, he pleads his case: was the war inevitable? Why did the Germans risk all on war in 1914? Why did Britain intervene? (This book is really about Britain and Germany—a fact that will gravely disappoint many readers.) Did Europeans welcome a war, and did

propaganda prolong it? Why did the economic power of the British Empire not defeat its enemies more quickly and without American help? Why did the superior German military machine not subdue its adversaries in the West as it had done in the East? Why, given the manifest horrors of trench life, did men continue to fight for more than four years, and why did they finally stop fighting? And "Who won the peace—to be precise, who ended up paying for the war" (p. xxvi).

This brief review can touch on only some of the answers on offer. Was the Great War inevitable? Of course not, we are told—but then, who among us thinks that it was, save for the dwindling band of threadbare Marxists. These latter Ferguson pounds appropriately. Why did the Germans risk all on their war "gamble"? They did so not in pursuit of a Napoleonic dream of European conquest but out of anxiety that their economic limitations and the growing strength of Tsarist Russia would render their position much weaker in the not distant future. This assertion also will not come as a complete surprise to historians of the war. Although Ferguson does not ignore Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg's carnivorous September Program, he generously considers it a bit of after-the-fact political opportunism rather than a blueprint for European domination.

Britain intervened first, because Herbert H. Asquith's government feared that the Unionists were better equipped to play the war card and dish his Liberals; second, because—however briefly—Belgium's plight *did* touch popular feeling; and, finally, because a cabal of politicians and generals, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey first among them, manipulated the nation into the conflict. Ferguson simply cannot bring himself to accept that Britain's vital interests really were at stake on August 4, 1914, although many historians, despite Ferguson's assertions, will continue to do so. I predict that vigorous defenses of Grey will soon appear in print as well.

Of the related themes of why the British on their side or the Germans on theirs did not win the war more convincingly and quickly, we are told among other things that the British were not well organized for war early enough and that the German Army killed more efficiently and cheaply. Yet, Ferguson suggests, the Germans failed to excel at the new technology of war or to conceive the proper strategy in the West, and they bungled their naval policy as well. But in the end, he reasons, it was "not Allied tactical superiority which ended the war, then: it was a crisis of [German] morale" (p. 313). The surprise here is that the blame is laid not on the troops who after four years of horror surrendered in droves but on the shoulders of the supremo himself, Erich Ludendorff, whose will broke after the "Black day of the German Army," August 8, 1918. One is left to wonder what general could possibly have saved Germany's ambitions then.

Why did men put up with trench life; why did they not simply walk away? This may prove to be Ferguson's

most valuable chapter, for he reminds us that in combat personal bonds among warriors outweighed abstract patriotism, that many on all sides in the war left behind pretty miserable lives, and, finally—something this reviewer has long believed—that some men in such situations become good at killing and even come to develop a taste for it. The jury will be out on this latter business for a while yet.

Who won? Who paid? An anti-Keynesian, Ferguson joins the side of those (though there is no mention of Étienne Mantoux's too-little-remembered *The Carthaginian Peace; or, The Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes* [1946]), who declares that the 1919 peace failed not because it was too harsh but, rather, because it was never enforced. He argues eloquently and with masses of data that the Germans—with the collusion of the well-meaning democracies—simply evaded the financial responsibilities they took on at Versailles. It was a good case fifty years ago, and it remains one today.

Ferguson's conclusion offers a provocative "counterfactual": had Britain remained neutral, there would have been a European but not a "world" war. Second, had Britain stayed out, all sides would have been better off, and it would have avoided "nothing less than the greatest error of modern history" (p. 462). The Central Powers would have won, and Europe would have evolved into a confederation "not wholly unlike the European Union we know today" (p. 460). Counterfactuals are tantalizing, but this one simply requires too much imagination: the brutal behavior of the German occupation forces and Germany's predatory designs for a conquered continent make it too much of a stretch to believe that a Europe fully dominated by the Second Reich would have developed as Ferguson suggests.

All the same, this book is at once provocative, brave, and entertaining. It also has much to teach; the mass of quantified information alone will be much used for many years. The book begs to be debated, and so it shall be. This reviewer, however, cannot shake off the conclusion that its most dramatic revisionism either is aimed at arguments that are not really being carried on or is simply not convincing.

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GEORGE L. MOSSE. *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism*. New York: Howard Fertig. 1999. Pp. xviii, 230. \$35.00.

This collection of essays was published shortly after the death of George L. Mosse. Mosse was one of the pioneers of the study of fascism and Nazism, and he has had considerable influence. Several of his works, such as *The Crisis of German Ideology* (published in 1964 and reprinted in 1988), and *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (published in 1978 and reprinted in 1997), have become classics. The work now under review aims at presenting to a new

generation of students a number of essays by Mosse or chapters he contributed to various collective works, all published in the course of the last forty years.

The most important of these essays is the seminal essay that gives the whole collection its conceptual framework. This essay, "Toward a General Theory of Fascism," is very well known. First published in 1979, it is presented here in a revised form, which is not the case with the other essays, which are simply reprinted. One finds in this essay the qualities associated with Mosse: a legendary analytical capacity, a tremendous breadth of humanistic and literary culture, a comprehensive and comparative understanding of the phenomena under discussion, and an impeccable knowledge of the sources. Even today, when recent works on fascism (such as those by Roger Griffin, Roger Eatwell, and Stanley G. Payne, to mention only those published in the last few years) have taken the study of the subject much further, Mosse's pioneering work has lost none of its original freshness.

Here one must make a further observation. In Europe, unlike the United States (where, in any university, talking about the 1930s is like speaking of the age of Pericles), fascism was something lived, a concrete experience that very deeply affected national feelings, as it still does. Twenty years ago, most educated Europeans refused to accept the idea that fascism was a mass movement, a true social phenomenon enjoying a broad consensus among all classes of society. It was much more convenient to see it as a mere accident, an aberration. It was still more comfortable to see it, as did Benedetto Croce or Friedrich Meinecke, as the affair of a few opportunists, leaders of a band of *déclassés*, particularly skilled at seizing an unusual opportunity. Hence there developed a tendency to exaggerate the role of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler so that the movements and regimes were identified with the personalities of their founders. Mosse was one of the first to perceive fascism as a phenomenon in itself and to see the attraction it held not only for the unemployed and those cast aside by modern society but also for the educated classes, not to speak of some of the greatest intellectuals of the time. He was also one of the first, and this is not the least of his titles to fame, to reject the idea of totalitarianism as the common explanation of fascism, Nazism, and bolshevism.

However, this collection of essays, which is very representative of the main aspects of Mosse's work, contains such a wealth of observations and insights that one inevitably takes issue with some of them. First of all, there is a disproportionate emphasis on the symbolic and aesthetic sides of fascism and Nazism, on style, liturgies, myths, and festivals rather than ideas. Unlike Mosse, I believe that fascism owed its success less to the emotional spell it cast or to the experience of World War I than to the fact that the fascist ideology was simply the hard core and the most radical variety of a far more widespread, far older phenomenon: a comprehensive revision of the essential values

of the humanistic, rationalistic, and optimistic heritage of the Enlightenment. At the end of the nineteenth century, the rejection of the Enlightenment assumed truly catastrophic proportions and swept away a large part of cultured Europe. It was this rejection of the Enlightenment adapted to the conditions of the mass-society of the turn of the century that produced the fascist ideology. Fascism appealed to people's imagination because it was concerned with a real problem: the nature of social relationships. Fascism provided attractive answers to some of the questions that preoccupied people in the last two centuries: first of all, what makes a group of humans into a society? What is the nature of the relationship between the individual and the collectivity, and thus, what is the basis of political legitimacy? What constitutes a nation? Is it a freely expressed option of individuals with equal rights, as the French Revolution in its first years maintained, or history, culture, religion, the ethnic group? What is the real basis of collective existence? What, precisely, is the nature of the common factor that enables people to develop the minimum of solidarity which makes life together possible? What gives life in society a meaning?

The second major point on which I disagree with Mosse is this: the fascist ideology developed long before World War I. The war enabled the cultural revolt to be translated into political terms, but it did not create fascism as such. The war produced favorable conditions: it provided the intellectual revolt, after half a century of incubation, with the opportunity and means to become a political force, but the basis for the rise of fascism is not to be found in the traumatic war experience or in postwar crises but in the struggle against ideological modernity, which means against the French and Kantian tradition of the Enlightenment.

Yet, whatever the differences of approach or interpretation, all those writing on fascism and Nazism today owe this great historian, who was also a warm and generous man, a debt that only increases with the passing of time.

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DANIEL GASMAN. *Haeckel's Monism and the Birth of Fascist Ideology*. (Studies in Modern European History, number 33.) New York: Peter Lang, 1998. Pp. viii, 482. \$69.95.

Just when it seemed that every possible source for the origins of fascist ideology had been examined, Daniel Gasman proposes a new candidate for the role of fascist intellectual godfather in the person of Ernst Haeckel, the late nineteenth-century biologist and zoologist. According to Gasman, who, if nothing else, is not afraid to take sweeping positions, Haeckel is not just the key thinker in the development of fascism. He is the crucial inspiration of much of modern art, including symbolist poetry, the works of Paul Gauguin,

Henri Matisse, and Edvard Munch, and *Art Nouveau*. As one might expect, positivist and Social Darwinist thinkers are also indebted to Haeckel, but Gasman argues that even antipositivists like Georges Sorel and the Italian modernists Giuseppe Prezzolini and Giovanni Papini based their thinking on Haeckel's theories.

Haeckel argued that one single evolutionary force guided all nature including man and that it would provide the basis for all social laws. He resolutely rejected Enlightenment rationalism and any kind of transcendental dualism, especially Judeo-Christian theology, in favor of a strict monism that bound human history to the laws of nature and individuals to the larger racial or ethnic group. He stressed that instinctual and primitive impulses, not individual rational choice and intelligence, guided human history. He fused this with an almost mystical vision of monism as a kind of secular religion that negated human progress and called for man's acceptance of the primitive and subordination to powerful natural forces.

Taking this as his starting point, Gasman reinterprets a vast segment of European intellectual history. This book is as much about Haeckel's part in shaping much of modern culture from the late nineteenth century to the 1920s as it is about his role in the development of fascist ideology. In the process, Gasman offers an interesting reading of Gustave Le Bon, Robert Michels, and a number of Italian positivists. His Haeckelian perspective also pulls out of relative obscurity a number of writers that are often omitted in other treatments of fascist ideology, such as Jules Soury, a French nationalist and anti-Semitic disciple of Haeckel; the racist thinker Georges Vacher de Lapouge; and the Austrian sociologist and military officer Gustave Ratzenhofer.

The problem with Gasman's approach is not in the scholarship. He has read widely and obviously knows the material. The difficulty comes when he states repeatedly that every reference to primitivism, every glorification of irrationalism, struggle, or elitism found in Haeckel and his disciples was "very likely" (a term the author uses quite frequently) responsible for some similar aspect of fascist or Nazi ideology. The entire positivist tradition in Italy is somehow drafted as a precursor to fascism. Gasman constantly scolds other authors for attributing to generic Social Darwinism what was instead Haeckel's omnipresent influence. He singles out Walter Adamson's fine study of the young Florentine antipositivist, modernist intellectuals (*Avant-garde Florence: From Modernism to Fascism* [1993]) for particular criticism in this regard, but it is difficult to separate out what was specifically Haeckelian from the prevailing Social Darwinist intellectual milieu. It is perhaps a narrow reading to ascribe the antipositivist, idealist, and religious revival around the turn of the century exclusively to spiritual monism. Gasman also insists that when Benito Mussolini referred to Charles Darwin, he really was talking about Haeckel, whose work he absorbed through a reading of

Roberto Ardigò's *La morale dei positivisti* (1878). But Ardigò brings out an uncomfortable feature of Gasman's analysis. The noted Italian positivist was much more influential on the Italian republican and socialist left and on figures like Filippo Turati who had nothing to do with fascism. Gasman might be more on the mark, however, when he notes that Mussolini was far more a Social Darwinist than a Marxist, but where the future Duce picked up his intellectual baggage is open to dispute, and it would be unwise to opt for a single source.

Although the author makes an interesting case for Haeckel's influence on specific thinkers like Michels, Le Bon, Vilfredo Pareto, and the Italian socialist Enrico Ferri, he often asserts or assumes connections that are not completely evident to this reader without much more proof. In the end, Gasman adds another perspective on the origins of fascism but fails to deliver the interpretive skeleton key that he claims to have discovered in order to unlock its puzzle.

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FRANÇOIS FURET. *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*. Translated by DEBORAH FURET. Chicago: University of Illinois Prss. 1999. Pp. xii, 596. \$35.00.

Two years before his death, François Furet published to great acclaim *Le passé d'une illusion: Essai sur l'idée communiste au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle* (1995). As the title and subtitle suggest, Furet's subject is the fascination exerted by the idea of communism in the twentieth century. His book is full of keen insights, often vividly expressed. The book also reveals an intellectual historian's unwitting tendency to subsume all of history under the rubric of ideas and a historian of France's unacknowledged inclination to write European history through the French model.

Right at the beginning, with deft phrases, Furet invokes the revolutionary passions that have guided so much of modern European history. He seems worried that, in our more prosaic, late modern era, readers will not be able to imagine the fierce hatreds and utopian desires that animated left and right in Europe. He places fascism firmly in the revolutionary camp; liberalism seems to disappear in his history, the main results of its dominance in the nineteenth century a fractured society and bourgeois self-loathing. A faint air of an older history emanates from these beginning passages, as Furet writes of unitary categories like "the bourgeoisie" or "the nation" and presents a history that seems to emerge directly from the idea. Aside from a few political eminences and intellectuals, Furet's history is devoid of individual actors. It is Europe or France or the bourgeoisie that "thinks" or "believes" or "is obsessed."

Yet he does then bring matters to life, usually with a shifting triptych of intellectuals who respond to the vast conflagrations of the century: Thomas Mann,



Alain, and Élie Halévy on World War I; first Boris Souvarine, Pierre Pascal, and György Lukács, then Romain Rolland and André Gide on the appeal of the Soviet Union. Later on, we encounter Hannah Arendt, Vasily Grossmann, and others. Even when the stories of writers and their paeans to Joseph Stalin and the Soviet experiment—or their subsequent disillusionment—are well known, Furet's deft portraits and incisive commentary make for enjoyable reading. Those in need of a bit of mid-day levity would do well to read his account of the visits to the Soviet Union by H. G. Wells, G. B. Shaw, and Sidney and Beatrice Webb (pp. 150–55).

"The universal spell of October," in Furet's view, lay in its act of pure volition, of man's invention of himself, a meaning that took the idea of communism far beyond the borders of Russia and the Soviet Union. The parallels with the French Revolution are obvious, and they fuel some of the most interesting commentary in the book. To Jacobinism, the Bolsheviks added science, the logic of history, thereby creating a powerful, politically potent synthesis (pp. 63–64). But the French parallel becomes strained by the time we reach the 1950s. To write of the post-Stalin transition as a Soviet Thermidor seems even less useful than Leon Trotsky's application of the term to the 1930s.

Furet's efforts are much less successful when he ventures beyond the realm of ideas and intellectuals to an analysis of the workings of the Soviet, Nazi, and fascist systems. His reliance on a dated, though classic, historiography, such as Karl Dietrich Bracher on the Third Reich, Renzo De Felice on fascist Italy, and Merle Fainsod and Leonard Schapiro on the Soviet Union, results in rather standard analyses of the systems in question. But deeply problematic are Furet's efforts at comparison. He is surely right to argue against the taboo of comparison, the notion that the two major forms of twentieth-century dictatorship were completely distinct species. But when Furet cites the mutual influencing of the Nazi and Stalinist systems, the evidence is precariously thin, even nonexistent, on issues that are highly charged. "Stalin's victory . . . provided, after Mussolini, a second example, which was studied and retained . . . [I]n terms of brutality, cynicism, and duplicity, Stalin cleared the way for the author of *Mein Kampf*" (p. 138). But what is the evidence for such assertions? Scattered comments by Hitler, including quite a number that Furet uses from Hermann Rauschning (pp. 187, 191), a highly suspect source, do not amount to all that much. Even more farfetched is Furet's claim that the Röehm Purge gave Stalin "new ideas" that led to the Kirov assassination (p. 202). Furet's statements suggest a causal linkage that brings him perilously close to Ernst Nolte, whose positions he partly defends, partly criticizes (pp. 518–19, n. 13). Certain parallel practices marked the Third Reich and the Soviet Union under Stalin, and they had some common origins, notably in the conflagration of World War I, as Furet cogently argues. But parallel developments by no means suggest

direct causal linkages, a mutual influencing of the internal logics of both systems. Furet is sometimes careful to describe the similarities and differences between National Socialism and Stalinism. But what then can one make of his statement that "Stalin and Hitler shared the same monstrous passions and the same enemy" (p. 182)? Stalin's anti-Semitism was episodic until the last years of his reign. Nothing remotely comparable to Hitler's vitriolic racism and anti-Semitism animated the Soviet system; "redemptive antisemitism" (Saul Friedländer's term) was unknown in the Soviet Union.

Furet is back at his best when he depicts the allure of communism in its "classic" period, from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s. The irony, which runs through his central chapters, is that the worst, most inhumane period in Soviet history was also the time when communism and antifascism became synonymous. Furet captures well the sensibility that animated intellectuals all over the western world. In reading these passages, however, one might sometimes think that Palmiro Togliatti, not Alcide De Gasperi, and Maurice Thorez, not a parade of politicians, held the reins of power in Rome and Paris. The post-World War II reconstruction of these societies along explicitly non-communist lines receives scant attention. In Furet's account, the communist world was self-enclosed and followed its own logic, as if the encounter with capitalism and the West had no impact on its internal development. Here also is where Furet displays an unfortunate tendency to generalize from the world of ideas and intellectual culture to Europe's history in its entirety. Yet communism, as he well describes, was a mass movement; the obsession with the idea was the property not only of intellectuals. A more comprehensive history of the illusion requires attention to the cultural adoption of communism in communities and workplaces not just in France and Italy, but in select localities all over Europe.

Furet's last testament, an engagement with his own youthful past (p. xi) and French intellectual culture's obsession with communism, is a vivid, fascinating, and flawed document.

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ROBERT H. JACKSON, editor. *New Views of Borderlands History*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1998. Pp. viii, 242. Cloth \$40.00, paper \$19.95.

Seventy years ago, Herbert Eugene Bolton awakened historians to the new historical perspective of "the Americas." He developed a new concept of the Spanish borderlands as a unified area of study, as opposed to taking a nationalistic perspective of history that was exclusively Spanish or Anglo-American. Now historians are being introduced to a new concept of the borderlands that is neither Anglo-American nor Spanish but as much Native American in its perspective. The "new views" of borderlands history represent a



bold new "pre-contact paradigm" of the borderlands as a zone of cultural interchange between Native American society and the incoming Europeans. The new view examines the structure of frontier society on the borderlands, the demographic patterns, and economic development of the common people—Spanish settlers as well as Native Americans.

A collection of readings on different regions of the borderlands, this book draws on the research skills of several writers. Indeed, editor Robert H. Jackson asserts that, in many ways, the specialist contributors can provide more intensive historical review of their respective regions than a generalist could provide in a broad synthesis. The specialists, for example, are more familiar with the colonial sources for a regional history of the borderlands. They offer the advantage of cross-disciplinary methodology for the new paradigm, and they are more familiar with the latest historiographical issues in their own fields.

The range of topics in this book is so broad, however, that at first glance, it seems to defy a cohesive analysis. One chapter reviews population fluctuations in colonial Chihuahua, while another documents the formation of frontier indigenous communities in California and Texas. The chapters are as varied in methodology as they are in scope and geographical region. The book consists of several regional studies and a mini-book on Florida's colonial experience. Jackson has successfully coordinated several major themes from his talented writers.

The first major thread winding through the several chapters is that the Spanish colonizers struggled to recreate in the North American borderlands the same colonization model that they had successfully established in Central Mexico. Their ideal, of course, was a Spanish society of municipal government and Catholic families. They failed. For the most part, they were unable to reduce or to assimilate the various indigenous tribes and hunter-gatherers to sedentary life. Spanish officials developed modifications to the traditional colonization institutions that had so successfully controlled labor and tribute among the hierarchical Mexica-Aztec. But in northern New Spain, the Spaniards encountered semi-sedentary agriculturalist chiefdoms that had no great wealth, precious stones, or large cities. Here, leadership was divided among war chiefs, elders, and ritual specialists living in extended families with complementary gender roles. Even where the Franciscan missionaries managed to reduce the natives to mission life, the natives often resisted and revolted throughout the colonial period. In Texas, the Franciscan missions "must be considered among the most sustained failures in Spanish colonial history" (p. 111).

The Spaniards were tenacious colonizers, however. The Spanish *vecinos* were as motivated by profits from the mines as the missionaries were by their baptisms at the altar. They used a variety of effective social devices to accomplish limited regional acculturation. In New Mexico, for example, the missionaries used role rever-

sal by providing a domesticated source of meat to the mission Indians. This made the women providers of food while it made the men weavers of cloth. The missionaries taught the natives to practice skills like blacksmithing, leather work, cultivation, and herding. As the Pueblos adopted the Spanish patriarchal family model and its attendant female submissiveness, their women began to marry into *vecino* society. In these cases, Indian government and communal solidarity became "a thing of the past." But disease, revolts, and resistance had a much greater role in the borderlands than did Spanish colonization.

Perhaps the strongest theme in the book is articulated by Patricia R. Wickman in her chapter on "The Spanish Colonial Floridas." This mini-book presents as broad a history of colonial Florida as one might expect to find in a general borderlands history, but it does so with specific regional data. The chapter provides the strongest example of the new "pre-contact paradigm" (p. 202). It depicts Native American society as a dynamic system of complex chiefdoms with far-reaching trade relations that continued to evolve before and after contact with Europeans, rather than as a static model that ended permanently upon contact. The argument is forcefully asserted with documentation from the Archives of the Indies as well as from specialized literature on the region. Wickman utilizes sophisticated methodology and convincing analysis of a dynamic native society as well as Spanish impact on borderlands history.

As promised, the book offers new and specialized cross-disciplinary methodology, including effective use of specialized regional archives. The chapter on New Mexico, for example, documents the lucrative Santa Fe trade routes with reference to the Archivo Palacio Municipal of Chihuahua and the archives of Palacio Gobierno of Durango. In fairness, however, the strength comes with weaknesses in the wide range of writing styles. Two contributors, for example, failed to coordinate their definition of the word "Tejanos," which means Spanish settlers in one chapter and "Texas Indians" in another. In another instance, one chapter twice repeats an entire paragraph on the mission economy of Branciforte. Minor editing inconsistencies notwithstanding, the book succeeds in presenting "new views" not only through its assertive position on the dynamic role of Native Americans in the borderlands frontier zone but also in its impressive demonstration of a new paradigm for future historical analysis of the Americas.

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ELI FABER. *Jews, Slaves, and the Slave Trade: Setting the Record Straight*. Reappraisals in Jewish Social and Intellectual History.) New York: New York University Press. 1998. Pp. xvii, 366. \$27.95.

Jews were certainly more common than Russians and Mexicans in the Atlantic slave system, although the

Russian and Mexican flags appeared over slave ships in the nineteenth century. How common were Jews in this business? Given the number of black owners in the St. Domingue coffee sector, the Afro-Brazilian slave trader community in the Bight of Benin, and the instances of English-speaking black owners of slaves and even slave ships, Jewish decision makers in the coerced labor system of the Atlantic may have been as common as those owners and investors who could claim enough African descent to be classed as non-white (without counting slave merchants of African descent who were based in Africa). Of course, neither of these groups are of any significance when set against the backdrop of the overall control of the shipping and management of slaves, especially compared to the numbers of non-Jewish British and Portuguese. The latter two national groups together probably accounted for four out of five Africans carried across the Atlantic, and (including their descendants) for only a slightly smaller proportion of New World slave ownership. Examining the shares of minority groups in the slave system, especially tiny minorities, is not in itself especially interesting to serious scholars of the slave trade. That it is done here, and that the book under review was written at all, may be attributed solely to belief in some circles that minorities such as Jews have had a role in the Atlantic slave systems out of all proportion to their numbers in the population at large. For what it is worth, which is not a great deal, a case could be made that, in the British case, Scots are more likely—though still improbable—candidates for the mantle that some have tried to drape over Jews.

That Eli Faber establishes the spurious base of the belief in the dominance of Jewish merchants and owners with clarity and thoroughness—at least for the very large British slave system—will not surprise anyone who has examined the primary sources. Less than half of Faber's 366 pages comprise text. Appendixes, mainly of names, are extensive, and references, mainly to the better known British colonial primary sources, are abundant. The broad argument is supported by a database on the transatlantic slave trade (published since the book appeared) containing the names of 31,260 individual owners of transatlantic slave ventures. Eighty-four of these names are linked to fifty or more voyages and only one of this "elite" group has any possible Jewish connotation.

Faber's record-straightening exercise is nevertheless unsettling. First, he has taken time off from his own specialist interests to carry it out, undoubtedly at a net cost to scholarship. Although the author achieves his aim comfortably, there is little here that slave trade specialists will find new, and the book contains occasional reminders that the slave trade is not the author's first field of study. Jamaica did not overtake Barbados in plantation output in the last quarter of the seventeenth century; the early English slave trade was substantially greater than the writer suggests, and it is Barry Higman, not Bernard. Closer to the author's home territory, Jews were admitted to Barbados be-

fore they were readmitted to England, not after. More fundamentally, there is the intrinsic problem of structuring a book around establishing a negative. Overall, what is new here will likely be of greater interest to students of Jewish history and those interested in what turns one group of people against another when there is no objective evidence to support such a swing, than to students of slavery and the slave trade. In the end, however, we are still left with the puzzle of why a belief in Jewish dominance of the slave trade or slave system has suddenly re-emerged in the 1990s. If the underlying purpose of the book is to force us to reflect on this, then it succeeds admirably.

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WILSON JEREMIAH MOSES. *Afrotopia: The Roots of African American Popular History*. (Cambridge Studies in American Literature and Culture.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. ix, 313. Cloth \$54.95, paper \$17.95.

Wilson Jeremiah Moses brilliantly recovers the attempts of black intellectuals—among them Maria Stewart, William Wells Brown, and Frederick Douglass during slavery, and W. E. B. Du Bois, J. A. Rogers, and St. Clair Drake in our time—to counter racist versions of the African past by claiming impressive black influence in ancient Egypt. "The Afrocentric tradition," he writes, "is related to utopian ideas of progress because it promises a glorious destiny for African people" (p. 42). In particular, Moses enables us to see how pivotal Egypt has been in African-American thought about history, especially among black nationalists. But he further demonstrates that although African-American writers turned to ancient Egypt as a source of pride, rarely have they invoked the history of modern Africa to counter charges of African inferiority.

This book will be controversial because issues currently being hotly debated in academic and non-academic circles receive sustained attention from Moses. Moreover, he places writers into ill-defined categories, at times leaving them with little shared apart from an interest in African history. Since the dominant Afrocentric designation probably dates in time no earlier than the 1960s and multiculturalism even later, those designations are not easily applied to earlier periods. Still, Moses's discussion, based on imaginative research, of the uses to which black writers have put Egyptian history, especially in the nineteenth century, establishes him as today's unquestioned leader in this realm of scholarship.

The agreed-upon choices before the mainly black nationalist writers, who place themselves on one or the other side, is whether ancient Egypt was a mulatto civilization of people much like American Negroes in color and features, or black African, alternatives profoundly at odds with theories of Negro inferiority. In

this context, Moses makes the excellent point that one of the ironies of African-American life is that "black nationalism, while urging political separatism, has been a conduit for the transmission of a universal high culture," the high culture that anthropologist Drake treats splendidly in his great volume, *Black Folk Here And There* (1987), to which Moses justly pays homage.

Moses is harshly critical of a number of recent Afrocentrists, accusing some of being racists and anti-Semites, thereby disclosing fresh conceptual problems, for he tells us that "political and anthropological definitions of Afrocentrism . . . dominate the work of [Melville] Herskovits and [Bronislaw] Malinowski" (p. 14). The precise relevance of this scholarship to Afrocentrists, many of whom are unaware of it, is evident since Herskovits and Malinowski argue the continuity of tradition from West Africa to America. Thus, while lacking an organic tie with Egypt, Afrocentrists have, overwhelmingly, concentrated on its monumental high culture to the neglect of West African cultures that have contributed to some of the modern world's greatest art. This has resulted in an unremarked but certain double consciousness: the glory of ancient Egypt, the shame of modern Africa.

Moses's treatment of Du Bois, who first used the term Afrocentrism in 1961, is a refreshing change from most Du Bois scholarship in recent years. Loath to embrace conventional or bizarre strategies at a time when clichés and wild assertions about Du Bois's life, public and private, draw applause, even Moses, for all his vigor of thought and intellectual courage, finds inconsistencies and contradictions in Du Bois's thought that might not be there. The influential argument that Du Bois was filled with contradictions, articulated by a distinguished student in the field, August Meier, is endorsed by Moses, who seems to promise more with his own reference to Du Bois's "complicated and endlessly inventive thinking" (p. 136).

High culture for Moses is captured by Matthew Arnold's reference to "the best that has been known and said in the world" (p. 35). In fact, Arnold's view courses through this study to form perhaps its chief organizing principle, the standard by which cultures are judged "high" or "low," are affirmed or relegated to the garbage heap to which Moses seems to consign black culture in America. To be sure, the art and religion of the black masses, treated by a few scholars in this study, are considered not really worthy of serious discussion, which is surprising considering the sea change undergone by scholarship on slavery—and its African antecedents—in recent decades.

Moses charts new lines of investigation and, fearless of consequences, opens up old subjects for discussion in new ways. This is a book that will inform the highly informed.

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ROBERT R. ARCHIBALD. *A Place to Remember: Using History to Build Community*. (American Association for State and Local History Book Series.) Walnut Creek, Calif.: Altamira Press. 1999. Pp. 224. Cloth \$46.00, paper \$19.95.

Public historian Robert R. Archibald locates the place of history in the fabric of community life. After more than ten years as president of the Missouri Historical Society and nine as director of the Montana Historical Society, Archibald is well positioned to reflect upon the contours of public history. The resulting volume reads alternately as personal memoir, meditation on the nature and goals of history, and manifesto on the importance of history for the present. He frames his narrative with a journey to his hometown in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, a journey that inspires an exploration into the relationships between place, memory, identity, and community. Upon his return home, Archibald is moved by the power of place, by the objects and relics, both natural and man-made, that become catalysts for memories long dormant. In this process, he finds that his personal feelings about the town and his professional work in public history—two realms that he had long endeavored to keep separate—have merged. Archibald chooses to embrace this blending of emotion and history, arguing that "in the absence of empathy, emotion, concern, and caring, history becomes an exercise in nostalgia, or an academic sidebar of limited use in a real world. If we do not care, we will not be motivated to take action" (p. 22). This logic fuels his book, opening up a series of questions about the role of history in forging community and shaping politics. Written for a broad audience, this book does not engage the extensive scholarship on public memory and history. It nevertheless remains a thought provoking and creative work.

In addition to his more philosophical reflections, Archibald relates several of his own professional experiences in order to illustrate his arguments. In one chapter, he uses the example of exhibition planning at the Missouri Historical Society to discuss the kinds of negotiations involved in choosing historical symbols that have resonance for all members of a community, a project that proved difficult in the segregated city of St. Louis. Researching this exhibit leads him to the Homer G. Phillips Hospital, located in the historic African-American neighborhood of St. Louis; once ranked in the top third of the largest hospitals in the nation, Homer G. now stands empty, boarded up. For the African Americans who visit the building with Archibald, though, it is "a place of nativity, a hall of hope, a promise broken, a place defiled, a legacy lost, a future imperiled" (p. 44). Archibald believes that the story of this once-celebrated institution "has the potential to heal" (p. 46), but only if it is celebrated and remembered by all of St. Louis, only if it is added to the canon of symbols, like the Gateway Arch, that represent St. Louis.

In several places, this book suffers from a lack of

theoretical precision. We witness Archibald grappling with the purpose of history when he relates his experience as a graduate student interviewing a descendant of the Isleta tribes in New Mexico. When asked what his ancestors did when they first saw the Spaniards arriving in the mid-sixteenth century, the informant responds that they got on their horses and fled to the mountains. This answer, of course, runs counter to scholarly accounts, according to which indigenous peoples would not yet have had horses. Yet the informant's story is a "narrative explanation that successfully sustained a community" (p. 91). From this, Archibald learns that "the truth of a narrative is not necessarily to be discovered in its historical consistency, but rather in its ability to create common identity and shared values and to facilitate survival" (p. 92). But is it not collective memory that he is discovering here? Certainly communal narratives are essential to group survival, but are they to be taken as "history"? Here, and at other moments in this book, history and memory seem to bleed into one another, undermining the purpose and distinctiveness of each.

Archibald argues that the work of the historian is to find "common ground"; too often, though, Archibald takes this goal literally: he wants history to reinforce an ideal, geographically bounded community. I find troubling Archibald's privileging of community, and in particular his conventional definition: "that a community has to exist *somewhere*" (p. 120). The patterns of racial and economic segregation in America have meant that most existing communities are quite homogeneous. In this sense, Archibald's work in St. Louis is actually far more radical than he seems to realize; it is more about breaking down community boundaries than it is about erecting them. The importance of the St. Louis exhibit lies precisely in its attempt to build solidarities across chasms of difference. Using history, as Archibald hopes to, to ensure social justice and to bring about change requires moving outside the community to form alliances across the class and racial lines that divide groups. Still, Archibald's quest for a public history that can produce empathy is stimulating and important, even if his thinking is sometimes less rigorous than it might have been.

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SARAH NUTTALL and CARLI COETZEE, editors, *Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 300. \$19.95.

How does a country with as bitterly divided, brutal, and haunted a history as South Africa come to terms with its past? What are the appropriate monuments to such a history, and how does one prevent new forms of silencing the Past from replacing the old? How can the people of South Africa create a new South African culture without obliterating the past? These are the issues that concern the contributors to this multifac-

eted collection on the remaking of history in post-apartheid South Africa.

Divided into four sections on "Truth, Memory, and Narrative," "The Remembered Self," "Museums, Memorials, and Public Memory," and "Inscribing the Past," this is a book about the ways in which memories are formed and reformed, manipulated, and appropriated. The authors are predominantly specialists in literature and history, but philosophy, museology, linguistics, art history, historical archaeology, and constitutional law are also represented. Despite their diverse disciplines, the contributors are united in some sense by their preoccupation with "the processes of memory . . . how memory is created and inscribed" (p. 1) and the multiple sites at which history is produced. The hearings before South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) provide the context.

Established to record the "truth" about apartheid and to effect reconciliation between victims and perpetrators through confession and contrition, the TRC has been the subject of lively debate within South Africa. Here the contrasting views presented in part one illuminate the different worlds still inhabited by white and black South Africans. Thus, faced with the enormity of South Africa's past, the well-known novelist André Brink maintains that the "facts" do not suffice. Let us, he argues, opt for magic realism, for only through imagination can we recapture the "truth." Many historians would accept Brink's view that "facts" have to be imagined to become "real." Much more problematic is his conclusion that while "something may in fact have happened . . . we can never be sure of it or gain access to it," so that "the best we can do is to fabricate metaphors." "In the long run," he maintains, myth "may well be the only guarantee for history" (p. 42). Like most historians, many black South Africans are unlikely to agree.

In the opening essay in the collection, Njabulo Ndebele clearly sees no such need for myth to make sense of "what happened." For South Africans, apartheid was a daily theater of the absurd, no less grimly oppressive for its absurdity. While the poet Ingrid de Kok fears lest the TRC silence the contestations over memory in its spurious search for the "whole truth" and its determination to heal the "fracture" in the inherited past, Njabulo perceives the TRC as rescuing stories that have been silenced: "the passage of time which brought forth our freedom has given legitimacy and authority to previously silenced voices . . . Where in the past the state attempted to compel the oppressed to deny the testimony of their own experience, today that experience is one of the essential conditions for the emergence of new national consciousness. These stories may well be some of the first steps in the rewriting of South African history on the basis of validated mass experience" (p. 21).

The remaining essays reveal the many sites in which history is being remade in post-apartheid South Africa: through autobiography and oral history, exhibitions and monuments, even in language policy, advertise-



ments, and the new constitution. Particularly exciting has been the reclaiming of spaces like the notorious Robben Island, District Six, the Company Castle at the Cape, the South African Museum, and the South African National Gallery as cultural brokers have begun to rethink earlier practices in which high culture and history were equated with whiteness and blackness with anthropology and natural history. These have not been painless transitions, as the volatile "Khoisan politics" that exploded around the 1996 exhibition "Miscast" (discussed by Steven Robins and Patricia-Davison in this collection) in the South African National Gallery revealed.

Non-South African readers may need reminding of the heavily Cape-centered version of past and present represented here. Slavery, Eva or Krotoa as the mother of white and brown Afrikaners, Khoisan identity, and the return of the "Hottentot Venus," Saartje Baartman's, genitalia from the Musée de l'Homme are almost as remote from the historical memory of most South Africans as they are from the consciousness of non-South Africans. The angst evident in many of these pages may also be a peculiarly Cape phenomenon. Nevertheless, behind the specificities the issues raised are important for historians well beyond the frontiers of the "new" South Africa; the richness and liveliness of these essays suggest that fears that debate will be stifled by the new forces of nationalism may be a little premature.

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#### COMPARATIVE/WORLD

HARRY N. SCHEIBER, editor. *The State and Freedom of Contract*. (The Making of Modern Freedom.) Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1998. Pp. vi, 378. \$55.00.

This collection of nine essays explores "economic liberty" in Anglo-American legal history, in particular the law and culture of "freedom of contract." Every essay is a pleasure to read: clear, devoid of jargon, and completely accessible to a general audience. Combined, they are a true collective enterprise. Such consistency is rare in an essay collection and a credit both to this volume's editor, Harry N. Scheiber, and to the series in which it appears.

Series editor Richard W. Davis's short foreword situates modern freedom in a history of traditional liberties (religion, speech, assembly, political participation) emerging uncertainly in the shadows of early modern England, then gradually spreading throughout the world in convulsive and reversible bursts. In the American case, that history is conventionally expressed as one of individual claims of rights against the state, with economic freedom—here "freedom of the individual from arbitrary and capricious authority over persons or property, and the freedom to produce and exchange goods and services" (p. vi)—the paradigm

case. This volume suggests that the Anglo-American history of economic freedom is more complex, expressed as much through the agency of state authority as its absence; but also that, ideologically and culturally, freedom of contract has indeed staked out a formidable presence at the American end of the continuum.

The first four essays focus on freedom of contract's English history. A. W. B. Simpson establishes the point of departure in a wonderfully entertaining essay on early modern property law. Until the nineteenth century, landed property was the Anglo-American legal system's predominant concern, managed by a complex common law that accommodated highly fragmented conceptions of ownership and regulated use. No Blackstonian "despotic dominion" of individual unencumbered ownership; property rights were subject to both the common law of private and public nuisance and to legislatures interposing claims on behalf of the public. Contract-like institutions were not absent from early modern property law (mortgages, leases) but were expressed entirely in its terms. That included labor, John Orth argues. Statutory regulation, not individual agreement, filled the substance of the hiring; once hired, labor was property. But this began to change during the eighteenth century. The complexity of commercial society and industrial processes exceeded the state's capacities to regulate hiring. The performance of labor hence was reconceptualized as a creature of contract. Laborers' own "contracts of combination" with each other remained beyond the pale. Nevertheless, recognition of labor as a subject for bilateral bargaining, not ownership, assumes fundamental causal significance in the emergence of the nineteenth-century regime of contract by demonstrating that contract was "a practical device for ordering economic relations" (p. 64).

The move to "freedom" of contract—privileging the parties' wills in conceptualizing their relationships—is usually associated with the late eighteenth/early nineteenth-century transition to an economy of commodified property and labor and with political and economic theories that elevate the individual over other sources of ordering, notably the state. But James Gordley finds few such connections. Will was no stranger to early modern law. The issue was what one could legitimately "will" to do. Following Aristotle, jurists thought will was relational: expressible only within a social and historical context that acknowledged the needs of others. Modern will theory emerged from the atrophy of this vital idea and became embodied in contract not because jurists embraced freedom of choice as a positive and preferable theory of human action but because they could no longer sustain older relational ideas in their understanding of how human will expressed itself. The unrestrained will thus became a norm by intellectual default, accompanied by the relocation of restraint in the name of fairness in a now externalized and hence structurally interventionist locale: the state.



Gordley's analysis is reinforced by David Lieberman's study of contract in the work of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. Lieberman finds little evidence of a transformative conceptual leap to new positive regimes of contractual freedom. Like Orth, Lieberman instead places the move to contract in the context of a more gradual and qualified process, the emergence of commercial society in England. That emergence did not "generate an ordering of the social world in terms of freedom of contract," for "it was the intervention of law and government, as much as the removal of legal restraints, that facilitated economic innovation" (p. 115).

Scheiber's essay moves these themes across the Atlantic. Resisting the implications of recent work on the history of the common law, notably William J. Novak's *The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America* (1996), Scheiber argues that in America private rights acquired such cultural hegemony as to externalize "the state" from "society" to an extent unparalleled in Europe. Yet once externalized, "public rights" had great vitality in American history too, undercutting claims of any *necessary* contradiction between private contract and property rights and an active state. Sometimes at the national level, more often locally, the state established "a dualistic framework with both promotional and regulatory functions" (p. 147). Although always sharply delineated, public and private were never so rigidly segregated as to prevent "areas of contract formerly left to the private law regime" entering public aegis (p. 153). Indeed, though his own approach prefers the language of "balancing," Scheiber's evidence suggests that in the last half century economic liberty has become a creature of a fusion of public and private action.

Essays by Charles McCurdy and Arthur McEvoy return us to Orth's emphasis on labor contracts, together demonstrating that it was here as nowhere else that freedom of contract gained its classic American expression. Nineteenth-century free labor ideology underwrote the "specialness" of the labor contract, impelling courts to apply with a vengeance "principles of neutrality" in the realm of private bargaining. Initially but one voice among many (including working people themselves) defending the private bargain, by the late nineteenth century courts were increasingly lonely in placing the labor contract beyond the state's police power. Such was their tenacity, however, that the courts forced sponsors of regulatory legislation into accommodations that, although they enabled the state to make inroads on inequalities of bargaining power, preserved the courts' position even at the marrow of the New Deal's "revolution" in labor law. McEvoy's nicely complementary essay shows that labor law's conceptually universalized contract regime actually has concrete frontiers. Labor relations exist in three "social spaces": the labor market, the workplace, and the household/family farm/plantation. Freedom of contract dominates the labor market. In the workplace, that dominance allows most of the rest of the

employment relationship—the organization of production—to be placed legally in the domain of the employer. In the household, meanwhile, law has been historically reluctant to find contractual potential at all, instead presuming relations constituted by norms of hierarchy. Thus in McEvoy's case, the labor contract is "special" because its presence/absence is key to the entire "structure of power relations" (p. 234) that the state endorses as social norm. Yet he adds, importantly, freedom of contract is conceptually unruly, no less an ideology of self-determination than a key to inequality. It has the potential to extend choice, not merely confine it.

Donald Pisani and Martin Shapiro complete the book on similar notes of novelty and uncertainty. Pisani addresses natural resources and economic liberty. "By making economic risks as predictable as possible," freedom of contract "encouraged individual self-interest to shape the market" (p. 236). The state appears as facilitator but also regulator in the private use of natural resources, attempting—Scheiber-like—to make acquisitive processes orderly. Historically, most such attempts seem to have been unsuccessful. "Even during the Depression, public policy did little to limit private control of natural resources" (p. 258). Lately, however, environmental policy has begun to conceptualize common good distinct from productive use, introducing a new "right of nature" with which prevailing ideas of private-public accommodation must be reconciled. Shapiro inspects contract's "globalization": the exponential increase in contracting behavior outside national jurisdictions. Modern designs for regulation and dispute resolution focus on strategic triadic figures such as arbitrators. Contemplation of those designs, however, uncovers a tension between now-familiar conflicting norms—the contract as an expression of equitable exchange informed by law and convention, versus the contract as written expression of the parties' will—that is also a tension between an older European and a newer American regime of arbitration. If, as Shapiro suggests, the American regime is becoming ascendant, one may perhaps anticipate that a struggle will ensue over whether to write equitable protections directly into a globalized contract law. As the other essays in this outstanding collection suggest, that particular conflict of norms has been and will remain unending.

CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS

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LENA ANDERSSON-SKOG and OLLE KRANTZ, editors. *Institutions and the Transport and Communications Industries: State and Private Actors in the Making of Institutional Patterns, 1850–1990*. Nantucket, Mass.: Science History Publications. 1999. Pp. xix, 359. \$49.95.

The transport and communications industries are heavily politicized; government ownership and regulation have been constant themes across time and place,

resulting from their strategic importance and the internecine struggles between many interest groups. Transport history has perhaps been under-researched in terms of its political economy. This volume, edited by Lena Andersson-Skog and Olle Krantz, concentrates on the interaction between the public and private sectors in the development and management of transport and communication systems. It is therefore a welcome addition to the extensive literature on the sector. Although empirically wide-ranging, key ideas are discussed regularly throughout the book. They distil into two main themes: the regulation of transport industries and the political procedures of transport development. Several authors look at the contemporary concern with regulating privatized transport industries and turn to historical experience for guidance. A fear of monopoly and social instability have influenced decisions to regulate. The political process of transport development has been shaped by competing elements including economic need, national prestige, and the role of lobbying by interest groups attempting to capture the process.

The book is organized into three sections. The first concentrates on comparative papers. The role of political processes in the development of railway systems is investigated for Germany and Japan by Ben Tipton *et al.*, revealing that political divisions and questions of social control inhibited transport planning. The methods of avoiding railway monopolies are contrasted in Prussia (state ownership) and the Netherlands (regulation) by Rainer Fremdling. Conflicting approaches to air transport regulation show American governments supporting the commercial development of internal services by an oligopoly of four companies while European governments adopted the subsidized national flagship approach (Peter Lyth). Somewhat differently, an interesting chapter by Colleen Dunlavy compares the rapid decline of corporate democracy in America, where firms had moved from one shareholder one vote to one share one vote by the 1850s and board powers had increased, with a later trend in these directions in Prussia.

The second section looks at national case studies of regulation including two chapters on regulation and nationalization of Britain's railways (Gerald Crompton, Terry Gourvish). These are again set in the context of current debates regarding ownership and regulation, and remind us that Britain's railways were never exemplars of purely private enterprise. Since the 1840s, in particular, the government regulated widely—including pricing, safety, and costs—in response to the failure of private enterprise. John Armstrong's chapter on British coastal shipping argues that this industry was likely to attract less government attention because it was represented by smaller, less powerful firms, although safety concerns were a paramount issue for legislators. In the foreign trades, of course, some very large shipping firms emerged and were heavily involved in restrictive practices through the conference system. It would have been interesting if

this study had extended to the whole industry and some discussion of the possible failure of the regulatory process. The other two studies in this section are somewhat different, looking at the intermodal competition between shipping and railways for Germany (Andres Kunz), and motor vehicles and railways in Spain (Antonio Gomez-Mendoza).

The third section of the book deals exclusively with Swedish applications, reflecting the origins of this volume in a conference held at Umeå in 1996. These five studies include evidence on the alternative Swedish mode of developing a national airline system (Jan Ottoson), two chapters on the origins of a Swedish transport institutional paradigm (Arne Kaijser, Lena Andersson-Skog), the role of well-organized interest groups in influencing motorway and bridge construction (Gunnar Falkemark), and, finally, the influences behind transport subsidies in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Thomas Petersson).

Although there is much here of value to those interested in transport history and in the political processes of economic change, there are some drawbacks with the volume. The contents of many of the essays are not new, even though it is useful to have them together in a single book. The volume might have been organized in a more thematically focused way; thus, the two studies of airline policies ought to have been juxtaposed, as should more of the chapters on railway regulation. The editors might also have been brave enough to exclude those chapters that barely address the questions of regulation and political process. This would have given the book a clearer and more sustained focus and helped to provide a strong identity in a competitive publishing market. Instead, the concept of institutions is used very broadly to bring these papers together. Like the political process of transport development, satisficing is often the final, if imperfect, outcome of academic interaction.

SIMON VILLE

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ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., FRANCO AMATORI, and TAKASHI HIKINO, editors. *Big Business and the Wealth of Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 575. \$59.95.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Alfred D. Chandler changed the way in which we think about business history. As Thomas McCraw has explained in a series of articles on the meaning of the Chandler thesis, one of the many brilliant moves that Chandler made in his career was to decontextualize business history. By focusing on an internal history of the managerial revolution, Chandler restored its complexity and rescued this important story from the oversimplifications of the "bad guys-good guys" dichotomy inherited from Progressive historiography. In depoliticizing the discussion of business in U.S. history, Chandler downplayed financial capitalism and promoted management as the engine of

economic growth. He gave the process of large organization its due.

Several of Chandler's books are widely read. *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprise* (1962), *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (1977), and *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (1990) are the best-known results of this lifelong effort fully to tell the story of the large, hierarchical, multidivisional business corporation. Chandler has done more than any other historian to push for an "organizational synthesis" of American history. But in giving business its due, he left unresolved the problem of reconnecting business history as he understands it to other forces of American history.

During the last fifteen years, however, Chandler has begun to reconnect his story, not to other parts of U.S. history but to the business stories that unfolded in other nations. In *Scale and Scope*, he juxtaposed American competitive managerial capitalism to Great Britain's personal capitalism and to Germany's cooperative managerial capitalism. But that was only three countries. The volume under review takes on the world. Coedited with Franco Amatori and Takashi Hikino, it is the proceedings of the Eleventh International Economic History Congress at Milan in 1994, where specialists in business history were asked to provide narratives comparable to the one Chandler produced for the U.S. and to test the relevance of *Scale and Scope* for their geographic areas of expertise.

The organizers/editors divided the world among prime drivers (such as the U.S. as the example of engine of economic growth in capital-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries, Great Britain as a case study of competitiveness, and Germany as an example of tension between cooperation at home and competition abroad), and small European nations (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) as cases of cooperative capitalism. After the prime drivers came European followers such as the slowly developing France and the tormented Italy and Spain. The third part is devoted to the late industrializers of East Asia and Latin America: specifically to the innovative organizational capabilities of Japan, the entrepreneurial moves of South Korea, and the growth of Argentina. Finally come the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe (USSR and Czechoslovakia).

Each chapter is written by a leading authority. The chapter by Patrick Fridenson on France is a small masterpiece on the social history of French management, with some excellent pages on French higher education; that by Hidemasa Morikawa on Japan's own version of the organizational synthesis is also excellent. All provide a good starting point for the comparative investigation of big business. Explicit in Chandler's *Scale and Scope* was the judgment that the American model should be the reference point. Geoffrey Jones on England and Ulrich Wengenroth on Germany take issue with such a thesis and argue against it with force and reason.

It is not easy to turn conference proceedings into a book, especially when authors are from so many different countries and do not share the same native tongue. This book is unfortunately marred by deficient editing; the volume editors and those at Cambridge University Press clearly were not up to the job of providing the level of care required. Most chapters could have been pared down without loss of substance. Several read as English transliterations of the writer's first language rather than real translations. Not enough effort and resources were invested in the necessary rewriting to make their narrative more readable. Moreover, each chapter has its own style of footnotes and bibliography. Word usage is also inconsistent. The chapter on Russia, one of the salient cases of poor rendering, ends with a sentence in brackets that belatedly reconnects the paper to the assigned topic. Economist Andrei Yu. Yudanov concludes: "[In our opinion the most recent Russian experience testifies to the correctness of the modern theories of large enterprise!]" (p. 426). There is a larger point hidden behind this belated recognition. We may not need to take on the Chandler thesis in comparative perspective to contrast the economies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Another way to apply Chandler's work is not to use it as a framework to evaluate the development of big business in other countries but to reintegrate the organizational history of big business into the mainstream of history. Now that we know the history of big business, why not make more of it and change the master narrative? This is an enterprise that has been going on for some time. American labor historians were the first to complain that Chandler had left them out and proceeded to put workers back in. Social historians, historians of small business, historians of regulation, and even historians of science and technology have also taken on the Chandler thesis. As a result, it has been revised, refined, challenged, and extended. In this volume, that job is carried out by some of Chandler's closest associates at Harvard and elsewhere who pitch for a broadening of managerial history in the form of reasoned critiques of the country-by-country essays. These critiques are important to read and ponder. Most instructive, it seems to me, are the contributions on skill formation by William Lazonick and Mary Sullivan, on government-business relations by Thomas McCraw, and on the cultural concept of the firm by Jeffrey Fear.

By its sheer coverage, the book might give the reader a false sense of closure. But changes in our capitalist world travel just a bit too fast for that. When the Chandler thesis of managerial capitalism has finally become the paradigmatic interpretation of American business history and is increasingly used as a standard of reference, history has begun to turn. With the resurgence of financial capitalism since the 1970s, the managerial revolution, so fully documented by Chandler, is being increasingly challenged in real life. As a result, when we finally thought we understood the

engine of big business in the twentieth century, the history is changing. I suspect that the next revolution in business history will focus less on testing the Chandler thesis worldwide and more on broadening it by taking a fresh look at what Chandler once consciously left out: the ways in which a wide range of financial institutions have affected and will affect anew the world's capitalist economy.

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SAMUEL L. BAILY. *Immigrants in the Lands of Promise: Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1870–1914*. (Cornell Studies in Comparative History.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1999. Pp. xvii, 308. \$45.00.

One of the leitmotifs of migration historians is the call to more transnational comparative studies. This is easier said than done because the historian is obliged to develop a background in more than one country and continent. In this book, Samuel L. Baily ventures into one of the more intriguing comparisons in the field: how did the experience of Italians in the United States and Argentina—or, more precisely, New York and Buenos Aires—differ before the outbreak of World War I? These two cities were the prime receiving centers for Italy's 14 million overseas immigrants in the four decades before the Great War, and many families found themselves with members in both metropolises. What drew a prospective migrant to either city? How was the Italian immigrant experience different in each city and why?

Baily examines these questions using both his own original research and a vast array of secondary studies. To make a methodical comparison, he prepares a tripartite matrix that examines the immigrants' backgrounds, what they found in their new homes (e.g., class structure, labor market, discrimination), and subsequent structural changes and interaction (concentration of Italians, strategies in the new city).

What did he find? Baily argues that Italians in Buenos Aires adjusted more rapidly and completely than Italians in New York. The main reason for this had to do with differing strategies in the two cities. Although Italian immigrants had remarkable savings rates in both locales, they used their surpluses in different ways because they developed different economic strategies. In Buenos Aires, immigrants invested in improving their standard of living in their adopted city because they had made a long-term commitment, whereas in New York, immigrants tended to save as much as possible in order to fulfil their dream of returning to their homeland. Thus Italians in Buenos Aires facilitated their adjustment to the South American metropolis.

Needless to say, there were other factors as well: there was a more developed and larger middle-class Italian elite in Buenos Aires, and the gradual drop in immigration figures after 1900 made it easier for the government to integrate newcomers. New York Ital-

ians tended to be unskilled, whereas skilled workers and merchants were more represented among Buenos Aires Italians. With a smaller middle-class elite and fewer community resources (because of a short-term economic strategy), New York developed fewer and less effective community institutions than its Argentine counterpart. There was significantly greater Italophobia in New York and much greater residential concentration of Italians in neighborhoods. Buenos Aires Italians were more spread out in the city.

Baily has finely crafted this study, and his argument makes sense. Because there is such a grand sweep here, however, too many details are glossed over. The treatment of the role of the church as an immigrant institution, although very balanced, is based more on assertion than on careful analysis. The argument that the host society more than immigrant institutions integrated Italians in New York fizzles out at the end of chapter eight, because support for this claim can only be found in the postwar period, into which Baily does not venture. These criticisms, in any case, are inevitable, because Baily has taken the kind of risk that a distinguished scholar can afford to take. Rather than give us a dry umpteenth microstudy of Italian immigrants in the New World, Baily delivers an engaging, economically written, and eminently readable comparative work that does not get bogged down in convoluted details or arguments.

This book can make a useful text in a migration history course. It reviews much of the recent migration literature, and in particular that on Italian migration to the Americas. The last chapter extends Baily's model to compare San Francisco, São Paulo, and Toronto with Buenos Aires and New York. This monograph is a clear invitation to further research, not only to compare other cities but to test Baily's arguments on the two grand metropolises in greater detail.

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WALTER THOMPSON, editor. *Great Power Rivalries*. (Studies in International Relations.) Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1999. Pp. viii, 414. \$45.00.

Ever since the London Declaration of July 6, 1990, proclaimed an end to the Cold War, scholarly interest in the complexity of rivalries between the Great Powers has increased significantly. The end of bipolarity suggested the importance of multipolarity, particularly in a world with one superpower and a disturbing supporting cast of global, regional, and local actors and agents. This volume testifies to the attractiveness of the analysis of Great Power rivalries, stemming as it does from a conference on the subject held in 1995 at Indiana University. Papers presented by thirteen participants are included, with an introductory essay by Walter Thompson, editor of the volume and himself one of the contributors.

The cast of writers is diverse in terms of age,



experience, and profession. Seven political scientists, five historians, and Suzanne Frederick, a policy analyst at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at California Institute of Technology, are included. Distinguished senior scholars like Jeremy Black, Jack Levy, and Paul W. Schroeder are complemented by graduate students like David S. Kelly and assistant professors like Paul Hensel. Similarly, the topics selected cover a broad range both geographically and chronologically. Early modern competitions between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, France and Spain, and England and Holland are balanced by treatments of modern rivalries between Britain and Germany, the United States and Japan, and, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union. The result is a diverse and engaging array that offers something for nearly everyone concerned with the subject.

All collections, even those based on the work of a single author, are of uneven quality, and this compendium does not refute the rule. Several essays stand out for their clarity, precision, and keenness of insight. Schroeder's trenchant analysis of Franco-Habsburg animosity is the class of the field. The rivalry between the two, easily understandable between 1494 and 1715, became after the demise of Louis XIV increasingly incomprehensible and eventually pointless. Yet this did not prevent its perpetuation long after its intelligibility had vanished. Why? Because, according to Schroeder, by 1715 both powers had become dependent on the status quo within the system of European states, and the areas in which their interests now began to converge were not consequential enough to convince them to jettison a rivalry with which both had grown comfortable.

Frederick's account of the intensifying competition between Britain and Germany from 1890 to 1914 is in some respects a dialogue with Paul M. Kennedy, whose *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (1980) remains the indispensable work on the matter. But she moves beyond Kennedy in illuminating the contrast between London's attitudes toward Berlin and Washington. Whitehall discreetly conceded Western hemispheric supremacy to America with quiet grace while opposing German expansionism because of its impact on strategic zones closer to home and far more vital to British interests than Venezuela or the Caribbean. As Germany's posture grew more belligerent after 1890, Britain decided it could afford only one major enemy at a time, and the rivalry with the United States would have to be adjusted in a more congenial direction.

Several other selections are notably insightful. Palmira Brummett's intriguing study of rivalry between Venice and the Ottoman Empire takes issue with William McNeill's analysis in *Venice: The Hinge of Europe, 1081-1797* (1974) and offers a periodization of the relationship that is certain to provoke animated discussion. John Rule's survey of the enduring rivalry between France and Spain in early modern Europe is up to his customarily high standards. And David

Rapkin's geopolitical analysis of the Japanese-American antagonism following the Spanish-American War is cogent, forceful, and consistently enlightening; his characterization of the Philippines as a long-term liability for American interests in the Pacific is particularly noteworthy. There are many nuggets in this book for prospectors to mine, provided that they can tell the gold from the dross.

Regrettably, however, there is a great deal of dross. The book appears to have been proofread by someone remarkably insensitive to the political and historical issues it addresses. How else can one explain Hensel's statement that Germany withdrew from the League of Nations in October 1934 (rather than 1933); Levy's consistent use of the word *glorie* (which does not exist in the French language) rather than *gloire*; or Frederick's assertion that France and Russia embarked upon their Dual Alliance in 1899 (rather than 1891, 1892, or 1894, any of which dates would find its own defenders)? Granting that such errors might creep into conference papers, the reader nonetheless has the right to expect that they would be corrected by the editor. Misspellings and typographical errors abound in such profusion that one is tempted to believe that spell-checkers have not yet been installed on computers used by the University of South Carolina Press. And the use of APA parenthetical citation, aggravating under the best of circumstances (since footnotes belong at the bottom of the page, not in the middle of a sentence), becomes completely baffling at the hands of Hensel, many of whose references cite only the book without the page number! The fact that much of his chapter was written from William Langer's *Encyclopedia of World History* (1948) and René Albrecht-Carrié's *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna* (1958) perhaps explains this omission, although no competent undergraduate history major would base a term paper on such sources.

More serious yet is George Modelski's highly dubious assertion that there is such a thing as a "democratic lineage" in Great Power rivalry and that fifteenth-century Portugal belongs to it. He is not the only scholar to assert that democracies do not fight wars with each other, but calling Bragança Portugal democratic stretches the concept well past normal elasticity. And several contributors lapse into incomprehensible jargon, such as "sequential probabilities of movement from one type to another or perhaps distinctive escalatory probabilities associated with variable mixes of state types" (p. 17). Had this collection been competently edited and had all authors attempted to write for the average Ph.D., it would have been a much more useful book.

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MICHAEL JABARA CARLEY. 1939: *The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 1999. Pp. xxv, 321. \$28.95.

Michael Jabara Carley offers fresh insights into the origins of World War II. Carley focuses on one



question: why did France, England, and Soviet Russia fail to form a military alliance against Nazi Germany in the 1930s? He blames England and France for much of this failure. Between 1935 and late 1938, Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov, an advocate of collective security, asked England and France for a military alliance against Adolf Hitler. Yet British and French prime ministers Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, and Edouard Daladier rejected all overtures from Moscow. Carley persuasively argues that the British and French leaders were driven by an intense anticommunist ideology. They were afraid that an alliance with Russia would lead to war against Hitler. Russia alone would benefit from a war. The Soviets might encourage a war against Hitler and then stand aside and watch the capitalist countries weaken themselves. Perhaps war and devastation would create the breeding ground for a socialist revolution. Even if Russia joined England and France, victory against Hitler risked the spread of communism as the Red Army advanced into Central Europe. At this cost, victory over fascism was not a high priority for England and France. Indeed, the fear that a war against Hitler would result in Soviet gains "drove appeasement as much as fear of Nazi power" (p. 257).

In April 1939, following Hitler's seizure of Czechoslovakia and the British guarantee to Poland, Paris and London began discussions with Moscow concerning security arrangements. Carley, profiting from recently released Soviet documents, adds new details to these negotiations and, in so doing, supplements the works of A. J. P. Taylor and Donald Cameron Watt. When Litvinov proposed a tripartite alliance, England and France rejected it because it included a guarantee for Finland and the Baltic states. Chamberlain feared that Russia would use the guarantee to occupy the four countries. France then offered a new proposal: Russia would come to the aid of London and Paris if war ensued as a result of their assistance to Poland. Russia asked for reciprocal guarantees. England and France refused, giving Russia the impression that it would have to face Germany alone. Additional time was wasted as they squabbled over the meaning of Nazi "indirect" aggression as it pertained to the small eastern states.

The negotiations broke down in August 1939 when France and England were not able to guarantee Russia's passage through Poland in case of an impending war with Germany. On August 23, convinced that France and England would not oppose Hitler, Joseph Stalin agreed to a nonaggression pact with Germany. Secure in the East, Hitler would now begin his conquest of Europe. Stalin, for his part, thought that he was getting security for Russia. In reality, by agreeing to the Nazi-Soviet pact, Stalin had tragically fallen into the same trap as Chamberlain and Daladier: he thought that he could do business with Hitler.

Carley is unsparing in his criticism of Chamberlain for the failure of the recent negotiations. Chamberlain, according to Carley, did not want an alliance with

Russia. Negotiations had been undertaken only because public opinion and domestic political pressure demanded an agreement. In mid-1939, when Moscow was hoping to arrange an alliance to fight Hitler, Chamberlain was offering to negotiate with Hitler. There were other indications, at least to Moscow, that Chamberlain was not serious about stopping Hitler. When the French-British military delegation arrived in Moscow for negotiations, Russia discovered that the British had no power to negotiate an agreement while the French had the power to negotiate but not the authority to sign an agreement. Furthermore, the British-French team offered no operational plans for a war against Hitler.

On August 16, while the British-French delegation was still in Moscow, the British chiefs of staff reported to Chamberlain that only Russia could save Poland from Nazi Germany; thus, a British-French-Soviet alliance was an immediate necessity. Warsaw must be ordered to allow Russian troops to move through Poland. The report warned that if there were no British-French alliance with Russia, there would be a Nazi-Soviet agreement and Poland would be sacrificed. Nevertheless, complacency and generalities continued to characterize the British negotiating approach to Russia. Carley concludes that at a time when a Nazi invasion of Poland was imminent and the Soviet army was demonstrating its military capability by thrashing the Japanese on the Manchurian border, Chamberlain's rejection of a Soviet alliance was "illogical . . . [and] incomprehensible" (p. 181). His decision can only be explained by an "ideologically motivated" (p. 181) anticommunism.

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JOHN KILLICK. *The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945-1960*. (BAAS paperbacks.) Edinburgh: Keele University Press. 1997. Pp. ix, 209.

GEIR LUNDESTAD. *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. viii, 2000. Cloth \$77.00, paper \$18.95.

Each of these short monographs addresses the central debate in postwar European historiography about the extent to which the subsequent development and current political and economic posture of Western Europe may be ascribed to American influence. The traditional argument has been that American influence was of very great importance; that position suffered a sustained assault in the 1980s, however, from a minimalist position asserted by Alan Milward and a school of historians under his influence. Milward argued that economic recovery would have occurred in Western Europe pretty much as it did had the Marshall Plan never existed, and that European integration was a pragmatic policy initiated by the European nations to do collectively what they were unable to do satisfacto-

rily for themselves. These two books reassert the "traditionalist" perspective of the centrality of American influence.

Of the two, John Killick's is the more effective. He grants that Marshall Plan aid was small as compared to the gross domestic product of the European nations but insists upon its critical importance at the moment when it was implemented. True, Europe was experiencing rapid recovery from the effects of the war by 1947, but the winter of 1946–1947 and consequent shortages of food and fuel threatened economic collapse and political instability. France produced 6.7 million metric tons of wheat in 1946 but only half as much in 1947, and the bread ration was reduced to 250 and then 200 grams per day. Investment could not have continued in these conditions; small in relation to French GDP, the Marshall Plan provided up to fifty percent of Monnet Plan investment in 1948. More importantly, what William Clayton correctly perceived from Washington was a breakdown in the structure of European markets, with peasants withholding their grain from the cities and feeding it to cattle. Killick assures us that the crisis was real, and, as it worsened during 1947, the Americans were obliged to step in with "interim aid" even before the Marshall Plan could be put through Congress in 1948.

Killick presents a multicausal argument for the Marshall Plan and concludes that its goals were attained, whereas without it, alternative outcomes were possible and even likely, ranging from an autarchic and closed European system of trade characteristic of the interwar period to total collapse and communism. The Marshall Plan met the British financial crisis of 1947 and provided for German reconstruction and integration into the Western bloc. Marshall aid helped the reestablishment of markets and stimulated the revival of intra-European trade, of critical importance to the smaller European countries. The plan was also motivated by the American desire to see a European economy of scale, a dose of federalism *à l'américaine*, and American-style corporate capitalism with labor relations based on a politics of productivity rather than class conflict. Killick draws freely from arguments put forward by Michael Hogan and Charles Maier, but his central point is that without the Marshall Plan France and Italy could have collapsed, dragging down the European system, while with substantial doses of Americanization in every sphere of politics and economics (about culture Killick is silent), Europe achieved the best of possible outcomes.

Geir Lundstad devotes his entire short book to American policy toward European integration, affording an aperçu that takes us from the postwar period through the present. This is an ambitious theme, and Lundstad only probes the surface, but the story is in its essentials a simple one. The Americans at all times supported European integration albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm and always within an Atlantic framework. That support was initially enthusiastic and manifested itself with considerable direct pressure, but

there were several key turning points at which the policy was altered in emphasis. In 1949–1950, the Americans pressed for a smaller Europe absent Great Britain, despite its explicit threat to American economic interests through discrimination against American exports. In 1962–1963, the Kennedy administration insisted on the insertion of European unity, including Great Britain, into an Atlantic framework under American leadership, lest it lead to a "third force" that might assert itself independently between Washington and Moscow. This emphasis was meant to meet the challenge from Charles de Gaulle, whom the Americans succeeded in isolating so as to maintain their direct hegemony within NATO. Finally, from 1969–1970, the Americans abandoned efforts to push the Europeans to unite while trying to see that whatever European entity did emerge remained open to American exports. But Washington still believed that European integration was beneficial to its long-term interests and irreversible; its policy was to adapt to it and shape it in the most favorable direction possible.

Lundstad's assessment of Washington's motives scarcely differ from Killick's. These were, in ascending order of importance, the American faith in the superiority of their own federal system based on free markets and political democracy, the need for European economies of scale, the desire to lessen the American economic burden, and the double containment of Moscow on the one hand and Germany on the other. NATO, for Lundstad, was indeed about keeping "Washington in, the Russians out, and the Germans down"; moreover, by neutralizing the fear of Germany in Western Europe the Americans made possible its insertion into a Western community of nations that could help it in turn to stand up to the threat of international communism. In emphasizing the importance of the containment of Germany, Lundstad does a signal service. On the extent of American influence, Lundstad places himself among the "traditionalists" as opposed to Milward's "revisionism"; he believes that the Europe that has emerged today is one with which the Americans have cause to be well satisfied. It is also a Europe that continues, despite exceptional progress economically and politically, to be dependent upon the United States as the arbiter in the last resort of its affairs. This was amply demonstrated in the recent crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, both of which the Europeans attempted to handle by themselves but which ended only following Washington's direct intervention. Thus does Europe continue to be an "empire by integration," just as it was earlier, in a celebrated term of the same author, an "empire by invitation." These terms, which Lundstad insists are morally neutral, are meant nevertheless to capture the nature of American Atlantic hegemony during the postwar era. Lundstad always uses "empire" in inverted commas, and insists that the American variant was unique among imperial systems of the past, whether French, British, or Soviet, in seeking to unite its dependencies rather than divide and rule them. At the same time the U.S. accorded

them a large degree of autonomy in accordance with its own values. It was an "empire" that Europeans by and large sought rather than fled from.

Each of these studies is effective in its own way, but both are flawed by what David Hackett Fisher once termed "Historians' Fallacies": in the case of Killick it is the fallacy of counter-factual argument, in the case of Lundstad the fallacy of names. Killick falls back too much on speculating about what outcomes were possible or likely absent American influence, while Lundstad constructs his argument by taking a loaded term, empire, putting it in inverted commas, giving it a definition, and then inviting the reader to conclude that the hegemonic relations he describes were in fact the thing in question. Whether or not one puts "empire" in inverted commas, its intended meaning remains unmistakable and arguably a mistake when it is applied to the story of American-European relations.

In the case of Killick, it seems hardly meaningful to speculate about American absence: there was never really a question of the U.S. withdrawing from Europe, the only issue was how its influence would manifest itself. Washington needed Europe as much as Europe needed it, and the Marshall Plan, for all its drama, must be interpreted in the context of a continued stream of financial resources the Americans made available to Europe between 1945 (not to mention lend-lease during the war) and 1954. As Killick recognizes, the American loan to Great Britain negotiated by John Maynard Keynes in 1946 was more extensive than Marshall Plan aid, and Europe was already receiving a great deal of American aid from loans and through the United Nations. The Marshall Plan systematized this aid, and rapidly gave way in turn to military assistance in response to the Korean war that continued through the 1950s. Both authors ignore that Marshall Plan aid also enabled European governments to avoid causing sustained privation of the masses and the corresponding pressure in favor of social egalitarianism that deprivation would have caused; it sustained the severe class divisions in Europe that its progenitors themselves criticized. The strikes in 1947 in France and Italy, ostensibly against the Marshall Plan, were in fact about the very pragmatic issue of the distribution of scarcity, less about communism than about wages and hours.

The Americans, moreover, were never directly hegemonic in Europe, which leads us to Lundstad's loaded term, "empire." They functioned more as a pressure group: they had lots of money to spend, fervent political allies who wanted nothing more than to rid themselves of communist influence by attaching themselves to American coattails, and they pressed specific policies on the Europeans but with mixed results. The French took Marshall Plan aid gladly but refused to spend it on housing despite Washington's pressure, and the Italians used it, as did the British, for a sterile operation of liquidating public debt, which in Italy led to recession rather than growth. The effectiveness of American aid in France must be evaluated

in the context of the costly and useless French effort to hold on to Indochina, a policy that in total over eight years drained France of more wealth than it received. Aid became a nasty habit: even in 1957, Washington dared not withhold help from France, during the height of the Algerian war of which it disapproved, for fear of internal consequences out of its control.

It was a strange "empire" indeed in which the imperial rulers lived in constant fear of losing crucial portions of it entirely through events that they could not control. The Americans feared German pressure in the direction of neutralism after the demise of Konrad Adenauer, and they constantly suspected the French of bargaining away essential components of western policy in exchange for an alleged "planetary deal" with Moscow. During the Suez crisis the Americans incurred the lasting enmity of the French and insured that the latter would build their own nuclear weapons. By not examining the European side of the equation, Lundstad touches too lightly on the extent to which Suez propelled the French into the European Community which was successfully negotiated in opposition to Washington, despite the American official policy in its favor. Adenauer and Guy Mollet, in November 1956 in Paris, condemned American policy in bitter terms and determined upon a policy of building Europe as a "third force" that could be independent of Washington. In 1957-1958 Paris pursued a plan for joint atomic weapons research with Germany and Italy based upon existing progress on the French bomb, a project that de Gaulle, great paragon of independence that he was, scuttled for fear of Germany. "Empire" by invitation or integration may obscure more than it clarifies. But these remain good books.

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PAUL GORDON LAUREN. *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen*. (Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 385. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$29.95.

For scholars of international human rights, it is difficult to imagine a finer gift on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights than this study of the Declaration's complex and far-reaching impact. Paul Gordon Lauren has skillfully combined a detailed history of the legal documents with the political, philosophical, and social contexts in which they developed. He has further enriched his study with the personal visions of leading individuals so that the story comes alive, unfolding with a human drama supported by meticulous scholarly research.

There are, of course, innumerable studies, within the field of human rights law and beyond, that offer insights into the processes that have led to contemporary understandings of human rights. The bibliography

that Lauren offers reveals the extensive literature that is now available on the subject and also the great breadth of resources the author has drawn upon and reflects in this remarkable study. There is, for example, a very thoughtful cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural analysis of the roots of twentieth-century human rights norms. Lauren finds within the world's religions—including Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, and Christianity—fundamental beliefs that support the concept of non-injury to others, responsibility for those who are hungry or ill, and profound respect for the life of each person. The author concludes from his extensive readings that although societies do not all respect and share the same rights and values, "the moral worth of each person is a belief that no single civilization, or people, or nation, or geographical area, or even century can claim as uniquely its own" (p. 11).

Lauren observes the contributions that various civilizations have made to the development of human rights. He argues that initially philosophy and law linked individual rights to individual responsibilities, a position later espoused by the socialist states in human rights treaty negotiations. He also points to a strong linkage between economic and social change and the emphasis on individual rights, particularly once the rise of science and the secular tradition established the intellectual and political basis for human rights. Pointing to the American and French revolutionary leaders, he argues that the visions of these political leaders, like those of the religious leaders, emphasized "the best rather than the worst in human nature" (p. 20), which is an essential attitudinal element in the continuing evolution of human rights.

Lauren does not shy away from the serious and extensive criticism of human rights law. In each section of the book, he carefully explains and acknowledges the legitimacy of many of the most critical arguments: failure fully to address race and gender discrimination, continuing gross economic and social inequalities, deep-rooted traditions of injustice, and the abiding challenge of respecting cultural difference while advancing universal norms. At each historical period, he points to the various forms these arguments took and indicates how individuals and organizations were able, nonetheless, to move the global human rights agenda forward.

What emerges from Lauren's research and analysis is that the Universal Declaration was a landmark representing a culmination of extensive, if slowly developing legal and political work and the particular circumstances, including outraged public opinion about the Holocaust, existing at the end of World War II. Many treated the Declaration as a rhetorical statement without legally binding authority, nothing more than a single resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. It quickly began to take on a higher meaning, however, as an interpretation of the human rights articles of the UN Charter, as a model for the constitutions of new nation states, as the basis for two

binding human rights covenants, and as customary international law. The many human rights treaties, global and regional, which grew directly out of provisions in the Universal Declaration or indirectly out of the spirit of emerging global human rights norms are evidence of how very far the international community has come since, and by building on the foundation of, the Universal Declaration. The publishers are to be commended on their foresight in asking this particular expert to take on the task of commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration in such an appropriate and useful manner.

Lauren concludes his work in the positive way that he begins. Although human rights norms have been critiqued by many for presenting idealistic goals that are not realizable, Lauren points to the progress that has clearly been made. One purpose of law, after all, is to set out expected behavioral guidelines, rules that clarify appropriate and inappropriate action. Prior to the drafting of the Universal Declaration, it was difficult to argue that human rights violations within a country were even a proper subject of international concern. Today, in spite of vibrant nationalism and continuing significant cultural differences, the governments of the world have accepted the idea of universal standards. "A widespread belief exists that serious human rights violation in one country in one way or another do threaten the peace and security of others" (p. 297). Lauren also points out that even when the news is bad, when governments have failed to prevent human rights violations or, in the worst cases, are themselves party to the violations, the perspective of history, of how far we as a world community have come, is an important antidote to despair. At such moments, the visions of those who have worked so hard to change our laws, our political agendas, and our view of our possible futures inspire us to persist.

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LINDA GRANT DE PAUW, *Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in War from Prehistory to the Present*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1998. Pp. xvii, 395. \$24.95.

History today is not so much a coherent academic discipline as an assemblage of loosely related sub-fields. The traditional divisions of time and space persist, but these now frame social and economic history as well as narratives of politics and war. New methodologies and theoretical approaches have inspired systematic reappraisal of earlier findings while simultaneously inviting us to discover history in nooks and crannies of the human experience previously overlooked. The result is a body of published research swollen to such immense proportions that few historians would claim to have mastered the relevant material for an entire sub-field. It thus requires considerable courage for an individual to pursue even a narrowly defined theme from prehistory to the present.



When, as in the present book by Linda Grant De Pauw, the theme is expansive and conjoins two richly developed sub-fields—military and women's history—the exercise is fraught with peril. For the treatment of those periods outside the author's own expertise (here the American Revolution), the secondary literature becomes critical. Poor choices invite errors of fact, method, and concept.

Since this book bears directly on a controversial public policy, it is unfortunate that it fails all of these tests. The opening chapter is conceptual, partisan, and flawed. Here De Pauw defines the terms woman and war preliminary to cataloguing the roles that women typically play in wartime (victim, instigator, camp follower, war leader, rear guard, covert operator, Amazon, androgynous warrior). She rightly views gender (p. 4) and war (p. 9) as cultural constructs, but her definition of war leaves much to be desired, and she declines to define the term "peace." War is "a disciplined and socially sanctioned use of deadly force by one group of people against another" (p. 9). Peace, we are told early in the second chapter ("Prehistory"), is merely the absence of war: "for 90 percent of the time our species has lived on this planet, we practiced only the arts of peace" (p. 27). This will not do: if war is a continuum, then peace must be as well. De Pauw cannot, however, make such a concession. Throughout she writes approvingly of women in combat, and it is manifestly clear (see especially pp. 294–95) that she is drawing on historical evidence to undermine the argument that women have no place on the battlefield. By situating the origins of warfare in the fifth millennium B.C. and having women ride onto the battlefield at the outset (pp. 33–34), she implies that the appearance of women in combat is as old as war itself. The evidence for warfare in earlier hunter-gatherer societies must, therefore, be explained away (pp. 26–33).

The insistence on lethality in De Pauw's concept of war conveniently eliminates the modern-day genderless class of economic warriors from the discussion. The definition is sufficiently broad to embrace female members of urban gangs, but these self-styled warriors are passed over in a text that favors "regulars" over "irregulars" throughout. Finally, although she twice refers in passing to the female's procreative function (pp. 210, 295), De Pauw never develops the argument that women are biologically indispensable to the military mission of any state. Classical Sparta, the most militarized society in history, restricted commemoration on tombstones to those who died in battle—or in childbirth. Future studies should focus on this question above all.

This brings me to the book's methodological deficiencies. The eight chapters that range from classical antiquity to the present amount to a collection of anecdotes taken out of historical context. We are repeatedly introduced to women who surreptitiously join the military. Since we cannot estimate their numbers, it is incumbent upon the author to locate the anecdotes inside a sustained analysis of the official

policies of the states involved. This is nowhere forthcoming. Other methodological lapses fall within the realm of wishful thinking. In the second chapter, De Pauw laboriously constructs an enormous Amazon empire (pp. 43–54). In contrast, Sue Blundell observes in *Women in Ancient Greece* (1995) that "no archaeological evidence has been uncovered which would remotely suggest the existence, in the Bronze Age or at any later time, of a community consisting entirely of female warriors" (p. 61). More outrageous still, in De Pauw's third chapter we read that "some Roman women, obviously, were capable of bearing arms. Did any of them ever fight in the ranks? The question is valid; the silence of the sources proves nothing" (p. 69).

Factual errors are legion, but this example is typical. Ancient historians will be astonished to learn that "by 2700 B.C. Sumer had a fully professionalized army complete with military academies, general staff structures, military training programs, a permanent arms industry, books on tactics, military procurement, distinct combat arms branches, logistic systems, conscription, and military pay" (p. 36). This is all wrong, but De Pauw has not misread her source. The error stems from treating a text that is egregiously inaccurate as authoritative.

This is a terrible book, then, on a good topic. A disinterested collaborative effort may one day produce more useful results.

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NICOLE ANN DOMBROWSKI, editor. *Women and War in the Twentieth Century: Enlisted with or without Consent*. (Women's History and Culture, number 13.) (Garland Reference Library of the Humanities, number 1969.) New York: Garland. 1999. Pp. ix, 377. \$59.00.

This collection of articles is an ambitious effort to consider the engagement of women in war in the twentieth century around the world. The fifteen contributions are grouped into three chronological categories: 1914 to 1939, 1939 to 1945, and 1946 to the present. Eight of the pieces deal with Europe and the United States; the remainder consider topics that range geographically from China and Japan to Central and South America and the Middle East. Much of this work is very interesting, but as is so often the case in collections, strong parts do not necessarily make for a strong whole.

The articles worthy of mention are thoughtful studies of little-known subjects. Helen Praeger Young writes on women in the Chinese Communist army before 1949, Barbara Alpern Engel on women in the Soviet Army of World War II, Atina Grossmann on rape of German women in the last days of that same war, Ivy D. Arai on the consequences of interment for Japanese-American women, and Elizabeth Thompson on efforts to establish women's social, political, and economic rights in Syria and Lebanon in the 1930s and



1940s. All these articles deal with World War II, and although they discuss very different topics, they demonstrate, taken together, the complexity of women's responses to that disastrous time. They also suggest that a volume devoted exclusively to comparative analyses of World War II's consequences for women would be very valuable.

Unfortunately, the excellent articles are not well connected to one another or to the other pieces in the book. As in most collections, the contributors report the results of their specialized research, making few comparative observations. Indeed, there is no indication that they read one another's pieces as they wrote their own. So it falls to the editor to write the more global analysis that will draw the parts together. Editor Nicole Ann Dombrowski does lay out many of the questions on the agenda of those studying women and war in the twentieth century in her introduction, but she does not make the connections between the pieces in the collection that would contribute answers to those questions. Nor was sufficient editorial control exercised over the contributors, with the consequence that the weaker articles are very weak indeed: muddled, repetitive, and poorly researched. Two of the pieces, one on Japanese suicides on Saipan in 1944 and another on the current status of rape as a war crime, are competent essays, but they bear only a tangential relation to the subject of the book, women's responses to and participation in war.

In part these difficulties may arise from the book's ambitious reach. Operating with such blunt conceptual instruments as "women" and "war" and seeking to cover the entire planet across a one-hundred-year period, the most creative editor would find herself hard put to say anything original. Dombrowski falls back on interpretations that are already well established. She concludes that women were significant participants in twentieth-century wars, although their participation was overlooked in postwar retelling. She argues that wars opened up opportunities for women to venture beyond social controls but that the dislocations provoked reassertion of sexual and gender norms during wartime itself and especially thereafter. These conclusions are not new, however true they may be and however important their reiteration may be to our understanding of war and women's history. They are just a starting point from which to undertake research that will break down such enormous and imprecise categories as women and war by studying particular groups of women and particular types of war. There are many such studies underway right now. This book, with the exception of the few individual pieces already cited, does not advance that scholarship.

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CINDY S. ARON. *Working at Play: A History of Vacations in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. xi, 324. \$35.00.

ORVAR LÖFGREN. *On Holiday: A History of Vacationing*. (California Studies in Critical Human Geography, number 6.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 320. \$29.95.

Both these histories of vacationing in Western cultures organize their argument around a polar tension. In Cindy S. Aron's book, the tension is between two views of leisure, seen negatively as idleness or positively as re-creation, in the literal sense of restoring bodily and mental health. Fears of leisure were not simply paternalist concerns of the middle class projected onto the working class. For middle-class Americans as well, it remained a central struggle to reconcile their need and desire for extended periods of rest and recreation with their commitment to work. The work ethic, or the gospel of work, shaped by both Puritan and republican doctrines, dominated the nineteenth-century social and intellectual landscape in the United States.

Orvar Löfgren places a different tension at the center of his analysis, a tension between two vacationing attitudes, embodied respectively by the fictional characters Phileas Fogg and Robinson Crusoe. The polarity is borrowed from French sociologist Jean-Didier Urbain and opposes the male and middle-class model of Fogg, "the ardent and hurried traveler in search of new sights," to the "Robinsonian desire 'to get away from it all'" (p. 9). This time the polarity has a class ring to it and serves in a discourse of moral and aesthetic distinction, elevating the "true traveler," the Fogg of this world, over the *tourist vulgaris* caught in the fake world of prefabricated experience and the package tour. Löfgren wishes to move beyond such "tired stereotypes" (p. 8) and to restore the moral and aesthetic neutrality of his polar pair of travelers, stressing the uniqueness of all personal travel experiences.

Aron's exploration of forms of vacationing as they emerged from the early nineteenth century through the Depression years of the 1930s is broadly chronological. She sees each consecutive form in conjunction with social and cultural changes, such as the changing structure of occupations and sources of income, the changing make-up of the middle class (and its use of vacations as a cultural marker, a middle-class entitlement), changing gender relations, the changing cultural concerns about leisure time (under churchly or secular auspices), and, finally, the rise of new vacationing groups, like the working class or the black population. Each type of vacationing comes out in remarkably rich detail, due to impressive research and a keen ear for the telling anecdote. Through the voices of a great many individual participants, the historical experience of the various forms of vacation is brought back to life, from the genteel pleasures of the early resorts and watering places to the exhilaration of touring once members of the working class could afford to own motorcars. The author has an eye for the gendered aspects of her story and for signs of resistance to them. The early fashionable resorts, with their rounds of

social events, gossip, and snobbery, she describes as “gendered female,” according to the popular press of the day. Religious resorts or, later in the century, self-improvement resorts of a secular nature were more clearly male-dominated. Still later, camping supplied a masculine remedy for the feminized resort vacation. Aron’s ironic conclusion is that by the early twentieth century, vacationing had become an experience widely shared among Americans, yet segregation rather than integration characterized that experience. Vacationing in this sense may have operated differently from other forms of commercial leisure, like public amusement sites.

Aron’s main narrative line remains the one of America’s unease with time not spent working. Again, the author keeps her sense of irony. With the advent of “tourism,” people touring as a form of vacation not only visited places that elevated and educated them, such as historic sights and monuments, but work sites also became tourist sights. By watching others work, tourists could keep themselves in touch with the world of work and avoid the potentially dangerous and corrupting influence of idleness. Throughout the nineteenth century, vacations may have been seen, although never without ambivalence, as a middle-class entitlement for people exercising their brains. Only in the twentieth century would people doing physical labor be seen as equally entitled. This would never occur as in Europe, as part of a political and social rights agenda, supported by unions or political parties, and instituted by law. To the extent that American workers now have paid vacations, it is in a context of voluntarism, agreed on between employers and workers, not as an entitlement by law.

“One striking testimony to the importance of vacations in modernity is the fact that nation-states started to take a keen interest in them early on” (p. 271). Or so Löfgren argues. The statement is illustrative of the author’s love of the sweeping generalization. If the nexus is between modernity and vacations, never mind the exceptions to the rule. Nowhere in the book are there the rigor of historical research and temporal specificity that characterize Aron’s study. Ideal-typical constructions with all their Weberian exaggeration form the logic of discourse. An example is the chapter on the Mediterranean in the age of the package tour. Using what the author calls a Braudel approach, he “can track the package tour’s institutions and routines” (p. 157). From that vantage point, it does not surprise that the story has a strong teleological thrust. Everything, we are told in a very selective and non-systematic way, works toward the Mediterranean experience as a packaged product, marketed across Europe. “The strongest homogenizing influence in the Mediterranean tourist industry is the unit on which nearly all vacationing builds: the charter tour week” (p. 186). Nearly all vacationing? How about the untold others from across Europe who went south in search of an entirely different experience?

The maddening lack of system and rigor in this book

even affects its central characters, Fogg and Crusoe. Fogg-like tourists are shown as “having taken up the new sensibilities of the sublime,” an interest “mirroring the other face of modernity,” a.k.a. the Robinsonian quest (p. 268). Like the ball in a pinball machine, the author touches many interesting points, topics worthy of further exploration, but he careens on. Like Fogg? Like Crusoe?

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ANGUS McLAREN. *Twentieth-Century Sexuality: A History*. (Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times.) Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. 1999. Pp. viii, 296. \$59.95.

Angus McLaren is well known for his significant contributions to the history of reproduction, gender, and sexuality, including *Birth Control in Nineteenth Century England* (1978); *A History of Contraception: From Antiquity to the Present* (1996); *Reproductive Rituals: The Perception of Fertility in England from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century* (1984); and *The Trials of Masculinity: Policing Sexual Boundaries, 1870–1930* (1997). The present study sets out to locate the sexual debates of the end of the millennium within their longer-term context. As McLaren cogently remarks, these debates are often “historically impoverished” and “unaware of the genealogy of the discussion” (p. 2). It is a mammoth task, especially as he includes not only North America (where surely enough has happened during the century just past to be sufficiently daunting to the synthesising historian) but Britain and continental Europe as well. McLaren, however, does not lump these together into a homogenous mass of undifferentiated “twentieth-century sexual culture”: while dealing with over-arching historical trends in common rather than differences, he is aware of the particular national traditions and idiosyncrasies that have inflected developments in different countries.

As always, the book is stuffed full of goodies in the form of little-known facts and events and provocative and stimulating interpretations, written in McLaren’s usual readable style. It elucidates the trajectory of changing sexual attitudes and mores over a broad front, registering both changes and the (sometimes occluded) continuities.

Having said this—and there is a good deal to be gotten out of this book—it does not come entirely up to the standard that one expects from its distinguished author. It may be quibbling to cavil, but there are a number of minor though irritating inaccuracies and omissions concerning the British scene. The body founded by an alliance of feminists and doctors concerned about venereal disease in 1914 (not 1915) was the National Council for Combatting Venereal Diseases, not the Association for Moral and Social Hygiene, formerly Josephine Butler’s Ladies’ National Association to Repeal the Contagious Diseases Acts.

Birth control was certainly not included within the National Health Service in 1948: contraceptive services were only fully incorporated in 1974. The take-up of vasectomy in the 1970s somewhat undercuts the assumption that, following the advent of the birth control pill, men were relinquishing contraceptive responsibility. The relatively early legalization of abortion in the United Kingdom is not mentioned, nor is the fact that in 1991, after two decades of struggle, the 1967 Steel Act was essentially confirmed rather than restricted, in spite of the "family values" agenda of the Thatcher government then in power. Domestic violence toward women (including sexual violence) was rediscovered in the 1970s rather than being a new issue, having been a major concern of the nineteenth-century women's movement. Although none of these instances seriously militates against the general argument, such blips are distracting.

In the later chapters, there is sometimes a feeling that McLaren was desperately trying to cram everything in, leading to rather odd juxtapositions of issues and chronological elisions (always a problem in a vast overview of this nature) and, more than in earlier sections, something of a sense that North America is the focus with Britain and Europe tacked on.

Partly the problem is that there is just so much to deal with; there are so many aspects to sexuality in the twentieth century. This may have been the case in earlier epochs also, but seldom does there survive the vast array of resources in a wide variety of media, telling different stories and needing different interpretative strategies, which the historian cannot help but be aware of, even when taking the decision to delineate certain boundaries within which the study can be contained practicably.

This book displays real strengths. McLaren does not try to simplify the complex story into what might be a more elegant but also a misleading narrative structure. Indeed, he cautions against too ready an acceptance of simplistic scenarios and assuming that apparent similarities across time and culture mean sameness. In particular he warns against a "unilinear and self-congratulatory" assumption of an evolution from obscurantism to enlightenment (without therefore glorifying the sexual worlds that we have lost) (p. 221). He emphasizes the ways in which "sex was not a natural act [but] continuously shaped and regulated" (p. 223), perpetually generating stories and being influenced by them.

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#### ASIA

EVELYN S. RAWSKI. *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions.* (A Philip E. Lilienthal Book.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 481. \$45.00.

This book by Evelyn S. Rawski is a major contribution to recent scholarship in Qing history. Relying on newly opened Manchu-language archives, Rawski's study presents a fresh analysis of the political culture of the Manchu conquest elite in the inner recesses of the Qing court. Rawski contends that the "Sinicization" thesis held among prominent historians (such as the late Mary C. Wright) is mistaken in its attempt to explain the Qing's successful control over its vast multicultural empire. She also claims that throughout the entire Qing dynasty "the Qing rulers kept their Manchu identity" (p. 4) and proposes "an alternative interpretation of the historic significance of this dynasty" (p. 299).

After laying out her premises in an introduction, Rawski devotes part one (chapter one) to a description of the "material culture" of the Qing court and its distinctive ruling policies, of which "separation" and "compartmentalization" were the two guiding principles. The system of multiple capitals (with Beijing as the empire's primary one) was adopted for "spatial" separation in order to facilitate the implementation of "culturally separated" imperial policies toward the three major ethnic groups of the empire.

Part two, on the "social organization of the Qing court," consists of four chapters. Chapter two analyzes the imperial lineage and the conquest elite that played a vital role in the imperial control policies toward the northeast and Inner Asian peripheries. The chapter also describes the Qing rulers' method of limiting their kinsmen's political autonomy to avoid the pitfalls of "inner circle" subversion that had plagued the Ming court.

Chapters three through five analyze Qing imperial policies dealing with other destabilizing factors: the issue of imperial succession in relation to "sibling politics" (chapter three); potential threats to the throne from the emperor's "agnatic relatives" (chapter four); and attitudes toward "imperial women" (mother, sisters, consorts, and daughters) and the issue of the "palace servants" (eunuchs and bondservants) (chapter five). In each of these areas, the Qing rulers were "true innovators." They selected heirs based on "merit" through a system of secret designation. Their policy toward female members of the imperial family also helped minimize the subversive potential from agnatic relatives; imperial consorts were recruited from "a wide social stratum of banner families," and "sons of lower ranking consorts were permitted to become emperor" (p. 296). Thus, the Qing, Rawski contends, "successfully synthesized Han Chinese bureaucratic techniques and non-Han fraternal alliances to resolve the perennial challenges of imperial kinsmen to the authority of the ruler" (p. 126).

In part three (chapters six to eight) Rawski argues that state rituals constituted an essential component of the Qing rulers' compartmentalization policy. By blending imperial images with political realities, they exploited the power of religious symbols "in the construction of imperial legitimation" (p. 10). The Qing

ruler was able "to speak directly in the cultural vocabularies of each of his major subject people" by patronizing Confucianism for the Han Chinese, shamanism for people in the northeast, and Tibetan Buddhism for Tibetans and Mongols. Qing rulers were "much less successful" in winning over the Turkic-speaking Muslims of Central Asia, despite their effort to support Islam (p. 10). Finally, private rituals performed within the palace of the inner court "created a solitary community that cut across other social boundaries" (p. 264).

Despite Rawski's bold challenge to existing scholarship, the issue of "Sinicization" remains a live one subject to further investigation. "Signs of acculturation" went on not only among the bannermen but also within the imperial court. From the seventeenth century through the late nineteenth, "[imperial] kinsmen in the mainline were taking Chinese names that followed the Han [three-character] conventions" (p. 39), and banner women showed up in "Han Chinese clothing" and "with bondfeet" even at the imperial inspection for "marriage draft" (p. 41). Languages are such culture-laden vehicles for social communication that it is, therefore, hard to see that no cultural reorientation had occurred at all within the "social self" (if not the "ego") of the Qing rulers who preferred to use Chinese rather than their "native speech" in the nineteenth century. Qing rulers' "awareness" of their Manchu identity does not necessarily mean that they successfully "kept" it (pp. 4–5).

Most significantly, Manchu rulers consciously "adopted" the "bureaucratic principles"—"the single most important aspect of the *Chinese political culture*"—and caused these borrowed Chinese elements to "take place systematically across a *wide range* of social institutions" (p. 296; *italics mine*). And by incorporating these principles into their compartmentalized cultural policies, they were also able to govern a multicultural empire more successfully than their predecessors, resolving some of the perennial problems in the realms of "dynastic politics," "imperial women," and "palace administration" (pp. 296–297) as well as in winning over both the Han Chinese and non-Han ethnic groups—except the Muslims—in the peripheries (pp. 10, 199).

Rawski's book should be commended for its extremely rich content and superb scholarly analysis. As indicated above, however, it seems to me that its provocative conclusion is not completely supported by the evidence. Perhaps in the author's usage, none of such terms as "adopted," "adapted," or "synthesized" is "Sinicization."

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DAVID WAKEFIELD, *Fenja: Household Division and Inheritance in Qing and Republican China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 1998. Pp. x, 261. \$42.00.

David Wakefield's book is a detailed, interdisciplinary, empirical study of an important phenomenon whose

nature has heretofore been mostly assumed rather than documented: the processes of household division and inheritance in Qing and Republican China. As such, it should quickly become the standard work on the topic.

Wakefield has used rare collections of household division documents from several regions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These documents are very detailed records of the composition of the family at the time of division and of the shares of property given to each of the heirs. Although the total sample contains only 166 cases and thus is unimpressive statistically, Wakefield makes the best of the data at hand and is able to discover both general principles and specific class and regional "orientations," or variations on these general principles.

Wakefield's findings are not surprising: they tend to verify what we had projected backward from ethnographic findings in the twentieth century. The majority of households waited to divide until after they had reached the phase of the patrilocal developmental cycle when married brothers, each with wife and some or all with children, formed joint households with their parents or surviving parent. Only about a third of households, however, waited until after both parents were dead before dividing. Wakefield speculates productively on what this tells us about the tension between economic incentives, which in certain circumstances tended to hold joint households together, and psychological tensions, which inevitably constituted a force for division.

Wakefield's most detailed findings, however, concern the distribution of household property at the time of division. In general, households in all the areas he examines followed the same basic principles: property was divided equally among brothers, but only after a certain amount of property was set aside for one or another common purpose, most often the lifetime support and funeral expenses of surviving parents. In addition, unmarried daughters always had the right to a dowry and wedding expenses, but married daughters had no further claim on family property. Adopted sons were ordinarily treated the same as biological sons, especially if they were adopted from within the lineage. Families made strenuous efforts to make sure that property shares were truly equal, going so far as to split each plot of land rather than giving different brothers unequally productive plots, for example, or compensating with money those brothers who received smaller rooms.

These general principles were followed everywhere, but certain regions varied the theme slightly. In North China, the practices were simplest; other than providing for aged parents, brothers rarely set aside property, instead dividing it all. In Taiwan, by contrast, property was sometimes set aside for the eldest grandson, effectively skewing the inheritance slightly toward the eldest son, but more significantly there were often set-asides for land or rooms to be held in common and used for ritual purposes. The gentry in Fujian com-



monly set aside property to pay schooling and examination expenses for potential officials; merchant families in Huizhou, Anhui commonly divided some forms of property earlier than others or left some commercial properties undivided as a sort of kin-based joint-stock corporations.

There are two important aspects of inheritance in the literature that Wakefield mysteriously neglects: the treatment of uxori-locally married sons-in-law and their offspring, and the possibility that property acquired since the last division of the family might have been divided differently from property that had been in the family for more than one generation. This is a shame, because both could shed important light on general principles.

Wakefield also draws some important conclusions from his analysis: Chinese inheritance really was equal; neither set-asides nor the modest favoritism sometimes shown to the eldest branch ever dragged the system anywhere close to unigeniture. This meant that equal inheritance really did lead to downward mobility in those branches of a family that were not able to add to their wealth before the next division. He speculates at the end that this might have retarded the development of capitalism, but he does not address the issue at sufficient length.

Wakefield's study also reinforces what we know about the unity of core Chinese culture in the late imperial era. There were regional variations, to be sure, but the same cultural principles of family formation and equal patrilineal inheritance operated in every corner of the empire that Wakefield has investigated.

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KATHY LE MONS WALKER. *Chinese Modernity and the Peasant Path: Semicolonialism in the Northern Yangzi Delta*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 330. \$55.00.

Kathy Le Mons Walker examines the economic and social consequences of modernization for Nantong County and vicinity. She argues that the cotton trade in this Yangzi delta region underwent three stages of transformation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: a period after 1884, when foreign yarn entered Nantong; the era of "self-reliance" programs promoted by domestic industrialist Zhang Jian; and a move by larger merchant firms in the 1920s and 1930s to ally with bureaucratic capitalism and undermine the enterprises of the second stage. These stages, Walker argues, were part of a "semicolonial process" begun after the Opium War that brought new focus to Shanghai markets and created opportunities for northern delta merchants to win inclusion in the activities of this new commercial center. In the process, a class strategy emerged defining a "merchant path," despite contradictory interests within this class, which sought

to reorganize the rural economy to meet the needs of urban-based capital. What most enhances the overall analysis in this study is the serious consideration Walker gives to the role of the peasant population; she concludes that peasant resistance to modernization constituted the only autonomous nationalist discourse of the period.

Walker's contributions to the study of rural China in the late Qing include challenges to the idea that the state itself was resistant to the activities of modernizing elites, a contention not born out by evidence from Nantong, as well as to the assumption that modernization created a separation between urban and rural (core and peripheral) areas, for at Nantong elites relied on a strategy of interlocking urban and rural economies to generate investment capital. Her evidence also shows that as advantages shifted to the large and medium-sized landlords, these groups expanded managerial farming, a finding contrary to previous studies of the Yangzi delta during this period. These economic shifts produced rural resistance as the Nantong farming population became increasingly subproletarianized, according to Walker's data. Although the discussion of rural resistance for the period 1900–1930 in the Nantong area is thin in this volume, the historical context of "policy-based resistance" by peasants throughout the north delta (dating back to the late Ming uprisings of bondservants and tenants) develops a framework in which the late Qing/early Republican resistance movements gain substance and meaning beyond mere response to short-term issues. The rights of dual ownership in landholding, won by peasants in earlier struggles, were, Walker argues, the foundation for the late Qing rent resistance efforts. The long-term evolution of an alternative "peasant path" renders industrial modernity alone problematic as an analytical standard for understanding the issues and potentials of early twentieth-century China.

Careful research of economic data informs Walker's study; she clearly sets her findings for Nantong alongside data from studies of other parts of China, drawing attention to the distinctive features of the northern delta region. Some of her conclusions, however, are more sketchy. The notion of a "peasant nation" with national goals is a leap. While sharing some grievances, would the peasants of Nantong, along with those at Chaunsha, Jiangsu or Laiyang, Shandong have held enough in common to constitute a national program? Possible their views were more anarchistic or imperial than nationalistic. The concept of "semicolonial process" modifies but does not really challenge the assumption of a universal model for progress, premised on the emergence of the nation-state. More details would be required on the cases of peasant activism at Nantong and elsewhere before the nature of the peasant alternative could be fully assessed.

This book is a uniquely well-balanced contribution to Chinese studies and to discussions concerned with the consequences of developmentalism. It presents



strong evidence that alternative visions of progress can be a serious factor in social change especially when those alternatives have deep roots in regional histories. A renewed look at discourses in peasant activism is a valuable endeavor to which this work points.

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WANG ZHENG. *Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1999. Pp. xv, 402. Cloth \$50.00, paper \$18.95.

It is not often the case that the reading of a scholarly book is so gripping that it keeps one up all night. But Wang Zheng's elegantly written study of women in China's so-called enlightenment (the May Fourth period, loosely defined as 1915–1925) makes for such fascinating reading! The book is unique in its attempt to recontextualize and thus to question the familiar narrative, perpetuated by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) historiography and Western scholarship alike, that the May Fourth period marked the decisive beginning of a women's movement in China, a movement that would eventually be brought to victory under the rule of the CCP after 1949.

Making use of hitherto unexplored sources (such as the oral narratives of five forgotten career women who lived through China's enlightenment), or interpreting well-known sources in novel ways (such as her close analytical readings of some of the most important women's journals from the period), and putting her findings into the broader theoretical context of gender studies, Wang paints a picture that is unprecedented in its richness and depth. She points to the important connections between the women's movement during the May Fourth period and developments during the late Qing to show that without these earlier foundations, the writings about and activities of May Fourth women would have been all but impossible—an aspect that is often overlooked in standard narratives. Moreover, Wang discusses the many contradictory dimensions of the women's movement during the May Fourth period, again an aspect which does not receive enough attention in the oft-repeated eulogy on May Fourth achievements. She uncovers the ambiguities in words and deeds of many of the movement's male protagonists, Lu Xun being a prominent example: although he advocated, in one of his most famous essays, that China's Noras had better find incomes before leaving their homes, he never allowed his own wife to work for a living and reduced her to being his helper and housekeeper.

Wang also elaborates on the changing positions taken by many of the female protagonists in the movement, noting that, more often than not, such changes had more to do with deeply felt personal experiences than with irreversible political convictions. (The case of female journalist Wang Yiwei, whose falling-out and later reconciliation with Liu-Wang

Liming over whether or not feminism ought to be a goal in itself or serve the greater purpose of supporting national salvation which was triggered by Wang Yiwei's disappointment over her husband's falseness, serves as an important example). Nor does Wang gloss over the many difficulties with which so-called liberated women were confronted throughout the May Fourth period. By providing evidence from misogynist discourse and behavior—which she shows to have been present in all the different gender, social, and political groups of the time—she illustrates how precarious the position of the “new woman” really was.

By thus providing a complicated picture tracing many vertical and horizontal dimensions hitherto unexplored, Wang's study constitutes a great leap forward in our understanding of the period's understudied feminisms. This is true despite the book's clearly defined subjective standpoint. Wang admits that she wrote it partly because she was shocked by the stories of the women she interviewed. It is her conviction that China needs to go back to the liberal feminism that was one of the options present during the May Fourth period. Even then, however, this option was contested by a feminism advocated by CCP partisans: a feminism subordinated to the good of the nation. The latter would become the one and only correct feminism after the foundation of the People's Republic of China.

All of the women interviewed by Wang were written out of the history of “correct feminism.” Wang is convinced that if the liberal option within feminism had continued to exist after 1949, their tragedies could have been remedied. This may be too one-sided a response to the dominant narrative that Wang tries to deconstruct. She herself points out that liberal feminism was an option only for a select few who would in turn be dependent on cheap (female) labor to take care of their children and household chores—thus perpetuating female submission at a different level, something that the socialist version of feminism attempted to eradicate. But one need not agree with this final conclusion at all to remain thoroughly convinced of the importance of Wang's book.

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HAROLD M. TANNER. *Strike Hard! Anti-Crime Campaigns and Chinese Criminal Justice, 1979–1985*. (Cornell East Asia Series, number 104.) Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University East Asia Program. 1999. Pp. x, 253. Cloth \$28.00, paper \$17.00.

In the early 1980s, Chinese newspapers abounded with vivid accounts of public show trials and open-air executions of rapists, murderers, and thieves. The country was in the apparent throes of a harsh government campaign to thwart the crime wave that crested with the market reforms and political liberalization of the post-Mao era. Harold M. Tanner studies this campaign in the context of the reform of criminal law under Mao Zedong's Communist successors. It is an

important study of legal institutions and official practice from 1979 to the late 1980s and a helpful guide to the writings of Chinese criminologists.

As Tanner shows, the reform of Chinese criminal law after 1979 was one of many efforts to address the injustices wrought under earlier revolutionary struggles. During the Maoist era, virtually any behavior could be deemed criminal, and untold numbers of people were subjected to unwarranted punishments. The codifiers of the Criminal Law of 1979 and the Law of Criminal Procedure of 1980 were determined to provide some protection against coerced confessions, trial without legal representation, and other abuses. At the same time, legal institutions were reorganized in order to implement criminal law more effectively.

These efforts were thwarted by ongoing institutional inadequacies, the instrumentalism of official Chinese legal thought, and the crime wave of the 1970s and 1980s. Chinese legal theorists continued to understand law as a tool of the moral transformation of the individual and the modern development of the economy. In spite of sincere efforts to codify legal protections and systematize criminal law, officials will circumvent written law when they deem it necessary to achieve more important economic or political ends.

Post-Mao Chinese authorities considered the increasing rate of serious crime to be inimical to economic development and socialist order. In party debates over the problem, advocates of policies designed to ameliorate the underlying causes of criminal behavior momentarily lost out to those calling for a "severe and rapid punishment" approach. The anti-crime campaigns of the 1980s were intended to reduce crime by striking fear into the hearts of criminals. The crime problem was not solved in the long term. But the harsh campaign to eradicate criminal behavior undermined many of the very legal reforms that the party had effected just a few years earlier.

Tanner has read widely in the sources on contemporary Chinese law and provides a wealth of important information about criminology, criminal procedure and behavior, statistics, and prison reform. But the book operates in a historical vacuum. He never considers the efforts of the People's Republic in light of the larger historical project of twentieth-century legal reform. Efforts to reform Chinese criminal law in the early twentieth century reflect many of the problems with which legal reformers struggle today: how do you maintain a sense of ideological integrity while adopting some notions of Euro-American criminal justice? How do you manage a burgeoning crime rate while industrializing within a global capitalist system? A consideration of the context of twentieth-century legal reform might at least have added greater analytical power to Tanner's application of modernization theory.

Ignoring earlier Chinese traditions in criminal law also leads Tanner into some misleading statements. The principle of legal analogy did not originate in the Communist base area laws, as Tanner writes. It had

been a central feature of Chinese criminal law for centuries (until 1935) and its persistence implies something larger about Chinese statecraft than the contemporary twist he gives to it. He also ascribes the organizing structure of the Criminal Law of 1979 (a division between "general" and "specific" criminal laws) to the sole influence of the Soviet code. The Soviet code was indeed highly influential in the formulation of Maoist criminal law. But the Qing reformed code of 1907 and the Nationalists' criminal code of 1935 were also structured this way. This is because the larger influence on twentieth-century Chinese (and Russian) reform was European continental law (initially filtered through Japan, in China's case).

Tanner does an excellent job of determining the social background of certain types of criminals. But the book neglects the Chinese social experience of the anti-crime campaign. Newspapers documented some trials and executions, and Tanner interviewed several Chinese criminals, but he does not appear interested in the social and cultural dimension of the campaign itself or what it was like for a criminal or a spectator to live through it. These reservations notwithstanding, his book remains highly useful reading for specialists in Chinese legal and institutional history.

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NGUYEN THI DIEU. *The Mekong River and the Struggle for Indochina: Water, War, and Peace*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999. Pp. xvi, 264. \$59.95.

In April 1965, as the United States was committing its ground forces and air power to the defense of South Vietnam, President Lyndon B. Johnson made a dramatic offer to North Vietnam. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University, Johnson proposed a vast program of regional economic development, backed by a pledge of \$1 billion from the United States, in return for North Vietnam's acceptance of peace on American terms. Johnson's project envisioned cooperation among the countries of the greater Mekong River region and contributions from multilateral agencies and other industrialized countries. This proposal for developing the Mekong River region on a scale comparable to the Tennessee Valley Authority won wide praise at home and overseas and enabled Johnson to appear as a "man of peace." Once North Vietnam rejected the overture, however, Johnson's project became a casualty of the escalating military conflict.

Nguyen Thi Dieu places Johnson's initiative in the context of a half-century's history of Mekong regional development. The establishment of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1947, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, brought the first international focus on the water question in the Mekong Region, which led a decade later to ECAFE's establishing of a Mekong Committee. The United States' involvement reflected strategic considerations. View-

ing regional development of the noncommunist states as a means of enhancing their economic well-being and hence undercutting the appeal of communism, the United States prevented the participation of North Vietnam and committed resources to the Mekong Project, which by 1960 was receiving support from twelve United Nations' agencies and twenty-one countries in addition to the four regional participants (Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam). Despite the breadth of support, the project's resources were limited (the American contribution over nearly ten years amounted to a total of \$67 million) and the renewal of fighting in Indochina disrupted development.

Johnson's proposal to expand this enterprise reflected not only his strong conviction about the capacity of the United States to carry its economic and social reform programs to Vietnam, a point emphasized in Lloyd C. Gardner's *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War* (1995) and on which this study provides important elaboration. Nguyen Thi Dieu observes that a scheme of regional development also appealed to Johnson as a "fourth solution" to America's problems in Vietnam; a number of officials, development specialists, and journalists advanced it in the early 1960s as a better investment of resources than other "solutions": relying on assistance to local governments, carrying the war against North Vietnam, or acquiescing in the neutralization of Indochina. By embracing the "fourth solution," Johnson implicitly recognized that the other approaches were unlikely to achieve the U.S. objective of securing South Vietnam. The Johns Hopkins speech also signaled an American decision to give greater attention to multilateral assistance in Asia and, most immediately, to support an Asian Development Bank (ADB), which had long been sought by ECAFE and Asian governments. The ADB was established in December 1965 with the United States and Japan as the principal donors. Although barely noticed at the time, the Mekong Project survived Hanoi's rejection of Johnson's scheme and, supported by the ADB, it aided a number of programs. The Nixon administration's Vietnamization gave greater emphasis to the ADB and the Mekong Project. Yet with the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, Vietnam's representation was assumed by the victorious Socialist Republic of Vietnam, whereupon the United States withdrew from the Mekong Committee. In the aftermath of the long war in Vietnam, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) emerged as a significant regional force and soon launched its own Mekong Basin Development Cooperation initiative.

Nguyen Thi Dieu recounts this story with special concern for the environmental issues that have demanded greater attention in recent years. Her thoroughly researched and clearly written study provides important details on a number of projects and an astute assessment of the extent to which Mekong development programs have affected Thailand, Cam-

bodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Progress, especially in the last three countries which have experienced the ravages of considerable warfare, has been limited. A comparative perspective on this point would have helped, for it seems, on the surface at least, that overall development in the Mekong region has not lagged behind that found in other areas of the Third World. Looking toward the new millennium, Nguyen Thi Dieu observes that China's willingness to cooperate with ASEAN will be significant in determining further progress.

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ROBERT K. BRIGHAM. *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1999. Pp. xviii, 215. \$35.00.

The Vietnam War continues to attract enormous attention as one of the most important events during the Cold War. Most studies, however, focus on the American side of the story. The Vietnamese dimension of the conflict, despite its obvious significance, remains a woefully neglected aspect of the entire war. The few existing accounts of the National Liberation Front (NLF) concentrate primarily on its organization, its military strategy, and its activities at the village level. With this well-written study of the Front's foreign relations, Robert K. Brigham has filled a gap in the literature on the NLF.

Drawing primarily upon interviews with former NLF cadres, the daily broadcasts of Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio, and Communist newspapers and periodicals, Brigham carefully reconstructs the development of the NLF's external relations, focusing on its diplomatic campaigns in promoting neutralism, conducting secret peace talks with the United States, navigating the shoals of the Sino-Soviet split, undermining the Nixon administration's plans to use superpower diplomacy to end the war, and disrupting relations between Washington and Saigon. One fascinating finding of Brigham's study is how the Political Bureau in Hanoi used the NLF to steer clear of the Sino-Soviet dispute between 1966 and 1967. The intensification of the intractable feud between Moscow and Beijing placed Hanoi in a serious dilemma since it needed both Chinese and Soviet support in its struggle against the United States. To ensure the continuous flow of supplies from Moscow and Beijing, Hanoi developed a sophisticated strategy to placate its two allies. On the one hand, it tried to distance itself from China in Soviet eyes by parroting Moscow's international line. On the other hand, it sought to smooth China's ruffled feathers by sending the NLF's diplomatic representatives to Beijing to criticize Soviet-style revisionism in favor of Mao Zedong's doctrine of people's war.

On the crucial question of the relationship between Hanoi and the NLF, Brigham correctly points out that "The Front was neither a puppet of Hanoi nor an autonomous organization" (p. xi). While the Political

Bureau in the North often guided and directed the insurgent movement in the South, the NLF's regional perspective frequently contributed to heated debates within the party over diplomacy, strategy, and military tactics. At times, the NLF's pressure could tip the balance within the Political Bureau. As Brigham demonstrates in the case of the Mai Van Bo-Edmund Gullion negotiations in 1965, one important reason for the hardening of Hanoi's position during the talks was the NLF's opposition to negotiations with the United States.

Due to the fact that many key party documents are still closed to researchers in Vietnam, the policy-making process in Hanoi during the war remains murky. For instance, Brigham discusses the division within the party's leadership over the Bo-Gullion contact with party Secretary General Le Duan leading the hard-liners and Truong Chinh, the president of the National Assembly, representing the pro-negotiation group, but he does not explain who in the Political Bureau authorized Bo's approach to the Americans in the first place. Was it a collective decision? If so, how was the decision made? Lack of further evidence renders some of Brigham's conclusions tentative. For example, his assertion that the NLF played a role in Hanoi's decision in October 1973 to use military force to weaken the Nguyen Van Thieu regime and deter Saigon's violation of the Paris Agreement appears conjectural and needs to be confirmed by the opening of such party records as Political Bureau minutes. Finally, the book is marred by a few errors and an inadequate index. Brigham calls Pham Van Dong "Party premier" (p. 49). Dong was the premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, not the premier of the Vietnam Workers' Party. Liu Shaoqi was the chairman of the People's Republic of China, not the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi appeared three times in the text but had no entry in the index.

These musings do not detract from the value of the book, which will likely remain the standard account of the foreign relations of the NLF for some time to come.

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MRINALINI SINHA. *Colonial Masculinity: The "Manly Englishman" and the "Effeminate Bengali" in the Late Nineteenth Century*. (Studies in Imperialism.) New York: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's, New York. 1995. Pp. xi, 191. Cloth \$69.95, paper \$19.95.

This study offers a compelling cultural analysis of elite politics in colonial India. By foregrounding masculinity as a critical site of power, Mrinalini Sinha recontextualizes four contentious episodes in the political history of India from the 1880s and 1890s. Customarily, the Ilbert Bill, native volunteer movement, native participation in public administration, and the age of sexual

consent have been viewed as polarizing events that defined the landscape of colonial and nationalist politics. Through the prism of colonial masculinity, Sinha complicates and transforms this narrative by revealing "the multiple axes along which power was exercised in colonial India among or within the colonisers and the colonised as well as between the colonisers and the colonised" (p. 1). In so doing, she illuminates the intersection of class, ethnicity, gender, and racial ideologies in constituting power and identity in colonial India.

Sinha grounds her study in the contradictions of British rule. After the 1857 Indian Mutiny, British officials substituted the traditional aristocracy as preferred collaborators for the educated, middle-class elite. Squeezed out, this elite appealed to the British promise of racial equality to secure a greater role in the colonial state and society. European British subjects, however, stubbornly opposed broadening native participation. They justified the preservation of racial privilege by calling into question the masculinity of natives: that is, their physical fitness and social accomplishment. As Sinha persuasively shows, British opponents deployed variations of the "effeminate" Bengali discourse to water down the Ilbert Bill—which narrowly extended the jurisdiction of native judges over European subjects—and to exclude middle-class natives from serving in volunteer reserve units or serving in the higher echelons of colonial administration on par with Europeans.

Even as this discourse masked the racial entitlement of British men, gender and class tensions within and without the Anglo-Indian community challenged the mythology of the "manly Englishman." The white women who publicly opposed the Ilbert Bill questioned the role of white men as female protectors. Similarly, the manliness of British recruits had concerned officials since the mid-century introduction of competitive examination for career appointments in the colonial service. Their concern not only reflected the aristocratic and English bias against middle-class and/or Irish and Scottish civil servants but also accounts for the efforts taken to preclude any embarrassing comparisons between British and native masculinity during the 1886 Public Service Commission hearings.

At the same time, Sinha demonstrates that the native elite helped shape the contours as much as they were defined by the politics of colonial masculinity. It provided them with a means to pursue power and authority. Whether seeking the right to bear arms or expanding government employment, they defined themselves as more modern than the traditional aristocracy, which the colonial state designated as more manly. This native elite also deployed the discourse of colonial masculinity strategically. By framing their subordination as symbolic of the contradictions of British rule, they linked the reclamation of Indian masculinity to their social and political advancement.

More than any other chapter, Sinha's analysis of the



consent controversy underscores how the politics of colonial masculinity circumscribed the emancipatory potential of nationalist politics. Framed as an intrusion into the domestic relations of native men, the bill mobilized a coalition of nationalists and traditional leaders in defense of orthodox Hindu patriarchy. Acutely aware of their own self-image, control over the bodies of native women provided opponents of the bill with a means to reclaim Indian masculinity by replacing white men as the protectors of native women. Even though the anticolonial protest diluted the law, this episode enmeshed nationalist politics more thoroughly in the arena of colonial masculinity. It buttressed the authority of indigenous leaders and practices while tainting domestic social reform legislation as a threat to Indian autonomy.

This book is a considerable achievement. Within its short compass, Sinha enriches the history of colonialism by foregrounding gender in the understanding of nationalist politics and examining the connection between patriarchal and nationalist politics. Here she opens up new horizons for rethinking the anticolonial politics of decolonization in India and elsewhere. As an analytical framework, colonial masculinity is no less original. Sinha challenges the national and colonial narratives of history writing by revealing how imperialism helped to constitute both.

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GAURI VISWANATHAN. *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. xx, 332. \$17.95.

Gauri Viswanathan has offered an apologia for the intransigent role within modern society of religious belief. Her concern is with its "worldliness": its capacity to force the civil rights of minorities on to the agenda of the secular state. Belief, apparently, has little to do with doctrinal authority. Instead, it derives its power from its character as direct, unmediated reflection on experience in autonomy from the state's attempts to enforce on minorities consensual definitions of their identity. Viswanathan invests "dissent" with a manifest historical destiny not simply to contest ecclesiastical orthodoxies but also, more controversially, to "unbuckle the consolidating ambitions of the secular state" (pp. 47, 213). Dissent fulfils this role because it denies modernity's relegation of religion to the marginal private sphere, most noticeably so when dissenters have arrived at their position via the "oppositional gesture" (p. 50) of conversion. Viswanathan endeavors to combine into a single argument the status of the non-Anglican communities in nineteenth-century England and the debates in India precipitated by religious conversion, whether of a celebrated individual such as Pandita Ramabai or of entire communities, as in the 1901 Census's treatment of the Muslim

population as being largely the result of conversion from Hinduism.

Viswanathan's book thus covers an extraordinary range, from John Henry Newman's conversion to Rome to Annie Besant's pilgrimage toward theosophy and B. R. Ambedkar's adoption of Buddhism. Whether she succeeds in integrating these discrete narratives is debatable. Although non-Anglicans in Britain long occupied a position of civil exclusion that can legitimately be compared to the status of colonial subjects, many of her linkages are speculative. No evidence is, or could be offered, for example, for the claim that it was not coincidental that 1858 witnessed both the admission of Jews to Parliament and the assumption by the crown of the government of India (p. 12). The weaving of the colonial and domestic narratives into a single fabric snags on the fact that conversion as such was not an issue in the domestic debates. The emancipation of religious minorities in Britain after 1828 was a response to the growing political and religious power of dissenting communities whose history stretched back for over 150 years. The conversion of a few Tractarians to Rome in the 1840s, although it aroused similar fears to those evoked among Hindus by conversions to Christianity, made no contribution to the dismantling of the Anglican confessional state in Britain. Such demolition was rather the work of Irish Catholicism and Protestant nonconformity. British, European, and American history alike suggest that religious dissent was not the antagonist but the architect of the modern secular state. The South Asian colonial context inherited but did not originate ideologies of toleration and the religious neutrality of the state.

Where Viswanathan is illuminating, though not entirely original, is in her perception that in India the dynamic of religious conversion ran clean across the logic of colonialism. Conversion movements destabilize the demographic equilibrium of power. The convert rarely assimilates easily and without offering criticism. In British India, conversion to Christianity, far from being a capitulation to the dominant colonial culture, brought "permanent dislocation and exile" (p. 88) from the Hindu identity that the Raj underpinned. Yet the Caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1850 insisted on treating converts to Christianity as legally still part of the Hindu community and therefore subject to Hindu customary law. In Viswanathan's view, this amounted to a suppression of converts' "religious subjectivity" that emasculated the radical potential of conversion. The act was, however, simply affirming that Indian Christians were to be treated by the law as Indians rather than as proselyte Europeans—an affirmation that missionaries themselves, whose business was "religious subjectivity," unreservedly supported, for reasons integral to their concern to establish an indigenous church. The term "Hindu" carried an ambiguity which Viswanathan does not sufficiently explore. Subsequent legislation on Indian Christian mar-



riage, succession, and divorce in fact erected different legal standards for Christian and Hindu communities.

Viswanathan is not a reliable guide to historical evidence or theology. She struggles to understand Newman, for whom neither dogma nor religious authority were dirty words, and overstates Ramabai's Unitarian tendencies. Neither a questioning of the Trinitarian formulation of the Athanasian creed nor an objection to praying to Jesus alone constitute clinching evidence of Unitarianism. Ramabai's second, evangelical conversion to faith in Christ as Lord is not mentioned. For all its dense theoretical sophistication and intermittent brilliance, this book never quite holds true to its own profession that instrumental explanations fail to communicate what is involved in religious conversion.

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KOJI KAWASHIMA. *Missionaries and a Hindu State: Travancore 1858–1936*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 252. \$26.00.

Today, the “Kerala model of development” is a fairly well-known term referring to the state with India's best social statistics (female literacy, infant mortality, etc), achieved with below-average economic growth. The princely states of Travancore occupied the southern half of today's Kerala, and what happened in Travancore from 1800 until its merger into the new Kerala state in 1956 is important for an understanding of how desirable developmental outcomes happen. Koji Kawashima's diligent work contributes both to such understanding and to debates about modern Kerala's history.

The book touches on a number of themes: “Hindu kingship,” the relationship between the British India and the princely states, and the role of Christian missionaries in effecting social change. Kawashima argues that previous accounts of Protestant missionary activity in Travancore have not fully appreciated the changing relationship between the missionaries and the government of the Hindu maharaja. Such accounts, he contends, have emphasized an adversarial relationship in which the missionaries are invariably depicted as challenging the state on behalf of their lower-caste converts' civil rights. According to Kawashima, however, the missionaries and the Hindu state needed each other, and until the 1930s there was more cooperation than conflict.

Growing out of a doctoral dissertation at the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), the book bears some of the hallmarks of a thesis. It sometimes reads more like a report on a body of sources than a response to gnawing questions, as if a supervisor had said, “Why don't you work on the such and such records?” Kawashima does, to be sure, provide questions and answers, but the questions occasionally seem to have been created to fit already

assembled “answers” (e.g., the discussion of Tamil and Malayalam languages [pp. 29–33]).

Of the book's six chapters, chapter four on medicine is perhaps the most original. Kawashima pulls together material on the growth of medical institutions in the state and charts the way in which the Travancore government encouraged missionary medical efforts. In making the missions dependent on government grants, the Travancore authorities helped to ensure that missionaries would want to avoid confrontation with government. Imaginatively, Kawashima draws on documents of the Rockefeller Foundation, which began to fund health-related programs in Travancore in the late 1920s.

The book's first two chapters, relying on secondary sources, establish the relationship between Travancore state and British governments of India and between the Protestant Christian missionaries and the British governments. The two core chapters are those on medicine, referred to above, and on education. Kawashima does not cast new light on the question of education, which has been studied fairly extensively. He argues that the Travancore government was happy to give grants to mission schools because this helped to spread education cheaply, but it sought to control missionary proselytizing through restrictions on religious instruction.

Chapter five focuses on the relationship between the Travancore state, its low castes, and the missionaries. Given that the state was dedicated to a Hindu deity and the maharaja was held to be the deity's earthly representative, it became a matter of policy from the 1890s to stem the flow of converts and thereby preserve the old social hierarchy. To this end, the government tried both to limit the attractions missionaries could offer low castes and to increase the attractions offered by the state. For low castes, this provided room for manoeuvre and opportunity for material betterment. (Strangely, Kawashima never alludes to the fact that Kerala became India's leading Communist state by the 1950s.)

The final chapter on the small, neighboring princely state of Cochin is welcome, since Cochin is seldom written about yet has interesting stories to tell. But the discussion here seems an awkward appendage. Kawashima does not, I think, capture the difference in social structure between the two states. What is perhaps most interesting about Cochin is that despite being “behind” Travancore in adopting Western-style educational organization, Cochin was always more literate than the rest of India. This indicated the effectiveness of old Kerala's village schools and the readiness of matrilineal society to let girls attend them.

Kawashima's book highlights and reexamines a subject and period. His use of archives like those of the missionary societies and the Rockefeller Foundation points to the riches that await researchers. His book underlines the admirable scholarship emanating from Japan, and I hope that he and his colleagues will

continue their thoughtful and insistent probing of South Asia, especially of Kerala.

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PRADIP KUMAR DATTA. *Carving Blocs: Communal Ideology in Early Twentieth-Century Bengal*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. 312. \$29.95.

This book represents a sedimentation of the rich, though often acrimonious, debates in South Asian history over the question of communalism. It shows how far the historiography on the subject has advanced since the early 1980s. Pradip Kumar Datta looks at communalism in Bengal in the 1920s with vastly more sophisticated concepts and methods than historians before him.

Datta's techniques are mainly discursive. He examines a series of interrelated texts from early twentieth-century Bengal—essays, pamphlets, news reports, editorials, official correspondence, some fiction—to describe the complex discursive field in which communal ideologies grow. Datta is particularly sensitive to the political uses of rhetoric. Unlike generations of historians before him, he does not think that ideological texts are to be read in order to peel away the layers of rhetoric and uncover some hidden truth representing a group claim or a class interest. Datta's book is an excellent example of how the writing of history has benefited from the so-called "linguistic turn." He has successfully interrogated and redeployed for his own purposes the established historical archive without abandoning the distinctive genre of the historical narrative.

To show the ways in which Hindu and Muslim communalism mutually shaped each other, Datta examines in detail five themes that were characteristic of Bengal's communal politics. The first was the fear among Hindu ideologues that the Hindus were "a dying race" about to be swamped by millions of rapidly multiplying Muslims. The second was a campaign to "improve" the Muslim peasant, to make him more industrious, thrifty, virtuous, and knowledgeable in order to enable him to resist the powers of the Hindu landlord and moneylender. The third was the theme of Hindu-Muslim brotherhood, whose appeal reached its peak at the time of the Khilafat-Noncooperation movement of the early 1920s and left, as Datta shows very effectively, a residue in popular consciousness that could express itself even against the recognized political leaders of the two communities. The fourth was the persistent allegation of the abduction of Hindu women by Muslim men. Finally, there was the issue of music before mosques, which was the pretext for most of the communal riots in the late 1920s and 1930s. On all of these themes, Datta presents much material that has not been seriously considered by earlier historians, but, more significantly, he treats in a much more deliberate and nuanced way the known archive on this

subject. The historiography has indeed moved a long way in the last two decades. Datta, for instance, wonders why the Subaltern Studies historians spent so much time belaboring the obvious fact that religion was a constitutive element of peasant politics. It is difficult to believe now that twenty years ago the ruling presupposition was that religion was a mask that had to be ripped apart before the real facts of peasant history could be apprehended.

The narrative that Datta produces can, I think, be outlined as follows. Hindu communal thinking in Bengal arose out of the anxieties of a dominant minority threatened by the loss of its privileges in a political order that placed great emphasis on representation in proportion to demographic weight. Muslim communalist thinking built on attempts to improve the lot of Muslim peasants by educating them, reforming their religious practices, and organizing them into a sense of collective solidarity. None of these was sufficient to produce organized political conflict along religious lines. What was crucial was the nature of organized political intervention. Here Datta makes the significant argument—against the received wisdom of much secularist historiography—that the federative moment of Khilafat-Noncooperation, and the specific form of C. R. Das's Hindu-Muslim pact, laid perhaps the most promising foundation for an anticolonial democratic solidarity of the Bengali people. This promise was dashed after 1925, when Hindu middle-class politicians chose to defend their narrow communal and class interests. They scuttled the pact, alleged abduction of their women by Muslim men, and defended their civil right to make religious processions in public places. The Muslim leadership felt betrayed and allowed a rival communalist ideology to take over their politics.

Datta's story separates very carefully the necessary from the conjunctural, the multiple from the singular. This is the most outstanding achievement of his book. His is a melancholy history. By the 1930s, the narrative seems to acquire the momentum of inevitability. The partition of India, and of Bengal, was for him, as for many others, a grievous tragedy. Surprisingly, Datta does not consider the possibility his material offers of moving out of the given parameters of postcolonial Indian historiography. After all, the historians of Bangladesh today do not write this story as an unrelieved tragedy.

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#### OCEANIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

JOY DAMOUSI. *The Labour of Loss: Mourning, Memory and Wartime Bereavement in Australia*. (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, number 7.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. Pp. x, 212. Cloth \$64.95, paper \$22.95.

During the twentieth century, participation in international wars has had a profound impact on Australian society. Anzac Day, which commemorates the disastrous but heroic dawn offensive mounted by Australian troops at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915, remains the nation's most important site of collective memory and public patriotism. Indeed, the cult of the Anzac soldier, with its emphasis on masculine mateship, has been aptly described as Australia's "civic religion." With 60,000 soldiers dead at the end of World War I—a heavy toll for a country with a population of just five million—Australians had to adopt new psychological and political strategies to bear and legitimate their losses. This is the subject of Joy Damousi's new and perceptive history, which explores how "mothers, fathers, widows and soldiers dealt with the grief that resulted from the deaths during and immediately after the two world wars" (p. i). As Damousi points out, notions of sacrifice and the rituals of mourning have histories, and the emotional pain of individuals and communities needs to be understood within specific historical and cultural contexts. This book tells an Australian story, but Damousi is theoretically informed by international scholarship on feminist and psychoanalytical approaches to history and studies on war and memory.

The book is divided into sections on World Wars I and II, and these are further broken into thematic chapters. In each section, Damousi traces the personal and civic scope of wartime bereavement in Australia through a series of nuanced and generally persuasive readings of contemporary sources, including family correspondence, government records, and diary entries. The letters, in particular, highlight family dynamics, and Damousi is particularly attuned to the gendered dimensions of mourning. World War I was a young man's war, with the vast majority of soldiers in the Australian forces aged under twenty-five years and unmarried. Men on the battlefields wrote predominantly to their mothers, and these letters were often intense, passionate, and laced with romantic imagery. In contrast, letters to fathers were less frequent and more formal. Damousi's inclusion of the diary entries of one John Roberts, shattered by the death of his son Frank, illustrates the disparities between the public and private notions of masculine identity and expressions of fatherly grief. In the section on World War II, which is briefer, the analysis of letters between General George Vasey and his wife Jessie (who was, after her husband's death, to be the driving force behind the War Widows Guild) is extremely moving and serves as a reminder that death cuts across social class.

Damousi uses her case studies to support her overarching argument that the scale of wartime loss in Australia during both world wars created new social groups who defined themselves, and were defined by society in general, through their relationships to the dead. The largest of these were known as the "sacrificial mothers," and Damousi charts how the status of these women shifted over time. But there were also

fathers, and war widows, and those soldiers who returned minus an arm or leg. Regardless of the differences between individuals in terms of wealth, religion, politics, or even just personality, it appears that a shared sorrow provided the focus, the point of common interest, for a collective sense of self.

A myriad of organizations such as the Sailor and Soldiers Fathers Association or the War Widows Guild sprang up in the wake of war. Their members often wore badges to proclaim their loss publicly and campaigned for the community recognition and the financial remuneration to which they felt entitled. The returned limbless soldiers were keen to secure preferential employment and repatriation benefits. The female dependants of slain soldiers agitated for pensions. For many, the situation was desperate, for without a male breadwinner they were plunged into acute poverty.

The book is primarily concerned with how Australian men and women channeled their own grief into public, and political, activities as they jostled for a favorable position on the increasingly complex and hierarchical scale of wartime sacrifice. But although individual and social mourning embraced the past, because mourning involved acts of memorialization, Damousi argues that it also provided a way forward, a journey toward personal and social renewal. Her study offers a new perspective on the impact of twentieth-century warfare because it engages seriously with the dimensions of grief and emotion experienced by soldiers and their families.

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#### CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

JANET E. CHUTE. *The Legacy of Shingwaukonse: A Century of Native Leadership*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 359. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.

In the preface to her thoroughly researched and scrupulously detailed biography of Shingwaukonse, a nineteenth-century Canadian Ojibwa leader, Janet E. Chute tells of her good fortune in finding a pair of American Indian communities eager for a young scholar to recount the life of their ancestral chief. "How often does a doctoral student receive an *invitation*," she writes, "to acquire data on a subject in which she has had an interest for many years? It seemed like a dream come true" (p. xi). The people of Garden River and Batchewana, near Sault Ste. Marie, pointed Chute to all the information she could hope for, and she has repaid their generosity with a book of high quality.

The locals will surely read this story—of Shingwaukonse (Little Pine, 1773–1854), his Native contemporaries and offspring, as well as his white adversaries and allies—with a strong sense of urgency and recognition. American Indian history is most often

local, and this book dwells on the personages and events who shaped the present state of these localities. At the same time, the book is worthy of attention by general readers in American Indian history.

Shingwaukonse was a man of mixed ethnicity. His father was white, but his mother raised him as an Ojibwa, and he chose as an adult to identify wholly with his Indian kin. As a youth, he achieved spiritual powers through a vision. He became a practitioner of the divinatory shaking tent ritual and an esteemed member of the Midewiwin medicine society. He fought with prowess against the Americans during the War of 1812; his skill as an orator earned him political as well as religious and military prestige. In the author's terms, he was a paradigmatic power-holder and a provider-of-services for his Ojibwa people.

In 1833, he affiliated himself with the Anglican Church, not because he had lost his tribal faith but rather in order to enhance his personal power on behalf of the Ojibwas. He felt that the god of the Christians held the key to technological advancement; furthermore, the Anglican hierarchy might prove to be an effective ally against Canadian policy makers intent on usurping Indian lands and resources.

His conversion made him a "model" Indian, someone the colonialists thought they could manipulate as a "chief." Shingwaukonse was not to be exploited, however. Rather, he used his status to lobby for the rights of Ojibwas and their Métis relatives, and when that status seemed to him an encumbrance rather than an enhancement, he eschewed the trappings of chieftaincy. In 1841, he withdrew from society, emptied himself of importance as if in a vision quest, and reemerged from isolation spiritually charged to revitalize his people's traditional culture. Through the 1840s and until his death, he confronted land surveyors, miners, police, churchmen, and bureaucrats, claiming all the while that "the Great Spirit" had given "His Red Children" (p. 123) territory and natural resources (particularly the copper being mined by whites).

Non-Indians rejected these aboriginal claims of divine right; they had their own pretensions of manifest destiny and were convinced that the Natives were no more than "unenterprising wanderers . . . with no claims whatsoever to proprietorship over land, minerals, timber, or fisheries" (p. 137). Bureaucrats brushed aside Shingwaukonse's rhetoric; nevertheless, Canada was forced to address the issue by arranging the Robinson Treaties of 1850 in order to secure its own rights. Shingwaukonse was signatory to these agreements, which ceded huge landholdings but preserved at least a portion of Indian homeland where a Native identity could persist. Chute makes it clear that Shingwaukonse was bound to lose in a struggle with powerful mining interests; that he helped create reserves protected by federal treaties made him a hero to the Ojibwas.

Even as Canada grabbed more lands and more resources through more treaties in the 1870s, the

Ojibwas were able to regard themselves as members of the First Nations, recognized by treaties and by God. "Despite . . . setbacks," Chute writes, the twentieth-century Ojibwas "had demonstrated that in the face of formidable odds they could still maintain a milieu in which they could develop their social, economic, and political culture" (p. 235). The Ojibwa "band leaders were able to retain Little Pine's faith that indigenous peoples might function as semi-autonomous, self-determining groups within the Canadian nation" (p. 235).

Today he is regarded at Garden River and Batchewana as a divinity as well as a man. The Ojibwas tell sacred stories of his feats: how he mastered Western technology, how he stood up to the forces of imperialism, how he exhorted his people to live as themselves rather than as imitation whites. His teachings are regarded as gospel; he appears in Ojibwas' visions; he has become a revered, local culture hero.

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MARY KINNEAR. *A Female Economy: Women's Work in a Prairie Province, 1870-1970*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 215. \$55.00.

Women's work has been a major discovery of the last twenty-five years of historical and interdisciplinary scholarship around the world. Interest in female labor has been a touchstone of Canadian women's history, particularly distinguished as it has been by close ties to labor studies. Scholars' early interest and participation in the "domestic labor" debates ensured that understanding readily encompassed recognition of the links between labor performed in the home and elsewhere. Feminist investigators have charted patriarchy's routinized privileging of men in the performance and remuneration of paid and unpaid work from the French regime to the present. Mary Kinnear's earlier explorations of the experiences of professional, farm, and suffrage women on the Canadian prairie, like her biography of the noted Manitoba activist, Margaret McWilliams, supplied a significant part of this quarter-century of recovery. Trained as a historian of eighteenth-century British politics, Kinnear turned her attention in the 1970s first to broad-ranging investigations, producing *Daughters of Time: Women in the Western Tradition* (1982), and then to the largely unknown history of the women of her home province, Manitoba. Her leadership, both in research and in making direct connections to the international world of feminist scholarship, has been influential in establishing western Canadian women's history.

Kinnear's new book provides a comprehensive study of women's paid and unpaid labor, within the family and beyond, from the creation of the postage stamp province of Manitoba in 1870 to the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on the Status of Women a hundred years later. Since, as the author notes, these dates are rather arbitrary, the analysis readily slips before and after in its broad-ranging coverage. The



centrality of work, in all its manifestations, to human life also makes the volume almost a survey of women's lives. Kinnear's self-consciousness about racial, ethnic, and class diversity, like her efforts, especially in the earlier chapters, to link Manitoba's developments to ideas and events beyond its borders, further enlarges her "story of ordinary women" (p. 10).

Chapters are arranged thematically to encompass the entire century. The first two set out the parameters of the study and outline a demographic portrait that traces the arrival of changing groups of newcomers, largely British and European, to the land claimed by First Nations communities. This was not a frontier of single men. Immigrants came as family groups and their needs set the contours of women's lives. Chapter three, "Prescriptions," turns to issues of ideology and expectation. While all women were expected to work, ideas about appropriate labor and rewards varied tremendously over the decades as feminist and non-feminist voices debated the province's version of the "woman question." The next chapter treats "Education and Training," emphasizing the pervasive resistance to equality and the continued insistence on women's primary responsibility for family work. Kinnear then takes up "Homemaking." Race, ethnicity, and class largely shaped domestic regimes, but, whether Aboriginal, Ukrainian, or working-class, women devoted lives and developed self-consciousness around their domestic responsibilities. The prominence of "Farm Work" in a largely agricultural economy is explored in chapter six. Kinnear's tracing of this often invisible work culminates with a first-hand account of "Harvest Time 1931." That lengthy testimony's success in bringing the intensity of past toil vividly to mind leaves one wishing that other chapters had been closed similarly. Chapter seven, the longest, examines "Paid Labor" with particular attention to legislation, domestic service, sales, and office, manufacturing, and professional employments. For all the variety of detail, women as a group were segregated and unequally recompensed. We then turn to "Public Service Work" or the volunteer and political activities of the woman citizen. Despite traditions of Aboriginal leadership and an active turn-of-the-century enfranchisement campaign, women faced more limits than opportunities in the exercise of public power. Divided among themselves, they were most often in the position of petitioning male authorities. The often bleak picture is summed up in the concluding section, "Looking Back," which points to the prevalence of the "notion of women's dependency" (p. 157). Women's work lives were ultimately never their own. By 1970, however, there were signs of change. Women's individual human rights were moving to center stage. But that is another story.

In short, Kinnear provides a critical summary of a quarter-century of feminist scholarship. This account nevertheless remains "provisional and incomplete" (p. 164), often tantalizing as much as informing. That we

have come so far, however, owes much to the dedication of scholars such as Kinnear.

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BRUCE MUIRHEAD. *Against the Odds: The Public Life and Times of Louis Rasminsky*. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1999. Pp. x, 380. \$45.00.

Central bankers do not lead lives filled with glamor and thrills. They prefer to operate quietly behind the scenes, trying to keep exchange rates stable and inflation under control, although they can face exciting times when fighting off an attack on the value of their currency by speculators. Louis Rasminsky served as governor of the Bank of Canada from 1961 to 1973, and Bruce Muirhead sticks strictly to his "public life" so that the focus of this book is sharply on administrative and policy matters. Rasminsky was a brilliant student at the University of Toronto in the 1920s, then spent a couple of years at the London School of Economics before abandoning doctoral studies to work for the League of Nations secretariat, where he remained throughout the 1930s. Returning to Canada in the 1940s, he helped manage wartime exchange controls, which led him to join the Bank of Canada and assume an important role in the negotiations over new postwar arrangements that culminated in the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at Bretton Woods. For the next fifteen years, Rasminsky was Canada's principal representative at the IMF and earned a reputation which led some to propose that he head up the fund in 1956; instead the Americans and the British successfully backed Per Jacobsson of Sweden.

Rasminsky had long been eyeing the post of governor of the Bank of Canada. In 1955 he was finally made a deputy governor, but it seems clear, though Muirhead has not been able to find conclusive evidence, that anti-Semitic feeling impeded his promotion. Instead the government chose deputy governor James Coyne. With the economy undergoing a prolonged burst of growth, Coyne became increasingly concerned that Canadians were "living beyond their means" and sought to clamp down by sharply limiting the growth of the money supply. At the same time, the governor warned against the increasing danger of American control over the Canadian economy. What he does not seem to have noticed was that restricting credit was driving domestic interest rates well above those in the United States, encouraging Canadians to borrow there and hastening continental integration. Once Canada began to slip into a recession after 1957, the newly elected Conservative government became increasingly irritated with Coyne and eventually fired him in 1961, with only a few months remaining in his seven-year term. This time Rasminsky got the job. Within a few months, however, the government had bungled the devaluation of the Canadian dollar, and Rasminsky



had to assist in the development of a series of austerity measures to restore international confidence.

The "Coyne affair" and the 1962 devaluation were probably the most dramatic events involving the Bank of Canada during Rasminsky's rise to the top. Unfortunately, Muirhead does not have much to tell us that is new about either. The background to Coyne's dismissal is dealt with in just a few paragraphs. Rasminsky may have been busy concentrating on dealing with exchange questions through the IMF, but it is disappointing not to learn more about inside views at the bank as the governor made himself increasingly unpopular.

In part, this lack reflects a curious imbalance in the structure of the book. If Rasminsky's public life holds much interest for readers outside of a few specialists in Canadian economic and banking history, it is surely because it can provide a clear understanding of his activities as a central banker. Yet of the 300 pages of text, only about one-third are devoted to his governorship, and this section suffers from an unhappy organizational structure. Two chapters are devoted to the major themes of each of his terms as governor ("Rebuilding Confidence," "Fighting Inflation"), and a third and final one deals with four crises in Canadian-American economic relations stretching from Washington's interest equalization tax in 1963 through the "Nixon shock" of 1971. The narrative lacks a smooth chronological flow, and as a result the reader has some difficulties in following the evolution of the policies of the Bank of Canada and the government during Rasminsky's term of office.

Writing the history of policy and administration can be difficult. Internal reorganizations and disputes are often more interesting to the participants than to those who come after. Choosing to confine himself so strictly to Rasminsky's public life has made the author's task even more challenging. For instance, the reader learns nothing about his parents beyond their first names, and very little is said of Rasminsky's family or his relations with other bureaucrats in Ottawa. More discussion of the importance of anti-Semitism in Canadian life and the federal civil service in particular would have been valuable. A little less about the long-forgotten study of nutrition he worked on at the League of Nations in the 1930s and a little more on the whole man might make this biography an easier read.

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SCOTT CHRISTIANSON. *With Liberty for Some: 500 Years of Imprisonment in America*. Boston: Northeastern University Press. 1998. Pp. xix, 394. \$35.00.

Scott Christianson's book is an oddity: a richly documented work geared for a popular audience. The aim of the book is nothing less than to trace the American history of imprisonment, broadly defined, from earliest colonial times to the present day. Although the peni-

tentiary takes center stage, Christianson spends quite a few pages chronicling other forms of captivity, including indentured servitude, transportation, chattel slavery, prisoner of war camps, and Indian removals. The result is a readable but sprawling account, of interest to the student but of limited value to serious scholars in the field.

Christianson's emphasis throughout is on narrative, and his story, on the whole, is well told. His breadth of focus has its virtues: by bringing together disparate institutions, this book ultimately underscores the omnipresence of captivity in American social history, and by examining American prisons over the long haul, the author demonstrates the cyclical nature of their evolution—a pattern of neglect punctuated by intermittent stabs at reform. Christianson's abhorrence of the message he is relating shines through on every page, and the author peppers his narrative with striking, and often disturbing, anecdotes. But the weakness of the work from the perspective of the scholar is that, despite ambitious research and extensive documentation, the account is wholly synthetic, bringing to light no new material. What is more, as the author promises at the outset, he employs a narrative style emphasizing "historical details above theoretical postulates, in order to render the story more unobtrusively" (p. xii). If by this Christianson had meant merely to eschew reified abstractions, we could all applaud his restraint. But, in fact, the work is resolutely unanalytical; even extended quotations go by without comment, and the narrative itself skips abruptly, without interconnection or transition, from one social institution to another.

Nor is the narrative itself without flaws. Carelessly, Christianson twice uses the same quotation on the same page, ascribing each one to a different source (p. 37); later, he uncritically recounts a tale about Warden Elam Lynds that has long been discredited (p. 127). Perhaps inevitably in a work ranging so widely, the author also falls prey to oversimplification (as, for example, when he informs us that "[b]y the end of the seventeenth century, three main classes . . . had emerged in the North American colonies" [p. 42]). These difficulties notwithstanding, the book may find a happy home within the confines of the undergraduate classroom. It cannot, however, be rated a major contribution to the scholarly literature.

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JAMES M. MAYO. *The American Country Club: Its Origins and Development*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 243. \$25.00.

The text of this book is as straightforward as its title. James M. Mayo begins conventionally with the origins of the American country club in London's socially exclusive, eighteenth-century "city clubs." Mayo describes the early-nineteenth-century transit of this institution from London to Boston, New York, Phila-

delphia, and other northern U.S. cities whose male possessors of mercantile wealth sought a place to socialize with their peers. (Such clubs were not popular in the plantation South.) The first chapter carries the story of the urban social club to the end of the nineteenth century, by which time the urban athletic club had also become an important institution.

The athletic clubs receive some attention in chapter two, "The Country Life." (For some reason, Mayo fails to mention the most important athletic clubs: the New York Athletic Club and the Chicago Athletic Association.) The chapter's focus, however, is on the spa (e.g., Saratoga Springs), the seaside resort (e.g., Newport), and the forest lodge (e.g., the Adirondack Club). There was considerable overlap between the athletic club on the one hand and the spa, resort, and lodge on the other. Athletic clubs like the famed Knickerbocker Base Ball Club were noted as much for their lavish dinners as for their baseball games; sports were a major attraction at most spas, resorts, and lodges. Nonetheless, Mayo considers Brookline's eponymous Country Club, founded in 1882, as the first of its type. J. Murray Forbes and his associates were "the first organizers to put key historic practices together as a coherent approach to the private club in the suburb" (p. 66). Among the Country Club's innovations was the limited acceptance of the members' female relatives.

In the last decades of the century, country clubs like Brookline's proliferated and most of them featured a golf course, which Mayo describes in a rare moment of lyrical interpretation as "an asymmetrical garden, a manicured landscape with a clubhouse that substituted for a British manor house" (p. 88). Tennis was a much less popular option.

Mayo's chapter on the period 1900–1920 is entitled "Country Clubs for Everybody," but, contrary to expectation, democratization is not the focus. There is information on physical access by railroad and automobile. There is comment on A. W. Tillinghast as a golf-course designer and on clubhouse architecture (e.g., the mission style in the Southwest). "Everybody" appears in an assertion published in 1912 by Edward L. Fox in the upper-class journal *Outing*: according to Fox, the Pierre Country Club (South Dakota) "should be called everybody's country club" because it was not for the elite alone but "for all who have a little money and a little time" (p. 115). One wonders how many clubs were, indeed, open to "everybody." And how little money sufficed?

Subsequent chapters describe what might be called the modernization of the country club. Financial problems were met by the issue of stocks and bonds and by the admission of women to full membership. In addition, pools and saunas and exercise rooms were constructed to lure new members. The administration of the clubs was turned over to professional club managers (who founded their own national organization and their own journal). Clubhouse design, which became an architectural subspecialty, was rationalized to maximize profit.

One expects "The Postwar Era and Modern Development" to include an extended discussion of the struggle over the country club's traditional policy of racial and religious exclusion (no African Americans, no Jews), but Mayo treats the topic in less than six pages. His emphasis, throughout the entire book, is on clubhouse architecture and—to a lesser degree—the design of golf courses. Since Mayo teaches in a School of Architecture and Urban Design, it is no surprise that these topics receive—in my opinion—a disproportionate amount of attention. Even here, however, Mayo's commentary seems superficial compared to the analyses of John Bale in *Sport and Place: A Geography of Sport in England, Scotland, and Wales* (1983), *Landscapes of Modern Sport* (1994), and a number of other books. A little more time spent on recent work in the geography of leisure and a little less time devoted to club histories, which Mayo seems to have read by the hundred, might have made a much better book.

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RICHARD W. COGLEY. *John Eliot's Mission to the Indians before King Philip's War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 331. \$45.00.

Until recently, there have been two basic categories of historical writing about the seventeenth-century Puritan missions to the Indians of southern New England. The first is institutional histories describing managerial, fiscal, and ecclesiastical issues related to the organization of the missions. The two seminal studies in this category are William Kellaway's *The New England Company, 1649–1776* (1962) and Alden T. Vaughan's *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians 1620–1675* (1965). The second is ethnohistorical studies, or works that attempt to illuminate the missions from the Indians' perspectives. The key works in this category include a dissertation and several articles from the early 1970s by Neal Salisbury, Francis Jennings's *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (1975), and James Axtell's *The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America* (1985). Works in the former vein have tended to depict the Puritans as well meaning and generally charitable toward the Indians, while those in the latter have suggested that, on the whole, the Puritan missions were driven by righteous disregard for the welfare and culture of the Indian population. Richard W. Cogley's book is an effort to revive the earlier, institutional approach. This is not to imply that Cogley has nothing to say about Indians. Rather, it is to suggest that Cogley's primary purpose is not to shed new light on such contested ethnological matters as the meaning of Christianity for Native converts.

Although the work touches on all the missions in seventeenth-century New England, its focus is the missions organized by the most active and energetic Puritan missionary, John Eliot. As it turns out—and this is, in itself, an important contribution of this

carefully researched and well-documented study—Eliot was involved in virtually every missionary initiative in southern New England, except perhaps the famous Mayhew mission on Martha's Vineyard.

The book begins with a revisionist discussion of Puritan missionary theology. It suggests that there was little genuine interest in converting the Indians among the first generation of Puritan migrants and that "the missionary idealism enshrined in the Massachusetts charter and other official expressions of purpose clearly reflected the regnant convention in the literature of colonization rather than the central priority for the leading planters" (p. 2). Further, Eliot's familiar millennialist views, according to Cogley, had little connection to the Old World but rather were the result of a series of lectures delivered between 1638 and 1641 by the great Boston clergyman, John Cotton. And even this millennialism had little real functional importance for Eliot. In Cogley's view, "the mission became important for Eliot because he came to know the Indians as individuals and to sympathize with their problems" (p. 171).

This discussion is followed by a series of more or less chronological chapters that carry Puritan missions through the early 1670s, the eve of King Philip's War. These chapters offer copious detail about the chronology of events, much of which—once again—is intended to cast doubt on the connection between mid-seventeenth-century transatlantic millennialist fantasies and the organization of Eliot's missions. They also offer a uniquely thorough and detailed account of the origins of the fourteen Indian "praying towns" Eliot and his supporters established. In addition to Natick, the best known of these, Cogley describes the genesis of such now forgotten Massachusetts-area towns as Punkapoag, Hassanamesit, Okommakamesit, Nashobah, Magunkog, Wamesit, and the others—a task made doubly laborious by the fact that most of these towns no longer exist.

Given its extraordinary detail and empirical rigor, it is perhaps not surprising that larger social and cultural patterns are often difficult to identify in Cogley's study. For example, the book says little about the racial politics of proselytization in New England, much less the mundane political battles between Eliot and the provincial government of Massachusetts Bay. These were battles that were real and lively and that had a significant impact on the history of the mission. In some sense, one can forgive this as an expression of the author's admirable resistance to glib generalizations, such as the all-to-common idea that Eliot's missions were all the same or that Puritan or Indian attitudes were uniform. Cogley makes it abundantly clear that they were not. But in eschewing these sorts of broader themes, Cogley does lead the reader to wonder about exactly what his larger purpose is.

In part, this seems to be rescuing Eliot from ethno-historian critics. By portraying the great missionary as more the pragmatist than the millennialist fanatic, more the well-intentioned philanthropist than the ar-

rogant ethnocentrist, Cogley appears to be trying to show Eliot to be a man driven less by Puritan dogma or racial ideology than simply by the changing exigencies of his times. But in his effort to depict Eliot in more accurate terms by liberating him from theological dogma and crude categorical imperatives, Cogley actually leaves us with little real sense of the man himself—and, in turn, little reason to feel any sympathy for Eliot or his project. For that, readers must still turn to Vaughan or, even better, to Cotton Mather's *Magnalia Christi Americana* (1702). For a comprehensive exploration of the Puritan missions and their early evolution, Cogley's book will nonetheless be the new starting point.

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LORENA S. WALSH. *From Calabar to Carter's Grove: The History of a Virginia Slave Community*. (Colonial Williamsburg Studies in Chesapeake History and Culture.) Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 1997. Pp. xxii, 335. \$34.95.

The heart and mind of this book concern slave demography and material culture. Through a century, and using meager sources, Lorena S. Walsh traces the pale markings of slaves who lived on a major tidewater holding (now a part of Colonial Williamsburg). Her arguments unfold in three periods: the arrival of the Africans in the 1720s-1740s; their settling during the mid-1700s and the beginnings of creolization; and their descendants' forced move west into the Shenandoah Valley and the southside in the 1780s-1790s, which probably "destroyed the small measure of security and the residential continuity that most of the Burwell group had enjoyed before the [American] Revolution" (p. 224).

Given the book's primary aim—to convey a sense of African cultural survivals as they shaped slave assimilation—the approach and conclusions are ambiguous but no less instructive for that. Using as a foil "the usual story" of slaves in the Chesapeake "portrayed as isolated individuals with few collective cultural resources left to counter an overwhelming, powerful, alien white presence," the argument is that acculturation was much less thorough and rapid "than is generally postulated" (pp. 76, 77, n.285). This proposal draws sustenance, principally, from the narrative of Olaudah Equiano, an Ibo who became an English abolitionist; brief ethnographic sketches of two West African cultural areas, Senegambia and the Bight of Biafra; and a long register of about 1,100 slaves including some whose African origin is assumed, given that they were named either after places or classical figures. Demographic comparisons of the 1,100 slaves underline the Africans' dismal prospects: their death rate was twice that of American-born slaves, and African women were notoriously incapable of sustaining a naturally growing population. Consequently, "cultural shock" for Africans meant the loss "irretriev-

ably [of] many elements that held their familiar world together" (p. 77).

A useful shorthand regarding the problem of slavery's impact on Africans as a people and a culture is to recognize interpretations as either emphasizing features intrinsic to the slaves' own culture and community that indicate resilience and resourcefulness, or as focusing on the external factors beyond the slaves' control that damaged and made them victims. The book's thrust—but its evidence less so—is predisposed toward the former. Hence, during the Middle Passage, new Negroes bonded, thus creating the fictive kin and ensuing associations that were both "reinforced by shared national identities" and based on "shared elements of their African childhoods that continued to structure much of their [slave] world." Accordingly, they soon created quarters that "closely resembled a West African compound"; and later, as fugitives, they "envisioned escape from white control and the recreation of African communities" on the frontier (pp. 112, 113; cf. pp. 76–77).

These assertions raise more problems than they resolve. For instance, the best picture we have of quarters is provided by the diary of another tidewater Carter (Landon), which makes it abundantly clear that quarters were largely organized Carter's way. And, as for the pitifully inept and confused efforts of new arrivals to run away, most traveled east, not west, and so down country to deep water and the coast. Only rarely did Africans run to the frontier where maroonage—throughout the entire South—was typically brief, furtive, and wartime (the 1770s–early 1780s).

But these are only the details of the larger issues of cultural exchange that are muted throughout and stymied by two basic problems of method. First, the whole is imbued with the community and culture persuasion that sees slaves as the quietly heroic and creative actors in their own fateful drama. Second, although it is implied that a fundamental dimension of slave acculturation was ontological—a matter of Africans confronting the whites' "alien cosmology"—the emphasis is on material culture. This section, which suggests that detribalization was comparatively radical, ranges from views of clothing—"standard-issue"—to personal possessions as uncovered in archaeological excavations of root cellars (the slaves' cubbyholes) that contained mostly "secondary refuse"—iron tools and ceramics—that was "almost all European" (pp. 77, 189, 194).

The book's basic ambiguity regarding the extent and function of African culture in the Chesapeake region pervades and confounds the conclusion as well. A view of slaves as victims is caught in the remark that some lived lives that were "nasty, brutal and short"; this follows immediately another impression of a first generation that "creatively fused selected customs and beliefs flowing from a generalized West African heritage" with elements of European culture (pp. 220, 221).

That Walsh's book is not about "creative cultural fusion" is in large part accountable to the difficulty of making the case for viable African cultural survivals in

the Chesapeake. To begin this daunting task is to work comparatively and to use those sources that enhance chances of seeing in particular situations of cultural exchange an African perspective; missionary sources may provide glimpses of African spirituality, and newspaper notices for fugitives offer unparalleled insights of Africans from the inside: on the ground, on their own, and occasionally expressing themselves in their own tribal and nonliterate manner.

In spite of the author's hopeful proposals regarding the acculturation of Africans, for them enslavement in the Chesapeake was distinctively peculiar and punishing. Why was this so? To answer this is to begin with the actual nomenclature whites used to designate new arrivals. Consider the groups that are the focus here, the Senegambians and Calabar. While elsewhere in the array of English-speaking plantation societies peoples comprising these cultures were recognized specifically as Mandingo, Ibo, Moko, and the like, in the Chesapeake the same were lumped together habitually and exclusively as "outlandish." This custom negated a need to recognize them as carriers of specific West African societies and cultural patterns. Also, elsewhere in the Americas, it is possible to uncover two indispensable indicators of Africanisms at play, maroonage and market women, both of which measure slave mobility. While other slave societies were in important ways open in this regard, Virginia was closed. That is (for starters), in the Chesapeake there was no maroon tradition, no institution of slave markets dominated by women (as was the case in both West Africa and the Caribbean generally); and, most importantly, there was no African information system at work in terms of drumming, possession dancing, and other (spoken) languages that were clearly recognized as such by whites and sustained by blacks (as "Coramantee" was by Akan-speaking slaves in Jamaica).

Given the array of New World slave communities that incorporated new arrivals, those cursed by sale in this corner of British America were dumped into a slave culture whose African content may be characterized most charitably as a backwater, and least as a cultural dead end. Hence it is the proverbial ghost in Hamlet herein—the "overwhelming, powerful, alien white presence"—that ought to hold center stage in what became for black people one of the most marginalizing and demoralizing plantation societies in the English-speaking world, precisely because African cultural survivals were so rapidly, customarily, and successfully ignored or crushed.

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ROBERT OLWELL. *Masters, Slaves, and Subjects: The Culture of Power in the South Carolina Low Country, 1740–1790*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 294. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$17.95.

In recent years, a good deal of excellent work has appeared on slavery in the South Carolina low country



during the early modern period. If some of this work is valuable mainly for extending and elaborating on themes first articulated by Peter H. Wood in his pioneering *Black Majority: Slaves in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 to the Stono Rebellion* (1974), other studies in this area are bold and original. Robert Olwell's book clearly falls into the latter category. Indeed, in my view, it is one the most insightful and interesting books on early America to appear in some time.

At first glance, Olwell's book, picking up as it does in the aftermath of Stono, seems like a useful, if limited temporal extension of *Black Majority*. That is to say, it seems a sort of southern variant of Edward Cook's work on Dedham, Massachusetts, a community first made famous by Kenneth A. Lockridge in *A New England Town* (1970). Because Olwell is such a gifted historian, and because he sees so freshly, his book is much more than that, allowing if not compelling readers to view everything in colonial South Carolina, even the seemingly commonplace, anew.

Olwell is concerned first and foremost with "the culture of power" in the low country, or, more specifically, with the manner in which such power was at once made manifest and, thus, rendered "readable" in the social dynamics of the area. To invoke *power* and *dynamics* in eighteenth-century South Carolina perforce means to examine slavery and the master-slave relationship. According to the author, however, one cannot fully understand either masters or slaves in the colony, much less their relationship, without embedding the same in the British Empire. Hence the third panel in his interpretive triptych: subjects. For metropolitan ideas and institutions—in refracted form, to be sure—provided much of the cultural authority that masters attempted to wield and slaves tried to reinterpret, manipulate, and often to resist.

Olwell "reads" and, more importantly, explicates the culture of power in four key arenas in colonial South Carolina: the legal system, the established (Anglican) church, the "market," and the plantation. Individual chapters on the performance—and inversion—of power in each of these arenas form the substantive core of the book. In each, Olwell shows how British ideas and institutions, whether relating to property rights, criminal justice, religious conversion and communion, capitalism, or patriarchy, were transferred to and transformed in South Carolina, through both colonial circumstance and the overarching influence of slavery. From the complex commingling of masters and slaves in a colonial context, the South Carolina low country became as much an exemplar, ironically, of cultural hybridity as of an *ancien régime*. If the rules governing this regime were tested to a degree during the American Revolution (as Olwell demonstrates in a riveting concluding chapter), the low country plantocracy survived the disorders of war and the end of empire relatively well. Hierarchy, inequality, and slavery, that is to say, could be made to fit as comfortably in republican garb as in the raiments of royalty. Alas,

according to Olwell, it was, more than anything else, the language and metaphors used to justify and legitimate cultural authority—"household" replacing "kingdom" and "children" replacing "subjects," for example—that changed after 1783.

All in all, this is a first-rate work in cultural history. Gracefully written, well researched, and ingeniously plotted, the study marks the debut of a prodigious young talent in the field of early American history. That this reviewer did not completely agree with the author's overall argument—Olwell sees greater subaltern agency, more contingency, and less complete and less confident supraordinate control than do I—in no way lessens my respect for his formidable achievements.

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REBECCA STARR. *A School for Politics: Commercial Lobbying and Political Culture in Early South Carolina*. (Early America: History, Context, Culture.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 218. \$45.00.

This volume addresses several central questions in early North American history: what role did ideology play in moving the colonies toward revolution, and what factors propelled South Carolina toward confrontation and secession in the mid-nineteenth century? Rebecca Starr suggests that the Carolina elite's exposure to interest-group lobbying shaped both these developments. Lobbying encouraged a view of the state as composed of diverse interests rather than individuals, an emphasis on harmony within the group, and a willingness to provoke confrontation with outsiders when persuasion failed.

Several factors pushed South Carolina leaders in this direction. More fully than other colonial elites, they embraced the commercial world and welcomed individual merchants within their ranks. Moreover, by the mid-eighteenth century, they had collaborated repeatedly in transatlantic efforts to lobby imperial authorities in England. During the 1760s and 1770s, several Carolinians gained greater familiarity with British practices through involvement in Bristol merchants' efforts to shape the colonial policies of the home government. In Bristol and London, men with Carolina connections joined in measures that attempted to influence electoral politics as well as incumbent officials and that moved beyond the pursuit of practical commercial interests to the quest for broader political objectives. Tellingly, they did not align themselves with the followers of John Wilkes and the earl of Chatham who sought radical changes in English government and who were closely associated with the country philosophy. Instead, they worked with the Rockingham Whigs, who supported more modest reforms that did not challenge the established structures of power and influence. The Carolinian reluc-



tance to embrace independence after the American Revolution began reflected this pragmatic and conservative faith in the politics of interest rather than ideology.

Carolina leaders applied the same principles to politics at home throughout the revolutionary era. In the First Continental Congress, they pressed for the exemption of rice from the nonexportation agreement, ultimately threatening to withdraw unless their interests were accommodated. Similar tactics won protections for slavery at the Constitutional Convention. Within South Carolina, they carefully balanced the interests of rice and indigo growers, debtors and creditors, lowcountry and upcountry sections. The legislature's committee system, with its emphasis on secrecy, informality, and accommodation, facilitated these efforts and retarded the development of political parties. At several points, public discourse moved strongly toward John C. Calhoun's nineteenth-century theory of the concurrent majority.

Perhaps inevitably, this ambitious argument is not always persuasive. Starr's contrast of the Carolina elite's acceptance of commerce with the Chesapeake gentry's rejection of it is overdrawn. Certainly, Virginia planters bitterly criticized tobacco merchants. Yet many operated as merchants themselves and accepted much of the spirit of the market. Indeed, ambivalence toward commerce decisively shaped Virginia culture, and one wonders if Charleston merchants' desires to become planters reflected something of the same mixed feelings in the society around them.

More fundamentally, although some Carolina leaders were exposed to lobbying, that hardly establishes this as the primary influence on the political thought and conduct of their class. The numbers of individual cases used to make parts of this argument are woefully small: three men's activities in Bristol and London in the late 1760s and 1770s essentially provide the evidence that British lobbying tactics guided the lowcountry elite as they embraced a wider political agenda in their confrontations with imperial authorities. Moreover, the link between past experiences and later attitudes and actions is often stated rather than demonstrated. For example, Starr suggests (pp. 85–87) that the lobbying experience led South Carolina leaders to develop and assert unanimity of legislative and popular opinion during the Townshend Act controversies of the late 1760s. Yet in many Virginia communities, the gentry's efforts to reassert their leadership within the culture of deference led to the same tactics for the patriot movement. Similarly, South Carolina's accommodation of diverse interests through legislative committees seems little different from politics in other colonial and state assemblies.

Finally, Starr's explicit focus on the leadership class weakens her analysis. Certainly she notes the influence of elite concerns with poor whites and slaves. Yet as Robert O'Neil has recently reminded us (*Masters, Slaves, and Subjects: The Culture of Power in the South Carolina Low Country, 1740–1790* [1998]), the relation-

ships of colonial planters with their slaves and with their sovereign were inextricably interlinked and mutually influential.

Despite its shortcomings, Starr's thoughtful book is essential reading for serious students of early South Carolina and the revolutionary South.

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ANDREW STEPHEN WALMSLEY. *Thomas Hutchinson and the Origins of the American Revolution*. (The American Social Experience Series, number 38.) New York: New York University Press. 1999. Pp. xvii, 207. \$37.50.

The figure of Bernard Bailyn casts a long shadow over Andrew Stephen Walmsley's new biography of Thomas Hutchinson, the last civilian governor of colonial Massachusetts. In *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson* (1974), Bailyn conveyed a certain sympathy for Hutchinson's personality while disdaining his political choices. Responding directly to Bailyn, Walmsley sets out to provide "a more complete contextual examination of the life and career of this vital colonial figure" (p. xiv). This reexamination amounts to a neat reversal of Bailyn's portrait. To Walmsley, Hutchinson is a "staid, unimaginative, and fastidious" man but a skilled public servant whose "flexibility and political maturity" have been long underrated (pp. 133, 122). Hutchinson's ability to see through the ideological blather to the true power politics of Massachusetts made him doubly dangerous to the radicals: he was both a political obstacle to their selfish ambitions and a rhetorical foe to be reckoned with.

Walmsley's chapters unfold a smooth and richly detailed narration of Hutchinson's career within this framework. Borrowing from Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1983), Walmsley posits the deliberate creation by Boston whigs of an imagined community of "Massachusetts unity and uniqueness" engaged in a noble fight for freedom (p. 52). And since every heroic nation needs traitors against whom to measure its own virtue, the radicals needed to demonize Hutchinson. As a native son, rich merchant, judge, and politician, he fit the bill perfectly for those eager to promote their own cause without taking the risks that an attack on Parliament or King George would have entailed. He thus became their "unique and singular enemy" (p. 74).

Hutchinson's tragedy was his inability to grasp the essentially symbolic nature of his own role in this conflict. A true gentleman-politician, he kept winning arguments on their merits while losing them on the larger political plane. In the Land Bank controversy of the late 1730s, he proved himself a better economist than Samuel Adams but inadvertently drove his enemies into organized and permanent political opposition. He opposed the Stamp Act but was too discreet to say so publicly, thereby allowing rumors to the contrary to take hold. Saddled with the British decision

to send redcoats to Boston just as he became acting governor, he nevertheless “demonstrated considerable political ability and personal courage” during the violent confrontations that culminated in the so-called massacre of March 1770 (p. 118). When he subsequently offered to resign his post he was actually trying to rouse his superiors in London from their complacency. Crucially but belatedly he came to grasp the importance of what we would now call spin control. Where Bailyn saw a fuddy-duddy placeman “confused or mystified by the radical challenge,” Walmsley sees “an accomplished political force” who gamely “joined the newspaper wars” (p. 127). His own newspaper flopped, but it did not stoop to the “simplistic moralistic raving” of the patriot press (p. 131). Ever the victim of his own virtue, Hutchinson was finally undone by one more quixotic attempt to prod London into taking decisive action. When a cargo of tea arrived in Boston in November 1773, he made a principled decision not to intervene and then pointed to the Tea Party as proof that British passivity had let Massachusetts go to the dogs. He soon left for England, never to return.

Walmsley writes elegantly and hews closely to such primary sources as newspapers and private correspondence. The book itself is beautifully produced as part of the American Social Experience series of the New York University Press, edited by James Kirby Martin. Like Martin’s own recent *Benedict Arnold, Revolutionary Hero: An American Warrior Reconsidered* (1997), Walmsley’s revisionist treatment of an American villain upsets some comfortable notions of patriotic virtue. But it is easier to make the negative case—that rebels do not always live up to their principles—than to establish the positive one for Hutchinson’s exceptional political intellect. Here is a man who called American independence an insane idea while energetically defending press censorship and arbitrary search and seizure. Readers more sympathetic to the aims of the revolution may be inclined to agree with Bailyn that Hutchinson was a decent man of unsound political instincts.

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MARK E. KANN. *A Republic of Men: The American Founders, Gendered Language, and Patriarchal Politics*. New York: New York University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 237. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$18.50.

Mark E. Kann notes that American boys arrange themselves into a pecking order. Some demand obedience; some acquiesce in these demands; and some boys are tormented as losers—“nerds,” “geeks,” “sissies”—whose visible humiliation helps ensure the submission of the others. When these boys grow up, they endorse a similar hierarchy of manliness, and thus does hegemonic masculinity perpetuate itself, usually at the expense of most men and of nearly all women.

How did this come to be?

Kann finds abundant evidence in the writings and oratory of the founding fathers, who seemed obsessively concerned with defining and enshrining manhood. On the eve of the American Revolution, Thomas Paine, like many others, denounced those who counseled peace as unmanly: “You are unworthy of the name of husband, father, friend, and lover” (p. 41). Benjamin Franklin disdained the persistent bachelor as “half a man” (p. 59). “Every man that really is a man,” he added, must be “master of his own family” (p. 7). Alexander Hamilton urged President John Adams to exhibit “manly but calm and sedate firmness” (p. 111). Some of Kann’s abundant references are striking, such as the words of a debtor, pleading to President Thomas Jefferson for his release: “This ignominious imprisonment unmans the heart” (p. 74).

Pronouncements such as these reflected widespread male anxiety during the late eighteenth century as political rhetoric and economic growth undermined traditional patriarchal values, an argument that has been developed in various ways by Jay Fliegelman, Mary Beth Norton, E. Anthony Rotundo, Kenneth A. Lockridge, Philip J. Greven, Jr., and Joan Hoff, among others. Kann’s contribution is to propose that the founders established a particular hierarchy of manliness that took root among subsequent generations of American men. The founders created a “republic of men” whose notion of manhood “constitutes the conservative core of contemporary liberalism” (p. 163).

At the apex of the founding fathers’ hierarchy of manliness was, in Kann’s terminology, the Heroic Man, of whom George Washington was the exemplar. The Heroic Man possessed special license to transcend popular opinion and social convention; he embodied the manly independence from which all other men derived vicarious sustenance. Below the Heroic Man was the Better Sort of Man, who exhibited exemplary virtue and functioned as lawmaker and leader. Then came the Family Man, who controlled his passions and submitted to his betters, deriving manly satisfaction from propagating a family and governing it. At the bottom were the Bachelors, disorderly and licentious, incapable of assimilating to the norms of the Family Man. The manliness hierarchy chiefly functioned to “stigmatize disorderly men and reward stable men” (p. 26).

Kann further proposes that these “hegemonic norms” were expressed within a “grammar of manhood.” The concepts were all the more powerful—even insidious—for being embedded within the structure of thought itself. But the founding fathers employed “manliness” and cognate words to mean many different things. For example, James Otis, Jr., advised protesters against the Stamp Act to exhibit “patience, meekness, and forbearance” because such traits were “consistent with the character of men” (p. 40). Yet within a few months, many patriots, including Otis, were calling for those with “manly sentiments” to put their lives on the line. The founders similarly enshrined the act of procreation—of “fathering” a

family—as an essential component of manliness, and yet they scorned slaves as “unmanly” for lacking sexual self-control and fathering so many children.

If “manliness” can signify both meekness and aggression, chastity and lust, then it ceases to mean much at all. “Manliness” functioned less as a hard implement of structural logic than as a Swiss army knife of the rhetorical arts. Whatever the founders wished to say, they could invoke words denoting manliness, suitably punctuated with thumping gestures, and expect the males in the audience—and perhaps the females—to applaud vigorously. The term encompassed so vast and subjective a realm that none could say what lay within its borders. And if “manliness” can be found everywhere and nowhere, then hegemonic manliness disappears as a category that exists in some meaningful opposition to “woman.”

Language conveys meaning, and the analysis of discourse is a useful adjunct to historical understanding, as Kann often illustrates. But when language is extracted from its social context, distilled into pure essences, and bottled in separate categories, it ceases to bear much relation to life.

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LAURA RIGAL. *The American Manufactory: Art, Labor, and the World of Things in the Early Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 253. \$29.95.

The concepts and vocabulary of cultural studies have played an increasingly vital role in recent early American history writing. (Re)defining culture as clusters of linguistic, visual, and conceptual representations and practices, a growing number of early Americanists have explored such diverse phenomena as self-fashioning, class formation, and the creation of American nationalism. Laura Rigal adds to this new approach an astute analysis of early national culture. In Rigal's account, manufactory carries a double meaning, representing both the transformation of American artisan production into machinofacture and the manufacturing of a broader national culture based in the concept of production.

Following the cultural studies paradigm, this book is less a discursive discussion of production as a mode of representation in the early years of the nineteenth century than a decentered exploration of several aspects of production as it was constructed in early national American culture. Using six vignettes ranging from the Federal Procession of 1788 to the trial and acquittal for bank robbery of Pat Lyon, the man who would become the artistic representation of the productive American artisan, Rigal observes the centrality of production in early American culture. The singularity of Rigal's analysis makes each of these vignettes unique and impossible to summarize in a brief review, but her discussion of John Fitch, the putative inventor of the steam boat, is worth of special mention. While

most recent studies of self-fashioning deal with those who, like Benjamin Franklin, succeeded in creating new and marketable personae, in Fitch, Rigal reveals in poignant detail the frustrations of a man who never seemed able to present himself in an agreeable manner. Suicide was the ultimate price Fitch paid for his failure to master the art of self-promotion in the early republic.

Rigal's vignettes are replete with insights into the production of American culture and American federalism in the early republic, but they also leave some important issues unexplored. In her hands, the culture of production is comprised of relatively non-conflictual representations. Take, for example, the Federal Procession of 1788. The procession itself was a well-planned and orchestrated affair undertaken by prominent local and national Federalists. It was designed to create and demonstrate exactly what Rigal suggests: a common culture of production as “the common ground of Union” (p. 24). Yet the representations of the procession were essentially ironic and the purported unity among artisans and Federalists more wishful thinking than reality. Even as Philadelphia artisans marched in apparent concert to the representations of city Federalists, barely disguised tensions and cleavages worked to divide the two groups on economic and political grounds. Within less than a decade of the procession, Philadelphia artisans and workingmen would flock to the opposition Democratic-Republican banner, deserting Federalists whom they branded as elitist and anti-labor.

More surprising, however, is Rigal's lack of discussion of the representations of the artisan community itself. Artisans valued their labor highly and built their own culture of production around it. By the late eighteenth century, American artisans were already articulating an ideology of productive and unproductive labor that would become the hallmark of the fledgling labor movement in the early national era. If, as Rigal clearly shows, production played such a central role in the culture of Federalism—and, indeed on the American cultural scene—then what linkages existed between this discourse of production and artisan “producerism”?

Finally, this leads to a broader question. What were the origins of the Federalist discourse of production? American artisans were heirs to an ancient culture of production that ran back to medieval Europe. Was the Federalist version of production culture an appropriation of this aspect of artisan culture? If so, how did Federalists learn about it, and how did they come to employ and manipulate it? Was there something specific about the Federalist approach, or was it a simple attempt to employ an existing mode of discourse to their own social and political ends?

As these questions suggest, Rigal has written an important book that raises important questions. This alone makes it essential reading for those interested in

deepening our understanding of early national culture.

RONALD SCHULTZ  
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C. EDWARD SKEEN. *Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1999. Pp. 229. \$27.50.

President James Madison's administration relied mainly on the militia to fight the War of 1812. C. Edward Skeen's book documents the abject failure of that reliance. It also locates the nadir of the militia system as a warfighting organization in this war. By war's end, the federal government still had not developed a workable method to raise an army or to feed, clothe, and arm such forces as it was able to raise. Federal funds were insufficient to pay for the men and supplies needed. Congress never levied the taxes that might have brought in enough income to pay the bills. The government tried to shift the financial burden to the states, but states also lacked the means needed.

The best chapters in this book are those that do not cover combat, namely chapter two, "Congress and Military Mobilization"; chapter three, "Military Organization"; chapter four, "The States and Military Mobilization"; chapter eight, "Federal and State Relations"; and chapter ten, "The War's End and the Decline of the Militia." The combat narratives have been handled in other books adequately and with more vividness than here.

Skeen makes full use of essential sources. The result is not exciting reading but is totally informative. What the militia lacked, Skeen says, was not the will but the ability to fight because of inadequate training, poor organization, and insufficient armament and equipment. He credits the states for meeting as many of the demands made by the government as they did. The national-state relationship was so unsatisfactory, Skeen says, that if the war had continued another year or less, several states would have raised their own armies. Militia duty was an indirect tax levied on men of military age, who by the Militia Act of 1792 were required to arm themselves.

The militia system was a political issue. To the Republican Party, it was the bulwark of national defense. To the Federalist Party, however, it was only useful to supplement a regular army. Fear of a standing army, shared by many Federalists, kept appropriations for regular troops inadequate. Conscription of militiamen could result in a standing army.

Chapter three contains tables of organization for all units from company upwards. Unfortunately, because militia units seldom conformed to these tables, those from different states did not become interchangeable. Several factors contributed to militia inefficiency. One was the right of a militiaman to hire a substitute; another was the manner of contracting for supplies and equipment. Disease took a heavier toll on militiamen than regulars, augmented by insufficient medical personnel. Finally, the traditional three-month tour of

duty did not allow enough time to turn citizens into soldiers.

Skeen's unequivocal judgements about some of the war fighters require notice. To him, Major General Peter B. Porter, holding a commission from New York, was the quintessential commander of citizen soldiers. To him, Brigadier General James Winchester of the regular army performed poorly in the west. Long experience fighting Indians on the frontiers should have made him and the western militia more effective than they were. The performance of the militia at Bladensburg on August 24, 1814, was acknowledgedly disgraceful, but linked to it was the leadership of Brigadier General William Henry Winder, whom Skeen rates as utterly incompetent.

Militiamen could perform creditably if they believed in their commanding officer. The greatest victory of the war was won by a general whom the soldiers believed in: Major General Andrew Jackson. Throughout the battles from December 23, 1814, to January 8, 1815, defending New Orleans against the formidable British army, Jackson wrung high level performance from citizen soldiers. The victory on January 8 refurbished the image of the militia as the bulwark of national defense but did not halt its obvious decline. What was left of the system did, however, enable states both Union and Confederate, five decades later, to raise the armies that fought in the Civil War.

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DONALD F. CARMONY. *Indiana, 1816-1850: The Pioneer Era*. (The History of Indiana, number 2.) Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana Historical Society. Indiana Historical Bureau, Indianapolis. 1998. Pp. xiv, 924. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$29.95.

This long-awaited second volume of the standard history of the Hoosier state is both a substantial achievement and a partial disappointment. Donald F. Carmony's research is prodigious, and no other scholar can match his comprehensive knowledge of Indiana's ambitious but always under-funded pioneer state government. He covers politics and public finance in overwhelming detail and canal building and public education in reasonable detail, but at the terrible cost of ignoring all other topics. Although Carmony is one of the few historians with a living memory of one-room rural schools and horse-powered farming, there is little of social history in his 632 pages of text. The great utopian experiments at New Harmony fall into this period, but neither George Rapp nor Robert Owen is ever mentioned. The remarkable word *Hoosier* first appeared during the early 1830s, but Carmony says nothing of its significance or its mysterious etymology.

The other four volumes of this series contain maps, illustrations, and real footnotes. Readers without a detailed understanding of Indiana geography will be at a loss without a map of their own, and Carmony's prodigious endnotes cover 227 pages without page



number headings. Despite the author's dream that this book will appeal to non-professional readers, it is emphatically a work for reference, supported by a seventeen-page bibliography and a forty-five-page index.

Carmony writes in the spirit of his mentor, Logan Esarey, and his work is firmly based on the printed primary sources, personal and official, as well as the colorful pioneer newspapers. The new state immediately found it necessary to borrow in order to meet its modest financial requirements, and its citizens were—as they are today—firmly opposed to increased taxes to pay for the services they demanded. Indiana was indeed an undeveloped economy throughout the period covered by this volume, and even by 1850 less than one quarter of its land had been cleared for cultivation. Although Carmony admires pioneer virtues, he never romanticizes the hardships of pioneer work: it was brutally difficult. His descriptions of farming are generic; there is nothing about regional or ethnic variations. In fact, there is nothing about immigration, and neither Germans nor Irish make an appearance. The well-known differences between upland southern settlers moving northward across the Ohio River and Yankees moving westward across Ohio play no part in this volume. Religion, too, is strangely neglected; neither Methodists nor Presbyterians appear in the index.

Carmony's prose is clear and straightforward, but the long chapters make for unnecessarily difficult reading. Chapter six covers seven years in eighty-four pages, with 321 endnotes occupying an additional thirty-eight pages. There are no subheadings. The exciting "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too!" campaign of 1840 is covered in rich detail, but it is hidden in a chapter labeled "1841–1850." Carmony covers state and national politics in widely separated chapters, making it difficult to follow the story of party development. Both Jacksonian Democrats and Adams-Clay supporters held conventions from 1828 to select candidates for Congress and presidential electors, but in state matters the parties were slower to organize. Whigs dominated Indiana through the 1830s, continuing in office despite the disastrous failure of Governor Noah Noble's "Mammoth Improvements" program of canal and railroad building with borrowed funds. The state was virtually bankrupt by 1840 and defaulted on its canal bonds a year later, but the Democrats did not win control of state government until 1843.

Readers would naturally expect this volume to close with Indiana's new constitution of 1851, which forbade public borrowing, took the state out of the banking business, and excluded persons of color from settling in the state. Carmony provides the best account ever written about the constitutional convention, but he ends the story without any summary of the condition of Indiana in 1851. Instead, he follows his rich account of state politics with nearly 200 pages about national politics in Indiana, duplicating much of his earlier description of party formation and development.

Throughout there are few comparisons with other states of the Old Northwest.

Carmony has spent a long lifetime studying pioneer Indiana, and no other historian can match his knowledge of the subject. This is a very useful book, but it lacks the sparkle of Carmony's wonderful talks about his beloved Indiana. For politics and public finance, his achievement is monumental, but for other aspects of Indiana history between 1816 and 1850 readers will have to look elsewhere.

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KELLY F. HIMMEL. *The Conquest of the Karankawas and the Tonkawas, 1821–1859*. (Elma Dill Russell Spencer Series in the West and Southwest, number 20.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1999. Pp. xvi, 192. \$32.95.

Despite the fact that Texas had many diverse Indian tribes living within its borders before the twentieth century, until recently most historical studies have focused on the buffalo-hunting Comanche Indians and their struggles with the United States after the Civil War. In the past few years, however, scholars have redressed the neglect of the other indigenous peoples of Texas by producing works that examine agricultural tribes and hunters and gatherers, longtime residents as well as recent emigrants, paying particular attention to their relations with various Euro-Americans from the colonial era through annexation. Kelly F. Himmel's fine study of the Karankawa and Tonkawa Indians is a part of this recent trend, as it focuses on the conquest of two heretofore neglected tribes during the period from Mexican Independence to the eve of the Civil War.

The Karankawas were a nomadic tribe consisting of at least five different groups that traditionally roamed along the Gulf coast from Galveston Island to Corpus Christi Bay in search of small game, shellfish, and edible plants. The one "fact" that all Texas schoolchildren are taught about the Karankawas is that they were cannibals who would eat any hapless European who had the misfortune to shipwreck in the Gulf of Mexico and seek refuge on the Texas coast. Although the Tonkawas shared the hunting and gathering lifestyle of the Karankawas, they were a linguistically distinct group of tribes that lived in central Texas, where they adapted to the introduction of horses in the seventeenth century and added buffalo-hunting to their subsistence strategies. Although the Karankawas and Tonkawas resisted Spanish attempts to congregate them into missions in the 1700s, by the nineteenth century both tribes—despite dramatic population losses—had accommodated themselves to the presence of the few Spaniards that lived in Texas.

Himmel begins his study of the two tribes in 1821 when Texas, as a part of Mexico, gained its independence from Spain, and when Anglo-Americans from



the United States began to flood across the Sabine River. Although this work is, for the most part, a narrative—using mainly published sources in English—of what the Anglos perceived as a “civilized” conquest of the “savage” Karankawas and Tonkawas, the author analyzes the conquest through the lens of world-systems theory. Himmel uses the Anglo-Texan conquest of the two tribes in an attempt to discern how conquest is affected by geopolitical location, degree of incorporation into world economic relations, cultural orientations of the conquered and conquering groups, and individual or collective human actors. The description of this methodology should not frighten traditional students of Indian-white relations in Texas, for the author never allows the theoretical jargon to overwhelm the narrative. Instead, the analysis serves to deepen and enhance the story in which the Anglo-Texans made war upon the two tribes, resulting in the virtual extermination of the Karankawas by 1845 and the removal of the Tonkawas to the Indian Territory in 1859. Himmel concludes that these results were almost inevitable due to the rapid population growth in Texas after 1821, which fueled economic expansion as Texas products began to assume growing importance in the world economy. These changes also took place in a period marked by growing disdain for non-Western peoples, which caused attitudes toward American Indians to coalesce around two avenues of action: “cultural destruction through civilization and physical destruction by extermination” (p. 122).

In addition to his thought-provoking analysis of the Anglo-Texan conquest, Himmel traces the source of the “myth” of Karankawan cannibalism. He points out that the early settlers of Stephen F. Austin’s colony justified their war of extermination against the Karankawas—who served no military or trading purpose to the colonists—by characterizing them as man-eaters. Despite the fact that there is much stronger evidence that the Tonkawas actually practiced cannibalism, in the early days of Anglo settlement the tribe provided Austin’s colony with military protection from hostile Indians, and therefore, its members were dismissed as harmless beggars and petty thieves by the *empresario*. Himmel has produced a very worthwhile study of two Indian tribes during a relatively neglected period of Texas history. The only drawbacks to this fine work are the lack of maps and the fact that the author did not make full use of the Bexar Archives, an important Spanish-language source.

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JOHN M. COWARD. *The Newspaper Indian: Native American Identity in the Press, 1820–90*. (The History of Communication.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 1999. Pp. viii, 244. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$18.95.

Historians have long seen the need for a careful examination of the contemporary media in their ef-

forts to understand the relative truth or falsity of representations of historical events. In this engaging book, John M. Coward brings to our attention how the predilections of those who tendered the news and the changing processes of news gathering reflected, and in most cases supported, the ideological preoccupations of many Euro-Americans about Native Americans during the nineteenth century. News reports from the west, which were filtered through editors and newspaper owners, often provided evidence that Indian peoples needed to be removed from the path of white civilization. As Coward explains, his book elucidates the process by which “the press turned actual Native Americans into ideologically useful Indians” and seeks “to identify and critique the political, economic, social, and cultural forces that produced Indian news, determined its structure, and defined its popular understandings” (p. 12).

After introductory chapters that discuss how early nineteenth-century beliefs about the Indian were based largely on representations drawn from such texts as Mary Rowlandson’s *Narrative* (1682) and the romances of James Fenimore Cooper, Coward takes his readers through the press accounts of the removal of the “five civilized tribes” from the South; the Sand Creek “Massacre,” as this event is now commonly known, but which was first reported in far different terms; the Fetterman Fight, the press reconstruction of which, Coward argues, “was a small rehearsal for the large and powerful myth-making forces unleashed by Custer’s final campaign” (p. 150); the creation of both the good and the bad personae of Sitting Bull; and the Ponca Removal, which galvanized both sympathetic and anti-Indian forces across the nation at the end of the 1870s. In all of these cases, Coward makes clear the relationships between the concerns of those who produced and edited the news and the construction of Indian identities.

Coward is at his best when describing the workings of the early American press. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, many reports, including most depictions of Indians, were informally gathered and communicated through the mails, and so there was often a lag between events and the accounts of them. Newspapers also included, however, “private letters, tall tales, anecdotes, poems, and other literary items” and “all manner of ‘unofficial’ and contradictory information, including hearsay and hoaxes” (p. 14). The founding of the Associated Press in 1846 and the coming of the telegraph meant that reports of events arrived more quickly, but they were compressed into shorter items that allowed for much politically charged elaboration and editorializing. The telegraph “tended to homogenize the news, promoting a standardized set of facts and a more ‘official’ form of news” (p. 15). Throughout the course of this study we see the emergence of such an “official” line toward the Indian, most of whom were portrayed as savages, others as anachronistic people whose nobility was in part predicated on their eventual demise, or, in the best of cases, as

people who had the potential to be assimilated into civilized white society.

It should be said that when not discussing newspaper accounts, Coward has a tendency to read what are complicated texts in a rather simplistic manner. His sense that the Indians in Rowlandson's *Narrative* are bad and that those in the *Leatherstocking Tales* and other Indian romances are good serves his purpose, but it might be misleading to the modern reader who does not know the primary texts. Also, at times, the book becomes a bit redundant. Coward lays out his argument clearly in his introduction and reasserts it when he feels it is necessary throughout the course of his study. As we read him restate it again in the concluding section, the reader may wish that the author had chosen instead to widen or redirect his gaze. His fine work on Indian representations in the nineteenth century could have provided a platform from which he might have taken a brief look ahead to twentieth-century depictions or back at nineteenth-century newspaper descriptions of other ethnic groups, but he does not take this opportunity.

Such a response, however, is based in part on the clarity of Coward's assertions and the consistent cogency of his reasoning. In the end, when Coward states that newspaper accounts were crucial in providing a rationale for anti-Indian sentiments during the nineteenth century, it is impossible not to be convinced by the force of his argument or the weight of his examples. This is a well-researched, carefully argued study that will provide thought-provoking reading for those interested in the construction of Indian identities or in the history of the methodologies of the press in the expanding nation.

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AMANDA PORTERFIELD, *Mary Lyon and the Mount Holyoke Missionaries* (Religion in American Series.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 179. \$39.95.

Although not delivering exactly what its title promises, this book provides some useful insights into Mary Lyon's theological ideas and analyzes how Lyon's Mount Holyoke students used their training when they became foreign missionaries. In the book's first half, Amanda Porterfield uncovers the New Divinity strands of Lyon's theology and demonstrates how those filaments became entwined with the ideology of Republican Motherhood. In the second half, she uses case studies to examine the work and varying impact of about a dozen Mount Holyoke alumnae at mission stations in Persia, India, and South Africa. In both sections, she takes issue with contemporary feminist scholars and theologians whose lack of sympathy for "the missionary impulse to self-denial" (p. 26), she believes, impedes their understanding of self-sacrificing nineteenth-century women. Porterfield is similarly

critical of historians who fail "to appreciate the importance of religion in social and intellectual change" (p. 36).

Many historians of women and of religion will be puzzled by these complaints. Surely some of the best recent work in the field has both recaptured historical figures' own understandings of their lives and analyzed the broader contexts in which those lives were lived. Moreover, the book's analysis of women missionaries diverges only somewhat from that of historians such as Patricia Hill, Jane Hunter, Mary Zweip, and Joan Jacobs Brumberg and is undercut by gaps and silences in the available evidence.

These evidentiary lacunae are especially apparent in the three case studies, where documentary materials chronicling the Mount Holyoke missionaries' impact on residents of mission fields is either absent or derived entirely from the missionaries' own accounts. When Porterfield draws parallels between missionary women in India and Hindu holy women, for example, or suggests that "missionary emphasis on the religious aspects of Republican Motherhood coincided nicely with" Hindu reformers' views (p. 109), the reader is left wondering whether Hindu converts themselves discerned the parallels. The revelation that "conversion to Christianity was never as prevalent . . . as conversion to Islam" (p. 107) in western India is likely to reinforce the reader's skepticism. And because the Mount Holyoke alumnae never labored alone but instead staffed mission stations in the company of other missionary men and women, sorting out Lyon's precise influence in specific locales is impossible. Indeed, for long stretches of the book's second half, the Mount Holyoke missionaries disappear from the story as Porterfield explicates local and missionary histories and internecine struggles at mission stations.

If Porterfield's book adds more suggestively than substantively to the literature on women missionaries, it nevertheless contributes usefully to historical understanding of Lyon by carefully reconstructing the Edwardsean and Hopkinsian framework of her "intellectual worldview" (p. 29). In pointing out that historians "have overemphasized the roots of Republican Motherhood in enlightenment rationalism" (p. 26), Porterfield enters the current lively debate over the phenomenon and its fate in the antebellum years. Yet in claiming a unitary line of development from "the New England tradition of female piety" (p. 4) through Republican Motherhood to Lyon and her missionary daughters, she runs the risk of oversimplifying the complex tangle of historical causation. However applicable the concept of Republican Motherhood is to the 1790s, it may not fit the very different 1830s or 1850s.

In 1887, an astonishing twenty percent of all women missionaries commissioned by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions had attended Mount Holyoke College. Surely Porterfield is correct that Lyon's life and legacy were crucial to creating this statistic. As an initial foray into studying the women

behind the statistic, this book is a start, but only a start.

ANNE M. BOYLAN  
University of Delaware

HUGH DAVIS. *Leonard Bacon: New England Reformer and Antislavery Moderate*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 293. \$60.00.

Leonard Bacon (1802–1881) has received scant attention in the standard texts of American religious history, and he deserves better. Hugh Davis has corrected this oversight. This biography also manages to make a fine contribution to studies of the nineteenth-century antislavery struggle, developments within Protestantism, the movements away from strict Calvinism, and the events leading up to the Civil War. Bacon began life on the Michigan frontier as the first of seven children of Congregational missionary parents. Their financial support dwindling, the parents relocated to Connecticut, and Bacon was eventually able to attend Yale College on a scholarship. There he formed close friendships with men who would become important and remain his friends for life. After graduation in 1820, Bacon was accepted at Andover Theological Seminary, where he studied under Moses Stuart and Leonard Woods, both eminent teachers. Here he blossomed, and after Congregational ordination in 1825 he was called to the prestigious Center Church in New Haven, a daunting prospect for a young man of twenty-two. Here Bacon would be pastor for the next forty-three years.

Contention (which was to be constant throughout Bacon's life) was already brewing over the modifications being made in Calvinism. The influence of Jonathan Edwards was so great after his death in 1758 that all New England theologians, including Samuel Hopkins, Joseph Bellamy, Timothy Dwight, Lyman Beecher, and Asahel Nettleton, claimed to follow Edwards faithfully, whether they did or not. The Second Great Awakening brought revivals throughout New England, but the concept was changing. The older understanding had been that revivals would come only at God's good pleasure. In addition, the prevailing Calvinist theory of election had a massive dampening effect: people must simply wait, perhaps all their lives, and if they were of the elect, in God's own time salvation—and revivals—would come. But by 1820, some leaders were teaching that revivals were the calculated means to an end, and they could be produced when pastors knew how to manipulate the proper "means and measures." In concert with this, sinners could make an overt decision for salvation themselves, without having to wait. These were liberating ideas that broadened the possibilities of revivals and evangelism, much in harmony with the activism of the period of Jacksonian democracy and stress on the "common man," and generally Bacon agreed with them.

The other doctrine that was producing great controversy was sin. Bacon's neighbor, Nathaniel W. Taylor,

professor of theology at Yale, denied original sin and insisted that people become sinful simply because they sinned. There was no one who did not indulge in sin, and to him "sin is in the sinning." In Taylor's well-known phrase, humans always had "power to the contrary," to do good instead of evil because of the freedom of the human will, even though in actuality sin was inevitable. To many clergy, this was heresy coming from Yale.

Bacon, a moderate on most questions, welcomed controversy and was thus in a maelstrom in New Haven. In that tumultuous antebellum period, the debate over slavery was at fever pitch. Bacon, as a respected and popular journalist, was soon contributing articles to leading periodicals, and he hated slavery, holding slaveholders to be reprehensible and criminally responsible. He entered eagerly on the side of the colonization movement, hoping to send freed blacks back to Africa, which proponents were convinced was the most humane way to treat them. This placed Bacon in opposition to other abolitionists such as the vitriolic William Lloyd Garrison, who demanded immediate emancipation. Bacon's fame grew rapidly through his books and innumerable articles in church papers, and he was soon known across America for his views on all subjects, as the debates raged on.

For years, through the Civil War, Bacon was the exceedingly busy pastor of a vital church, an outstanding leader in Congregationalism, a lecturer at Yale, a recognized authority on church history, a controversial author, and an outspoken colonizationalist. Davis convincingly traces the complex strands of Bacon's long life and is basically sympathetic with his subject. Richly annotated and based on a wide study of the sources, this volume is handsomely printed and well written. This reviewer did not find a single typo.

KEITH J. HARDMAN  
Ursinus College

WILLIAM C. DAVIS. *Lincoln's Men: How President Lincoln Became Father to an Army and a Nation*. New York: Free Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 315. \$25.00.

William C. Davis has provided us with a highly readable account of President Abraham Lincoln's relationship with the Army of the Potomac. The title, however, suggests a broader paternity than actually existed, since Lincoln had little if any contact with the other armies operating in more distant theaters of operations. The book argues that the president's militia experience in the Black Hawk War forged a deep respect for the citizen soldier as the backbone of the republic and also provided him with insights into the motivation of militia troops that served him in good stead during the Civil War. The insightful first chapter is followed by a description of the mobilization process at the outset of the war and Lincoln's initial reliance on patriotic volunteering to assure a public stake in the cause. Lincoln made a point of visiting the training camps regularly and showing the administration's con-

cern for the soldiers' welfare. Though not providing a particularly original insight to the competitive relationship between General George B. McClellan and Lincoln for the affection of the army, Davis's account is lively and clear.

The president's ties with the army prevented the rise of Caesarism during the years of disappointment and defeat. The Emancipation Proclamation probably reinforced his hold over most of the army's rank and file and conversely isolated conservative elements in the officer corps and among the enlisted men by redefining the army's purpose into a revolutionary instrument for spreading liberation and democracy. Lincoln astutely perceived that the rank and file would support emancipation for idealistic reasons and because it would speed the end of the war by making black recruits available for enlistment. His finding that most soldiers went along with the policy has already been confirmed by other historians, but it is substantiated here with lively quotations from the soldiers themselves. The last three chapters of the book describe Lincoln's empathy for the plight of soldiers convicted of various offenses and his numerous commutations of their penalties. Neither the chapter on Lincoln's compassion nor the last two about the 1864 election and the reaction to Lincoln's assassination diverge much from existing interpretations. Nevertheless, the style and price of the book make it accessible to a much larger audience than may not be familiar with more academic studies.

Two questions come to mind after reading this interesting book. First, one wonders why Lincoln did not take more interest in the troops in the western theater. Davis claims that there was less need because the western armies were victorious and morale remained higher. Yet the debacles at Shiloh, Murfreesboro, and Vicksburg in 1862, followed by the 1863 defeat at Chickamauga and the crisis in Chattanooga, make one wonder if this is an adequate explanation. The president was, after all, a westerner, and one would assume that he had a keen awareness of the strategic importance of that theater. Perhaps he was suffering from the same ("inside the beltway") narrow focus that prevailed in the war.

My second question concerns the president's attitude about the changing nature of the war, as war aims were radicalized and tactics followed suit. What did Lincoln think of the "hard war" being conducted by generals like Philip H. Sheridan, David Hunter, and William T. Sherman, a war whose officially sanctioned brutality was often enthusiastically exceeded by the rank and file outside the control of higher officers, and how did he react to the use of Union League and the military commissions' repression of dissent at home and in occupied areas? And if Lincoln tacitly supported or sanctioned this punitive type of war, how can it be reconciled with his conciliatory postwar policy toward the conquered?

These comments aside, Davis has provided the

general reader with an engaging description of important political and military aspects of the Civil War.

JOSEPH ALLAN FRANK,  
EMERITUS  
University of Ottawa

DALE BAUM. *The Shattering of Texas Unionism: Politics in the Lone Star State During the Civil War Era*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 283. \$37.50.

The history of Texas during the Civil War and Reconstruction has not been well-served by historians in the twentieth century. Ever since the William Archibald Dunning-inspired study by Charles W. Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas* (1910), all the scholarly literature until the past two decades has parroted his viewpoint and accepted his interpretations. Although we still do not have a history of Texas during the Civil War, or even Reconstruction, Dale Baum's new work attempts to bridge this gap by focusing on politics, elections, and social dynamics. The quantitative material and explanations are dense, murky, and difficult for the non-climetrician, but Baum has provided a reasonably clear and concise narrative to guide the uninitiated.

Beginning with Sam Houston's gubernatorial triumph in 1859, which briefly checkmated the pro-slavery Democratic Party's control throughout the South, Baum chronicles various decisions by Texas voters during the critical Civil War era. Houston's success stemmed from several factors, which included Hardin R. Runnels's failure to stabilize the western frontier, his inability to mobilize one-third of his 1857 supporters or attract new voters, and his loss of support in the Rio Grande Valley and the western region. Conventional wisdom suggests that Houston assembled a "curious" or "strange" coalition in winning the governorship, but Baum does not view the 1859 victory as "exceptional."

At any rate, Houston's success was short-lived. He could not forestall disunionism, which flourished in the wealthy plantation areas, "characterized by high levels of hog and cotton production, low ratios of horses to mules, large native-born percentages among their white population, and considerable concentrations of Methodists, Baptists, and Presbyterians" (p. 52). Opposing the secessionists were areas where wheat production was high (North Texas) and counties where Lutherans, Disciples of Christ, and Germans were concentrated. Fraud and intimidation occurred against union voters in the secession referendum, but the overwhelmingly vote for separation meant such acts would not have significantly altered the outcome.

Civil War elections presaged Reconstruction results, even without the presence of black voters. Francis R. Lubbock assumed direction of the state with Houston's resignation and then won the closest gubernatorial election in state history. Formal party organizations had disintegrated, but conflicts developed between groups who either promoted states rights or favored



the centralization of the Confederacy. These patterns continued throughout the war. In 1864, James H. Bell attempted to win the chief justiceship of the state supreme court. An "ardent" unionist, he was decisively defeated. Baum observes that to a "considerable extent the electoral roots of Reconstruction in Texas can be traced back to the 1864 judicial election" (p. 123).

These portents did not augur well for the postwar Republican Party. Unionism encompassed a wide variety of behavior, from voting against secession and joining the Confederate Army to fleeing the state and enlisting in northern service. Baum contends that "wartime experiences of antebellum unionists often shaped, but did not unfailingly predict their positions after the war on Reconstruction" (p. 126). What divided individuals was the debate over the status of the former slaves and their societal role. Those who engineered Texas out of the Union were better organized and, aided by President Andrew Johnson's lenient policy, easily captured the major political offices in the aftermath of war.

Radical Reconstruction began when the military removed James W. Throckmorton in 1867, enfranchised black males, and ordered elections to frame a new constitution. Baum discusses the two major controversies surrounding the 1868 election of delegates to the constitutional convention and the 1869 gubernatorial contest. How widespread was white disfranchisement, and to what extent were fraud and chicanery practiced in the bitter struggle for control of the chief executiveship? The number of whites disfranchised must remain a mystery, Baum concludes, but he asserts that no matter what A. J. Hamilton contended in his race for governor against the radical E. J. Davis, if a totally "fair and free" election had been held, Davis still would have won.

The major contribution of this book is that statistically it overturns several myths, especially for the postwar years, that are part of the historical canon in the state's history. For example, political divisions continued to exist during the war, and the candidates differed in policies and ideologies. In 1869, Davis did not "steal" the election from Hamilton and did not use the United States Army to police the polls to intimidate conservative whites. By bringing numerical sophistication to the Texas political arena in the years before, during, and after the Civil War, Baum has dispelled several long-held ideas about this era and added significantly to the historiography of the Reconstruction years.

BARRY A. CROUCH  
Gallaudet University

DAVID WILLIAMS. *Rich Man's War: Class, Caste, and Confederate Defeat in the Lower Chattahoochee Valley*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, in association with the Historic Chattahoochee Commission. 1998. Pp. xiv, 288. \$34.95.

David Williams's monograph is the latest addition to a growing body of literature within Civil War historiog-

raphy: a regional study that concludes that the Confederacy lost the Civil War because of internal conflict. Well written and forcefully argued, Williams's book is compelling reading. According to Williams, most small farmers and landless tenants of the Lower Chattahoochee Valley of Georgia and Alabama had a deep and abiding distrust of planters. Well before the war, most poorer whites had grown to despise their wealthy neighbors, viewing them as arrogant, self-serving, and utterly opposed to their democratic yearnings. During the secession crisis, these plain folk became even more leery of planters' motives but found themselves unable to stop the flow of events. When war erupted, they may have supported the Confederacy, but their commitment was weak. According to Williams, most poorer white men joined the Confederate Army because community leaders compelled them to do so or because they hoped that military service might help them to advance out of their miserable lot in life. Lacking an ideological commitment, their enthusiasm for war proved transitory. By 1862, many had become disenchanted with military service because of the poor rations, horrible camp conditions, abusive treatment of officers, and the very real prospect that they might die for a cause that they did not really support. By 1863, Williams tells us, "thousands" began to flee the Confederacy as deserters. Thousands more wanted to join them, but they feared the consequence—execution—if caught. By the end of the war, Williams asserts, most common soldiers fought without enthusiasm or purpose.

Meanwhile, conditions on the homefront deteriorated rapidly. The families of small farmers and laborers suffered greatly because of hyper-inflation, the corrupt practices of local impressment officers, and the greed of their wealthy neighbors. Despite widespread suffering, wealthier residents looked after their own interests first. While their poorer neighbors starved, the rich continued to grow cotton to sell on the black market. Many hoarded their wealth and refused to give to local charities. Those who did give to the poor soldiers and their families did so only "grudgingly" and expected compensation in return (p. 109). In time, the planters' selfishness became their own undoing. Williams concludes that the Confederacy was defeated because its leaders failed to win over the hearts and minds of its people. Indeed, by war's end, many southerners openly opposed the Confederacy.

This book provides is one of the most thorough treatments of class conflict within the Confederacy. Yet the very force of Williams's argument may put some scholars off. Williams acknowledges no nuances, no gray areas, no ambivalence. Unfortunately for Williams, the last few years have seen a steady flow of Civil War scholarship that has done much to muddy the internal conflict paradigm that he follows. These works have not necessarily abandoned the notion that the Confederacy was wrecked by internal conflict, but they have suggested that the lines of the conflict were not as clear as Williams suggests. Take, for example,



soldiers' motives for fighting. Contrary to Williams's argument, many studies have found that military service had a way of converting reluctant Confederates to the cause, particularly after they witnessed Yankee deprivations firsthand. Other studies have shown that soldiers' commitment to the war followed the fortunes of the Confederacy. Thus, Confederate morale plummeted after Gettysburg and Vicksburg in July 1863 but rose in the summer of 1864 when the war-weary North looked just about ready to give up the fight. For much of the war, the Army of the Confederacy may have acted as a source of social cohesion more than a source of class conflict.

Life on the homefront was even more complex. Although class inequality was a source of conflict on the homefront, it was not the only source of tension. Civilians found themselves assailed from a variety of quarters. At times, the forces that united rich and poor were as great as the forces that divided them. After all, both groups felt threatened by the growing autonomy of African Americans, the licentious and disorderly behavior of garrisoned soldiers, deserters, and draft dodgers, and the increasingly arbitrary power of the government in Richmond. Unfortunately, Williams rarely looks beyond the narrow focus of his thesis to explore the full texture of civilian life.

The book suffers from other problems as well. Too often, Williams relies on evidence from beyond the Chattahoochee to make his case. Thus he uses Hinton Helper, a North Carolinian, to show that poorer whites resented planters before the war (pp. 31–32). A few pages later, he quotes a Tennessee yeoman to show that poorer farmers had never trusted the planters (p. 48). The use of such evidence reads like a tacit admission that Williams does not have adequate evidence to make his case for the Chattahoochee Valley. Equally troubling, Williams sometimes resorts to hyperbolic statements that obscure historical truth. In describing soldiers' growing disenchantment with military service, for example, Williams tells us that they "continued to leave by the thousands" (p. 128). Because he fails to state when these "thousands" left, he implies that desertion from the Confederacy resembled a steady stream throughout the war. In fact, most authorities argue that the flood of desertions did not begin until the autumn of 1864, after the fall of Atlanta, John Bell Hood's disastrous defeats at Franklin and Nashville, and Abraham Lincoln's reelection all sealed the fate of the Confederacy.

Williams provides one of the most forthright and articulate presentations of the class conflict argument. As such, social historians of the Civil War will want to digest his book. Yet its overall impact upon the field may be short-lived. The study of soldiers' and civilians' motives has changed dramatically in recent years. As a result, this book may be remembered as the consummate expression of a now dated argument.

STEVEN ELIOTT TRIPP  
Grand Valley State University

STEPHEN P. HALBROOK. *Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866–1876*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 1998. Pp. xiii, 230. \$55.00.

Bad things happen when the historical record is ignored. The aim of the Fourteenth Amendment—to protect the "privileges and immunities" guaranteed by the Bill of Rights from state encroachment—was almost immediately hijacked by a perverse, ahistorical Supreme Court ruling. While judges felt obliged to respect the ensuing string of skewed precedents, and lawyers eventually found other ways to achieve the original purpose, an effort has been underway to recover the historical record. Stephen Halbrook's book is a part of that effort. His purpose is precise and, in its own way, skewed—to demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to incorporate the Second Amendment about which he has written so much, and that the Second Amendment was understood to protect an individual right to be armed. Both the strength and the weakness of this book stem from that narrow, albeit important, focus.

Halbrook proposes that the debates during the drafting of the Freedmen's Bureau and Reconstruction civil rights legislation offer important insights into whether the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to include the individual's right to be armed. Therefore he undertakes "a unique methodology," a day-by-day account of the proceedings in the 39th Congress leading to passage of the Civil Rights and Freedmen's Bureau Acts and the proposal for what would become the Fourteenth Amendment. To this he adds an analysis of public proceedings before the Joint Committee of Fifteen and press reports on these discussions. Happily, he also gives the reader an account of later debates in southern state conventions on whether to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment, a requirement for readmission to full status. This coverage places the Fourteenth Amendment in its legislative context, part of a series of acts to protect the rights of freedmen from fearful or vengeful southerners.

Since Halbrook's sole interest is the Second Amendment, he provides a hefty string of references to bearing arms culled from government and press discussions about the troubles of the former slaves. Beyond this he seldom ventures. This is unfortunate, since it is difficult for anyone but an expert to get a glimpse of the larger picture, or even the full legislative picture, and that in turn makes it more difficult to appreciate the debates he is exploring. For example, there is no explanation of the full scope and authority of the Freedman's Bureau or complete text of the laws, including the Fourteenth Amendment, that are his subject. Not until page 67 does he mention, in passing, that the Freedman's Bureau Act had divided the South into military districts, each commanded by a general. Halbrook mentions the Military Bill for the South, but since no clear explanation of its content is provided, it is difficult to follow the debate on it. There is no explanation of who in the South was and was not

armed, the composition and use of the South's postwar militia or voluntary militia, or—and admittedly this is a knottier problem—whether southern fears of an armed black insurrection, black fears from armed southerners, or Congress's fears of insurrection by blacks whose rights were denied, or all of these, were well founded. Intriguing, if tangential, subjects surface but are not discussed. At the opening of the 39th Congress, a bill was introduced to extend suffrage in the District of Columbia to women and blacks. Did women get the vote? The Arkansas Constitution granted Indians a right to be armed. Did any other state do this? The copious footnotes provide citations but no further explanations.

All this should not take away from the fact that Halbrook assuredly achieves his goal. He provides overwhelming evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect the right of individuals to be armed and that this particular right was a major concern of its framers. He offers scholars in the field a wealth of quotations from the historical debates. He includes an interesting account of southern conventions, and an excellent account of the events leading up to the landmark *Cruikshank* case which, he believes, heralded the end of Reconstruction. Above all, Halbrook helps restore the historical record of a badly served constitutional amendment.

JOYCE L. MALCOLM

*Bentley College and Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

JEFFREY R. KERR-RITCHIE. *Freedpeople in the Tobacco South: Virginia, 1860–1900*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1999. Pp. xv, 345. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$18.95.

Scholarly study of emancipation and its aftermath in the American South has focused disproportionately on the cotton-producing areas within the region. This book offers a welcome corrective to the imbalance. It is a well-crafted, broadly focused, deeply researched monograph that raises important questions; it is not without flaws, however, and it will not be the last word on this under-explored area.

Jeffrey R. Kerr-Ritchie prefaces his book with a model introduction that outlines the scope, thesis, and thematic focus of the work with admirable clarity. His thesis is straightforward: in the tobacco-producing region of Piedmont Virginia, “slave emancipation combined with transformed market conditions gradually eroded traditional forms of social discipline” (p. 2). Employing a “qualified historical materialism” (p. 8), Kerr-Ritchie intends to “illuminate the shifting frontiers of a world caught in the transition between a postemancipation society no longer defined by slavery and emergent capitalist forces that were not yet fully matured” (p. 6).

What follows is a largely effective overview of the experience of three generations of black Virginians from the Civil War to the early twentieth century,

deftly situated in larger regional, national, and even global contexts. The first half of the book focuses on the 1860s and early 1870s, a period Kerr-Ritchie significantly characterizes as the “beginnings” of emancipation, in keeping with his understanding of emancipation as an evolutionary rather than revolutionary process. Traditional master-slave relations began to shift during the Civil War due to the disruption of contending armies and the high incidence of absentee slaveowners. The conclusion of the war brought an official end to slavery but not the immediate, full realization of the former slave's material, political, and social objectives. The freedpeople's “emancipatory aspirations” (a phrase of which the author is excessively fond) clashed persistently with the differing objectives of the former masters, who sought to perpetuate their control of black labor. They also jarred against the free labor ideology of the Freedmen's Bureau, which tended to view free labor “as only the freedom to labor as opposed to labor's freedom” (p. 84).

The second half of the book investigates the period from the early 1870s through the end of the century and concentrates on two economic developments: the protracted agricultural depression that began in 1873, and the transformation of the tobacco economy stimulated by the growth of western competition and the rise of the cigarette industry, culminating in the formation of the American Tobacco Company in 1890. Along the way, Kerr-Ritchie also examines changing legal definitions of the proprietary rights of tenants and sharecroppers (which contributed to their “proletarianization”) and even briefly examines the relation of the freedpeople to agrarian protest as manifested in the Grange and the Colored Farmers' Alliance. He concludes with an intriguing overview of two central features of the black experience in “Tobacco Virginia” during the 1890s: impressive acquisition of land among the older generation born in slavery, and extensive emigration from Virginia among “freedom's second and third generations” (p. 236), twin developments that he positions within the overall context of agricultural decline in the region.

This work has numerous strengths. It is wide-ranging in scope, effectively integrating economic, social, and political history and alternating effectively and impressively between microcosmic and macrocosmic contexts. With great sensitivity to nuance, Kerr-Ritchie has mined census records, Freedmen's Bureau reports, agricultural periodicals, and farm and plantation accounts to convey the complexity of this crucial transitional period, and, what is perhaps most impressive, he recaptures a significant historical voice for the freedpeople themselves.

There are weaknesses as well, however. To begin, the first half of the book offers little fresh insight for our understanding of emancipation in the American South, largely repeating familiar themes from the scholarship on the cotton-producing regions. The idea that slavery was undermined gradually during the Civil

War has been accepted for at least a generation. The emphasis on the "agency" of the freedpeople, while more recently embraced by scholars, is rapidly approaching an unassailable dogma in emancipation studies. The tripartite struggle among ex-slaves, former masters, and Freedmen's Bureau agents is also a familiar theme. In addition, scholars familiar with the poverty and racial oppression of the late nineteenth-century South may find the tone of the book—encapsulated in its assertion that "the freedpeople managed freedom better than their former masters did" (p. 11)—a bit too celebratory. Others may deem objectionable the peremptory manner in which the author dismisses rather than seriously engages the insights of neoclassical economic historians. Nevertheless, Kerr-Ritchie provides valuable information about an under-examined region, and historians of the postbellum South will need to reckon with his assessment.

ROBERT TRACY MCKENZIE  
University of Washington

RONALD E. SEAVOY, *The American Peasantry: Southern Agricultural Labor and Its Legacy, 1850–1995; A Study in Political Economy*. (Contributions in Economics and Economic History, number 200.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. 1998. Pp. xiii, 599. \$79.50.

From slavery to sharecropping to mechanization, the history of agricultural labor in the American South has been debated so thoroughly and contentiously that one might believe any purportedly new interpretation would fall into one established camp or another. Ronald E. Seavoy proves this expectation wrong, and quite possibly succeeds in uniting all previous schools in opposition to him, by advancing an argument of the utmost simplicity: productivity and agricultural incomes in the South were persistently low because southerners were peasants whose primary motivation was to achieve subsistence with the minimum possible expenditure of labor. Acknowledging that other factors and motivations may at times have intruded, Seavoy invokes the principle of Occam's razor: "The general rule that best explains the privation inherent in subsistence cultivation is the minimal performance of agricultural labor" (p. 9). The book proceeds to retell all the major chapters of southern agricultural history from this vantage point, extending its reach in the last chapter to the problems of the underclass in modern American cities.

The author's claims for his discovery are far from modest. He writes: "The assumption by U.S. scholars that southern subsistence cultivators were not peasants remained unchallenged because there was no workable definition of peasants. This changed in 1986 with the publication of [Seavoy's] *Famine in Peasant Societies*, which contains the only workable definition of peasants" (pp. 2, 251). Peasants, according to the author, practice equalized access to land use, equalized sharing of harvests among households, and "minimal expenditure of labor in food production in normal crop

years" (p. 3). Armed with these definitions, Seavoy subjects previous writers to scathing criticism for over-looking or downplaying these norms, prime targets being Willie Lee Rose, Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, and the present reviewer.

The standards of argument and evidence mobilized in support of this case are not impressive. The bibliography is lengthy, but crucial assertions are undocumented, and Seavoy performs virtually no original work with data. Most of the forty-five tables and nine maps are directly reproduced from secondary sources. A more serious methodological problem is the indiscriminate application of the author's *idée fixe* to contexts that are barely comparable. The minimum-work principle is deployed to explain subsistence-crop production by small white antebellum farmers (pp. 248–58), but also to explain the preference for sharecropping by postbellum freedmen, because the furnish provided secure access to subsistence (pp. 183–84), and to explain the attraction of Populism to cotton-growing Texans in the 1890s (pp. 291–314). The author does not seem to notice that by claiming so much for a single behavioral proposition, he has deprived his thesis of any specificity or falsifiability it might potentially have had.

Although the author is identified as affiliated with the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University, the book abounds with misuses and misreadings of economic analysis. Seavoy contends that "the fundamental assumption of economic theory" is "that all persons are motivated to earn money incomes" (p. 173), and that therefore "economic assumptions cannot explain" the origin or operation of sharecropping (p. 182)—statements that are patently inaccurate. His characterization of Texas cotton growers as "self-made losers" (because they failed to grow food crops) is a classic confusion of micro motives with macro outcomes (p. 311).

The poor overall quality of the analysis tends to discredit the argument of the book. This is unfortunate, because Seavoy is actually raising potentially legitimate and relevant issues. The chapter dealing with the twentieth century, in which the author examines detailed micro-level surveys conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the American Agriculture Association, poses challenging questions about effort levels and responses to opportunity on the part of poor southern sharecroppers. Very likely it is also true, as Seavoy charges, that historians have neglected such behavioral topics, preferring to concentrate on the oppressive political and racial regime. However that may be, it adds nothing to historical knowledge or understanding simply to label rural southerners "peasants" and to assume thereby that their behavior was governed by a universal set of peasant labor norms, unchanged from their origins in Africa and medieval Europe. All of the components that one might hope to see in a cultural interpretation—intergenerational transmission and conflict, competing modes of rationality, norms adapting to conditions and evolving with

experience, family relationships over time and so on—are not to be found here.

As history this is a travesty, and recurrent outbreaks of undisguised moralism add an overlay of offensiveness to the mockery. Seavoy complains that historians “gloss peasant indolence” and “disguise it with euphemisms” (pp. 119, 206). Although the impact of debilitating malnutrition and parasites is acknowledged, this, too, Seavoy attributes to peasant labor norms. He writes: “It is completely accurate to say that peasants who died from acute pellagra died from acute indolence” (p. 222). When a black sharecropper complains that “cotton will work you to death and then ruin you,” Seavoy interprets this as a way of “phrasing his preference for indolence” (p. 401). Having followed this motif for five hundred pages, one is hardly surprised to encounter the author’s pronouncement on urban poverty: “The underclass is not poor. It is subsistent” (p. 500).

GAVIN WRIGHT  
Stanford University

VICTORIA SAKER WOESTE. *The Farmer's Benevolent Trust: Law and Agricultural Cooperation in Industrial America, 1865–1945*. (Studies in Legal History.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 369. Cloth \$49.94, paper \$19.95.

Victoria Saker Woeste skillfully weaves legal, business, and agricultural history to explain the transformation of cooperative marketing and cooperative marketing law from 1865 to 1945. How and why, Woeste asks, did cooperatives, once vehicles for economic reform, emerge after 1900 as tightly organized sales associations and as integral institutions of capitalist agriculture? And why, too, were these cooperatives granted antitrust immunity? Woeste answers these questions by focusing on the early history of the Sun-Maid Raisin Growers and the emergence of a “California style” of centralized cooperative marketing because it was the raisin cooperatives that initiated the institutional and legal changes in cooperative marketing during and after the Progressive era. More generally, she argues, these changes reveal how law and state interacted to construct twentieth-century markets.

Cooperative marketing in the nineteenth century tended to take two forms. The Grange, the Farmers’ Alliance, and other agrarian movements saw cooperation as a means of protecting farmers from profit-seeking corporations and private middlemen. A second form consisted of smaller cooperatives dedicated to the Rochdale principles of voluntary participation, democratic control, non-capitalized structures, and restrictions on profits. These cooperatives seemed an ideal form of self-help and mutual aid. To California raisin growers, however, the demands of competitive markets and a chaotic marketing system rendered these organizational ideals unworkable. Consequently, they expropriated cooperative rhetoric to justify building corporate stock organizations that signed growers

to long-term marketing contracts, sought to take over the packing, storing, and distribution functions of the private middlemen, and worked to gain control over prices. The most important of these experiments was the California Associated Raisin Company (CARC), which was established in 1912 and then reorganized in 1922 as Sun-Maid. The CARC prospered and inspired other California producers to follow its lead, but success came at the expense of democratic voluntarism and the non-stock structure. Paradoxically, Woeste notes, in the name of protecting small-scale agriculture, the CARC was turning itself into a major business enterprise.

Critics charged that the CARC was a ruthless trust bent on vertical integration and gouging urban consumers. The CARC countered that if it was a trust it was a “benevolent one” dedicated to the well-being of its farmer members. Federal courts, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission wrestled with whether CARC was a cooperative serving its members or an illegal combination seeking to restrain trade. The issue came to a head after World War I, when the CARC, with ninety percent of California’s raisin output under contract, was able to deny business to private packers and to manipulate prices. Prodded by the middlemen, the Justice Department filed suit under the Sherman Act in 1920. The raisin case and the postwar farm crisis produced two results. In 1922, CARC (now Sun-Maid) agreed to a consent decree that accepted its corporate structure but restricted it (and other cooperatives) from using its market power to influence prices. Congress, meanwhile, legitimized the new form of cooperation by passing the Capper-Volstead Act, which largely exempted cooperatives from anti-trust prosecution.

The consent decree, Capper-Volstead, and the passage of numerous state cooperative marketing laws constituted a legal revolution of sorts. Woeste concedes that even with the new legal standing the cooperatives were helpless to alter the unfavorable terms of trade confronting farmers after 1920. Sun-Maid lost its command of the raisin fields and the attempts by Aaron Sapiro to launch a national cooperative crusade ended in disaster. Only with the backing of the state, in the form of New Deal marketing orders, could fruit cooperatives control production.

This is a well-researched, well-argued book. It is particularly good at telling the story of Sun-Maid and its larger connection to anti-trust and cooperative marketing law. It also challenges the view of California agriculture as dominated by agribusiness or “factories in the field.” Woeste persuasively argues that the number of small-scale fruit growers actually increased from 1900 to 1940, and, far from being trampled by industrial agriculture, these producers were important actors in shaping California’s system of farming. Cooperative corporations were the growers’ answer to changing economic realities.

Concentrating so heavily on the raisin story creates a rather misleading perception that all cooperatives



were bent on market control and combination. In fact, however, many cooperative leaders were bitterly critical of Sun-Maid, and many cooperatives struggled to balance the need to operate on a larger scale with the hope of creating genuinely farmer-owned and farmer-managed institutions. Nevertheless, Woeste's book is an excellent contribution to the study of the transformation of American agriculture during the first part of the twentieth century.

DAVID E. HAMILTON  
University of Kentucky

REBECCA SHARPLESS. *Fertile Ground, Narrow Choices: Women on Texas Cotton Farms, 1900–1940*. (Studies in Rural Culture.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1999. Pp. xxiii, 319. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$19.95.

Gender issues have been prominent in the study of rural history during the last twenty years. Regional studies by Deborah Fink, Sally Ann McMurry, Mary Beth, Nancy Gray Osterud, Glenda Riley, and others have focused on women in different geographical places in nineteenth and early twentieth-century America. In a welcome addition to this literature, Rebecca Sharpless's book examines the period 1900 to 1940 in the Blackland Prairie, a strip of Texas extending approximately from San Antonio northeast to the Oklahoma border, which around 1900 grew as much as six percent of the nation's cotton.

Sharpless emphasizes how poverty, racism, and the South's restrictive definitions of gender shaped women's lives. For instance, she shows that whether a woman was part of a land-owning, tenant, sharecropping, or farm labor family affected how much cotton chopping, cultivating, and picking she did, in contrast to housework and childcare. So did race; in all land tenure categories, black women did more fieldwork than their white counterparts. Within Mexican-American families, however, which became increasingly numerous over time in the southern Blacklands, women did relatively little fieldwork, despite economic need.

Drawing on her own oral history interviews and those of others as well as contemporary social science investigations, Sharpless recreates in meticulous detail (with more than 1200 footnotes) women's day-to-day lives. For example, readers learn how the frequent relocation characteristic of sharecropping families affected women as housekeepers; how different ethnic and racial groups celebrated weddings; how the availability of a water source determined how women washed and cooked; how women showed self-expression in processing butchered hogs into food; how women cared for small children while doing fieldwork; how telephones replaced peddlers as a primary link between women and their communities; how female family members helped one another through the rural-urban migration that increasingly characterized the Blacklands; and about dozens of other informative

topics. Aptly chosen photographs from the Farm Security Administration collection illustrate many of these points. This book is unsurpassed as a scholarly source for understanding how farm women got their tasks done in the era before widespread mechanization of agriculture.

Sharpless is more explicit about the implications of some of her findings than others. For example, the participation by women in cotton production, which Sharpless describes in detail (pp. 169–87), ended when the crop left the farm for the gin. She makes clear that gender boundaries meant that only men collected payment for the crop and settled accounts with landlords and storekeepers. About the meaning of other points, readers must decide for themselves. For example, Sharpless's thorough discussion of intrafamily disharmony (pp. 59–65) could mean that Blacklands women were often trapped in unhappy marriages by poverty and gender restrictions, or that they were strongly dedicated to the integrity of their families and had female support systems to rely on in difficult times.

Similarly, Sharpless often puts her findings into the context of what other scholars have reported. She finds that the public discussion in the Blacklands about the appropriateness of fieldwork by women (pp. 160–63), for instance, paralleled arguments elsewhere in the South. On other topics, regional specialists in rural history will have to analyze Sharpless's findings for themselves. For example, it appears to me that the introduction of the automobile in the Blacklands (pp. 221–30) negatively affected community life more quickly than it did in the rural Midwest.

More careful editing would have improved the book. For example, numerical data are too often inaccurately described in the text. When Sharpless writes, "the birthrate remained higher than the rate of rural-to-urban migration" (p. 8), she means "the number of births exceeded the number of out-migrants." When she writes, "in a sample of 250 households in 1910 the 4 wealthiest households (.01 percent) in the survey had greater combined wealth (\$60,495) than the bottom 158 (63 percent)" (p. 11), she means "the 4 wealthiest households (2 percent)." When she writes, "In 1923, one marriage in five in Texas ended in divorce" (pp. 62–63) she means "there was one divorce for every five marriages during 1923." Also unsatisfactory is the University of North Carolina Press's style of annotation, in which all citations in the footnotes are abbreviated and must be cross-referenced to the bibliography. An example of the consequent confusion is Table 2. This table must be based on the manuscript United States censuses for 1900 and 1910, but these sources are listed nowhere in the bibliography.

Sharpless's book will be a valuable and informative resource for all scholars in women's history, rural history, and the history of Texas.

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GERALD J. BALDASTY. *E. W. Scripps and the Business of Newspapers*. (The History of Communications.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 217. Cloth \$42.50, paper \$16.95.

Gerald J. Baldasty has written the type of book we all like to cite as a good example to our students. This study of Edward Willis Scripps, an early press baron who was an advocate for the emerging working class after the Civil War, is based on manuscripts, newspapers, and other primary sources and integrates findings from the wide array of secondary sources about the turn-of-the twentieth century years that also witnessed the early careers of Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. Baldasty's book rewards the tendency for historians to read the footnotes, encouraging one to turn back often.

Scripps had a long working life, from his association with the *Detroit Evening News* in 1873 with his brother James to 1908, when he turned over his extensive holdings—approximately thirty newspapers—to his son. Scripps built up a group of newspapers by purchase or founding in smaller cities, such as Seattle and Denver, leaving Pulitzer and Hearst to fight it out without him in cities such as New York and (for the most part) Chicago. Scripps newspapers paid reporters and editors little but gave opportunities for promotion and profit sharing. Newspaper staffs were small. Baldasty writes that Scripps regarded it as a luxury to purchase ice in the summer or soap and toilet paper—expenses that individual newspapers could cover, if desired. Presumably most newspapers did.

Newspapers that became part of the Scripps group were advocates, Baldasty, found, for the working man, emphasizing news about strikes less than did competing papers but providing more news about a wide range of other items of interest to labor. Scripps wrote many letters to editors and managers and regarded himself as a damned old crank, which became the title of at least two books about him. He expressed definite views at times. For example, he wrote his brother that he had learned that it was less important to have all the news in the paper than to have news in the paper that was interesting. Scripps's papers were small, often four pages, and big advertisers were less represented than small ones because Scripps felt that too much reliance on a few big advertisers undermined journalistic independence. One of his cost-cutting activities—the creation of a press service to share news among his newspapers—became part of the United Press Association in 1907, an important contribution to twentieth-century journalism.

This is a monograph, and Baldasty focuses on Scripps from the point of view of his business activities and beliefs in journalism rather than evaluating Scripps from a wide social perspective. The book organizes chapters around topics such as “management,” “avoiding competition,” and “expansion” that keep a tight focus on the business aspect of Scripps's life. This approach is clean and clear—Baldasty is an

excellent writer as well as scholar—but it forces the reader to work a little to spot the personal and professional growth by Scripps within these categories, across a career that stretched more than three decades. Baldasty does provide evidence here and there of change, however, so that Scripps does not appear unidimensional. All men and women change, if they are lucky enough to live a long time in good health. That was true of Scripps. I hope that Baldasty will keep going and perhaps contribute another study to examine the influence on the larger culture of this man who liked to drink, write letters, stand up for the common man, make money, and generally stir things up—this representative of labor who was so, well, capitalistic.

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EDWARD GALE AGRAN. *“Too Good a Town”: William Allen White, Community, and the Emerging Rhetoric of Middle America*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. 1998. Pp. 239. Cloth \$30.00, paper \$15.00.

In general histories, the place of journalism in America's past rarely receives more than passing mention of epochal communications developments or journalists involved in major events, leaving journalists outside the fabric of American culture. Two exceptions are *New York Tribune* editor Horace Greeley, who, because of his antislavery efforts, has received more attention from historians than any other American journalist; and William Allen White, the *Emporia* (Kansas) *Gazette* editor who, in Edward Gale Agran's words, became a “cultural icon” via rhetoric that imprinted him as a “middle-class icon” long before his death. Among the most respected of early twentieth-century journalists, White has been the subject of at least seven dissertations and seven biographies to date.

Known for his *Emporia Gazette* editorials, White stands out because of writing that overflowed his own newspaper: more than twenty books (the first published in 1893, when he was twenty-five, and the last in 1946, two years after his death at seventy-six), “hundreds of articles” between March 1897 and July 1942 in more than thirty “popular magazines and erudite journals,” and “hundreds of speeches” (p. 33). His multiple facets—including careers as journalist, fiction writer and “political broker” early in life and an ultimately “persistent . . . voice in national councils” (p. 33)—can diffuse focus and obscure precisely why scholars find him more fascinating than other American journalists.

An exception is this case study, which interweaves White's ideas with American culture, fulfilling the author's stated purposes to analyze the relationship between his “small-town rhetoric and his philosophy that was attuned to the emergence of a twentieth-century Middle American culture” and to examine the “successful contribution of a leading spokesperson who helped devise a language, an ethical paradigm,

which spoke to and for . . . Middle America—the new urban-oriented middle class struggling to forge an identity within a convulsive social order” (p. 32). Contrary to a criticism (apparently from a reviewer of the work in progress) that “it’s a lot more like journalism than history” (p. 2), the context looms over the journalism story. The book is about a set of ideas tied to American culture: community, small-town ethos, Main Street U.S.A., middle class, Middle West as the essence of America, and the Progressive movement as shaper of all of these and of White, their great articulator.

Asserting that White was no intellectual, Agran casts him as delineator/disseminator of culture-shaping concepts; a myth-producer; a “key author” of the progressive agenda who “could relate to and through twentieth-century mass culture in a way few intellectuals could” (p. 25) and who summed up “thoughts and movements” (p. 20); a constructor of “a belief system suited to the new patterns of living” (p. 41); and a national spokesperson whose identity, after a 1897 editorial called “What’s the Matter with Kansas,” flowed in part from his persistently addressing “What’s the Matter?”

Little evidence (beyond views of a few elite White associates) supports the book’s underlying assumption that Americans nationwide read and internalized White’s rhetoric. But the thesis overshadows weaknesses. Other strengths include rich analyses of White’s writing, especially his concept of community, and of numerous scholars’ work concerning the book’s themes. Chapter four, the heart of the book (including twenty-five photographs), explicates how White established himself as spokesperson for middle America while portraying Emporia as a model community for the nation and arguing that Americans could solve their problems by acting “selflessly, in their own best community interests” (p. 128).

The linkage of one journalist’s ideas to American culture illustrates a useful model, contributes significantly to journalism history literature, and is valuable also for students of history, American studies, and popular culture. The story is not about a journalist’s career development, however, and lacks linearity and dates (no birth, college, marriage dates appear, for example) that tidily conduct readers from event to event. Rather, informed by David Shi’s advocacy of “investigating the means by which myths are put into practice” (p. 29), this very readable book highlights the place in American culture of the kind of journalism practiced by one individual across some four decades.

HAZEL DICKEN-GARCIA  
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LENDOL CALDER. *Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999. Pp. xv. 377. \$29.95.

This book attempts to establish several disparate points about the evolution of consumer credit. On the

one hand, Lendol Calder wants to show that the use of debt to finance “the American Dream” has deep roots: contrary to myths about a more economically virtuous past, “a river of red ink runs through American history” (p. 26). Even Victorian strictures on thrift were far more elastic than is commonly assumed. On the other hand, Calder demonstrates that the 1920s saw a qualitative expansion of debt and major changes in money management mores. But he rebukes pundits who equate contemporary consumerism with hedonism. Drawing on the work of Philip Rieff and T. J. Jackson Lears, Calder stresses the ways that individuals who buy on credit are forced into the discipline of regular monthly payments and intense work commitments. The result is a book that does not always link all its points into a step-by-step argument, but whose separate sections are very informative.

Part one describes how credit operated in the late nineteenth century. By the end of the century, home mortgages, usually financed by building and loan associations, were the largest source of household debt. There was as yet, however, no central way of financing other personal consumption needs. Pawnbrokers were the bankers of the poor, and despite their usurious rates, they filled a widespread need in American cities. Moderate-income workers tended to patronize loan sharks rather than pawnbrokers, often because they had fallen behind on the installment plan purchases that had multiplied in the 1800s and 1890s. Middle-class families were more able to call on friends or family for loans when they overextended themselves.

This section would benefit from a more systematic examination of how the patterns and consequences of such indebtedness differed from those Calder describes for the eighteenth century, where day-to-day informal loans and credit among households existed alongside huge mercantile debts such as those in which southern planters were enmeshed. Calder asserts that urbanization and mobility eroded the intimate relations that had undergirded the eighteenth-century culture of debt (p. 64), but he does not precisely differentiate between the mores of that culture and the nineteenth-century one. Indeed, he somewhat disconcertingly uses Benjamin Franklin’s “The Way to Wealth,” first published in 1758, to illustrate Victorian norms.

Franklin’s precepts, indeed, seem to have become more popular in the nineteenth than the eighteenth century, as Victorians drew on a preexisting set of aphorisms against debt in order to bolster their specific views on the work ethic. At the same time, Victorian moralists developed a convoluted justification of some forms of consumerism. Debt was bad, encouraging profligacy and undermining morality. But credit was good, because of the work it took to establish oneself as credit-worthy, and because of the homes and businesses that could be started on responsibly borrowed money. Thus Henry Ward Beecher could label debt a “fountain of iniquity” (p. 92) and still remark that “if a young man will only get in debt for some land, and

then get married, these two things will keep him straight, or nothing will" (p. 97).

Many societies have condemned debt in principle while condoning some forms in practice, and I was unable to discern exactly what was unique about the way Victorians accomplished this. But several of the quotations Calder cites suggest that a key criterion was whether the debt shored up family life. The connection between Victorian financial and family values would have been worth exploring, both to distinguish more precisely their views from earlier ones and because Calder's discussion of how credit imposes work discipline on individuals applies so well to contemporary two-earner families.

In part two, Calder analyzes how some philanthropists and social reformers, intent upon democratizing lending rather than selling products, pioneered methods and ideas that were then used by small lenders to standardize, legitimize, and expand their own operations. In the 1920s, such lending developed into the personal finance business. This process interacted with the emergence of new forms of installment credit, especially those associated with the automobile industry, to transform the role of credit in retail sales. I found Calder's discussion of the diverse motives and methods that created the personal finance industry both interesting and persuasive.

The final section of the book covers the geometric expansion of debt since the 1920s. Consumers initially reacted cautiously to the 1929 crash, but by 1933, finance companies and retailers had spearheaded a revival of consumer credit that lasted through the Great Depression. By the 1950s, debt had become a way of life for millions of American families. Calder notes the role of government in this expansion but devotes most of his attention to the changing public discourse about consumption and debt. Economist E.R.A. Seligman played a crucial organizational and ideological role in breaking down the always-shaky Victorian distinction between "productive" and "consumptive" credit, arguing that consumption could be seen as the "production of satisfactions" (p. 259). By this logic, borrowing to produce satisfaction was an investment.

Calder then elaborates his critique of contemporary moralists who believe that today's debt patterns undermine the traditional American work ethic. Rather, he suggests, consumerism financed by debt acts to contain mass production's "potentially subversive" effect on work patterns. As the internally imposed Victorian impulse to work and save was eroded by the temptations of a mass production economy, the desires that were then unleashed were channeled into credit buying that imposed the external discipline of regular payments. Rather than producing more leisure, the installment plan helped "to transform consumer culture into a suitable province for more work" (pp. 302, 303).

STEPHANIE COONTZ  
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STEPHEN B. ADAMS and ORVILLE R. BUTLER. *Manufacturing the Future: A History of Western Electric*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. Pp. xi, 270. \$34.95.

This history of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company's (AT&T) production subsidiary, Western Electric, touches upon most of the great themes of business history but never quite gets to the bottom of any of them. Many of the issues that make business history interesting today—the process of innovation, urban history, overseas expansion, welfare capitalism, labor relations, race relations, geography of production, gender, and the role of the state—make recurring appearances in this study but hardly build toward rigorous analytic themes. Even the famous Hawthorne Experiments on worker motivation and productivity, perhaps the most significant scholarly issue ever to leave the gates of a Western Electric plant, are covered in such a cursory fashion as to shed no new light on a subject that has been at the center of intellectual controversy for decades.

What makes the Western Electric case unique and interesting, as this company biography does make clear, is its subservience to "two masters": it was the captive manufacturing wing of AT&T, while AT&T itself was a government-regulated monopoly (p. 214). Bell Telephone (which became AT&T in 1899) first acquired Western Electric in 1882 as part of its vertical integration strategy. This acquisition made the manufacturing firm into the communications conglomerate's sole supplier of equipment for most of the twentieth century. The electrical producer's liberation from its regulated parent began with a series of anti-trust suits and the break up of the Bell System in 1984. In pursuit of new markets in anticipation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, AT&T finally spun manufacturing off in 1995, and Western Electric was reborn as one of the most highly capitalized public companies in the United States: Lucent Technologies. As the authors sum up, Western Electric's past made Lucent "a new company with a 127-year history" (p. vii).

Stephen B. Adams and Orville R. Butler do offer insight into the nature of industrial management in this restrictive, dual overseer environment, but even this theme rises inconsistently above their narrative approach. When the study does get into the thick of business leadership, the reader finds that the executives at Western Electric tended to be rather gray and risk-averse characters from whom we learn far too little. Overall, Adams found a much more engaging subject and did a much more intellectually-rigorous job of juggling the relationship between business and the state in *Mr. Kaiser Goes to Washington: The Rise of a Government Entrepreneur* (1997).

Even though the business history here is staid, Adams and Butler did unearth some real gems that might catch the eye of a social historian. For example, Western Electric spent a sizable twenty percent of its annual profits on its display for the 1893 Columbia

Exposition. Regrettably, however, we never learn anything about the many enticing themes that historians have found evident at the Exposition, from national mission to the dazzle of the machine. On another front, the authors suggest that the organization of labor in Chicago led to the company's choice to move its manufacturing outside of the city in 1902. The theme is regrettably underdeveloped, then dropped. When new plants are located to the South later in the volume, labor issues have disappeared as causal factors—a seemingly unlikely scenario. There is also some fascinating material on how management dealt with race relations, including one standoff in Baltimore that ended with management accommodating white employees' demands by setting up segregated entrances to integrated bathrooms!

While far from uncritical about their subject matter, the authors often allow anecdote and company folklore to trump hard-boiled analysis. This fact makes the book to seem a bit too much like an official company history. Although Adams and Butler convincingly state that Lucent exercised "no editorial control" in the writing and research of the volume, company representatives were included on the advisory board for the project, and the president of Lucent served as the "sponsor" of the book (p. viii). Allowing the subject of inquiry to look over one's shoulder may be worthwhile if there is something vitally new to contribute that cannot be achieved otherwise, but, in this case, access to the Western Electric archives seems to have offered no historiographical breakthroughs. This volume may ultimately serve its role, however, in that it will be attractive "both to retirees and to employees of the newly independent Lucent"—the audience for which the book seems to have been written (p. viii).

JEFFERSON COWIE  
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GAIL COOPER. *Air-conditioning America: Engineers and the Controlled Environment, 1900–1960*. (Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology, number 23.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 228. \$35.00.

Gail Cooper's study is a welcome addition to the history of technology and urban history. Its strength lies in mapping out fundamental engineering and marketing issues about a technology that has had a profound impact on the very nature of inside environments. The book also is a first step in revealing the impact of air conditioning on urban life.

Cooper employs the records of the Carrier Engineering Corporation to argue that "Only with the appearance of air conditioning did engineers and architects believe that a totally artificial indoor environment, independent of the natural climate, was a possibility" (p. 1). The implementation of air conditioning in the early twentieth century revolved around interrelated issues: "what form the technology would take" and "who would determine that configuration"

(p. 3). Two engineering and design traditions converged, one interested in a centralized system integrated into the structure of buildings and a second, more flexible and mobile approach—a machine-in-the-window device. Setting up her study in this fashion, Cooper engages an important issue in the history of technology: that is, the propensity to design and construct centralized systems at the expense of modularity and individual control. It is a classic issue clearly presented, and one that raises important questions not only about engineering philosophy but also about consumer preferences. Cooper avoids a progressive view of technology, preferring to concentrate on several contested choices that led to diverging paths for producing "man-made weather."

Chapter one explores the views of key engineers—Alfred P. Wolf, Stuart Cramer, Willis H. Carrier—who envisioned ways to develop a new kind of comprehensive ventilation system. As Cooper notes, until the 1930s, refrigeration machinery was not necessarily considered fundamental to air-conditioning; humidity control was more essential. Subsequent chapters shift to venues where air-conditioning technology was applied: factories, movie theaters, public schools, and residences. Such an approach is an excellent way to demonstrate how spatial environments and distinctive types of consumers responded to the technology and helped shape its applications. Factories that produced hygroscopic materials were the first key market for custom-made air-conditioning systems. Cooper argues persuasively that their application did not simply produce conflict between capital and labor but also among engineers, managers, and labor. Engineers wanted a comprehensive plan for creating an indoor artificial climate. Managers were more pragmatic, concerned about eliminating seasonal weather fluctuations and desirous of the ability to construct factories with less attention to geography. For their part, workers cared about comfort and health on the job and were skeptical of centralized systems over which they had little control. Human comfort was the key issue in motion picture theaters; a cool haven from the summer heat could be as big a marketing draw as a popular film. In public schools, however, children were not treated as consumers, and the focus shifted to developing "an experimentally defined comfort zone" (p. 5).

It was in the home that the battle between centralized systems and modular ones was the most intense and complex. This was not merely a debate over preferences, however. The introduction of mass production methods for producing window air conditioners undercut the ability of engineers and designers to promote the idea of an "ideal climate" and offered more options to consumers in a broad band of economic groups. The success of the window units in some respects deflected or even challenged the notion of producing a "man-made climate." Ultimately, Cooper argues, "None of these systems [custom-designed systems, plug-in appliances, standardized installation in tract homes] perfectly mixed the interests of the



engineer, the company, and the aggregated groups known as the consumer" (p. 190).

In such a slim volume, Cooper is not able to take her story to a wider gauge and examine the broader implications of creating artificial internal environments in modern cities, or even to question whether megalopolises like Houston could even exist without the technology. Also missing is an in-depth discussion of the social and cultural impacts of changing environments and essentially changing seasons for the average person, human tolerance for heat and cold, transformation of building technology, and so forth. Treatment of these issues, however, is too much to ask from this book. It is an important volume and certainly worth reading, because Cooper addresses several key issues concerning the application of an influential technology in the twentieth century. In so doing, she has helped to forge a new historical path by asking critical questions.

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STEVEN J. HOLMES. *The Young John Muir: An Environmental Biography*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1999. Pp. xv, 309. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$22.95.

As a central figure in American environmentalism and a founder of the Sierra Club, John Muir has been the subject of a number of biographies. Steven J. Holmes's study of Muir's early life is, in part, a response to the ways in which previous biographers have relied on and nourished traditional images of Muir's early life, including "the wild child" (p. 4) and his ecstatic conversion experience at Yosemite. In this work, Holmes reexamines "the Muir myth" (p. 14) not merely to assess its truthfulness but to test its moral utility in our own time.

This is an environmental biography that focuses on Muir's developing relationship with the natural world. But it is also a psychosocial biography that employs a variety of psychoanalysis called the "object relations" approach (p. 11). Going beyond the Freudian concentration on the dynamics between parent and child, it asks which relationships—including those involving the non-human environment—are the important ones for the individual. Holmes's main sources are the writings of Muir himself, which he subjects to a close textual analysis. He makes extensive use of letters, especially those between Muir and important women in his life, most notably his friend Jeanne Carr.

The book's first chapter deals with Muir's formative years in Scotland and Wisconsin. It provides fascinating glimpses of his relations with his family and nature and explores the image of the wild child with a critical eye. It must be said, however, that the psychosocial approach does not appear promising at first. Holmes begins with a narrative involving the two-year-old Muir and his mother, drawn from *The Story of My Boyhood and Youth* (1913), and seems to burden the event with more interpretation than it can bear. The same could be said of his description of Muir's childhood habit of

stealing food from farmers' fields, which he views as part of a "lived experience of the natural world as 'mother earth'—at an age when the psychosexual legacy of the oral urge for the breast" was still a "felt reality" (p. 32).

Holmes's approach to biography becomes more interesting as the source material becomes richer. Holmes's analysis of Muir's university years and his quest for a vocation bring to life the intensity of his religious fervor but also his confusion over how he was to avoid being doomed to a life "at odds with his own desires" (p. 137). For a time, he found his identity as an inventor of labor-saving devices and measuring instruments, all of which, as Holmes points out, provided ways of mechanically regulating life and the body; his early-rising machine, for example, was a bed that tipped the sleeper onto the floor at a predetermined time (pp. 52, 92). His scientific studies and the influence of friends gradually drew him toward botany as a vocation, and Holmes eloquently conveys Muir's growing sense of himself as a romantic adventurer in the image of Alexander von Humboldt.

Following sojourns in Canada West and Indiana during his mid-twenties, Muir set out on foot in 1867 on a remarkable journey to the South. As he progressed, his pleasure in encountering strange new plant life contrasted with his growing alienation from the primal wilderness he encountered. As a consequence, Holmes argues, Muir was by this point neither anthropocentric nor ecocentric but religiocentric, having come to believe that good and evil coexist in the natural world as well as in human life, and that the divine, wherever it is found, is "at the centre of value and power" (pp. 182–83).

Equally fascinating is the final chapter on Muir's first years in California, where he finally found his wilderness "home." His letters to Carr richly document his growing devotion to Yosemite and his religious evolution toward a belief in the presence of God in all things. Holmes brings to life Muir's highly sensuous relationship with the natural world—not just with living beings but with (for example) the play of light in an environment. Most importantly, the author shows how Muir learned to live with contradictions, to live with the tension between "human connection and solitude, familiarity and adventure, domesticity and wildness" (p. 248). Holmes's deep involvement with his subject is evident throughout this biography, and his conclusion, while it describes Muir as a figure "to walk beside" rather than to follow, clearly seeks to present "the new Muir myth" as a source of spiritual inspiration.

PATRICIA JASEN  
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MARK DAVID SPENCE. *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. viii, 190. \$35.00.



One of the recurrent themes of environmental history is that "wilderness," which seems so tangible to the public, is in fact a malleable social construct. Authors such as Roderick Nash, William Cronon, and Theodore Catton have forced readers to confront the nuances of what seemed to be such a clear-cut term. In broad terms, the author of this book follows in their footsteps, but Mark David Spence has taken a new tack by revealing the story of the exclusion of Native Americans from the national parks. Although they may not seem that wild now, a century ago national parks represented the first efforts to preserve wilderness in the United States. Spence shows that the American definition of wilderness had shifted from one that encompassed Native peoples to one that excluded all people, except visitors. Preservation of wilderness via the national parks, then, would not be complete until the federal government pushed Native peoples from parks into reservations, and Spence sees these two institutions as closely linked. The heart of his argument is that "uninhabited wilderness had to be created before it could be preserved" (p. 4).

Spence focuses on three national parks: Yellowstone, Glacier, and Yosemite. It is not entirely clear why Glacier is a more suitable choice than better-known parks, such as Grand Canyon or Rocky Mountain, but the author argues that his three choices are linked because they all had Native inhabitants when they were founded and those inhabitants were removed against their will. The time frame ranges from the removal of the Bannock, Crow, and Shoshone from Yellowstone in the 1870s; to the exclusion of the Blackfeet from Glacier in 1910; to the final removal of the last Yosemite family from the eponymous park in 1969. While each removal unfolded uniquely—depending on which tribes had treaties, how they resisted, or lessons learned by preservationists—one constant is that all of these peoples still seek access to the resources of the parks, and only in recent years has the National Park Service begun to reverse course.

Although various white characters show up, the central players in this book are the aforementioned five tribes. The dispute in each of the parks grew from competing ideas about proper use of resources within park boundaries. The federal officials who administered the parks tried to encourage certain game species that the public wanted to see; the Indians claimed rights, such as hunting those game animals, as they had for untold years. Because the government had a preponderance of power, its view generally prevailed, even if the tribes were able to delay implementation or use the parks clandestinely. Ultimately, Spence argues, whites tried to reduce the Natives in these parks to "'past-tense' Indians" (p. 71). Whites generally believed that Native Americans were doomed to cultural, if not genetic, extinction. Therefore, all that was left for the Blackfeet, for example, was to serve out their declining years as showpieces for white tourists to Glacier who wanted to see true American wilderness.

For all of its strengths, this is a rare example of a

book that is too short. Some fairly important ideas and events get relegated to footnotes or brief passages that cry out for elaboration. For instance, the ten-year battle to pass the Glacier National Park Bill gets less than a paragraph. Likewise, the origin and definition of the recurrent idea of "'past-tense' Indian" are never adequately explained. Finally, the author provides not even a footnote to back up his charge that Native removal from these parks is important because it provided a model for "native dispossession . . . the world over" (p. 5). Two more concerns can presumably be laid at the door of the publisher. First, there is no bibliography, which is part of a troubling trend to cut costs at the expense of scholarly standards. Second, the maps appear too late in each section, and there is nothing in the table of contents to reveal their location.

These problems, though, do not negate the book's crisp prose, exciting subject, and clear argument, which will make it extremely useful for students of environmental, western, and Native American history. Anyone who has marveled at the beauty and wildlife of our national parks will have second thoughts about their cost after reading this book.

KURK DORSEY

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GLEND A RILEY. *Women and Nature: Saving the "Wild" West.* (Women in the West.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1999. Pp. xviii, 279. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.

For the past two decades, historians of American environmentalism have recognized the key role that women played in many aspects of the movement. They protected the national parks, fought the spread of billboards, and preserved endangered wildlife. In articles and books, the important contributions of women as both leaders and indispensable foot soldiers for conservation causes have been emerging. Glenda Riley has now brought that research together and done invaluable work exploring manuscript sources on her own. The result is an engaging synthesis of what is known about the varied ways in which women have participated in environmental issues. "Environmentalism would have been far less effective," argues Riley, "had it not been for the thousands of women who supported it" (p. xiii). Riley makes the persuasive case that seeing early twentieth-century conservation activity only in terms of men such as Gifford Pinchot or Theodore Roosevelt distorts the actual development of the movement.

One obstacle to a better perception of what women have provided to the environmental cause has been the pervasive assumption that what men have done in this area is intrinsically more significant and substantial than anything women might have attempted. The stereotypes of "garden club" ladies or soft-minded feminine interests have governed historical attitudes in the same manner that they have shaped policy making

in the public arena. Riley indicates how misleading an impression this is and how little it reflects the real range of interests that women have brought to environmental concerns. As Riley says, "women's interpretation of environmental conservation included far more than the land and its resources" (p. xiii).

Riley's work spans the entire sweep of American history from seventeenth-century nature writers to the environmental activists of the 1980s. Many familiar figures appear in her narrative, including Rachel Carson and Lady Bird Johnson. She also brings out of the shadows the reporter and mystery novelist Mary Roberts Rinehart, the western writer Mari Sandoz, and the Texas rancher Mary Ann Goodnight, each of whom participated in environmental campaigns. Because Riley has ranged so widely in manuscript collections and located so many examples of women engaged in conservation work, her book will be an indispensable starting place for future research about a variety of topics relating to women and the natural world.

One continuing strand of women's activism was the protracted fight against roadside clutter and billboard proliferation. Riley's work indicates that women's clubs in Washington State and Hawai'i, for example, created institutions such as the Outdoor Circle in Hawai'i that fought the presence of outdoor advertising from an early date. Highway beautification is one of the most long-standing environmental causes, dating from the first appearance of the automobile and roadside signs. Riley's study shows how much a study of the running war over billboards would say about how women have shaped environmentalism.

Riley has tackled a formidable and worthwhile topic, and she has provided a solid foundation for further examination of many fascinating issues. Because she has tried to cover so much, the book sometimes reads like a catalogue of discrete names and episodes without much interconnection among them. After discussing Lady Bird Johnson and her beautification work, for example, Riley identifies Senator Maurine Neuberger of Oregon as another environmental advocate. That the two women cooperated in the passage of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 goes unmentioned. The Neuberger Papers at the University of Oregon, which Riley used, have an abundance of material on the senator's interest in other environmental questions. The interaction among these women affected their approach to policy issues, and further exploration of female environmental networking is much needed.

Although Riley has done exemplary research in manuscript collections across the country, her sources do not indicate similar exploration of the information contained in presidential libraries. The Lou Henry Hoover Papers at the Hoover Library are important for that First Lady's interest in conservation questions, for example, and the abundant materials in Lady Bird Johnson's files at the Johnson Library in Austin, Texas are rich for understanding how women viewed environmental questions in the 1960s. The accessibility of

these types of records in the presidential libraries make them easy to use and well focused on particular and controversial matters.

Riley's well-documented and thorough book should put to rest the erroneous notion that environmental issues have been exclusively a male preserve. Future writers in this field will consult Riley's work as an indispensable guide to the available sources and best-informed writings on women and the environment in American history.

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Austin

LORI LANDAY. *Madcaps, Screwballs, and Con Women: The Female Trickster in American Culture*. (Feminist Cultural Studies, the Media, and Political Culture.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 258. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$22.50.

Folklorists and anthropologists have described tricksters as cultural figures whose attributes of liminality, duality, and irony challenge and often subvert the boundaries of social regulation. As Lori Landay argues, however, scholars have presumed the trickster to be a male figure, or, at best, a genderless figure. Although tricksters are known for switching genders, implicit in these definitions are "the criterion of masculinity and the privilege of autonomy and mobility with which masculinity is synonymous" (p. 2). Landay's book fills a gap in trickster studies that has ignored the role of women in cultural acts of duplicity and subversion. This study examines how women characters in American popular culture from 1850 to the present had used trickery, deception, and disguise to articulate and subvert hegemonic expectations of femininity.

Cultural norms about women's appearance, sustained through fictional texts and advertising, encourage women to gaze at themselves as they perform femininity through acts of duplicity and masquerade. Against this context, Landay analyzes female tricksters who exploit and manipulate that duality to expand their power. She focuses on popular comedy because, she argues, "the interplay between the comic narrative and the serious messages it often contains" (p. 26) reveal female tricksters' tactics of resistance, self-preservation, and self-definition. Although Landay's focus is on comic texts, she does not invest women's humor or female tricksters with inordinate power. Indeed, she rejects "the critics' tendency to equate women's use of humor with feminist protest" (pp. 34-35), a move that enables her to examine how trickery and deception can as easily reinforce dominant social systems as contest them.

Excellent textual and visual analyses chronicle changes in female trickery from mid-nineteenth-century popular novels about the constraints of femininity and domesticity to Jazz Age confrontations with modernity in paintings, poetry, movies like *It* (1927), and Anita Loos's widely acclaimed novel, *Gentlemen Prefer*

*Blondes* (1925), confrontations that “illustrate the difficulties and rewards of women’s entrance into the public sphere” (p. 93). Screwball comedies in the 1930s and 1940s, like *Bringing Up Baby* and *The Lady Eve*, reveal changing sociosexual expectations as the tactics of female trickery shift from the struggles for equality during the Depression to the demands of “domestic-based femininity and polarized gender roles” (p. 145) of the war and postwar years. An excellent chapter on *I Love Lucy* addresses the social functions of women tricksters in the late 1940s and 1950s. This television show captured the contradictions of postwar gender ideals through the figure of Lucy, the housewife who is “a self-involved liminal character whose mode of interaction in society is characterized by nonconforming behavior and subversion” (p. 162). The textual and visual style of *I Love Lucy* promoted an intimacy between the viewer and the actors, which in turn depended on the viewer’s familiarity with the real-life stars. This created an “in-joke predicated upon the bisociation of the series’ representation of ‘reality’ and ‘fictionality’” (p. 181). As Landay explains, disjunctions between fiction and reality in Lucille Ball and the character Lucy further exposed the gap between postwar ideals about femininity and the experiences of working women.

Landay’s fine readings expose the contradictions embedded in the cultural work of deception and masquerade. This emerges clearly in her argument about the differences between narrative closure and ideological closure. In her discussion of contemporary popular culture, Landay points out that while films like *Thelma and Louise* (1990) always provide narrative closure, the instabilities created by deception and disguise frequently leave texts without ideological closure. The cultural work that female tricksters do, and thus their appeal, she argues, lies in their “subjunctive mood of possibility” (p. 209).

This book provides a fine example of current trends in studies of popular culture that seek a balance between identifying the subversive elements in a text and recognizing the hegemonic power of popular media. Landay’s study, however, also demonstrates some of the limitations of this genre. Brief references to historical developments contextualize changes in the popular texts under review, but this contextualization frequently remains too generalized. Thus, economic, social, and political forces appear primarily as a backdrop rather than as central to the analysis. Mechanisms of social change and how they are addressed and mediated by women tricksters remain unexplored questions.

WENDY KOZOL  
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JOEL BEST. *Controlling Vice: Regulating Brothel Prostitution in St. Paul, 1865–1883*. (The History of Crime and Criminal Justice Series.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 175. Cloth \$29.94, paper \$16.95.

This book offers more than its subtitle suggests. Joel Best, a historically minded sociologist, skillfully uses

St. Paul’s regulation of prostitution and the controversy surrounding it to build a model of how societies respond to ineradicable deviance. Regulatory schemes work better than prohibition, which invites corruption and organized crime. They are unstable and politically vulnerable, however, because they implicitly sanction immoral activities. Regulated vice is a moral eyesore.

At least it was in St. Paul, Minnesota, where politicians and police devised a practical system for dealing with prostitution. The system, which had variants in many nineteenth-century American cities and towns, formally criminalized prostitution. Once a month, madams appeared in court to pay modest fines for “keeping a disorderly house.” What they were actually doing was renewing a contract to keep orderly disorderly houses. Madams who tolerated robberies and assaults in their brothels risked heavy fines and imprisonment. Those who cooperated and kept the lid on could count on a measure of stability, even jovial support: uniformed police frequently attended their open-house parties. Their customers, assured of greater physical (if not venereal) safety and guaranteed anonymity by police and a cooperative press, naturally supported this détente.

Respectable citizens objected to regulated brothel prostitution because it offended their moral principles, subverted the law, blighted their neighborhoods, and discriminated against women. Not only did prostitutes’ patrons go unpunished, but the police largely ignored gamblers, their male counterparts in vice. Protestors enjoyed few successes, however, until 1883, when reform mayor Christopher O’Brien imposed prohibition. His successor reinstated regulation, but it remained a sensitive issue. Regulation disappeared for good in St. Paul and elsewhere during the 1910s. Progressivism and World War I ended local experiments in regulating prostitution, whose significance afterwards declined in American life. The normalization of gender ratios, the disappearance of itinerant bachelor laborers, and the sexual revolution all diminished demand.

St. Paul is a good place to study regulated prostitution. Journalistic and legal sources, including a police registry of prostitutes, are ample. Neither a big city nor a raw frontier community, St. Paul offers a setting different from other American histories of prostitution. Nodding in the direction of feminist studies, Best reconstructs the lives and subculture of brothel prostitutes. They were young, mostly native-born women in their early twenties. They entered the life for a variety of reasons, among them escape, abandonment, and economic opportunity. They moved about constantly and risked infection, suicide, alcoholism, and drug addiction. Some—Best does not know how many—got out before it was too late.

Their employers fared better. Protected by the regulation system, madams could stay in business for years, selling sex and alcohol. “Personal liberty bracers” were a lucrative sideline, though inebriated customers also posed the greatest challenge to main-

taining order. Madams who managed the feat reaped substantial rewards. One, Mary E. Robinson, listed \$2,000 in personal and \$75,000 in real property in the 1870 census. She may have been, Best comments, St. Paul's most successful female entrepreneur.

Best devotes his last chapter to spelling out—the book's one conspicuous defect is a penchant for repetition—his story's lesson. It is that vice regulation works but will always be more vulnerable to criticism than prohibition. What happened to the supporters of regulated prostitution has also happened to advocates of needle exchange, marijuana decriminalization, and other controversial reform proposals. Although labeling theorists and critical criminologists discount moral objections as pretexts for status and power interests, Best rightly insists that we take them seriously and at face value. They express genuine outrage, have "rhetorical primacy," and act as "trump cards" in policy debates (p. 134). Prohibition opponents stand their best chance when they can advance both practical and principled arguments (e.g. adult access to pornography on First Amendment grounds). Lacking a plausible moral defense—no one in Victorian St. Paul would have imagined defending regulation on any basis other than ameliorating an inevitable social evil—prostitution reverted to its prohibited status.

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WANDA A. HENDRICKS. *Gender, Race, and Politics in the Midwest: Black Club Women in Illinois*. (Blacks in the Diaspora.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 162. \$27.95.

During the period from 1890 to 1920, African-American women in Illinois helped to establish the nation's largest network of black women's clubs. Focusing with especial clarity and insight into the experiences of these women, Wanda A. Hendricks adds greatly to our understanding of change and continuity in this important period of women's history. Hendricks looks at the unique structure, ideologies, strategies, and tactics "that differentiated the Illinois club movement from, but at the same time linked it to the national movement" (p. x). The Illinois Movement was linked to the national black club movement via voluntary associations but differed from it because of the numerous challenges that black women faced in the Midwest. Illinois was one of several midwestern states affected by a burgeoning industrial economy and massive movement of African Americans. Like other states of that region, it was mostly rural but was dominated by a large city, Chicago. Because of the declining farm population, Illinois (especially Chicago) became one of the most urbanized regions in the country.

For the black female activist, the confluence of the said circumstances presented some unique challenges and opportunities. Although the migration that had brought so many black southerners to the state came to represent both an escape from oppression and a

promise of opportunity, it also represented major challenges to the reform efforts of these women. Thus Hendricks's book joins those of a growing number of scholars whose works modify the once rigid boundary drawn between the public sphere inhabited by men and the private sphere inhabited by women. In a word, this study offers an alternative public. Using research done by scholars from a wide range of disciplines, runs of black newspapers, contemporary articles, recorded speeches, minutes, and personal papers, the author traces the efforts of club women to meet the needs of the poor, educate and entertain themselves, and in some cases distinguish themselves as elite ladies. Racial consciousness and noblesse oblige both played a large part in Hendricks's story, as she recounted the complex ideologies and strategies used by Illinois black club women to "lift as they climb."

Although Hendricks has thoroughly mined women club's records, other sources would have added depth to a sometime one dimensional picture. For example, what about the public response to club initiatives? While the author mentioned that some club initiatives became law, legislative hearings and proceedings would have registered reactions toward them. This omission, however, should not distract from a well-researched book. In total, this study represents a strong record of community building both in Chicago and the Midwest by the region's club women, whose work made a difference in the lives of many African Americans.

MERLINE PITRE  
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MARGARET FINNEGAN. *Selling Suffrage: Consumer Culture and Votes for Women*. (Popular Cultures, Everyday Lives.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 222. Cloth \$49.50, paper \$17.50.

This is one of several books about the woman suffrage movement in the United States published since 1995 (the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment). Margaret Finnegan develops a cultural history of the woman suffrage movement that focuses on white, middle-class women in the urban North during the early twentieth century. Finnegan connects rising consumer capitalism in the decade of the 1910s to the cultural milieu of the middle class, arguing that the women of the nonradical woman suffrage movement adapted their strategies and campaigns to the commercial and consumer-capitalist environment of urban culture. In so doing, she finds that these twentieth-century suffragists incorporated modern methods of advertising, publicity, and performance in attempts to convert the masses of the voting public to the cause.

In discussing the various strategies used by nonradical, modern suffragists, Finnegan goes back in time to the nineteenth-century movement to examine the similarities and differences in woman suffrage ideologies, arguments, and strategies and their transformations over time. This approach, which she uses in each



chapter, is quite helpful to historians because it contextualizes the development of consumer culture as it parallels changes in the suffrage movement. Finnegan hypothesizes that early nineteenth-century suffragists would not have accepted the argument of their Progressive-era counterparts, who believed consumerism contributed to the success of women winning the right to vote. She notes how even in the post-Civil War years, many suffragists were still ambivalent toward the ideas of consumerism.

In examining the suffrage movement's transformation, Finnegan finds that by 1900 suffragists argued that as consumers, women were unrepresented taxpayers. The vote became expedient for them, as did the argument for it. In embracing "expediency," Finnegan contends that suffragists replaced "natural rights" as the primary platform for the woman suffrage argument. This line of reasoning was introduced by Aileen S. Kraditor in her pioneering work, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920* (1965).

Finnegan goes on to explain the use of performance and pageantry, which characterized the tools of urban suffragists and other reformers of the first two decades of the twentieth century. In this discussion, she makes brief reference to non-white reformers and to suffragists who used the same technique. However, her context is the role of woman suffrage parades and pageants in reflecting images of "ideal suffragists," most of whom were represented as Nordic whites. Although Finnegan explains that this image reflected xenophobia and racism among nonradical suffragists, she does not address racism in the movement as a whole, which reflected the wider American popular culture of the times.

Perhaps Finnegan's best discussion is about the role of the press in the woman suffrage movement, with her specific analysis of *The Woman's Journal* (1870-1931), the longest-running woman's periodical in United States history. Finnegan details the founding, development, and transformation of the newspaper during the early twentieth century with specific reference to the "newsies"—women who sold the newspapers—and the impact this form of entrepreneurship had on them. Very few studies of the woman suffrage movement have given such in-depth history and analysis of *The Woman's Journal* as does Finnegan's.

Among the arguments propelling her study is Finnegan's claim that suffragists combined political aspirations with women's everyday duties. In so doing, they redefined both "voter" and "shopper," connecting them to responsibility and rational behavior and making these characteristics synonymous with women. Another argument is Finnegan's repeated claim that historians have not only ignored the relationship between consumerism and the woman suffrage movement but that some have divorced woman suffrage from what she calls its "cultural context" (pp. 4, 111, 170). This may be true of earlier studies of the woman suffrage movement; however, recent works about the movement, although not dwelling on consumerism,

have analyzed other aspects of cultural context in the United States. They have focused upon the use of the press as both sources of woman suffrage propaganda and as sites for publicity for events, use of public demonstrations such as parades and pageants as agents of assembly, and the impact of negative cultural assumptions fed by nativism and racism. Finnegan's study is not unique in connecting cultural expressions to the woman suffrage movement; however, her work creatively adds another dimension to this trend.

ROSALYN TERBORGH-PENN  
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SUSAN CURTIS, *The First Black Actors on the Great White Way*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1998. Pp. xix, 277. \$29.95.

*Three Plays for a Negro Theatre* (1917) by the white poet Ridgely Torrence is the centerpiece for a racial/cultural study of professional American theater in the 1910s. As cultural history, much about this book is to be recommended; as theater history; however, the problems are myriad and unfortunately mar what should have been an important addition to scholarship of race relations in theater practice.

The 1917 production of Torrence's one-act plays was the first to feature an all-African-American cast in a non-musical play on Broadway. Many others followed in the 1920s. This book by Susan Curtis, however, focuses exclusively on the first production and its cultural context. After laying out the appropriate cultural theory, the author proceeds to examine aesthetic elements of the production and its practitioners and outlines a few previous presentations of black characters written and performed by white playwrights and actors. All is done with frequent forays into varied cultural issues to contextualize the artistry. In chapter five, Curtis effectively takes various theater critics of 1917 to task for their racism or racial assumptions in analyzing *Three Plays* and its actors. She is particularly concerned with critical "amnesia," which appeared only months after the positively assessed premiere. In chapter six, the author compels us to reconsider the usual explanation of the production's early closing as simply a casualty of the U.S. Congressional declaration of war.

The book's misleading title is exacerbated by a cover photo, which is not from *Three Plays* but from the 1908 musical *Bandanna Land*. Curtis makes the aesthetic choice of labeling only spoken-word plays as "serious," thus dismissing all previous African-American actors in musicals, minstrel shows, and Ziegfeld Follies as somehow not counting. It is puzzling, therefore, that she castigates others for claiming that early black jazz and ragtime music and musicians were not "serious" (p. 18). It is this field that the author knows far better than theater and drama.

When Curtis surveys Torrence's family and artistic background, her work underscores the playwright's inability either to create great works of drama or to



portray black characters honestly. Torrence was a minor poet who wrote few plays; none resulted in professional production beyond *Three Plays*. If Torrence has been marginalized, it is because he never produced significant full-length work. *Three Plays* is self-serving drama indicative of the worst parts of the Little Theater movement in America. Torrence's producer, Emilie Hapgood (whom Curtis curiously labels an artist), was a dilettante who probably meant well but was always an outsider in professional theater. What made *Three Plays*' memorable was the moving and finished acting performances of unsung African-American artists such as Marie Jackson Stuart, Inez Clough, and Opal Cooper.

Of the white artists involved, only director/designer Robert Edmond Jones was of the first order, but he had been designing professionally for only two years, most of the time for Arthur Hopkins, arguably the finest American director of the period. Curtis does not mention Hopkins and his obvious influence on Jones. *Three Plays* was the first attempt by Jones at directing, and he would not find his own directing voice until 1924. In 1917, he was clearly imitating Hopkins's approach to giving the actors freedom to create independently. The artistic world of Jones as director and designer is well documented in many books and dissertations, but none of that scholarship is evident here. Curtis confesses that she had never heard of Jones when she started research on *Three Plays*.

In the author's attempts to examine aesthetics, we often read confused phrases such as "a shift away from realism to imagination" (p. 23). She seems to identify realism with David Belasco, whereas "Belascoism" was only a cosmetic appropriation of realism. She dates the "New Stagecraft" on the American stage with Jones's *The Man Who Married a Dumb Wife* (1915), when it really began with Max Reinhardt's *Sumurun* (1912). The upshot is that the author's work does not serve the subject well. This book could have been a compelling addition to our understanding of the history of American race relations in the world of art. As it stands, it must be read selectively.

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ROBERT G. LEE. *Oriental: Asian Americans in Popular Culture*. (Asian American History and Culture.) Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 271. \$27.95.

Karl Marx has said that while people make their own history, they do not do so in a world of their own making. Robert G. Lee observes that this is particularly true for Asians in America who have had to contend with numerous stereotypes. Whether seen as the "Yellow Peril" or the "Model Minority," the representations of Asian Americans have affected their status in American society. Often viewed as

racially different and alien, they are sometimes regarded as unassimilable and non-American.

Asians in the United States have hardly been unaware of the consequences of stereotypes. In fact, they have, through actions and court proceedings, challenged such representations and have sought inclusion as Americans. But popular stereotypes led to judicial decisions defining them as non-white and therefore ineligible for American citizenship. The *Thind* decision (1923) serves as an example. Bhagat Singh Thind was an Asian Indian who declared that he was a Caucasian and therefore could be naturalized for citizenship much like European immigrants. The Supreme Court, however, declared that although he was Caucasian, he did not fit the popular conception of who was white.

The *Thind* case shows that race is a social construction, formed from American ideologies of ethnicity and class. For this reason, Lee focuses on the representations of Asians in American popular culture. Popular culture here does not mean dominance by an elite oligarchy or common folk. Instead, he sees it as a continuous process of negotiation for hegemony between the two segments. Popular culture is thus a contested terrain, malleable and changing.

The vehicles for disseminating images of Asians in popular culture are many. They include songs, minstrel performances, museum exhibits, pulp fiction, Hollywood musicals, dramas, and movies. Over time, several stereotypes came to be associated with Asian Americans. They did not occur spontaneously or *sui generis*. Instead, they were constructed at particular historical moments marked by economic changes and cultural crises.

Lee identifies six images or paradigms that developed in a historical trajectory, characterizing the Asian as pollutant, coolie, deviant, yellow peril, model minority, and/or gook. The image of Asians as pollutants arose in the mid-nineteenth century during the Gold Rush era, when the Chinese were seen as a threat to a pristine California Eden. In the 1870s and 1880s, the Chinese were portrayed as coolies competing against free white labor. Immigrant Irish leaders seized the opportunity to claim Americanness and whiteness for themselves, even as they lent support to the anti-Chinese movement. Later, as Victorian middle-class values about family and domesticity were being redefined for the West, Orientals came to be seen as deviants.

At the turn of the century, as the United States embarked on its expansionist course, representations of Asians took a different turn. They were now viewed as the yellow peril, a threat to family, race, and nation. After World War II and in the midst of the Cold War, Asians were regarded as the model minority. In contrast to African Americans and Hispanics, they were compliant, silent, and could be assimilated. At the time of the Vietnam War and after, however, this model minority image coexisted with the view of Asians as gooks.

Building on the earlier work of James S. Moy, Lee

brings fresh insights in his account about how different images of Asians were constructed in the United States. He creatively and imaginatively draws on the idea of Antonio Gramsci that ideology can be hegemonic and can subordinate groups such as Asian Americans. Critical of liberalism and capitalism, he calls for a heightened political consciousness that can challenge and resist Orientalist representations. What this means is not explicitly spelled out, however; how Asian Americans can act to free themselves from these vexing stereotypes is far from clear. Nonetheless, Lee has written a pioneering study about the representation of Asians in American popular culture that will be an important resource for other scholars.

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RALPH DIETL. *USA und Mittelamerika: Die Außenpolitik von William J. Bryan. 1913–1915.* (Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Überseegeschichte, Number 67.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 1996. Pp. 496. DM 168.

A book of some 500 pages on American policy toward Central America between 1913 and 1915 must cause astonishment, but Ralph Dietl has a far more ambitious agenda than his title suggests. Though he limits himself to policies toward four countries around the Caribbean, he seeks nothing less than to refurbish William Jennings Bryan's reputation as a statesman by portraying him as the principal architect of the missionary diplomacy generally associated with Woodrow Wilson.

He begins with an overview of conflicting perceptions of America's world role that are traceable to Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson and shows how these were played out during the Manifest Destiny years of western expansion and found their expression in the Spanish-American War and the national debate over imperialism that followed it. Bryan, who had come to prominence as the Populist champion of the cause of free silver, emerged during that debate as a dedicated anti-imperialist. His opposition to further American expansion rested squarely on his domestic views and led him to favor an optimistic, utopian, and moralistic foreign policy designed to promote democracy in other countries and to foster not foreign investments by "special interests," but trade in products produced by American farmers and workers. By the time he was named secretary of state in 1913, Bryan had become a dedicated opponent of the prevailing dollar diplomacy and "undemocratic means" such as armed intervention and, according to Dietl, had a clear agenda to revise American foreign policy toward Latin America, and to some extent also toward the world at large.

When dealing with Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Mexico—in that order—Dietl chooses to recount the generally unhappy history of each country from the achievement of independence

to 1912. Combined with his extraordinarily detailed account of diplomatic activities from 1913 on, however, this unfortunately undercuts his primary thesis by showing that Bryan, whatever his intentions, had only a modest practical impact on U. S. policy toward Latin America. Only spottily supported by the president who shared his views with regard to Latin America but had other priorities and a Senate that ratified few of the agreements he negotiated, and ill-served by colleagues and subordinates who were either incompetent or hostile to his ideas, he was frequently forced to react to fast-moving events by following the paths of least resistance. Bryan, the foe of dollar diplomacy and military intervention, came to support both when circumstances seemed to warrant it. From Nicaragua, for example, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty secured leases of territory and the right to establish a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, and it would have included the Platt Amendment had Bryan had his way. Only in Mexico did Bryan have the chance to implement at least some of his ideas, and even there his proposed policies were overtaken by global exigencies. It is not far-fetched to suggest, as Dietl does, that Bryan's 1915 resignation was prompted not only by the second Lusitania Note but also by the simultaneous derailing of his proposed Mexican policy. But that surely speaks to his inability to reshape American policy effectively.

When Dietl discusses Bryan's relationship to both the *Grosse Politik* and World War I, it becomes evident once more that although Bryan opposed much of American policy, he was never able to control or to change it. He accepted Wilson's move toward the side of Great Britain in return for a free hand with his beloved cooling-off treaties, and he actively supported Wilson for reelection in 1916. That support may have provided the campaign slogan, "He kept us out of war," which reflected Bryan's priorities, but Wilson's victory surely ended all possibility that what Bryan disliked might yet be changed.

In the nature of things, a book as complex and detailed as this one—there are over 1,200 footnotes—makes for heavy going, but there are added difficulties here that detract further from the persuasiveness of Dietl's thesis. The book's organization requires frequent references across both time and space, which tend to breed confusion. Dietl, moreover, is enamored of English phrases and overuses them in ways that are not always self-explanatory and sometimes misleading. "Bryan's *good-neighborhood policy*" is perhaps the most egregious example. Nor does it help that numerous proofreading errors remain. It is disconcerting to find Theodore Roosevelt identified as Undersecretary of the Navy or the WCTU as the National Woman's Temperance Union. It does not breed confidence to find a newspaper listed as both the Newark Evening News and Evening Post on the same page, or to have prominent individuals endowed with given names other than their own. Winfried Scott, Joshua Strong,

Graham Sumner, and Jeremiah Beveridge simply won't do, especially not in the "Personenindex."

There is an extensive bibliography, but no subject index.

MANFRED JONAS  
Union College

MELVIN G. HOLLI. *The American Mayor: The Best and the Worst Big-City Leaders*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. Pp. xi, 210. Cloth \$47.50, paper \$18.95.

Professors of urban history and social science agree about who the very best and very worst American mayors have been. Melvin G. Holli surveyed 160 experts (sixty-nine responded) and found a strong consensus that Fiorello H. La Guardia, Tom Johnson, David Lawrence, and Tom Bradley are among the nation's very best mayors, while Big Bill Thompson, Frank Hague, Frank Rizzo, and Jimmy Walker place among the very worst.

There could hardly have been a better scholar to oversee this task. Holli is not only the author of *Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. Pingree and Urban Politics* (1969) and seven other books about city politics but also the coeditor, with Peter D'A. Jones, of the *Biographical Dictionary of American Mayors, 1820-1980* (1981). This book describes Holli's survey and his findings. The first chapter offers all too brief sketches of the ten worst mayors. Three succeeding chapters present more substantial political biographies of the ten best. (Appendixes list the next twelve worst and the next twenty-four best.)

Holli follows up with a discussion of urban leadership. Reviewing major theories of political executives, Holli argues that U.S. cities exhibit two styles of mayoral leadership: the "task-oriented mayor" and the "relationship-oriented" mayor. Nearly all of the best mayors were task oriented, with long lists of accomplishments from orchestrating little New Deals to rebuilding downtowns. Although two "relationship-oriented" mayors (Bradley and Johnson) rank among the ten best, they too have more than respectable credentials as leaders who got things done. Holli also studies the post-mayoral career paths of urban executives, showing that few move on to higher office.

There is plentiful food for thought here about mayors, professors, and voters. The "best" mayors succeeded at the polls more than once. Several of the "worst" mayors did, too, and three of the four worst—Big Bill Thompson, James Michael Curley, and Frank Hague—were very popular over long periods. Students and teachers might well puzzle over the difference between academic and popular judgements.

More practically, mayors and would-be mayors are well advised to read this book. A close reading of the careers of the best and worst suggests the following list of Do's and Don'ts to this reader. The sins of the worst mayors changed over time. Every mayor ranked among the worst before World War II was personally corrupt.

In the postwar years, the undoing of the worst was due to poor management (Jane Byrne, Michael Bilandic, Wilson Goode), fiscal imprudence (Dennis Kucinich, John V. Lindsay, Abraham Beame), and flirtation with white supremacist sentiment (Frank Rizzo, Sam Yorty).

The best mayors boast significant accomplishments. Between 1890 and the World War II the mayors rated best each cleaned corruption out of city hall and aggressively pursued the collective good of ordinary voters. Three—Hazen Pingree, Tom L. Johnson, and Samuel ("Golden Rule") Jones—became national heroes by championing the three-cent street railway fare. Daniel W. Hoan, LaGuardia, Johnson, Jones, and Frank Murphy organized little New Deals, securing their popularity with voters and the praise of historians.

In the years since World War II, every mayor ranked among the best, from Bradley to Andrew Young, organized a growth coalition that changed the face of the city's downtown. Of course, the same administrations were targets for the anger and resentment of those who suffered from growth initiatives, and several of them also drove up municipal debt. Running for mayor? No one promises you a rose garden.

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DOUGLAS BUKOWSKI. *Big Bill Thompson, Chicago, and the Politics of Image*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998. Pp. 273. Cloth \$49.95 paper \$21.95.

William Hale "Big Bill" Thompson served three terms as the last Republican ever elected mayor of Chicago (1915-1923 and 1927-1931). Thompson was a former "cowboy" rancher, "wildwest" showman, athlete, and minor political figure in Chicago before his 1915 election, hardly the credentials that one might expect for the mayor of the nation's second largest city. In this political biography, Douglas Bukowski argues that the man and his tenure can best be understood in the context of industrial, immigrant Chicago's raw and brawling past history, which continued to shape its politics even as the city matured economically and socially. According to Bukowski, Thompson parlayed his vision of a city engaged in class, ethnic, and race warfare into three mayoral terms characterized by the lack of a coherent political agenda for the city, a willingness to switch sides on any issue when it suited his purpose, and blatant appeals to ethnic or race consciousness.

Thompson's years in office were constantly marred by political scandals that might well have driven another mayor from office, and Bukowski is most successful in depicting the man and his manipulative rhetoric. Even after Thompson was forced by a particularly nasty graft scandal in the public schools not to stand for re-election in 1923, he rose from the ashes to win again in 1927. According to Bukowski, the four-

year interlude of Democrat William Dever "gave Chicago reform," but Dever was unable to conciliate "classes, factions, and races" (p. 150) as he tried to enforce prohibition laws, failed to disavow an anti-labor citizens' committee, appointed new school board members who selected a moderately pro-business superintendent to clean up the system, and took no public stand on a racist textbook. When Thompson announced his candidacy for mayor in 1927, middle-class good government reformers, many of whom were Republicans, threw their support to Dever. Bukowski says that Thompson appealed to "traditional" class, racial, and ethnic divisions on such issues and won the election.

Political biography moves among an analysis of the person, that of the political institutions, and, in the case of mayors, the political history of the city. This book emphasizes the politics of Big Bill Thompson, although Bukowski does not ignore practical matters as he explores how the city's factionalized political party system contributed to Thompson's electoral success. Yet his primary emphasis remains demonstrating how Thompson's twelve years as mayor, marked by divisive and ethnocentric rhetoric and lack of attention to governing, resulted from Chicago's willingness to accept the politics of image rather than of substance. Big Bill with all his warts and his populist speechifying comes alive in this book, and his successes do underscore the potential that a democratic political system has to produce a victory of image over substance. Ultimately, discerning whether Thompson produced such victories necessitates more attention to the city's political institutions and history than this book contains. In Bukowski's account, all Chicago politics was a socially constructed battleground whereon working-class labor and ethnic voters fought middle-class WASPs to control the city, with Thompson succeeding because he championed the former. To judge whether blatant appeals to narrow self-interest did indeed determine mayoral elections, whether Dever failed as a reform mayor because "Chicago's problems did not result from government corruption" but because immigrant parents wanted a mayor who built roller coasters rather than one who truckled to the women of the Juvenile Protective Association (pp. 149–50 and pp. 133–34), it would help to know how this situation developed. If race and class were important political determinants, what about gender? Chicago women voted in municipal elections from 1914, yet when they appear in this book they are subsumed into class, racial, and ethnic categories that privilege male voices and organizations. Ida B. Wells-Barnett, after all, did not support Thompson; she first stayed loyal to another Republican leader and then rejected Thompson's appeals to black voters as full of image and bombast and devoid of actual political promise for black Chicagoans. In sum, this book gives us a fascinating view of a "populist" politician, but it leaves

unanswered some important questions about the political context in which he operated.

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ROBERT B. FAIRBANKS. *For the City as a Whole: Planning, Politics, and the Public Interest in Dallas, Texas, 1900–1965*. (Urban Live and Urban Landscape Series.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 318. \$47.95.

In his account of Dallas through the early and middle years of the twentieth century, Robert B. Fairbanks traces the rise and decline of a discourse of "the city as a whole." He contrasts talk about "the city as a whole" with a later rhetoric that centers on individuals and groups. At various stages, linked to comprehensive planning, council-manager government, and aggressive pursuit of economic growth, Fairbanks argues, "whole-city" rhetoric enabled a small group of business and civic leaders, with the backing of the city's daily newspapers, to govern Dallas.

Fairbanks finds, however, that "whole-city" talk did not fully subdue conflicts of race and class. Creative responses to problems ranging from racial discord to the development of a regional airport lay beyond the reach of Dallas, despite extensive reliance on planning and management expertise. Effective as "whole-city" rhetoric was on some matters, it proved to have limited range in problem solving.

As Fairbanks points out, Dallas was not alone in embracing a discourse about "the city as a whole." Still, he suggests, Dallas's leadership, through the city's Citizen Charter Association, may have guarded this rhetoric more vigorously than was the case in most cities. Even so, Dallas, along with other cities saw "whole-city" talk go into decline at midcentury. Yet, though Fairbanks is strongly attentive to the shift in discourse, he has little to say about why dominant ideas change.

Significantly, Fairbanks traces the downfall of the "whole-city" discourse in Dallas to events in the 1950s, whereas the conventional wisdom for most cities places it in the 1960s. Fairbanks thus connects decline not only to increased activism by minorities (a 1960s phenomenon) but also to the emergence of shrill partisanship on the political right in the 1950s. Thus decline in the dominant discourse seemingly had more to do with heightened division within the city's leadership than with challenge from without.

Useful as Fairbanks's book is in linking names, dates, rhetoric, and events, it leaves some key questions unaddressed. The reader is left wondering what Fairbanks sees as the causal force of an idea like the good of the city as a whole. He makes the point that it did not advance social justice even though, on several occasions, task forces and leadership groups invoked the idea of the good of the city in calling for actions to improve race relations. "Whole-city" rhetoric notwithstanding, city officials in sundry instances gave in to



white opposition despite reports justifying racial changes as in the public interest. In the case of planning for a regional airport, city decisionmakers simply refused to embrace an expanded understanding of what constituted the public interest.

All things considered, what is the place of a particular rhetoric in the flow of events? At times, Fairbanks writes as if the city's leaders were simply handmaidens to a powerful body of ideas. For example, he states that the "city-as-a-whole strategy dictated the city's response to its labor problems" (p. 164). At another point, he argues that a restrained approach to prosecuting the bombing of black homes in previously all-white neighborhoods was an approach that "city-wide interests dictated" (p. 200). Using the word "citywide" in itself reveals a fundamental ambiguity in the discourse: what exactly is "the city" in "the city as a whole"? Is the concept about what satisfies a majority of the population at a particular time or is it about timeless criteria that can be applied in an objective manner? In what sense does a discourse *determine* a course of action?

Although Fairbanks does not resolve these issues, he narrates the Dallas story at least some of the time as if ideas control actors. The path of causation seems to be "idea leads to action." If so, how do ideas change? How does a new rhetoric of individual rights and legitimate group interests come to replace a "whole-city" discourse? In Dallas, was it the challenge of physically building a city in the Texas plains that brought the "whole-city" rhetoric into being, while conflicts accompanying growth into a complex metropolis pushed out the old rhetoric? If so, the path of causation seems to be "action leads to idea."

One might, of course, argue that causation is a two-way street, but Fairbanks does not probe the issue. His narrative suggests that a dominant set of ideas impelled the city along a particular path of development only to have those ideas run their course and be replaced by an alternative set. But who determines when ideas have run their course? Fairbanks's Dallas narrative leaves the role of human agency in shaping, using, and discarding ideas incompletely examined.

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RICHARD POLENBERG. *The World of Benjamin Cardozo: Personal Values and the Judicial Process*. Paperback edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1997. Pp. xiv, 288. \$19.95.

By any measure, Benjamin N. Cardozo remains a shining star in the American judicial constellation. Elected to the Supreme Court of New York in 1914, he was instantly elevated to the Court of Appeals, where he served (including six years as Chief Justice) until his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1932. Nationally acclaimed as the worthiest successor to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Cardozo participated in the New Deal judicial revolution until his death in 1938.

Rejecting arid legal formalism, Cardozo resolutely adapted venerable legal principles to developing social needs. A judge, he knew, did not find law but made it. In *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (1921), Cardozo acknowledged judge-made law "as one of the existing realities of life" (p. 10). Judges were invariably guided by "inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions"—all of which shaped "an outlook on life, a conception of social needs" (p. 12).

Yet Cardozo became an icon of judicial self-restraint. Intensely self-conscious about the dangers inherent in "judge-made" law, he was sanctified by bench and bar for his detachment, his freedom from his past and his predilections, and his deference to legislative judgment. Cardozo understood that the rule of law must not rest upon "sentiment or benevolence or some vague notion of social welfare" (p. 242).

It is the virtue of Richard Polenberg's illuminating analysis that this discordance—between the Olympian Cardozo, exalted for judicial restraint, and the "strongly moralistic" (p. 43) Cardozo, whose opinions often were guided by his deepest personal convictions—is deftly unpacked and thoughtfully scrutinized. As the subtitle of his book suggests, Polenberg is drawn to the intersection of personal values and the judicial process. This is precisely where Cardozo, and by implication every judge, inevitably stands.

But it is a problematic location for understanding Cardozo, an intensely private man of "fastidious reticence" (p. 3). The source of Cardozo's "unusual sense of reserve" is uncertain. It may have been, Polenberg speculates, the premature death of both parents during his boyhood; or private tutoring from Horatio Alger, Jr., "intent on hiding a furtive past" as an accused child molester; or "the atmosphere in a household scarred by scandal" (p. 43). (Cardozo's father, accused of corruption, had resigned his judgeship in shame.)

Despite Cardozo's dense silence about himself, Polenberg persuasively links his judicial opinions to his deepest personal beliefs. Ignoring Cardozo's landmark public law decisions, extensively analyzed by legal scholars, Polenberg focuses upon cases involving "morality, scholarship, sexuality, religion and criminality" (p. xii) in which Cardozo "revealed his innermost sentiments" (p. 5). And reveal them he surely did. An insanity plea, in a case displaying (to Cardozo) "shockingly aberrant" behavior, elicited "a decidedly moralistic response" (p. 71). Protecting universities from negligence suits, Cardozo demonstrate an "overly idealized" conception of the university as "a company of scholars fearlessly pursuing the truth" (p. 118), a myopic distortion quite common among those who spend their adult lives outside the academy. He brought to cases involving sexuality "a set of moral convictions shared by many people raised in genteel circumstances in the Victorian era" (p. 131). And, despite (or because of) his Orthodox Jewish upbringing, Cardozo's distrust of "religious certainty" (p. 193) was evident in his opinions.

With Cardozo's death, Polenberg indicates, his leg-



acy was vigorously contested. Did his fine intellect display "Jewish" or "universalistic" values? Was his jurisprudence, in the end, liberal or conservative? Above all, perhaps, could a non-lawyer be permitted to assess his historical significance? Certainly not, according to the priestly caste of lawyers who were determined to enshrine Cardozo's memory in their own scholarly mausoleum. Judge Irving Lehman, Cardozo's literary executor, cavalierly destroyed the intimate correspondence between Cardozo and his sister Nell. Felix Frankfurter, certain of Cardozo's personal detachment and judicial restraint, insisted upon a lawyer as the official biographer. The biography, published sixty years after Cardozo's death, was a veritable model of haste when compared to the official biography of Holmes, undertaken by another lawyer chosen by Frankfurter, which was never completed.

These scholarly assessments are best left to the talents of historians such as Polenberg. Penetrating the lingering aura of mystification that still surrounds Cardozo, he demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that "Cardozo's entire career illustrated the importance of personal values in the judicial process." As any sensible lawyer might finally concede, *res ipsa loquitur*.

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LAWRENCE J. NELSON. *King Cotton's Advocate: Oscar G. Johnston and the New Deal*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1999. Pp. xviii, 330. \$38.00.

Lawrence J. Nelson throws a direct spotlight on Oscar G. Johnston, a sometimes shadowy figure, as he makes an argument for recognizing Johnston's major role in the New Deal's stabilizing efforts to rescue King Cotton in the South before World War II and the agribusiness changes of the late 1940s and 1950s totally changed how cotton was grown. In the first two chapters, Nelson outlines Johnston's career, after his birth in the Mississippi Delta in 1880, as lawyer, banker, and Mississippi politician, elected to the state legislature in 1907, 1911, and 1915. In 1919, he ran for governor as a conservative against the Vardaman-Bilbo faction but was defeated. In 1926, he left law and banking and became, first, general counsel for the mostly British-owned Delta and Pine Land Company, which operated the largest cotton plantation in Mississippi. In 1927, he became the well-compensated president of the company, living on the plantation near Greenville. The company remained his primary employer until 1950. His better known public life, which constitutes the bulk of the book, included his services with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, first as finance director of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) from May 1933 to February 1934, and then as manager, from 1933 to 1936, of the federal cotton pool founded to sell the government holdings of cotton from the 1920s Federal Farm Board's accumulations and crop of 1933. Johnston also served as a

board officer of the important Commodity Credit Corporation from 1933 to early 1938 and acted often as an official representative of the Department of Agriculture at home and abroad. He intimately involved himself with the complex annual decisions stabilizing cotton prices, which guaranteed a minimum price and created orderly marketing processes. During the period 1933 to 1938, he frequently explained the New Deal cotton policies to southern growers, cajoled their cooperation, and, in 1937 and 1938, disastrous years for overproduction and prices, defended these policies to angry farmers. In 1938, Johnston decided that cotton woes would never be adequately answered by government-sponsored reduction of supply, so with considerable personal skill he created the National Cotton Council—an organization representing growers, merchants, warehousemen, ginneries, and cottonseed crushers—to promote the consumption of cotton. As president, he became the most audible national voice for cotton until his retirement in 1948. In the early 1950s, illness forced him from public life, and he died in 1955.

In telling Johnston's life, some chapters stand out for the contributions to other topical concerns. Nelson has a superlative chapter on the February 1935 purge of the liberal lawyers in the AAA with insightful detail about the conflict over tenant rights. Johnston argued that the AAA was not an instrument of racial experiment to change landlord-tenant relations. Nelson in another chapter examines Johnston's management of the Delta and Pine Land plantation with its 900 black tenant families and some 30,000 acres. Although Nelson acknowledges that the southern plantation system was "oppressive and exploitative" (p. 117), he defends Johnston's self-description as a welfare capitalist who treated tenants fairly and with concern for their health and well being. In this chapter and throughout, Nelson joins the growing number of historians attempting to explain better American conservatives. Johnston, to Nelson, locked in his time and place on issues of race and class, believed sincerely in paternalism, and you best understand his world not by condemnation but by careful analysis. The concluding chapter of the book examines Johnston's ferocious attack in the 1940s on the Farm Security Administration. By this time in full retreat from the New Deal, he would use language almost similar to contemporary southern conservatives attacking federal government social up-lift programs. Less successful are the explanations of Johnston's technical efforts in draining the cotton pool and the intricate ins and outs of price supports. Nelson writes well and the book is deeply researched, and Nelson himself has flawless command of this particular economic history, but most readers will find it hard going.

Nelson intends Johnston's story to underscore the utterly pragmatic nature of the early New Deal's economic policies as the various ideological camps clashed in the face of the daunting social and economic problems of the crisis-ridden cotton South. He argues that the likable, energetic Johnston, who "possessed

perhaps the most brilliant legal and financial mind in the entire South" (p.xii), supported the first Agricultural Adjustment Act as an officer of the Department of Agriculture because of his personal and financial commitments to cotton prosperity, but as New Deal policy evolved, Johnson became, inside and outside of government, a critical voice for southern landlords, particularly of the Farm Security Administration. Johnston's work as a policy maker and as a manager of one of the South's largest tenant plantations serves as a case example for understanding why southern conservatives supported the early New Deal and why because of differing policy goals they deserted the New Deal as it moved toward reform rather than recovery alone. This is, of course, the story of southern conservatism after the New Deal, writ large through the decades. Nelson's book then not only offers a contribution to New Deal and agricultural history, but it serves as well as an interesting example explaining the nature of southern conservatism in the midst of liberal and post-liberal change from the 1930s on.

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GILBERT J. GALL. *Pursuing Justice: Lee Pressman, the New Deal, and the CIO*. (SUNY Series in American Labor History.) Albany: State University of New York Press. 1999. Pp. xiii, 363. \$21.95.

This biography delivers a succinct and richly textured study of Lee Pressman (1906–1969), the New Deal lawyer, political activist, and onetime Communist who served as general counsel to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) from 1936 to 1948. Gilbert J. Gall has ably used Pressman's life as a means of exploring many broader subjects in mid-twentieth-century American history, including the impact of radical lawyers in the New Deal and the American labor movement and the factors that led many liberals to embrace and later reject Communism. By delving deeply into a wide range of sources, including labor union collections, FBI files, and oral histories, Gall has compensated for the paucity of Pressman's personal papers.

After graduating second in his class at Harvard Law School, where Alger Hiss was a *Law Review* colleague, Pressman briefly practiced law at a corporate firm in New York before joining the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) at the outset of the New Deal. In discussing Pressman's futile efforts to have the AAA do more to assist impoverished farmers, Gall provides a useful case study of the tensions in the New Deal between radical reformers and moderate regulators.

Convinced that he could pursue justice more effectively as a labor lawyer, Pressman persuaded John L. Lewis to hire him as the CIO's first attorney. Pressman was the first middle-class professional significantly to influence the policies of an American labor union, encouraging the CIO to pursue broad aims to

strengthen unionism. Pressman also advanced the CIO's size and power through his legal and political skills in negotiating with management, drafting contracts, organizing workers, litigating, and lobbying Congress. Pressman acted as a liaison between the CIO and federal agencies, because he shrewdly recognized that the manner in which laws are administered is at least as important as what the laws say. By showing how Pressman helped to persuade federal administrators to interpret statutes in ways that promoted the CIO's interests, Gall makes an important contribution to an understanding of the development of the modern administrative state and the aggrandizement of executive power at the expense of Congress.

Overestimating the strength of the Left, Pressman left the CIO in 1948 to plan strategy for Henry Wallace's third-party presidential bid and to conduct an unsuccessful race for a congressional seat on Wallace's American Labor Party-Progressive Party ticket. His career began to unravel after Whittaker Chambers named Pressman, along with Hiss, as a member of a Communist cell that met in New York during the 1930s. In analyzing Pressman's complicated relationship with the Communist Party (CP), Gall offers fresh insights into Communist influence within the labor movement. Gall argues that the long-standing controversy about the extent of Communist influence in the CIO should be reformulated. According to Gall, "[t]he real significance of the CIO-CP alliance during the New Deal lay in the ability of *both* sides to form a symbiotic structure that advanced the aims of each for over a decade" (pp. 307–08).

Gall also provides an interesting study of a tough but naïve liberal who appears to have been half-hearted in both his embrace and renunciation of Communism. Gall contends that Pressman, like many other leftists, believed that Communism provided the only effective means of defeating fascism, ending the Great Depression, and achieving fundamental social reforms. Gall does not venture to explain, however, why some American liberals became Communists while far more liberals of the same era recognized the obvious maladies of Communism.

In exploring Pressman's murky Communist connections, Gall does not offer conclusions that conflicting evidence fails to support. Accordingly, he wisely refrains from offering any final opinion about the full extent of Pressman's fealty to the party or the veracity of his testimony to House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), particularly his contradiction of Chambers's insistence that Pressman and Hiss were simultaneously members of the same cell. Although this book does not attempt to cast new light on the Hiss case, its account of the case from the viewpoint of Pressman's testimony offers a fresh perspective. Pressman's career never fully recovered from the HUAC investigation, but his useful work as a maritime labor lawyer provides an interesting example of how one former Communist reassembled his life.

Pressman's efforts to "pursue justice" were in many

ways successful but were ultimately stunted by Pressman's personal deficiencies. Although Gall acknowledges that Pressman was "coldly analytical, deceptive, self-centered, and ruthless" (p. 296), he rightly admires Pressman's energetic dedication to the improvement of the lives of American workers.

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ROGER HOROWITZ. *"Negro and White, Unite and Fight!": A Social History of Industrial Unionism in Meatpacking, 1930-90.* (The Working Class in American History.) Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1997. Pp. xvi, 373. Cloth \$44.95, paper \$17.95.

RICK HALPERN. *Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904-54.* (The Working Class in American History.) Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 309. Cloth \$44.95, paper \$17.95.

The two volumes under review draw on the rich union archives of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. They demonstrate that African-American workers were the dynamic element in the formation and survival of a strong, self-consciously democratic, decentralized, shop-floor-oriented trade union, the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA). Alliances with whites who were not racists or were willing, for pragmatic reasons, to cooperate with black workers helped to maintain union strength. Roger Horowitz demonstrates that, from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, the UPWA's working shop stewards forged strong linkages ("chains") in different meatpacking plants of the same company, enabling rank-and-file workers to conduct effective, strategic "rolling" strikes. "Right-wing" and "leftist" stewards worked together in these chains, whose members attended national contract negotiations. Unlike Ford and General Motors, but like Chrysler, the nation's largest meatpacking firms maintained an anti-collective bargaining orientation well into the 1950s. Meatpacking workers defended themselves by intensifying shop-floor job actions.

Horowitz shows that the specific character of meatpacking technology created a dialectic of management "drive" systems and strategic opportunities for skilled animal slaughterers and meat cutters to use job actions to resist management pressure. The effectiveness of shop-floor action was enhanced by the need to slaughter animals soon after they were delivered and to dress the dead carcasses shortly thereafter. The rate of slaughtering strongly influenced production in all other departments of the meatpacking plants. The brutal cold (rarely above 40 degrees Fahrenheit) and the blood and animal parts that permeated the killing floors made many white workers reluctant to take slaughtering jobs, creating a vacuum that was filled by African-American workers attracted to jobs that paid

sixteen to fifty percent more than the best jobs available to blacks in other industries. In the 1920s, the packers retained blacks hired during World War I. After blacks did not join the 1921 and 1922 strikes, their employers promoted black meatpackers on the assumption that they would continue to be largely anti-union. But this policy created a large core of black workers, who backed Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) union organizing efforts in the 1930s.

Horowitz indicates that Communists in the vital Chicago region, where blacks were a large majority of the packinghouse employees, played a crucial role in interracial organizing in 1936 and thereafter, using racially integrated flying squads, integrated open air rallies, and black preachers from storefront churches as organizers. (Many became shop stewards.) In Kansas City, Orthodox Croatians, who had been discriminated against by Protestant and Catholic foremen and managers, empathized with blacks. Black and white Communists pressed for the formation of interracial coalitions among packinghouse workers and for union action to reduce racial discrimination, leading African-American centrists like Bill Weightman to admit that without the Communists' anti-discrimination activities "I might not have been as aggressive as I was" (p. 197). Both Horowitz and Rick Halpern conclude that the Communists in the Chicago meatpacking unions used non-ideological organizing appeals and—unlike their counterparts in the United Auto Workers (UAW)—often ignored directives from national Communist officials. Horowitz and Halpern find that black meatpacking workers were especially resistant to post-World War II redbaiting, since they appreciated the support the Left had given to anti-discrimination efforts. Redbaiting white politicians probably had little credibility among black union members, who had a strong consciousness of race.

Migration induced by World War II increased the number of black workers in the major meat packinghouses to forty percent of the industry total. After Ralph Helstein, a social democratic attorney, became president of the UPWA (1946), the union's national office actively backed the locals' civil rights struggles against discrimination in meatpacking plants and in local department stores that scorned black consumers. Following the 1948 strike, Helstein and rank-and-file leaders made a special effort to draw younger black workers into the union's shop-floor committees. An anti-discrimination department was established in 1950. The UPWA pressed management to admit black workers to job training programs. White local and district officers were much more likely to back anti-discrimination actions than the white rank and file. (Halpern notes that older white workers were more likely to have racist proclivities.) Union officers fought white racism by pointing out that the militancy of black workers in the pivotal Chicago locals had forced the meatpackers largely to eliminate north-south wage differentials, a concession that palpably benefited southern whites. Other whites tolerated their union's

anti-discrimination efforts because the UPWA protected workers against acute shop-floor exploitation and secured decent fringe benefits in national contracts. Horowitz argues persuasively that, after 1945, the UPWA was more effective than any other national union in the United States in combating workplace racial discrimination. (The analysis would have been improved by more explicit consideration of James R. Grossman's *Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration* [1989], which explores African Americans' consciousness of race.) Like all industrial unions of this era, with the exception of the United Electrical Workers (UE), the UPWA gave only limited attention to eliminating discrimination against female meatpackers.

Horowitz, whose narrative is enhanced by his graceful prose, convincingly argues that from its inception the UPWA was an unusually democratic union. Rule from the center was discredited by the authoritarian orientation of the CIO leaders who dominated the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC) and often appointed incompetent but loyal district and national leaders. In 1943, district representatives wrote a UPWA constitution that guaranteed local and district contract negotiation autonomy. World War II accelerated tendencies toward decentralization. With wages frozen, most bargaining took place on the shop floor. Black workers took the lead in using sit-downs—in which workers armed with their butcher knives remained at their work stations, refusing to work—to resist management speed-ups and to pressure recalcitrant, anarchistic managers to respond to contractually authorized grievances and to abstain from interfering with union elections. Government pressure to meet war production quotas gave rank-and-file workers additional leverage in these confrontations.

Between 1946 and the advent of automation and industry decentralization in the early 1960s, shop-floor militants, encouraged by Ralph Helstein, used slowdowns to give workers more control over the pace of production lines, especially when management arbitrarily intensified the labor process. It is unfortunate that the uneven nature of UPWA collections did not allow either Horowitz or Halpern to be more precise about the overall effect of shop floor actions on the wage-effort bargain. They do not explain the exact contractual procedures covering authorized production standard strikes, making comparisons to the experience of the UAW, the UE, and the International Union of Electrical Workers difficult.

Both Horowitz and Halpern make excellent use of the UPWA's oral history archives, which they were instrumental in creating. Halpern focuses entirely on the Chicago district. His analysis confirms existing paradigms about the role of the Left and of liberal Catholic Church officials in 1930s unionization. Halpern presents vivid examples of management efforts to inhibit worker unity by encouraging white workers' fears of black power in the workplace. Neither Halpern

nor Horowitz indicates the significance of their findings for Edna Bonacich's split labor market theory, which argues that employer-induced segmentation creates and intensifies racial and ethnic bias.

Halpern shows that the initial unionization drive was aided in 1938 by Chicago Mayor Edward Kelley's pressure on Armour and Company to engage in collective bargaining. (By this time, most of Chicago's blue-collar workers were voting Democratic.) Elected in 1939 with open assistance from the packinghouse workers, Alderman Earl Dickerson also supported the PWOC. But in 1948, Mayor Martin Kennelly, who sat on Wilson's board of directors, directed the police to harass strikers. Both authors could have provided more detail on internal union discussions about electoral strategies and the UPWA's actual political campaigns.

Unlike the archives of the centralized UAW, the UPWA archives do not appear to document extensively the interactions between the national office and the district and local structures. It is not clear whether Horowitz and Halpern overlooked recent case studies of postwar industrial unionism by Kevin Boyle, Ronald Filippelli and Mark McCulloch, James R. Zetka, and Robert Asher and Ronald Edsforth or were prevented from comparing their findings to these works by the production schedule of their press. Stanley M. Weir's work on small groups and shop floor culture could have been integrated into the accounts of meatpacking unionism. Howard Kimeldorf's analysis of the success of left-wing West Coast longshoremen's union leaders, who eschewed economism and had especially close ties to rank-and-file workers, should have been considered.

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DAVID KENNEDY. *Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945*. (The Oxford History of the United States, number 9.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. xvii, 936. \$39.95.

This is a monumental book in so many ways, the least of which is its bulk: over nine hundred pages, some six pounds. It is towering narrative history in the grand style, describing the most momentous era in the twentieth-century United States, analyzing the weightiest of matters and the largest questions, focusing on the king-size notables whose behavior was of such immense consequence. Recounting the tangled tale of the watershed Franklin D. Roosevelt years for the Oxford History of the United States is a daunting challenge, and David M. Kennedy succeeds brilliantly. All his talents for synthesis and storytelling, glimpsed in his many articles and previous books (*Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret Sanger* [1970] and *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* [1981]), come to the fore. Hardly a page is without a memorable phrase, an apt quotation, the most telling of details. It is history as sheer, riveting drama, an enormous pleasure to read. The book begins with the



doings of Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Roosevelt on November 11, 1918 (yes, it is very much a book about men, indeed, about male officialdom). Although a bit contrived, this prologue enables Kennedy to introduce his main protagonists and connect World War I to his subjects: the Great Depression and World War II. Downplaying any appreciable linkage between the stock market crash and economic catastrophe that followed, he views the Depression's origins primarily in the huge and ruinous war reparations imposed on Germany and other economic effects of the punitive Treaty of Versailles. Some one hundred pages then depict the worsening ordeal of the Great Depression and President Herbert Hoover's unprecedentedly vigorous, creative, yet ultimately unsuccessful corrective actions. Kennedy's spirited defense of his fellow Stanford alumnus may not be entirely persuasive, but the sophisticated intelligence of his argument will occasion the rewriting of many lectures on the first years of the Great Depression.

In a less unfamiliar but equally skillful manner, Kennedy then guides the reader through the maze of New Deal agencies and programs, delineating Roosevelt's cunning leadership and conflict with the Supreme Court, chronicling labor's tempestuous relationship with FDR, and dissecting the New Deal coalition that made the Democrats the dominant political party for nearly half a century. Although nothing in the chapters on the Great Depression and the New Deal are the least bit dull, the book truly soars as Kennedy turns to the conflict between isolationists and internationalists, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the creation of the Grand Alliance. The nearly 500 pages of rich detail and trenchant analysis devoted to the coming of World War II, and to its diplomatic, economic, and military aspects, are the best account in print. Kennedy's enthralling treatment of the military campaigns in North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific and the air assault on Germany and Japan reads like a novel. His caustic profiles of Generals Leslie Groves and Douglas MacArthur, his rendering of the miracle of production in the wartime United States, and his unsparing depiction of battlefield atrocities linger long after one puts this book down. And Kennedy's explanations of the evolving American military strategies, of how and why the United States won, and of the consequences of victory are as clear and compelling as any I have read.

Given the scope of the work, Kennedy needed to be highly selective in his emphases even in a volume of this heft. Inevitably, it is not the book that some historians might have preferred or themselves written. The cultural and social history of this era is virtually nonexistent. Religion is barely mentioned. More attention is paid to Germany's 352nd Division or Twelfth Panzer Division than, for example, to Native Americans or the National Farmers Union, to Harlem or the American Civil Liberties Union. The National Urban League merits mention only in a footnote. And women are all but invisible. Less than a score of women's

names appear in an exhaustive fifty-nine page index of many hundreds of entries.

One might also question the weighting of or balance between the sections of the book. The New Deal garners less than half the pages devoted to World War II. Unlike the book's other sections, moreover, Kennedy's New Deal chapters exhibit neither research in primary sources nor much novelty in interpretation. The carefully nuanced emphasis on the circumstances circumscribing Hoover vanish when it comes to the shortcomings of FDR; and Kennedy's cataloguing of the New Deal's compromises, timidities, inconsistencies, incoherence, and both partial and outright failures are well known to those familiar with the New Deal scholarship of the past quarter century. Likewise, his ultimate conclusion that the New Deal, despite the fact that it did not end the Great Depression or redistribute the national income or challenge the fundamental tenets of capitalism, *did* change America for the better, providing unprecedented security (freedom from fear) to millions of Americans, is hardly uncommon. Kennedy's pages on the New Deal, unlike those on Hoover and on World War II, will spur little revising of textbooks.

Such qualms aside, Kennedy's lucid, capacious account of the crises and calamities of the FDR years will be the definitive treatment of this era for some time to come. His searing account of the war years, in particular, warrants careful reading by all students of the twentieth century. This book raises the distinction of an already distinguished series. Kennedy and Oxford University Press are to be commended.

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WILLIAM O. ODOM. *After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918–1939*. (Texas A&M University Military Series, number 64.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1999. Pp. 282. \$44.95.

In this book, William O. Odom assesses the evolution of U.S. Army thought during the interwar period as reflected in the capstone manual on doctrine, the *Field Service Regulations (FSR)*. Odom argues that the 1923 *FSR* effectively integrated army experience in World War I to create a sound doctrine, while the next revision of the *FSR* (1939) was flawed by its failure to reflect tactical, technological, and organizational changes adapted by the European armies on the eve of World War II. The most important reason for the shortcomings of the 1939 manual was the budgetary starvation of the interwar period that rendered the army incapable of conducting the kinds of training or equipment acquisition that would have allowed greater experimentation, but Odom also notes several internal institutional failures that exacerbated the problem. Indeed, given those institutional shortcomings, it is not clear that even lavish funding would have resulted in doctrine better than actually produced. The author



presents his ideas in well-organized and clearly written form, and given the very narrow focus on the inception, authorship, and effects of these two manuals, his research, primarily in records of the U.S. Military History Institute and the military archives, is well grounded.

Although coherent and plausible, Odom's argument is not especially compelling. Part of the problem is the focus on doctrine, which attempts to codify general principles of war fighting. There is no standard of measure of doctrinal efficacy short of battlefield outcomes, and even then, the actual influence of doctrine is seldom unequivocal. Without such a measure, it is difficult to avoid the appearance of teleological criticism, as when Odom comments on the neglect of integrated combined arms warfare in the 1939 *FSR*. Another issue is explaining what fosters or inhibits the process of institutional learning. Odom acknowledges the highly chauvinistic terms by which army leaders steadfastly rejected European lessons from the Great War as fundamentally unsound and irrelevant given Americans' temperament and abilities. The 1923 *FSR* bolstered principles largely rejected by Europeans in 1918 that spurred their subsequent doctrinal innovation; Americans, coming in late to the war, attributed their success to the ideas brought with them and overlooked the extraordinary circumstances they faced fighting in the last six months of a four-year war. Odom notes that army leaders saw no reason to rethink doctrine before the 1930s: was the problem with their original assumptions or in failing to challenge and rethink what they considered sound doctrine?

Odom addresses two issues that offer significant promise for further development. The best chapter in the book deals with Army War College studies of foreign armies. This gives literally a world view of the institution and provides a sense of what was or was not visible to these officer observers. The comparative and cultural aspects of this chapter help to tie the American experience into a larger framework. The second issue is the institutional learning process, which continued even in the absence of an updated capstone manual. Odom rightly emphasizes that this was not a period of intellectual stagnation, and he shows how ideas percolated through the army schools, the separate branches, and separate commands filling voids left by the *FSR*. Lacking was centralized direction from the General Staff to control the process and coordinate the disparate sources of innovation. In other words, the institution continued to learn and evolve without a modified *FSR*, especially in the Air Corps, all of which again raises the question about the real value of using the *FSR* as a measure of what was occurring during the interwar years.

Odom's study has its merits and will serve as a basic reference for those who want to know more about U.S. Army interwar doctrine. But the narrow focus on doctrine is also the key limitation of the book. It is neither broadly comparative, systematically fitting the American case into the larger spectrum of military

innovation or doctrinal stagnation after the World War I, nor is it a thorough explanation of the dynamics underlying institutional learning, because doctrinal development is only one element in that larger dynamic. For a limited group of specialists, this is a useful addition to the literature on military doctrine and adaptation, but it offers little for a more general audience.

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JOHN E. MOSER. *Twisting the Lion's Tail: American Anglophobia between the World Wars*. New York: New York University Press. 1999. Pp. x, 263. \$45.00.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, commentators observed that the United States seemed to be casting about for a new enemy. Would it be Japan, Islamic fundamentalists, China, or perhaps a struggling Russia? Great Britain, the original "evil empire," was not a contender. John E. Moser's book explores an era when American fear and suspicion of Great Britain played a significant role in both domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy.

Moser clearly and competently lays out the variety of anti-British coalitions in American politics, noting that they often tended to be made up of those who saw themselves as economic, political, or social "outsiders"—ethnic minorities, northern liberals and socialists, populists, and midwestern progressives—uniting against social and economic elites. For quite different reasons, Republican conservatives, Irish-Americans, German-Americans, western progressives, and anti-imperialist liberals shared an antipathy toward Britain that united them in opposition to the League of Nations. In the 1920s, a group of politicians, naval officers, journalists, and industrialists called for a build-up of the U.S. Navy to rival the Royal Navy. Wary of British cultural dominance, the state legislatures of Illinois, Wisconsin, Texas, and Ohio declared that their official state language would be known as the "American" rather than the "English" language, and civic groups called for a purging of a pro-British bias in school history textbooks. In the Depression years, politicians denounced the failure of former European allies, especially Britain, to pay back billions of dollars in war debts, even though prominent New York financiers called for the cancellation of the debts. Huey Long and Father Charles Coughlin, popular critics of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, warned against the "Wall Street-Downing Street Axis." Congressional leaders, who like most Americans believed that U.S. involvement in World War I was a mistake not to be repeated, supported the passage of neutrality acts. The British, it was declared, would not make suckers out of the Americans again.

As World War II approached, American anglophobia was expressed in the repeated assertion that the United States would not "pull British chestnuts out of the fire" this time. When FDR negotiated the Destroy-

ers for Bases Deal of 1940, he won support from anglophobes who for years had insisted that the United States take over British bases in the Western hemisphere in partial payment of war debts. Moser notes that the anti-British movement, more conservative and partisan in 1940 and 1941, maintained a self-interested silence through the election year following Pearl Harbor and America's entry into the war but later emerged to condemn Britain's allegedly "lethargic" war effort and imperial ambitions. The Republican Party attempted to use an anti-British stance to unite their isolationist and interventionist members into a nationalist position on U.S. foreign policy. At times, the sweeping term "anglophobia" can appear misleading. For instance, liberals also voiced criticism of the British Empire but made the common Anglo-American goal of defeating fascism their first priority. After the war, Moser claims, anglophobia died out with the decline of progressivism, the decolonization of the British Empire, and the rise of the Soviet Union as a threat.

Moser concludes by discussing how potent myth and stereotyping can be in designating the "enemy." He identifies the roots of anglophobia in the national mythology surrounding the revolutionary war, a mythology that wartime British diplomats referred to with exasperation as the "ancient grudge." He asks why such a powerful mythology ever disappeared. As Michael H. Hunt and John W. Dower have shown, Americans have demonstrated the ability to adjust their positive and negative images of potential friends and enemies to suit their interests. By the end of World War II, British power no longer challenged the United States. Both British and American leaders promoted the idea of an Atlantic partnership based on shared economic and strategic advantage. Moser's book is at its best when it shows how anglophobia was used as a tool to foster a domestic political agenda or to assert U.S. national interests abroad.

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PAUL G. PIERPAOLI, JR. *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1999. Pp. xi, 261.

June 25, 2000 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Korean War. A steady stream of studies has appeared over the last two decades demonstrating the military, diplomatic, and international significance of this conflict, but Korea's domestic impact has attracted almost no attention. Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr. attempts to fill this void with "the first in-depth, scholarly treatment of the Korean War mobilization and the American home front" that "offers new insights into the changing shape of the postwar political economy and political culture by tracing the nation's path from a demobilized peacetime status to an indefinitely mobilized Cold War status" (p. 2). President Harry S.

Truman, Congress, and the American public feared "the ghastly apparition of a militarized garrison state" (p. 169), but Korea justified adoption of a "mobilization base strategy" that "became a hallmark of American national security policy" (p. 46). Pierpaoli argues that "the Trojan horse of Korea" would lead to "perpetual military preparedness, huge military expenditures, and strained government budgets" (p. 15).

Pierpaoli first describes how a traditional belief that mobilization brought political repression and economic regimentation caused postwar leaders to reduce defense spending, despite pressure from Leon Keyserling and others for "military Keynesianism" (p. 10). Without Korea, Truman would not have approved the massive military buildup under National Security Council Paper 68. Rejecting "measures of economic control" (p. 30) beyond the Defense Production Act (1950), Truman's "meandering rearmament effort" (p. 80) relied on taxes and restricted credit until Chinese entry, when he adopted a "radically altered" approach to rearm "almost overnight" (p. 44), while imposing wage and price controls. The Spring of "1951 was one of the most active—and divisive—periods of the Korean mobilization" (p. 82), because nineteen new agencies struggled to balance industrial growth, set price guidelines, control interest rates, reduce shortages, pacify labor, and protect small businesses. The public became "confused and divided" (p. 101) because the administration did not "convey its intentions of embarking upon a long-term rearmament program, in which the Korean War played only a relatively minor role" (p. 117).

Exhaustive research in manuscript collections, government documents, and contemporary periodicals is a strength of this study. But this also might explain its narrowness, as Pierpaoli covers the impact of mobilization almost exclusively inside the government, weakening an incoherent application of the corporatist analytical model. To avoid a garrison state, Truman had "relied on New Deal Era-style cooperative management, decentralized operations, and 'dollar-a-year' business and production experts" (p. 81). When Republicans and Southern Democrats with the real goal to end New Deal social programs joined to reduce funds and weaken authority for mobilization starting in the summer of 1951, "policymakers turned toward the tried and true gospel of decentralization, corporatism, and volunteerism" (p. 159). Women would be the leaders of regional and local committees that became "the linchpin of Korean mobilization" (p. 202). Truman's support for labor in steel and coal disputes in 1952 completed his split with Congress, while also causing key resignations in a "stabilization program now bereft of purpose" (p. 217).

Good biographical sketches and clear explanations of complex economic concepts compensate for stiff prose. A "final analysis" appears three times (pp. 14, 211, 230), while Pierpaoli writes only for American readers when using the word "us" (p. 236). He mistakenly suggests that Truman deployed U.S. troops within

twenty-four hours after the war began, while dating plans for reunification in October 1950 and the start of truce talks in June 1951. A booming economy with high production and savings, low unemployment and inflation, and a stronger West Europe all support his claim that Korean mobilization "was nothing short of extraordinary" (p. 186). Recent scholars also would agree that the Korean War brought "one of the great sea changes in postwar American history" (p. 1), but Pierpaoli takes this argument a bit far. He attributes to Korea not only the triumph of a government-dominated high-tech economy, but U.S. industrial relocation to the Sunbelt that caused urban blight and the civil rights movement. And estimates of a \$2.9 trillion surplus over the next decade expose exaggeration in Pierpaoli's lament "that now when the nation can begin to address its many social and economic ills, it lacks the monetary resources with which to do it" (p. 236). This does not negate this study's value in showing the difficulty of mobilization in a limited war for an indefinite period with "no Huns or Hitlers to defeat" (p. 45).

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ZACHARY KARABELL. *Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946-1962*. (Eisenhower Center Studies on War and Peace.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1999. Pp. 248. Cloth \$37.50, paper \$16.95.

There have been many analyses of United States policies and interventionism in the Third World, but Zachary Karabell's book is among the first to appear after the end of the Cold War. In keeping with the post-Cold War perspective, Karabell's main theme is that observers of the record of American actions in the Third World have paid little attention to matters outside Washington. To illustrate his thesis, the author selects seven cases of U.S. interventions that occurred in the period prior to 1962: Greece, Italy, Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, Cuba, and Laos. For each case, Karabell supplies a study that focuses on how local political and other conditions affected the decisions for intervention and subsequent success or failure of those attempts.

The major thrust of this work is to apply to the Cold War milieu the theories developed in the mid-1950s by British historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher that reinterpreted classic European imperialism in Africa as a function of the ability of local elites to induce major power involvement. Karabell argues by extension that the contours of U.S. intervention in the Third World were less a function of Cold War considerations than of the pull that elites could exert on Washington, where varied arrays of American policy makers were simultaneously pushing for actions abroad. The notion has much to recommend it.

It has often been the case that historians and other observers, looking at the impact of the Cold War on

the Third World, have deplored the way superpower competition was permitted to eclipse the real interests and needs of small nations. In this respect, Karabell's work follows in a rich tradition, although his emphasis is decidedly away from the Cold War factors. Most of his case studies, of which that on Lebanon is quite the best, shed good light on the conditions that led to appeals for U.S. intervention and the disparities in political forces that influenced subsequent outcomes. Karabell argues that interventions were successful when there was convergence between the interests of local elites and the interventionary forces. In this way, the Third World played a central role in determining the international system. At least in the early Cold War period, however, success proved fleeting, the possibilities of forcing a change in the government of Third World countries minimal, and intervention rarely favored democracy but more often the private interests of the indigenous elites clamoring for U.S. help. These conclusions are not very novel; few would dispute them.

In places, Karabell seems to take his model too far, or not far enough. He describes a fragmented Lebanon, with mere slivers of factions exerting the "pull" effect Karabell posits. In the Laotian case, the U.S., by manipulation of internal politics, literally created the local elite's interest in an American connection, something not accounted for by this model. In the Bay of Pigs case, few of the authors whom Karabell faults for an "air strike orthodoxy" actually claim that the CIA invasion of Cuba would have worked with better planning; many simply note how the agency offered these rationalizations. In that case also, Karabell himself concedes that the elite pulling Washington was internal to the U.S.—in Miami, not Havana. Most important, Karabell's theory fails to account for the many cases where local elites appealed for U.S. intervention and Washington did nothing. Nevertheless, it is important in this post-Cold War era to refocus on the dynamics of relationships with small nations, and this book is a useful effort in that direction.

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GERHARD TH. MOLLIN. *Die USA und der Kolonialismus: Amerika als Partner und Nachfolger der belgischen Macht in Afrika, 1939-1965*. Studien zure Internationalen Geschichte Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 1996. Pp. 544.

This book by Gerhard Th. Mollin is characterized by a virtue and a flaw not uncommon in European scholarship on U.S. diplomacy: although it familiarizes readers with a very detailed outside perspective on U.S. foreign policy, a distinctly European intellectual cynicism with regard to American policy makers marks its style.

The book reviews the transition from Belgian colonialism to the independence of the Congo between World War II and 1965, with an eye on U.S. interests

in this process. Taking the reader from the crisis of the European colonial system through the Belgian-American economic coalition to the emergence of the African continent as a priority of U.S. national interest, Mollin concludes that the United States took an ambivalent position vis-à-vis the Belgian presence in Africa. While nominally condemning colonialism in the United Nations General Assembly, in subcommittees U.S. delegates actually supported Belgian sovereignty in the Congo. When the Eisenhower administration finally changed gears and blocked Belgian recolonization during the Congo crisis, these actions were designed to impede Soviet influence in the area, not to support African independence.

Evaluating U.S. investment and export numbers, Mollin refutes longstanding revisionist claims that U.S. colonial policy was driven by capitalist expansionism and instead places the "conservation of [U.S.] preponderance as a global power" (p. 421) at the center of American policy. Only thanks to the intense pressure of the anticolonial powers (Australia, the Soviet Union, China) and the African and Asian states represented in the United Nations did U.S. diplomats realign their policy with a seeming middle-of-the-road course that combined formal acknowledgment of Congolese independence with avid support of local dictatorships.

This is a thought-provoking book that students of American foreign relations during the Cold War should read, for it ties in well with much of the existing literature on U.S. diplomacy toward the Third World. First, Mollin's analysis underlines the finding of those U.S. scholars who have questioned the revisionist assessment of Cold War history and stressed instead U.S. grand strategy (Melvyn Leffler) or local interests (Geir Lundestad). Second, his evaluation of American ambiguous behavior in the United Nations underlines the claim of scholars like Penny Von Eschen who argue that faced with the civil rights movement and the surge of independence throughout the Third World after World War II, U.S. policy makers often publicly supported the sovereignty of African nations while their policies actually defied such postulations.

Mollin's book introduces American readers to a general turn in the German study of foreign relations that mirrors a similar development in U.S. diplomatic history. Edited as part of a series on "international history," this study exemplifies the effort of a new generation of German scholars to rejuvenate the study of foreign relations. Departing from the traditional state-to-state analysis, Mollin stresses the significance of non-governmental players, such as the Société Generale, that operated virtually autonomously in Belgian Congo and often served as the primary negotiation contacts for U.S. officials. In passing, Mollin also pays attention to aspects of cultural diplomacy. The United States Information Agency's activities in Belgian Congo, he shows, were designed to help persuade both indigenous people and Belgians to cooperate with the United States while countering Soviet propa-

ganda broadcast by Radio Moscow. Equally insightful are his occasional flashlights on racial aspects of U.S.-Congolese relations. When the United States sent African-American troops to the Belgian Congo, the Belgian government vehemently protested the move, stating that "Congo natives might begin to think that they should have the same privilege as the highly developed American blacks who are college graduates, doctors and professors" (pp. 101-102).

At the same time, American readers might find Mollin's study a trifle revisionist in the European tradition. The author often assesses U.S. motivations with a tad too much suspicion and speculation, thereby questioning his own, otherwise flawless, analytical credibility. For example, despite the lack of evidence, Mollin conjectures that a considerable part of the funds declared as "supporting assistance" in the 1960s went into activities designed to bolster favorite authoritarian regimes (p. 467). Conceivably, the United States would have preferred someone more cooperative than the radical Mobutu Sese Seko, and it is becoming clearer now, after the end of the Cold War, that this dictator had his own, independent sources of control over Zaire. Nonetheless, Mollin's minute analysis manifests an important non-American contribution to the literature on U.S. policy toward the African continent.

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MICHAEL L. KRENN, *Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945-1969*. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. 1999. Pp. viii, 223.

Things are pretty bad in the academy when diplomatic historians begin throwing punches. At least, that is the feeling one gets reading a recent article in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* that reported on a conflict between scholars over the direction of diplomatic history, a shrinking field that is losing both scholars and prestige. One of the primary reasons cited is the perception that diplomatic history is mainly about dead white males.

Michael L. Krenn's study must come as a welcome contribution to a field in turmoil. Krenn's work follows the narrative history approach familiar to diplomatic history. This book is, however, not so much an account of the actions of a relatively few black Foreign Service officers as an examination of America's failure to confront the hypocrisy behind its foreign policy.

Starting with the heady days surrounding the end of World War II, Krenn chronicles the efforts of African Americans to enter the last major branch of the federal government closed to them: the Department of State and Foreign Service. Krenn's account ends in 1969 with remarkably few victories to show for the effort.

A number of heroes emerge in the struggle to integrate the foreign policy-making apparatus. The



efforts of W.E.B. Du Bois on the outside and Ralph Bunche on the inside are perhaps the best known. Krenn enriches this history by bringing to light the efforts of such pioneers as Rayford Logan, Clifton Wharton, Sr., Terence Todman, Edward Dudley, George McGhee, Carl Rowan, Theodore Brown, and Patricia Roberts Harris to move the nation forward. Joining them in the struggle were a few white allies such as Ambassador Chester Bowles and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration John Peurifoy.

They received no help from the law. With the passage of the Rogers Act in 1924, appointment to the new Foreign Service of the United States would be by "open, competitive examination with promotion strictly on a merit basis" (p. 45). The act was meant to broaden the Foreign Service to include members from places other than Harvard and elite private schools. There were two important exceptions to the act's democratic aspirations: African Americans and women.

The first African American appointed to a ministerial position was Ebenezer D. Bassett, who was sent to Haiti in 1869. Two years later, J. Milton Turner was named minister to Liberia. Haiti and Liberia, along with the Canary Islands, Madagascar, and the Azores, became the "black circuit" where virtually all African American diplomats were posted. Efforts to break through these segregated postings produced the response that other countries would be unwilling to accept black ambassadors. This argument held despite the lack of any empirical evidence to support it. Ironically, reports Krenn, when African nations began to achieve independence in the late fifties and early sixties, it was argued by some that African nations would resent being assigned African-American ambassadors!

Cold War politics had a profound impact on African American leadership and the foreign policy establishment. Recent works by Penny Von Eschen, Gerald Horne, and Brenda Gayle Plummer examine the efforts to separate domestic civil rights from foreign policy. Yet Krenn contends that the evidence reveals a "great deal of consistency in the African-American analysis of U.S. diplomacy during the Eisenhower period" (p. 68). Particularly after the Little Rock school desegregation conflict in 1957, the attacks in newspapers and magazines began to take on a much more cynical and combative tone. Not coincidentally, Clifton Wharton, Sr., was appointed minister to Romania in 1958.

The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 brought new hope to civil rights advocates and led to the first White House conference with American black leaders on U.S. foreign policy. Yet while Kennedy devoted more attention to Africa than his predecessors, it was primarily as an arena of significant Cold War rivalry. Even this limited attention declined under Lyndon B. Johnson, who moved Africa to the back burner and actively resisted efforts to form an African-American lobby on Africa. Thus, says Krenn, from Franklin

Delano Roosevelt through Johnson, the main line of thinking remained unchanged: "the biggest problem facing the United States in underdeveloped regions such as Africa was communism, not racism; therefore, American propaganda should focus on the East-West, not black-white struggle" (p. 132).

This book lays the foundation for further in-depth studies on black influence in international relations. One would have wished for more stories from some of the diplomatic pioneers Krenn interviewed. Still, his work helps explain why U.S. foreign policy seems adrift in a world without the "evil empire."

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TIMOTHY N. THURBER. *The Politics of Equality: Hubert H. Humphrey and the African American Freedom Struggle*. (Columbia Studies in Contemporary American History.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1999. Pp. x, 352. Cloth \$46.00, paper \$21.00.

Timothy N. Thurber's book is a fine contribution to the growing body of scholarship reevaluating, yet again, the history of American liberalism. That Hubert H. Humphrey's commitment to civil rights provides a fitting vehicle for such a reevaluation is no surprise, but Thurber is unusually good at showing how politics and government actually work. The central thread of his argument is that while Humphrey supported equal access to public accommodations and voting rights as these became the dominant legislative issues in the 1950s and 1960s, he remained convinced that African Americans needed government help to advance economically at least as much.

As mayor in the late 1940s, Humphrey brought a fair employment practices ordinance and human rights commission to Minneapolis. He led other "crackpots" (as President Harry S. Truman called them) in pressing for a strong civil rights plank at the 1948 Democratic national convention. As a senator, he urged Democrats to make jobs and civil rights priority issues, and he served as floor manager for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That act, along with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, provided the "ground rules by which we can wage the struggle" for a more just society, Humphrey said (p. 185). For Humphrey himself, the struggle got no easier after he became Lyndon B. Johnson's vice president in 1965. On the one hand, many African-American activists accused him of sacrificing militancy to ambition. On the other hand, Johnson denied Humphrey real authority to combat job discrimination and school segregation. Showing how government worked—or did not work—in the world outside White House claims and exhortations, Thurber gives a poignant account of Humphrey's efforts to prod officials and businessmen into providing jobs for black teenagers during the volatile summers of the late 1960s. Ironically supported by southern white segregationists, who now saw him as a lesser threat than Robert



Kennedy or Eugene McCarthy, Humphrey won the 1968 presidential nomination but lost to Richard Nixon, partly because of the white backlash against integration, black nationalism, and urban violence. Ironically, too, Humphrey ended his career as he began it—as a party outsider. While Democrats in the late 1970s grew increasingly skeptical of the welfare state, Humphrey, who returned to the Senate in 1971, insisted that a country with a \$100 billion military budget could “give every American a good job” (p. 237). The Humphrey-Hawkins bill, which would have established mechanisms for providing full employment, was watered down into a symbolic admonition when it passed in October 1978, nine months after Humphrey’s death.

This book’s flaws appear when Thurber strays from the thick record he has accumulated and indulges in ideological or methodological asides. For instance, he thinks Humphrey asked too little effort from the poor, supposes that the political power wielded by conservatives went unnoticed by historians until roughly five years ago, and cannot resist swipes at identity politics as the bane of contemporary liberalism. Indeed, his animus to identity politics leads him to exaggerate the differences between the “old” liberalism and the “new.” Liberals did not write affirmative action into law before the 1960s, but if Democratic presidents, mayors, and ward leaders had not informally hired men and women on the basis of religion and ethnicity, there would have been no New Deal coalition. These shortcomings are minor compared to Thurber’s fresh insights and reminders of the insights historians have misplaced. During the 1950s, for example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower received more than one third of the African-American vote, many Republicans supported civil rights legislation, and Humphrey, among others, feared that the Democrats would lose out politically if they lagged behind on the issue. Although the Cold War probably impeded the civil rights movement overall by giving segregationists the added weapon of red baiting, this is a close judgment call, because the anomaly of Americans preaching freedom abroad while denying it to blacks at home provided a powerful argument for supporters of racial equality. As Humphrey’s volatile exchanges with Fannie Lou Hamer at the 1964 Democratic convention show, there was no golden age of blissful relations between black and white advocates of civil rights. Thurber also shows that the private massaging of congressional egos, especially the ego of Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen, played a role almost as important as public demonstrations in passing a civil rights bill in 1964; he highlights the significance of religious groups in lobbying for this measure. In the end, although studies of the Vietnam War and the Cold War red scare would show less admirable sides of Humphrey himself, he emerges here as an unusually decent, ambitious, mainstream politician.

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WILLIAM HENRY KELLAR. *Make Haste Slowly: Moderates, Conservatives, and School Desegregation in Houston*. (The Centennial Series of the Association of Former Students, Texas A&M University, number 80.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1999. Pp. xv, 226. \$38.95.

In recent years, historians have published a significant number of books examining the process of school desegregation in local communities. Texas cities, however, have received less attention than have cities in many other southern states. William Henry Kellar’s book helps to fill this gap by providing us with our best understanding to date of school desegregation in Houston, home to the country’s largest de jure segregated school system in the 1950s.

Texans reacted to the Supreme Court’s desegregation mandate in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) with less defiance than did much of the South, indicative of Texas’s border-state status. In the aftermath of Supreme Court’s May 1955 implementation decision in the *Brown* case, school officials in a number of Texas cities, such as San Antonio, Corpus Christi, Galveston, Waco, and Austin, announced plans to desegregate their schools. Although a few of these districts backed off early decisions to end school segregation, several Texas school districts, particularly in the state’s mostly white western counties, desegregated their schools in the fall of 1955, becoming some of the first southern school districts to do so. Several months later, only five of Texas’s twenty-two members of the House of Representatives signed the Southern Manifesto denouncing the *Brown* ruling. Although Governor Alan Shivers did exploit the desegregation issue for his own political advantage, his resistance efforts were less successful than those of many other southern governors.

In Houston, many residents strongly opposed racial mixing, but the city was less united in its opposition to school desegregation than many other southern cities. In 1957, a mere two weeks after federal district court judge Ben Connally ruled that the Houston schools were unconstitutionally segregated, Houston voters elected the more racially liberal of two mayoral candidates with over sixty-three percent of the vote. One year later, at the height of the city’s struggle with the school desegregation issue, Houston voters elected their first African-American school board member, Hattie Mae White, a forceful proponent of school desegregation, and re-elected the racially liberal Walter Kemmerer, former president of the University of Houston, even though African Americans comprised less than twenty-five percent of the city’s population.

When Houston began its decidedly token school integration in the fall of 1960, there was virtually no violence, in sharp contrast to the simultaneous and far more tumultuous desegregation of the New Orleans schools. As Kellar notes, “Houston’s business and political leaders acquiesced in limited school desegregation, because the alternative—a city disrupted by

racial violence—seemed more distasteful. Houstonians had learned the lessons of Little Rock and desegregated the country's largest segregated school peacefully" (p. 138). Kellar suggests that the experience of Little Rock influenced Judge Connally in his handling of the Houston desegregation litigation. Although Connally found the city's schools unconstitutionally segregated in 1957, shortly after the onset of the Little Rock crisis, he waited three years, until 1960, before ordering the school board to implement a very modest, one-grade-per-year desegregation plan.

Kellar focuses his attention on the 1954–1960 time period. Although Kellar does consider the post-1960 era in an epilogue, this time period, in many ways the most interesting phase of the city's desegregation history, invites further exploration. In the fall of 1970, the Houston schools opened under a much more extensive court-ordered desegregation plan. This desegregation plan triggered extensive white flight from the city school district, as well as protests from black and Hispanic parents who argued that the burden of desegregation plan fell primarily on their children. At the same time, residents of Houston's largely Anglo westside neighborhoods initiated efforts to secede from the Houston school district. One leader of this separatist effort, former school board president Robert Eckels, announced that he would "go to jail before seeing white children bused to predominantly black schools" (p. 159). This secession movement was ultimately thwarted by the courts, but white flight from the Houston school district proved dramatic. Whereas non-Hispanic whites comprised fifty percent of the school district population in 1970, by 1980 that figure was twenty-five percent, and by 1995, twelve percent. Like so many large urban school districts, white flight in Houston led to an overwhelmingly non-white school district. Closer scholarly examination of this aspect of urban school desegregation across the nation will be welcomed.

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ERIC C. SCHNEIDER. *Vampires, Dragons, and Egyptian Kings: Youth Gangs in Postwar New York*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999. Pp. xx, 334. \$29.95.

Urban gangs come to public attention periodically as the result of a gruesome killing or a serious rumble or sometimes as the subject of a lengthy report or government hearing. Although this has been less the case during the 1990s, gangs seized a good deal of attention during the 1940s through the 1970s—a period that, incidentally, also saw the rapid decline and transformation of America's older cities. If any city was the focus of this national concern over juvenile delinquency and gang behavior, it was New York, and Eric C. Schneider makes New York the site for his narrative. The result is a very fine analysis that mixes history, sociology, cultural studies, and ethnology with per-

sonal observations and a talent for sensible conclusions.

In fact, this book recounts several parallel and intersecting stories, each of which is crucial to the whole. These include the economic and demographic history of the city over the postwar decades, the changing residential and job structures, the shifts in attitudes of private and public agencies toward various child and adolescent-saving programs, changing governmental strategies, and the larger political climate. Other stories have to do with shifting gender relations and the growth of the drug culture. All of these strands weave a context for the central chapters, which explore questions of masculinity, culture, and adulthood as they defined the gang.

Schneider's sources range from his close reading of the voluminous juvenile delinquency literature about New York, the sociology and ethnology of gangs and immigrant communities, documents relating to community agency and government interventions, newspapers, and interviews with former gang members. The interviews form an important part of the evidence used in the central chapters to explore the culture and motivations of gangs.

The author concludes that gangs had multiple and changing functions. During and after World War II, and in the decades of rapid demographic changes in the city, they defended ethnic and racial turf. They tended to be Italian, Irish, Puerto Rican, and African Americans fighting over access to public facilities like swimming pools or preventing changes in neighborhoods. But gangs also had another function, which Schneider speculates was responsive to the thwarted needs of adolescents to express their masculinity. Raised in dysfunctional families, schooled in inept and failing institutions, and facing dead-end work, young men found in the culture of the gang an outlet for their aggressiveness, independence, and competitiveness. Within such groups, they could find ways to dominate others and express their frustration with the outside world. In addition, female auxiliaries provided a sexual outlet. Although this may have been a temporary solution to a problem that ultimately only maturity could resolve, the gang provided a temporary refuge where alienated individuals could band together. This is not to say, however, that the author romanticizes gangs; he does not, and he is well aware of the toll that this sort of behavior exacted from the individual gang member and from the community. But his point is to demonstrate the power of their attraction and the force that maintained their social, cultural, and psychological cohesion.

Schneider attributes this version of masculinity to (if anything) working-class, immigrant culture. I have no doubt that this is true. At the same time, I wish he had inquired further to explain why this particular construction of masculinity developed at the time it did in American culture. Was it universal? Did it pertain primarily to working-class men? Was it regional? Did

it stem from the culture of particular immigrant groups?

Although the bulk of this book focuses on the 1940s through the 1960s, Schneider updates his story to the present. In so doing, he skillfully demonstrates the links between gang behavior and the shifting economic and political climate. Of particular interest to him are the shifting employment structure of New York City and the decline of industrial jobs. And, although he reviews the counterproductive and always inadequate projects of reformers, he wisely proposes no solutions nor advocates any causes of his own. The result is a hard-hitting, important, and very readable study.

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FRITZ FISCHER. *Making Them Like Us: Peace Corps Volunteers in the 1960s*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution. 1998. Pp. viii, 237. \$27.95.

President John F. Kennedy established the Peace Corps agency in 1961 to assist the development of Third World nations. During the 1960s, volunteers who went overseas served in the areas of teaching and community development. At the time of the creation of the agency, Washington's liberal elites held a distinct opinion of the Third World and its people. The people of the Third World were backward, primitive, and in the very early stages of development. Those proscriptions dominated the thinking of officials in Washington as they formulated the Peace Corps. Fritz Fischer's book is a well-written and documented account of those ideas and perceptions and their implications for the training and performance of the volunteers in the Third World.

The Third World, Fischer writes, was comparable to the early American frontier. Indeed, Sargent Shriver, the Peace Corps's first director, believed that the volunteers were heading into "the new frontier of the Third World" (p. 46). Such ideas, Fischer argues, influenced the training of the recruits. Training programs were designed to "mold these young, unsophisticated Americans into a cohesive platoon of pioneers" (p. 46). Some of the trainees were excited with the idea of being the "Malboro man, riding their horse . . . on the plains of Bolivia, Tanzania, or Afghanistan" (p. 46).

Such views of the Third World placed the volunteers and their Washington leaders on a collision course, for the trainees refused to be "molded into new pioneers" (p. 76). A training manual emphasized that the volunteers should "be prepared to live a pioneer life" (p. 48). In training a jack-of-all-trades, the program failed to provide the volunteers with the skills required to solve specific problems in the Third World. Aspects of the training included psycho-testers, and the deselection intensified the friction. Increasingly, Fischer argues, the volunteers questioned the development philosophy of their Washington leaders and worked to develop their own notions of what the Peace Corps

should and should not be. In dealing with women, African-Americans, and Indians, the frontier analogy failed to withstand critical examination. There were built-in contradictions. While professing the frontier image of individuality and risk-taking, the Peace Corps instituted policies regulating the lives of women volunteers. Unlike the early American frontier where people promoted individuality, and owned slaves, African-Americans were struggling to forge a group identity. The Indians were in a similar situation. Fischer's analysis is apt. "The volunteers may not have been able to describe exactly what they were doing, but they did know that they were not toiling like nineteenth-century American pioneers" (p. 134).

A particularly significant portion of the book deals with the transformation that took place among the volunteers as a result of their services in the Third World. The volunteers learned that Africa, Asia, and Latin America were remarkably different from the portrayal in magazines such as *National Geographic*, and other media outlets. The culture of those regions is sophisticated and complex. Unlike official Peace Corps thinking, Third World people were not looking to change their value systems. The Washington leaders, Fischer writes, were naïve to assume that the people of the developing world were rushing to accept American values in their societies. The philosophy behind several community development projects, the author states, was fundamentally flawed, because it was designed to "change the mind-set and cultural values of the local people" (p. 141). It was, therefore, a form of cultural imperialism. As a result of those conflicts and contradictions, the volunteers "developed a philosophy based on their individual relationship with peoples of the Third World rather than any preconceived ideas about their linear, straightforward national development" (p. 160). Living in the Third world forced the volunteers to reevaluate their convictions about politics, race, and the overall American culture. Volunteers returned to the U.S. determined to think "out of the box" and were more ready to take up the monumental task of reeducating their fellow Americans about the non-Western parts of the world. The volunteers of the 1960s, Fischer concludes, "rejected long-held views of other cultures and began an important reshaping of American cultural understanding of the rest of the world" (p. 200).

This book is an important addition to Peace Corps historiography. It adds to the understanding of the role the volunteers played in changing American cultural perceptions of people in the developing world and also shows how this has influenced the formation of the foreign policy toward those regions. Returned volunteers must continue to engage in such significant functions. Perhaps, and just perhaps, Washington policy makers may finally get it right when it comes to instituting policies for the Third World.

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GREGORY L. SCHNEIDER. *Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of the Contemporary Right*. New York: New York University Press. 1999. Pp. xi, 263. \$40.00.

Gregory L. Schneider's book chronicles the history of the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), an organization of young right-wing activists that existed from the early 1960s through the 1980s. Part of the same conservative resurgence that pushed Barry Goldwater to run for president in 1960, YAF members worked hard for their cause both within the Republican Party and throughout the nation. Following their successful involvement in the 1964 Draft Goldwater movement, these young conservatives eagerly turned their energies to other projects. They mounted an often isolated battle on campuses imbued with countercultural liberalism and vigorously supported American anticommunist efforts, particularly those in Vietnam. Ironically, even as the larger conservative movement began to gain prominence and power during the 1970s and 1980s, YAF started to lose its focus, and members indulged in increasingly self-destructive internal battles. Although the organization continues to exist in abbreviated form on some campuses, it is but a shadow of the group that spawned the careers of men such as Richard A. Viguerie, David Keene, Tom Charles Huston, and Richard Allen.

Based on extensive archival work and numerous oral interviews, Schneider's book joins the growing number of scholarly monographs seriously examining the conservative movement of the late twentieth century and helping to provide a more fully rounded view of American politics. The author's diligent efforts to unearth the details of the inner workings of the group create a clearer picture of both the organization and its relationship to the larger conservative movement. Although the book suffers from the normal problems of a dissertation-turned-monograph (sometimes dull writing style, frequent plodding listing of examples), it is still a valuable addition to the historiography.

In particular, Schneider manages to accomplish two important goals in this work. The first is to show the other side of 1960s activism. Tracing the history of YAF from its origins in the 1950s, the author shows how young people both on campuses across the country and through a national organization worked for their causes and against leftist student organizations. Schneider details the specific activities of these young right-wing activists from boycotts against corporations doing business with communist countries to take-overs of leftist student offices. Although their numbers could not compare with those of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) or antiwar demonstrators, these "conservative cadres" offered an alternative form of activism on college campuses. Particularly interesting, though not as well developed as it might have been, is Schneider's discussion of the attempts by conservatives to join forces with moderate students who did not necessarily disagree with the leftist demonstrators but

wanted to be able to continue going to class. This phenomenon is a circumstance that deserves its own study.

Schneider's second goal was to place YAF within the developing conservative movement. He also accomplishes this well. From the chapter detailing YAF's efforts for Goldwater in 1964 (perhaps his strongest chapter) through his conclusion listing the careers of former YAF members, Schneider shows the close ties the organization maintained with prominent national conservative leaders and the role it played, or at least tried to play, on the national scene. Willing to do the drudge work of campaigning, these young people provided essential services to national candidates and in turn gained valuable experience for their own careers.

Schneider's study is strongest when he is discussing YAF's early years and its members' efforts in the 1960s. When he moves into its twilight years, the narrative, like the organization itself, becomes bogged down in personalities and endless disputes. Although certainly recounting the various internecine battles is important in explaining the decline of the group, the step-by-step chronology becomes mind-numbing. It is not clear exactly why the reader should care any more about an organization caught up in such a petty disputes and continual financial crises. Schneider almost undercuts his own argument in this section. His conclusion, however, draws the reader back to the significance of the work.

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DAVID BURNER. *Making Peace with the 60s*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. 295. \$29.95.

David Burner's book argues that the decade of the 1960s promised more than it delivered, and that its major problems stemmed from the inability of liberalism to assert its civilizing virtues against the nihilistic excesses of the radical left. Although critical of the liberalism practiced in the 1960s, Burner's book seeks to recuperate liberalism's ideals, which hold "that the good must be constructed and continually reconstructed" (p. 12). This liberalism "reject[s] the conservative faith in the driftings of the market" and "scorn[s] the Marxist faith in dialectical inevitabilities" (p. 12); it emphasizes participatory democracy, a self-critical and academic intellectualism, a faith in government's role to help its people, and a respect for civilization. Liberal politicians' failures to live up to these ideals in part made it possible for "slovenly communes and drug-taking, antiwar actions marked by flag-burnings, sullen student militants, children of the favored classes turning political tantrums into amateur terrorism" to dominate the headlines and public memory of the 1960s, opening the way for a conservative renaissance. Chapters on civil rights, the Vietnam War, the counterculture, student movements, and Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society focus on how liberals



let the radical left dominate 1960s politics to disastrous effect.

Burner's argument too often depends on reiterating unexamined stereotypes instead of historical analysis. The book presents a predictable cast of heroes and villains: the saintly, church-oriented civil rights activists vs. the nihilistic, street-wise Black Power "hustlers"; the macho individualism of the Beats vs. the drug-addled carnality of the Hippies; the mannerly students of the Free Speech movement's first days vs. the uncouth dupes and spoiled brats of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). And like many 1960s books, Burner's narrative often devolves into lists of "outrageous" acts, proffered as self-evident examples of the failures of the left and the counterculture.

Burner's account of Black Power is perhaps the most egregious. In a chapter sensationally titled "Killers of the Dream," Burner casts Black Power as the murderer of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s dream of an integrated society. In contrast to civil rights, Black Power is portrayed as narcissistic, nihilistic, anti-intellectual, and exploitative. Its heroes—Malcolm X, Huey Newton, and Eldridge Cleaver—are represented as self-aggrandizing thieves, rapists, and drug pushers. The current social problems among African Americans—the record number of black men in prison, the low number of college graduates, the prevalence of drugs and gangs, and the persistence of black-on-black violence—are all legacies of Black Power, according to Burner. The only positive trends in post-1960s African-American society stem from liberalism and the civil rights movement. In fact, Burner claims that integration and civil rights legislation have made racism essentially obsolete, and continued emphasis on racism as the key problem in black experience is only due to the persistence of Black Power's irrational ideology. Conservative social politics reacts to the violence and immorality among blacks, not to race, he claims. Burner also suggests that Black Power's Afrocentric cultural politics rests on ahistorical myths, because "instead of bringing over with them a culture like the white ethnic groups, blacks shaped out of resistance to slavery and white supremacy a powerful new culture" (p. 52). Whether any historical basis for recuperating pre-diasporic cultural traditions exists seems purely academic—it would be more fruitful to consider how Black Power's nationalist politics and cultural forms responded to and shaped interests and needs in the period. Burner never considers how Black Power might have helped African Americans find positive and powerful new roles for themselves in American culture.

Burner is similarly dismissive of white student rebellions. He gives scant attention to racial, social, and regional differences among 1960s college students; they are always implicitly white, privileged students of top research universities. He overlooks the facts that relatively few students engaged in the radical activism typical of 1960s iconography, and that a substantial percentage of students attended small, regional insti-

tutions. Instead of trying to understand student activism in its proper contexts, Burner simply patronizes it. He downplays the severity of police brutality against student uprisings by claiming that it was "not comparable to the clashes between Appalachian coal miners and guardsmen during the bitter days of labor war" (p. 150). Such a false analogy trivializes student rebellions against the "more authentic" struggles of the pre-1960s working class. Later he speculates that perhaps one "advantage to rebelling against university authority was that it was the only authority in the land that students could effectively rebel against, certainly the only institution that might up to a point tolerate rebellion" (p. 158)—up to the point when, perhaps, the National Guard is called out to fire on students at will. Significantly, although Burner dismisses students as self-indulgent, he indulges politicians and administrators (the adults), providing elaborate contextual analysis to justify John F. Kennedy's behavior in office and excusing college administrators' ham-fisted responses to student rebellions as well-meaning but ineffective liberalism.

Burner trots out the tired cliché that a neo-Stalinist political correctness holds sway on campuses because the 1960s radicals have now become college faculty. He defines "PC" as "the political equivalent of . . . philistinism" that fails to present "any genuine critical evaluation of the object in question for its excellence or its flaws on its own terms. The philistine chooses instead to adopt the appropriate fixed or prefabricated posture" (p. 165). This is precisely the problem with Burner's book: its lack of any genuine critical evaluation of the 1960s on its own terms and, instead, the adoption of prefabricated postures.

MICHAEL BIBBY

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JOHN G. CROWLEY. *Primitive Baptists of the Wiregrass South: 1815 to the Present*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 1998. Pp. xiii, 244. \$49.95.

Primitive Baptists are enjoying a revival—of sorts. Scholarly interest in this group, sometimes known as "Hardshells," has increased over the past decade, and John G. Crowley's book is the latest addition to a growing, increasingly sophisticated body of literature dedicated to this segment of Baptist life.

Crowley maintains that Primitive Baptists—usually dismissed either as ignorant backwoods types or hyper-Calvinists out of step with the Christian mainstream—are neither. His study focuses on one group of Primitives, the Ochlocknee Association in southern Georgia and Florida. He argues that Primitives are generally well-informed folk who have traditionally cast social, cultural, and political conflicts in ecclesiological terms. This tendency to fuse spiritual and non-spiritual issues has resulted in widespread misunderstanding and misrepresentation. It is an intriguing argument that Crowley develops well.

Most Primitive Baptists claim to practice a pure,

apostolic form of Christianity. Crowley, however, sees them as a synthesis of several elements. They inherited their staunch Calvinism from the British Particular Baptists by way of the Philadelphia Association, whose 1742 confession of faith mirrored the Particular Baptists' Second London Confession of 1689. Their church polity is a different matter. Crowley notes that Primitive Baptists are associational. That is, each congregation is independent, but churches are free to work and worship in association with one another. They also shun "professional ministers," and they keep a close eye on one another. Records indicate that Primitives have been known to exclude church members for offenses ranging from adultery to nonattendance. Crowley sees associationalism and church discipline stemming from two different influences, namely Separate and Regular Baptists.

Of course, Primitive Baptists are no strangers to controversy, and they are perhaps best known for their role in the "Anti-mission Controversy." Many American Baptists began organizing their missionary efforts in the early nineteenth century, but Primitive Baptists were wary of modern missions. Critics claimed that their Calvinism led Primitives to dismiss missionary efforts as unnecessary. Crowley argues that Primitive Baptists saw more than theological presuppositions looming on the horizon. Organized missions meant bureaucracy, which, they believed, violated proper church order. They ultimately opposed seminaries and Bible societies on similar grounds. Politically, the Primitives feared the power that an expanding government would exercise over individuals, especially when political sentiments affected one's spiritual judgement. It is a fascinating argument, and chapter four, "'Always Primitive': The Missionary Controversy," along with chapter seven, "'Contentions Among You': The Crawfordites, Jackites, Battleites, and Coonites," merit especially close attention.

Unfortunately, the anti-mission controversy was not the only time that Primitive Baptists faced schism. Yet their internal controversies help demonstrate their diversity. Howard Dorgan's *In the Hands of A Happy God: The "No Hellers" of Central Appalachia* (1997) even chronicles one group of Primitives with Universalist tendencies. On the other end of the spectrum, Crowley notes that Primitive Baptist history is punctuated by long periods of peace. Beverly Bush Patterson's *The Sound of the Dove: Singing in Appalachian Primitive Baptist Churches* and Joyce H. Cauthen's *Benjamin Lloyd's Hymnbook: A Primitive Baptist Song Tradition* help explain one thing that helps unite Primitives across time and space: namely, their unique worship through song—without instruments, of course.

Maintaining the "old paths" has taken its toll on Primitives, and Crowley tells their story with an even-handed empathy. He advances an argument that is both clear and convincing. This work has a good bibliography for further study as well as several photographs that enhance the text. Even more impressive,

Crowley's inquiry into Primitive Baptist life blends religious and social history to tell a story that has been neglected far too long.

Like many other religious groups, today's Primitive Baptists struggle with issues such as urbanization, divorce, declining numbers, and "worldliness." This lure of a modern, unconverted world is an especially troublesome issue for a group Crowley describes as not wishing "to change the world but escape from it" (p. 189). Still, an epitaph for Primitive Baptists would be premature. Others have predicted their demise, but Primitive Baptists have always managed to survive. Crowley believes that a renewed interest in Calvinism may trigger a renewal among Primitive Baptists. He is probably right.

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MARK S. MASSA. *Catholics and American Culture: Fulton Sheen, Dorothy Day, and the Notre Dame Football Team*. (A Crossroad Book.) Crossroad: New York. 1999. Pp. x, 278. \$24.95.

In the past half century, American Catholicism has undergone a major transformation. The most significant aspect of this has been its progression from the Catholic ghetto to the mainstream of American society. Mark S. Massa marks this transition between the years 1945 and 1970. He opens his book with the publication of Paul Blanshard's *American Freedom and Catholic Power* (1949), the classic statement of liberal fears of Roman Catholic authoritarianism and hegemonic designs on Protestant America. Massa then presents nine events that "ironically" contributed to dispelling these fears and integrated American Catholics so thoroughly into the mainstream of American culture that it created "a traumatic identity crisis" for American Catholics. By the end of the twentieth century, American Catholics were asking what it meant to be a Catholic in America.

Beside Fulton Sheen, the successful TV evangelist for Catholicism, Dorothy Day, mother of the radical Catholic social gospel message, and the Notre Dame football team named in the subtitle of the book, Massa has added six additional aspects of American Catholicism that serve as "windows" to illustrate the transition of American Catholics into affluence and acceptance: Leonard Feeney and the Boston heresy case; the spiritual writings of Thomas Merton; McCarthyism; the Kennedy presidency; a post-Vatican II conflict between the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in Los Angeles and their local bishop; and the furor surrounding the implementation of liturgical reforms on the first Sunday of Advent, 1964. Although these "windows" do not present a cohesive narrative, Massa uses each to point out the ironic twists of history and to promote an awareness that "manyess" is at least as important as "oneness" in considering the American Catholic story.

As the reader goes from window to window, there is

no doubt that Massa tells a good story. He is most adept at historical narrative. When he overlays each episode with sociological theory, it seems that Massa is more interested in the scholarly value of providing a new interdisciplinary methodology. His attempt to integrate social science theory with his historical narrative does not add much insight to his analysis of each event. At best, Massa's adoption of Reinhold Niebuhr's "theological irony" provides him with a generous and sympathetic reading of this transformative period in the history of American Catholicism.

The limitations of Massa's theoretical framework are most obvious in his account of the conflict in 1967–1968 between the Immaculate Heart of Mary (IHM) nuns in Los Angeles and their local bishop, Cardinal Francis McIntyre. By placing the conflict within Max Weber's observation that the world's great religious traditions operate between two dialectical impulses, charisma and routinization, Massa undercuts the complexity and significance of the event. By confining himself to Weber, Massa never considers the women's movement, nor does he use gender as an analytical tool; thus the story is retold in terms of Blanshard's fear of Catholic authoritarianism. The IHM nuns publicly announced their plans to respond to the reform imperatives established by the Second Vatican Council. Cardinal McIntyre saw their changes as a threat to his parochial school system in Los Angeles and registered his objections to the Sacred Congregation of Religious in Rome. Without hesitation, the Sacred Congregation issued a four-point revision of the original reform imperatives to conform to Cardinal McIntyre's objections. Thus, Roman authorities confirmed the power of the local bishop and dismissed the initiated reforms of the 560 IHM nuns. Many departed their religious community en masse, leaving a remnant of fifty nuns. This conflict was more than an example of what Massa calls "ironic pawns of the same Holy Spirit" (p. 194). The results reflected an unhesitating confirmation that reform imperatives did not change the hierarchical power structure of the Roman Catholic Church. They also illustrated the church's unwillingness to protect and support women, even those women who had given their lives and labor to staff the church's institutions. Massa ends this chapter with no mention of the impact of this event on American Catholic women; rather he speaks of the hope of institutional renewal and leaves it up to the Holy Spirit. As he put it, "the Spirit listeth where it will, and no one knoweth from whence it came, and to whence it shall go." Massa's use of social science theory and Niebuhrian religious irony does not deepen our understanding of what historians already know about the past fifty years.

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ALBERT ISAAC SLOMOVITZ. *The Fighting Rabbis: Jewish Military Chaplains and American History*. New York: New York University Press. 1999. Pp. xiii, 171. \$35.00.

Before Israel's military feats startled the world, Jews were generally thought of as a non-martial people or, worse, as draft dodgers, malingerers, and war profiteers. When "heroes" were meted out, American Jews got a money lender, Haim Salomon, while military men like Tadeuz Kosciuszko and Frederick Von Steuben were reserved for other ethnic groups. The anti-Semitic imagination has been particularly active in misrepresenting the relationship of Jews to the military, and a study of the Jewish chaplaincy is compelled to deal with that reality. Albert Isaac Slomovitz's book is on one level a straightforward account of the role of the Jewish chaplaincy in the American military. But it also needs to tell the story of how in the free air of America the negative image of Jews and the military was gradually overcome. In some measure this study does that, but it could have gone further. What we learn is that the acceptance of the Jewish chaplaincy really parallels the unprecedented acceptance of Jews in all roles of American life, even those traditionally antipathetic to them. It is the military dimension to the Herbergian principle that saw Judaism as one of the three major Abrahamic religions in America.

The history of American Jewry's encumbered relation with the military begins almost in the year they landed in America in 1654, when Asher Levy rejected the notion that Jew's should pay a special tax in lieu of standing the "watch and ward" guard duty. He won his case, and Jews became part of the volunteer militia that safeguarded New Amsterdam. Slomovitz begins with the renowned Fischel case during the Civil War. He then takes us to the Spanish-American War and unto World War I. It was in the latter that eastern Jewish immigrants furnished a disproportionate number of recruits and casualties even while having to bear the traditional taunts of draft dodging and malingering. The high point of the Jewish chaplaincy came during World War II, when the Nazi foe was obsessed with liquidating European Jewry. Jewish bona fides in the chaplaincy were fully established when a troopship, the USS *Dorchester*, was sunk in the North Atlantic. Rabbi Alexander Goode was one of the four chaplains who gave up their lifebelts to save others. The "immortal chaplains" were commemorated in film and U.S. postage stamps and went far to underline the message of tolerance and religious harmony. The Jewish dimension of the chaplaincy role was marked by the nurturing of the survivors.

Yet despite the presence of Jewish chapels at the major military academies, suggesting that the Jewish relationship to the military has normalized, occasionally an incident crops up to indicate otherwise. During the Vietnam War, the role that Jewish young people played in the antiwar movement strained the good relationship between Jews and the military. In 1979, it was two Jewish Harvard Law School students who

challenged the chaplaincy law on the basis that it breached the wall of church-state separation. Paradoxically, it was Rabbi Israel Drazin, a chaplain and colonel in the reserve, who successfully fought the case in court. In March 1986, a Jewish officer, Simcha Goldstein, insisted on wearing the traditional head covering (yarmulke) of religious Jews in contravention of army regulations. He eventually won his case, but many old devils may have been awakened. But the military establishment is itself becoming less hide-bound. A female rabbi was among the first chaplains to select the army for her ministry.

This book is a readable account of the Jewish chaplaincy. But as deep history, it is rather slight and does not always avoid a celebratory tone. There are several key secondary works that are not included in the bibliography. The institutionalization of the Jewish chaplaincy can serve as a prism through which to view the anomalous relationship of Jews to the U.S. military. It surfaces somewhat in this book but requires more attention to bring it above the picture postcard level.

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BONNIE J. MORRIS. *Lubavitcher Women in America: Identity and Activism in the Postwar Era*. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1998. Pp. x, 186.

Bonnie J. Morris's book provides an overview of the ways that women in this ultra Orthodox community, from the 1950s on, actively participated in the negotiation and dissemination of their gender-role ideology. Although the Lubavitcher Hasidim aim to create a community apart from the secularizing influence of modern society, their very focus on *kiruv* (reaching out to assimilated Jews to bring them closer to Orthodoxy) forces them to enter into the secular world and engage with it. Thus the community needs ready responses—rebuffs, really—to those forbidden aspects of secular culture that might in some ways be attractive to its members or newcomers. The liberalization of women's roles in the wider society over the past forty years has been just such a challenge, calling forth renewed Lubavitch commitment to conventional gender constructions. The fascinating and sometimes contradictory ways that Lubavitcher women—who themselves might have felt burdened with many children and no help with housework—nevertheless ridiculed the feminist alternative and supported the community and its rabbis' outlook, are the primary focus of this book.

Morris argues against a possible feminist reading of these women as "falsely conscious" victims of the male rabbis, whose possession of greater textual knowledge is the basis for their community authority. Instead, she maintains that Hasidic women are agents who, within the parameters set by the religious authorities, seize opportunities actively to participate in the creation of their social worlds. Although they are antifeminist, the

Lubavitcher women have developed high levels of organizational and communication skills that allow them to engage in campaigns of outreach, both within and outside of the community. By planning and running women's conferences and journals, they have consciously created outlets in which women are empowered to work together to create and disseminate their interpretations of the rebbe's ideology.

The book highlights the development of the women's journal, *De Yiddishe Heim* (the Jewish home) as the chief organ through which Lubavitcher women (and often a variety of male rabbis) articulated their responses to contemporary American ideologies and issues and, in particular, to feminism. The articles extolled the virtues of women's dedication to serving others and derided the contemporary feminist emphasis on women's need for self-fulfillment. They decried the ready availability of divorce, birth control, abortion, and sexual freedom, seeing in them the breakdown of traditional family structures and ultimately, of society itself. The inclusion in the journal of articles by *ba'alot teshuvah* (newly Orthodox women) reinforced the community's proselytizing goals; the newcomers compared the beauty of their new familial roles in the community to the confusion and angst of their previous lives. Although the Hasidim could not, as outreach workers, ignore the surrounding culture, they did their best to enforce resistance to it by showing the superiority of the Hasidic way of life.

Morris's emphasis on the appeal of traditional family values in maintaining the Hasidic community and in building its attractiveness to newcomers is consistent with the findings of previous sociological studies of Jewish "returnees" to Orthodoxy, Lubavitch and otherwise. Although these earlier studies (see Janet Aviad, *Return to Judaism: Religious Renewal in Israel* [1983]; Herbert M. Danzger, *Returning to Tradition: The Contemporary Revival of Orthodox Judaism* [1989]; Lynn Davidman, *Tradition in a Rootless World: Women Turn to Orthodox Judaism* [1991]; and Debra Renee Kaufman, *Rachel's Daughters* [1991]) relied primarily on ethnographic data for their analyses, whereas Morris's approach is historical and based on a close analysis of Hasidic women's publications, all conclude that Orthodoxy attracts newcomers, especially women, through its vaunting of the nuclear family and women's "separate but equal" roles within it.

This confirmation of earlier findings is a strength of the present work; it is also, however, its weakness. The earlier studies on newcomers to Orthodoxy were all available by 1991. Given that Morris's work was published in 1998, I was hoping that the author would offer some new insights or perspectives that would go beyond those already available. Her argument that even antifeminist women need to be seen as agents who participate in the creation of their own social worlds was articulated in Kaufman's book and in mine as well. Furthermore, the book remains largely on the descriptive level and lacks a larger analytic framework and conclusion. Instead of simply describing events in



a Jewish community in the context of that community, a richer analysis could be developed by, for example, situating this project as a case study of the emerging trends in contemporary religion, such as the growth of conservative religious movements. By setting Jewish events in larger historical and analytic frameworks, studies of Jews can tell larger and more subtly nuanced stories. Such an approach might have increased the appeal of this work beyond readers interested primarily in Jews to a broader audience of students of history, sociology, and religious studies.

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RICKIE SOLINGER, editor. *Abortion Wars: A Half Century of Struggle, 1950–2000*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. Pp. xvi, 413. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$16.95.

At the dawn of a new century, abortion remains a divisive and incendiary political issue in the United States. The Supreme Court's landmark 1973 decisions, *Roe v. Wade* and the often-overlooked but equally important companion case, *Doe v. Bolton*, overturned more than a century of abortion restrictions and made a woman's "right to choose" the law of the land. Sort of. Since 1973, a newly energized pro-life movement has restricted the freedom women have to exercise abortion rights unfettered by bureaucratic red tape, harassment, and financial and physical obstacles to abortion services. Laws requiring parental consent and mandatory waiting periods, the intimidation and murder of abortion providers, federal restrictions on abortion funding: these are some of the "victories" for which disparate pro-life proponents claim credit. Clearly, this is not some lofty intellectual disagreement. This is war.

This collection of essays examines the pro-choice side of this struggle. Edited by historian Rickie Solinger, it combines the recollections and policy recommendations of eighteen women and men—from physicians to educators to advocates—who have devoted much of their lives fighting for safe, legal, and affordable abortion. The volume is often more autobiographical than analytical and somewhat lopsided in its refusal to contend seriously with (and hence to explain) the appeal and success of pro-life politics. Many readers will yearn for a more inclusive account that offers greater chronological breadth. Still, Solinger has assembled an impressively interdisciplinary volume that adds something new to an already hefty body of abortion literature: a history of activism written by activists themselves.

The first of the book's five thematic sections tackles the history of abortion politics in the pre-1973 era. Solinger's article on pregnancy and power discusses the culture and practice of criminal abortion in the decades before *Roe*. Not only did millions of women obtain illegal abortions between 1950 and 1970, but they overcame significant obstacles to do so, including

the Cold War demonization of abortion practitioners, the reification of the white nuclear family, and the humiliation of having to share one's sexual past with hospital therapeutic committees who judged the worthiness of each applicant's "case." Laura Kaplan's essay discusses the history of Jane, an underground feminist network that performed over 11,000 nonmedical abortions by the spring of 1973. Kaplan calls for the return of a like-minded "woman-centered" health system where abortion is viewed as an opportunity, a "potential catalyst for personal growth" (p. 33). Kaplan romanticizes nonmedical abortions—"The pain women felt . . . was managed through personal attention" (p. 37)—but raises an important question: what are the requisite features of feminist health care? Amy Kesselman's article shifts the focus from abortion as a procedure to a right. Detailing the history of Women Versus Connecticut, a women's work group, she shows how liberation activists wrested control over abortion reform from physicians and population controllers by linking abortion to the larger politics of women's oppression.

Part two of the book analyzes post-1973 strategies. Marcy Wilder's thoughtful essay illuminates the need for a broader abortion agenda that goes beyond talk of "rights" and "violence" to support a range of services essential to women's full reproductive health, including prenatal care, contraceptives, and pediatric medicine. Kathryn Kolbert and Andrea Miller take stock of the many legislative, judicial, and medical setbacks since *Roe* and suggest new litigation strategies—such as an appeal to the government's responsibility to protect the rights and choices of women as medical consumers—to challenge restrictive laws and practices. William Saletan's excellent contribution examines the price of single-issue abortion politics for the movement's ideological consistency and integrity. As abortion rights advocates narrowed their program to reach a larger audience, they traded the feminist egalitarianism of earlier years for a more popular but significantly less radical message. Dorothy Roberts analyzes the prosecution in the 1980s and 1990s of drug-dependent mothers, a disproportionate number of whom were poor women of color. Illuminating the classism and racism undergirding government efforts to control female procreation, she shows how eugenicist beliefs continue to shape reproductive policies.

Part three highlights activism. Loretta Ross documents the history of fertility control among African-American women from slavery to the present, underscoring the resistance of black women to racist attempts to control their fertility. Marlene Fried reveals how class biases in the predominantly white and middle-class pro-choice movement and current restrictions on abortion services hurt low-income women, who in growing numbers are resorting to illegal abortions to realize procreative self-determination. Faye Ginsburg traces the rise of Operation Rescue and anti-abortion militance, locating both within a larger history of social movements and violent grassroots

action. In a fascinating discussion of efforts to develop RU486 for the American market, Marie Bass shares her experiences in the Reproductive Health Technologies Project and shows how the project bridged significant ideological differences among activists to create a diverse but united coalition.

Part four, "Physicians and the Politics of Provisions," focuses on the experiences of abortion providers. Three of the four essays are written by physicians who explain why, how, and the chilling circumstances under which they perform abortions. Each of the three doctors reflects on what compelled them to commit to this line of work and to persevere against overwhelming obstacles and at great personal cost. The final essay examines the impact that these costs—from death threats to broken windows to professional ostracism—have had on the medical profession as a whole. The dilemma of modern medical abortion remains one of limited provision. While a majority of physicians support abortion rights, few are willing (or able) to assume the risks needed to make abortion an accessible medical practice.

The final section of the book offers readers a theoretical assessment of abortion as practice and principle. Evaluating an article she wrote twenty years ago advocating legal abortion, philosopher Alison Jaggar urges pro-choice activists today to reframe the abortion debate to "make the gender dimensions of the issue more explicit" (p. 348). Sharon Gold-Steinberg and Abigail Stewart look at the psychological experiences of women who had abortions between 1962 and 1978 and note striking continuities against a backdrop of change: in a post-Roe world, women continue to struggle with the anxiety and powerlessness that come from having to locate a qualified practitioner, conceal the procedure, and answer to charges that—legal or not—abortion is wrong. In the volume's concluding and perhaps most intriguing article, Marsha Saxton pits abortion rights against disability rights. In a multicultural world that purportedly respects difference, what message do we send to disabled people when we endorse selective abortion on the basis of prenatal diagnoses of potential disabilities?

Saxton's critique of what she calls eugenic abortion stands out in an anthology that otherwise celebrates pro-choice views. This would be less of a problem were it not for the fact that contributors often caricature anti-choice activists as violent simpletons or women haters. Such tendentiousness trivializes a more complicated political reality (a majority of pro-lifers oppose violence and many are women) and denies the "opposition" the same intellectual courtesy—namely, the right to hold complex and variegated beliefs—that authors wish to claim for their cause. If those of us in the pro-choice movement are to be successful, we must engage in a dialogue with those whose politics we hope to change.

Still, Solinger is to be credited with putting together a highly readable collection that sheds new light on an

issue that, after more than a half century of struggle, remains at the center of the nation's political consciousness.

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SUSAN M. HARTMANN. *The Other Feminists: Activists in the Liberal Establishment*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. ix, 292. \$30.00.

The history of late twentieth-century feminism is gradually being pieced together as an array of new studies, both local and national, begin to reach publication. Susan M. Hartmann's contribution to this work is of central importance precisely because she shifts the focus away from specifically feminist social movement organizations ranging from the liberal National Organization for Women (NOW) to hundreds of radical "women's liberation" groups. In Hartmann's work, we begin to see the powerful importance of feminist activism within mainstream, liberal organizations. Some of this preceded and prepared the way for the eruption of the feminist "Second Wave." Much of it was inspired and spurred on by the rebirth of feminism, and it contributed to many of the women's movement's most important achievements.

In separate chapters, Hartmann offers case studies of feminist activism in several specific organizations. The International Union of Electrical Workers played a pioneering role on issues of pregnancy rights and comparable worth, with exceptional leadership from its legal office and lawyer Winn Newman. Women in the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), led by Pauli Murray, seized the opportunity to press for greater leadership opportunities. Their Women's Rights Project was a key source of litigation in the 1970s. Women in the National Council of Churches provided critical leadership in bringing feminist concerns to the center of theological debate and at the same time a moral focus on poverty, minority, and international concerns into actions on women's rights. The Ford Foundation funded feminist scholarship, research centers, *Signs*, and a series of innovative programs addressed to the needs of poor women of color. In some organizations, individual women and men were able to use their structural positions to provide innovative leadership. In others, feminism inspired women on the inside to mobilize for changes first within their organizations, which gave them the clout and the leadership positions with which to advocate for programmatic changes.

Hartmann's book creates a clearer sense of the continuities that marked the Second Wave. For example, Dorothy Kenyon in the ACLU had worked on women's rights since the 1940s and served as a critical mentor to Murray when she joined the Board in 1965. Hartmann's research also confirms the importance of the President's Commission on the Status of Women in the early 1960s as a meeting ground for women from union, religious, and legal backgrounds who were

ready to move. Although she makes it clear that the commission did not raise these issues in a vacuum, the repeated recognition that key women in the liberal organizations she studies served on that commission or on its staff strengthens our understanding of how such service built effective networks, a shared knowledge base, and a strong sense of urgency among key leaders.

In one of her most important contributions, Hartmann gives the lie to the notion that the women's movement was all white. Indeed, the presence and the leadership of women of color in all of the organizations she examines prompted her to write a separate chapter on the topic. These organizations made it possible for African-American women to play key roles in raising women's issues within the context of civil rights. They were freer spaces for them than either the male-dominated civil rights organizations, especially in the "black power" era, or the emerging organizations of the Second Wave.

Hartmann's study illustrates the critical alliances built between "insiders" and "outsiders" in the 1970s—alliances that go far toward explaining the sweeping changes feminists were able to effect in American laws and institutions. Her book is an important contribution to understanding the breadth of the Second Wave as well as its impact.

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#### CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

JEREMY ADELMAN, editor. *Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History*. New York: Routledge, 1999. Pp. xii, 318. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$22.99.

A collection of twelve essays that takes us from colonial Africa to taxicab historians is almost, by definition, eclectic. This collection grew from a conference held at Princeton in 1995 to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the appearance of Stanley and Barbara Stein's *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective* (1970).

That landmark book explored the structures of dependency. All of us who have come out of graduate school since 1970 have read that book, absorbed its persuasive theses, cribbed from it shamelessly, and probably still assign it as signal reading for a new generation of students desiring to learn why Latin America "fell behind" North America in the long process of modernization.

It is inevitable that the scholarly generation following the Steins have forged their own new perspectives. This collection is a wonderful primer for those desiring to get up to speed on what historians have concerned themselves with these past thirty years. Like all collections, it is a mixed bag. Some reading is delightful, some takes real devotion, but, in the main, the essays are the works of master craftsmen in the field. Some

have condensed earlier, longer works; some thoughtfully imposed an order and interpretation over a life's work; some take a semi-whimsical tour of Latin American life and culture, quoting from timeless pieces of literature such as Gabriel García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude* (1982) or borrowing gems from others.

Some I had never seen. Tulio Halperin Donghi on Argentina's perennial dilemma of why those who have so much have fared so badly: "a witty economist . . . classified the countries of the world into four categories: developed countries; underdeveloped countries; Japan, that did everything right; and Argentina, where everything went wrong" (p. 152). Or Steve J. Stern, in an essay on enduring legacies through time: "As José Arcadio Buendía, the patriarch of Macondo, puts it, 'Incredible things are happening in the world . . . [yet] we go on living like donkeys'" (p. 137).

Why? That is basically the question posed by all these social scientists, or as Stuart B. Schwartz phrased it in an essay on Brazil, how to "explain contemporary national conditions by understanding their colonial origins" (p. 175). In fact, Schwartz's essay, "The Colonial Past: Conceptualizing Post-Dependentista Brazil," identifies post-dependency concerns clearly. Schwartz in turn draws from an earlier article by Steve Stern, but this is not the place for discussing historiography.

Post-dependency analysis is principally concerned with—and most of these essays reflect this concern—the internal dimensions of Latin American life that were/are not tied to the European and Atlantic worlds that have so dominated Latin America, a theory persuasively argued by dependency analysts since the middle of last century. Instead of focusing on economic and political structures of dependency, the new studies turned to a myriad of subjects, from gender relations to indigenous societies, from rituals to racial identities, all in one form or another advancing the thesis that Latin America is immensely more complex than the adjunct status appointed to it by dependency analysis.

None of the essays depreciate or disown the sowers of dependency, such as Raúl Prebisch of Argentina or Celso Furtado of Brazil. Although heavily weighted toward economics, dependency is a valuable tool. What this book shows is that post-dependency analysis has deepened our understanding of the powers—social, intellectual, religious, cultural, for example—that determine the essences of Latin America. If anything, the very label "Latin America" becomes less meaningful, other than as a simple geographic tool to identify the region so diverse.

The introductory essay by editor Jeremy Adelman, "The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History," probes the differing views of historians on the dominance of continuity or change in societies. His general thrust, as in most of the essays that follow, is that persistence, or tradition in the argot of a genera-

tion ago, runs through Latin America much more deeply than in the experience of the United States.

Those interested in individual countries will find essays that update them on the literature of post-dependency by Schwartz (Brazil) and Halperin Donghi (Argentina). Some general themes that transcend national boundaries are essays by Stern (colonial continuities), the creation of new societies (Philip D. Curtin), and comparison between Africa and Latin America (Robert L. Tignor). Some essayists find the new approaches a bit stifling and doctrinaire. In "Hegemonies Old and New: The Ibero-Atlantic in the Long Eighteenth Century," Kenneth R. Andrews takes some of the "new cultural history" to task. This approach especially focuses on a concern with the "other" in society.

Andrews, in a review of the major economic and political events and trends in the "long" eighteenth century, makes a case for more traditional histories. "Today," he writes, "we tend to know more about slaves than their masters, more about the forced *Indian labor drafts of the Andes* than the attitudes of Peruvian merchants and bureaucrats in Lima, more about Mexican silver production than the political role of mining entrepreneurs" (p. 70). In doing so, he joins a loud debate in the academy of Latin Americanists over the new cultural history that has produced almost as much fire as light.

The pitfalls of synthesis are evident in essays with such a broad sweep. For example, Stern's characterization of evangelical Protestantism's role in late twentieth-century society misses an important nuance of this sweeping movement. It is not just "new versions of an old story" (p. 146) of church and state in Latin America. Pentecostalism—very distinct within the Christian community from traditional Roman Catholicism—has produced profound changes within families in many parts of Latin America (Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, etc.) that are pushing out into political society. My point is not to pick on Stern but rather to thank him, as I do other contributors in this fine collection, for bringing these trends, issues, analyses, points of view before us whether we agree with them or not.

Having written a textbook recently, I am painfully aware of the difficulty of trying to reconcile the old with the new, to forge a synthesis, to explain so much that is so different in a coherent narrative. I highly recommend this book for all students of the region who wish to inquire into what some of the best minds in our fields are about.

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CARLOS DÁVILA and RORY MILLER, editors. *Business History in Latin America: The Experience of Seven Countries*. Translated by GARRY MILLS and RORY MILLER. (Liverpool Latin American Studies, number 1.) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 241. £11.95.

The subtitle of this anthology should have been the bibliography of seven countries. This is not a survey of business history in Latin America. Instead, the authors each contribute a bibliographic essay on business history in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Several studies focus on the period between 1850 and 1950; others emphasize the twentieth century to the present. In some ways, as coeditor Rory Miller explains in the introduction, this is a successor volume to an issue of *Business History Review* (1985) devoted to Latin America; the current work concentrates on literature since the late 1970s. It is far too specialized for undergraduate students, but its generalizations should be of interest to research historians and graduate students. The country-by-country bibliography at the end of the work is excellent.

Just as the structure of each nation's economy has differed, so, too, has the evolution of business. While these authors are in command of their subjects, the topics covered vary enormously from essay to essay; few common threads run through all the studies. One notable exception is the consistent rejection of economic generalizations developed by CEPAL (also called ECLA or the United Nations' Economic Committee on Latin America) and by dependency theorists. In the eyes of all these authors issues of dependent development and structural obstacles to development are passé or were wrong all along. The authors claim that such ideas led historians to overlook major elements in the internal economies of the region, from the organization of business firms to the linkages between domestic and export sectors. Nonetheless, the topic of "business history" is so disparate, covering so many different economic activities and social developments, that no one proposes an alternative perspective on how and why Latin American economies have developed as they have. All the authors focus on issues of entrepreneurship and the studies of business firms. The reader is left with the assumption that neoclassical theory can provide the tools and agenda for developing future studies although this is never stated explicitly.

Individual essays by Miller (on Peru), coeditor Carlos Dávila (Colombia), Luis Ortega (Chile), and Ruth Capriles and Marisol de Gonzalo (Venezuela) have different but considerable strengths. In the case of Ortega, Capriles, and de Gonzalo, the authors provide excellent syntheses of new literature developed in their respective countries. Dávila does a fine job of covering an obscure literature on Colombia. Like the other authors, he stresses that the field of business history contains numerous subfields and ties to other large topics, such as economic history per se. As a topic of research, however, it has "a high degree of dispersion, fragmentation, and contributions from various disciplines, with the result that a critical mass of research has not yet been attained" (p. 115). Ortega is more direct, "To put it in a nutshell, there is a whole history yet to be written" (p. 82). Miller's study of Peru is the



only one that suggests how future studies can triangulate various issues into coherently manageable sets of relationships among the state, foreign and domestic firms, and such key social topics as labor. His is a well-written and fascinating tour de force, albeit the mention of labor reminds the reader how little interest business historians seem to have in working people.

None of the essays addresses the rise of capitalist power or the development of businessmen as actors in a political economy. There is, instead, an assumption in each essay that the contours of national development are well known. National business associations are barely mentioned; regional ones are ignored. The laws of countries are never analyzed. No theory of the state or evaluation of the regulatory environment is offered. We are told about works on particular firms but not how firms changed over time. Amazingly for a book on business, there is no sustained analysis of foreign or domestic corporations. Although many entities are mentioned in passing, no one offers insights on how landlords and merchants of the nineteenth century were replaced by corporate banks, industrialists, and agribusiness.

In all, the anthology can be recommended as a starting point for organizing research on business topics, for the essays do discuss particular strategies for research and the kinds of sources to be found. The essays also provide a brief guide to recent work. Nonetheless, the anthology leaves the reader with the sense that business history is not a coherent field of study—not in Latin America, in any event.

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EVA P. BUENO and TERRY CAESAR, editors. *Imagination Beyond Nation: Latin American Popular Culture*. (Pitt Latin American Series.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1998. Pp. viii, 314. Cloth \$50.00, paper \$22.95.

The study of Latin American popular culture has lagged behind most studies of North American popular culture in a variety of ways. Co-editor Terry Caesar even criticizes his home institution, where, "alas, the sort of research this book represents is simply not acknowledged" (p. ix). Thus, Caesar, Eva P. Bueno, and others are still seeking for their discipline the respect that most universities have grudgingly shown similar studies of North American subjects.

Bueno and Caesar have gathered a wide variety of "predominantly younger scholars" to make the case for studying Latin American popular culture. The contributors address on a wide variety of subjects, some (the telenovela, the tango, the comic strip) that have been discussed in the classic works on Latin American popular culture that have appeared in the last decade, and some that represent some new areas of study or probe unknown aspects of oft-studied topics. An example of the latter is Bueno's article on Amacio

Mazzaropi, an extremely popular film star in rural Brazil, who, although virtually unknown outside the country, built his career at the same time the Cinema Novo captured the attention of Brazilian elites and cinemaphiles around the world.

Bueno and Caesar argue that the essays in this collection concentrate mostly on the "nation" and its meaning in Latin America. Some of the contributors argue that this conception is meaningless in the age of globalization, as the malling of the Americas has placed Walmarts in both New York City and Buenos Aires. Others examine the varieties of cultures within the various nations discussed in these essays to show, for example, that the notion of a Brazilian culture becomes meaningless as one examines the internal divisions between rich and poor, urban and rural.

The editors seem to have a clear sense of the framework and the meaning of the essays that they have assembled; more often than not, the contributors do not have as strong a sense of the context of their ideas. As a result, many of the essays read more as case studies of particular themes or subjects, but the authors seem unaware of the larger context of their ideas or the hopes that their editors hold for their studies.

Illustrations are used particularly well in this collection, as readers are supplied with the necessary graphics (whether comic strips, photographs of paintings and folk art, or film stills) to understand the issues raised in the articles. This collection will be useful for those interested in the study of particular issues concerning popular culture. It does not, however, achieve the lofty goals set by the editors.

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MADHAVI KALE. *Fragments of Empire: Capital, Slavery, and Indian Indentured Labor Migration in the British Caribbean*. (Critical Histories.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1998. Pp. 235. \$37.50.

Indentured labor held a central position in the Anglo-Caribbean economy. Indeed, it could be seen as its alpha and omega in that the sugar plantation system began with white indentures (chiefly English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish) during the seventeenth century and ended with indentures from Asia (chiefly Indians and Chinese) after the abolition of slavery by Britain in 1833. At each end of the historical spectrum, indenture was predicated on the perceived needs of the planter for labor in the midst of a plentiful supply of fertile land. And in the situation of a low man/land ratio—especially within the context of the presence of aggressive merchant/planters with relatively low technologies—there is the tendency to employ some form of coerced labor.

After emancipation, the planters of the larger colonies—Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad—felt threatened: above all, they feared labor scarcity, especially in view of the fact that the newly freed blacks were

leaving the plantations in droves, determined to control their own destiny by establishing communities where land was available. Planters worried that labor shortage would increase wage rates and, worse, that this would give the freed bargaining power through the institution of "combinations" or unions. In fact, between 1840 and 1848 the Afro-Guyanese had their best days in this regard. They had their first strike in 1841 and were successful in obtaining better working conditions and an increase in wages until 1848, when they were decisively defeated, as the planters had planned. They planned it by, among other things, reintroducing indentured labor, on this occasion, from Asia. The introduction of Indian ("coolie") and Chinese labor contracted to work on the sugar plantations for a stipulated period of time was designed to accomplish more than merely satisfying labor shortages. There was also the unmistakable agenda that the planters openly and repeatedly articulated: Indian indenture was to be a weapon against the rising independence of blacks. With the Indians, a "very docile and easily managed" (p. 16) labor force, black wages would be flattened, their competitive edge would disappear along with their newly found bargaining power, and indeed they would be rendered dispensable and thus come under the control of the planter class. Such was the "philosophy" that undergirded nineteenth-century indenture, spawning in its wake the potentially explosive race relations between Afro and Indo-Caribbean peoples in Guyana and Trinidad today.

Madhavi Kale's book stresses Indian indenture (not Chinese also), and its title carries some very complex words: empire, capital, and slavery. Yet it is contained in only 175 pages of text, each chapter (seven, plus introduction and postscript) averaging just over seventeen pages. These short chapters do not always hang together and may seem elliptical at times, perhaps due to the methodology, which, the author tells us, is "characterized by synchronicities (explorations and juxtapositions of moments and events conventionally separated one from the other and imagined as discrete and unrelated) rather than by diachronic narrative" (p. 174). This resurrected "New History" mode probably accounts for the style of writing with long and involved sentences throughout and polysyllabic words in tow, as if an indulgence—reminiscent of what paint was to some surrealist artists. More important, Kale approaches Indian indenture not as labor or migration history but as "imperial labor reallocation," separating it from the usual "conventions and assumptions of Labor History" (pp. 5, 6, 88) without making the distinction compellingly clear. In the process, she concentrates her criticisms on the primary documents produced by the system, viewing them as self-serving, catering only to an imperial audience to justify empire. Professional historians using them become complicit in the biased representation of imperial practices. Even the liberal anti-slavery writings especially those from the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (BFASS),

are criticized for serving the empire at least in their hierarchization of race, class, and gender.

Kale overlooks the effectiveness of the anti-slavery humanitarian attitude toward indenture from 1838 to the mid 1840s. Fearful that the system would become no more than a euphemism for slavery, the literature of the BFASS became its custodian at every point of the process. This yielded some very positive results, and even a furtive comparison with seventeenth-century white indentures would reveal that in some cases the Indians—initially—were given considerations not accorded to the whites. One example speaks to the sale of indentures. White indentures could be sold along with plantations, without any consultations with the indentured, extending, in many instances, their original contracts. This could be done with impunity because, unlike the Indians, they had no humanitarian voices raised on their behalf. Kale recounts the case of a planter in Guyana who sold his plantation in excess of £2,000 "for the services of the coolies for two years" (p. 33); this prompted an outcry from BFASS, terming it as "SLAVE TRADE," and the entire British legal corpus was brought to bear on the sale, which was finally deemed illegal. Indeed, even the use of the term "free," first used by the planters to designate indentured labor at this period, was another euphemism in genuflection to humanitarian sentiments. White indenture labor was never called "free": it was semi-coerced, bonded labor. It is true that from the decade of the 1850s, for complicated reasons, the humanitarian voices ceased to be effective, and indentured protection against abuses of the planter came to an end.

Most of us engaged in writing colonial/imperial history bemoan, like Kale, the heavy reliance on European documents. We lament particularly the absence of the voices of the subjects—or objects—of empire, creating major gaps and distortions. But if we are to retrieve and reconstruct colonial history we must reach out to utilize the insights of unorthodox types of evidence: ethnography, archaeology, and the like. Each has limitations. Archaeology, for instance, with its focus on the detritus of material remains of human society, is mute on many behavioral processes, forcing all good archaeologists to bow, eventually, to the "magisterial authority" of documentary sources. The alternative would be, if not to sit and fold our arms, to speak off the top of our heads? Kale has not supplied alternatives.

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ANGEL SMITH and EMMA DÁVILA-COX, editors. *The Crisis of 1898: Colonial Redistribution and Nationalist Mobilization*. New York: St. Martin's. 1999. Pp. ix, 221. \$65.00.

1998 was the centennial year of the United States' war with Spain, a conflict remembered very differently in each country and in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, the principal theaters of battle. The coming of

war enabled President William McKinley to mobilize his party and the public into intervening in the civil conflict that had erupted three years before in Spanish Cuba. Victory three months after the onset of fighting propelled the nation (willingly, scholars nowadays concede) headlong into the business of extracontinental empire and with it all the benefits and problems of governing eight million people of color.

For the humiliated Spanish, the coming of the war and the government's ineptitude in dealing with the civil conflicts in its far-flung colonies enabled Spanish republicans and liberal constitutionalists (who had ruled Spain from 1868 to 1873) to rejuvenate their cause for a secular, more democratic society. For some Cubans, Filipinos, and even Puerto Ricans, the war meant not liberation but the exchange of one colonial master for another. Others, particularly those social elites who believed that closer ties with the United States would be financially advantageous or who were apprehensive about independence, welcomed U. S. tutelage.

Much of the scholarship on the war, editors Angel Smith and Emma Dávila-Cox note in their suggestive introductory essay, too often focuses on limited aspects of the conflict or on specific geographical areas to the neglect of broader issues of continuing importance. The contributors to this volume (the result of a conference on the war held at the University of Southampton in May 1997) have undertaken to correct the imbalance with essays on such traditional topics as U. S. politics and the coming of the war or the origins of the revolt in Cuba and on less familiar ones such as the impact of the war in Puerto Rico and in Spain. The result (as is sometimes the case with such efforts) is a collection of essays that does not quite live up to the overarching promises of the excellent introductory essay ("1898 and the Making of the New Twentieth-Century World Order") yet provides the reader with a solid if not encompassing assessment of the origins of the war and its significance for the twentieth-century world. The fighting may have been of short duration, but the consequences of the war remain with us today.

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JOHN MASON HART, editor. *Border Crossings: Mexican and Mexican-American Workers*. (Latin American Silhouettes.) Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources. 1998. Pp. xii, 246.

Until recently, scholars have drawn a fine line between Mexican and Mexican-American labor history. This collection of essays, edited by John Mason Hart, suggests that existent mutual aid or *mutualista* organizations in Mexico and the United States argue against segregated studies. The text maintains that workers of Mexican origin, regardless of location, shared a similar heritage of fraternal and social networks that foreshadowed attempts at self-improvement and development of class consciousness in both countries.

This skillfully edited collection traces the social, ethnic, and class origins of *mutualista* societies from the Aztec period through postrevolutionary Mexico and subsequent immigration to the United States. Although not always labor oriented, and often divided by regional and ethnic differences, Mexican *mutualistas* actualized worker solidarity to mobilize and manage against an impinging capitalist economy. Later, when Mexican workers began to answer the call for low-wage labor in the United States, they crossed the border readied with this know-how.

In the United States context, *mutualista* societies helped immigrants bridge between old and new circumstances in states such as Texas, California, and Illinois. In other words, Mexican immigrants did not enter the U.S. labor economy devoid of organizational skills. The transmission of this critical knowledge and experience mitigated oppressive conditions generally associated with low-wage and nonwhite immigrant communities.

The essays are well researched and supported by extensive reference notes; as might be expected, however, some are stronger than others. The material on Mexico is particularly well balanced across the depth of Mexican history, inclusive of women workers, and the evolution of working-class political groups. Alberto Olvera Rivera's history of petroleum workers at Poza Rica, Vera Cruz provides a succinct analysis of the interaction of unions and the developing modern state. Writing on Mexican-Americans, Gerardo Necochea Garcia and Devra Weber effectively show how immigrants adapted mutual aid strategies to foster constructive protests against discrimination and the impersonal nature of industrial employment.

The broad scope of these essays will almost surely trigger the attention of labor historians. In the process of dissecting the structured forms of labor organization among Mexican and Mexican-American workers, some scholars have overlooked the relationship of social networks to worker political consciousness. For too long, sporadic or short-term labor protests among Mexican Americans were simply characterized as spontaneous, unorganized responses to miserable working conditions. The essays contained in this volume suggest otherwise.

This book is a decided contribution to our knowledge of the shared experiences among Mexican and Mexican-American communities. For this reason, the text should also be welcomed by scholars of transnational studies. This compilation of essays dispels any doubts about the value of exploring meaningful symmetries between country of origin and destination. As the editor makes clear, Mexican and Mexican-American workers, although separated by a political boundary, used remarkably similar social and political responses to decidedly different circumstances.

On the whole, Hart has succeeded in organizing a very readable and thought provoking text. Read as labor or Mexican-American history, or from the perspective of transnational studies, it should be of con-

siderable interest to every scholar looking for an informed discussion of the emerging literature on these topics.

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GRANT D. JONES. *The Conquest of the Last Maya Kingdom*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1998. Pp. xxvii, 568. Cloth \$69.50, paper \$24.95.

Visited by Hernán Cortés in 1525, the Petén of northern Guatemala remained a colonial backwater until the late seventeenth century, when Martín de Ursúa y Arizmendi, already granted the future governorship of Yucatán, proposed to construct a road from Merida to Guatemala. Underlying this politically acceptable project was the would-be conquistador's plan to conquer the last surviving native kingdom in Spanish America, that of the Itzas.

The greater part of Grant D. Jones's substantial book (over 500 pages) comprises a detailed narrative account of the conquest of the Itzas from 1695 to 1704. The study begins with the initiation of the project and ends with the final attempt of the Itzas and other Mayan groups to recapture their conquered capital, Nojpeten, today Flores in Guatemala. The first detailed account of the conquest of the Itzas was written in 1701 by Juan de Villagutierre Soto-Mayor. This work, entitled *Historia de la conquista de la provincia de el Itza*, was commissioned by the Council of the Indies as an answer to Ursúa's critics. Although Villagutierre had access to vast documentation in Spain, his account is unreferenced and often biased and unreliable. Jones has undertaken the painstaking task of tracking down the sources used by Villagutierre and has also drawn on Guatemalan archives. In the reworking of the sources he has brought to bear his deep knowledge of Maya society, culture, and language.

The first part of the book considers the ethnographic and historical background to conquest. A significant part of this section is devoted to a reconstruction of the political geography of the region. In the mid-fifteenth century, the Itzas migrated from northern Yucatán and sought to carve out a power base centered on Lago Petén in a region inhabited by the Kowoj, Kejaches, and Mopan. Through a detailed examination of surnames encountered in colonial sources, Jones paints a vivid picture of shifting alliances and power struggles. In this brilliant piece of ethnohistorical reconstruction, he concludes that the Itzas were not, as he had previously conceived, a confederacy of polities of equal status but one in which relationships were more hierarchical, with the Itzas attempting to integrate other groups through conquest and marriage alliances. Ultimately subordinate groups' mistrust of the intentions of the Itza leaders in their dealings with the Spanish undermined the ability of Mayan groups in the Petén to unite in opposition to Spanish rule.

Although cleavages existed within Itza political or-

ganization, there were also power struggles among *audiencia* officials, the secular clergy, and the Franciscans. While such struggles are familiar, in this study they are given depth by the richly drawn personalities of the main actors. Jones gives a brilliant account of how the would-be conquistador Ursúa, through contacts on the Council of the Indies, out-maneuvered his rivals and was able to secure for himself *de facto* rights of conquest. Despite the lesser abundance of documentary sources, Jones also reveals the personalities of native actors, notably the Itza ruler, Ajaw Kan 'Ek, his emissary AjChan, and AjKowoj, who regarded the Itza leaders as traitors.

Despite being over-burdened with detail in a few places, this excellent narrative account makes for compelling reading. Spanish troops and missionaries gradually converge on the Petén from Yucatán and Guatemala, and in the background the construction of the *camino real* makes relentless progress, signaling the inevitability of conquest. The climax is reached with the twelve-day siege of the island, when 350 people were mustered at Ch'ich on Lago Petén. Here they rapidly constructed a heavily armed *galeota* to carry troops to Nojpeten. After a brief battle in which the Itzas suffered heavy casualties, the Spanish occupied the island, destroying their settlements. Spanish triumph was tempered by food shortages, continuing native hostility, an epidemic, and the absence of reinforcements. The *presidio* established on the island struggled to survive, and a rebellion broke out in 1704. The Spanish responded by making more concerted efforts to settle the Indians in mission towns, conducting military expeditions to bring them in by force. Further reduced by epidemics, by the mid-eighteenth century the mission population had fallen by about three-quarters, and little evidence remained of the former Itza kingdom.

There is no attempt in this study at comparative perspective, but Jones shows that conquest was not a simple affair whose outcome was determined by relative military might but rather a complex process, often riddled with political intrigue on both sides and influenced by personalities and chance events. This is an impressive study that will be regarded as the classic account of the conquest of the Itzas for many decades.

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WARD STAVIG. *The World of Túpac Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in Colonial Peru*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1999. Pp. xxxiv, 348. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$25.00.

Ethnohistorical study of Andeans under Spanish rule has advanced considerably in recent decades. Regional examinations by Karen Spalding, Steve Stern, Brooke Larson, Ann Wightman, and Karen Vieira Powers have been particularly important in deepening historical understanding of the complexities of Andean life.



Ward Stavig's book joins this list of distinguished works. Focusing primarily on the late seventeenth to the late eighteenth centuries, the author adds a fascinating portrayal of the indigenous populations of the distinct, although contiguous, rural provinces of Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis. Located in the Cuzco region, these provinces were the center of the massive Túpac Amaru rebellion that began in 1780. Although Túpac Amaru, the revolt's celebrated leader, appears in the book's title, Stavig gives relatively little attention to the rebellion and its immediate causes, emphasizing instead that passive resistance, including recourse to the Spanish legal system, was the normal form of protest against Spanish impositions. Employing a "ground up" approach, his study is a detailed and wonderfully rich portrait of ordinary indigenous lives in the Cuzco region within the context of colonial economic and political institutions.

Following an introductory outline of the scope and approach of the book, a background chapter traces Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis from pre-Spanish conquest through the establishment of Spanish provincial officials (*corregidores*), the reforms of Viceroy Toledo in the 1570s, notably the creation of new villages (*reducciones*) and the introduction of the Potosí *mita*, the introduction of Christianity and its agents, and the incorporation of European livestock into an established herding tradition. Stavig makes an important link between the natives' participation in the *mita* and their belief that this service was part of a reciprocal agreement with the crown that guaranteed their right to land.

The author devotes subsequent chapters to indigenous sexual values and marital life; robbers, rustlers, and highwaymen; indigenous-Spanish struggles over land; ethnic land conflict; labor in the Spanish realm; community, identity, and the labor draft (*mita*); and rebellion, redemption, and Túpac Amaru. Throughout he provides rich archival evidence that documents the actions of the Andeans both toward their compatriots and toward colonial and clerical officials and other nonindigenous persons. He concludes his study with a brief chapter that emphasizes the altered, heavily Eurocentric perceptions of the nonindigenous population toward the native peoples in the wake of the Túpac Amaru rebellion.

Stavig underscores the importance of complementary indigenous and Spanish values in maintaining colonial rule. Noting that unequal exchange between rulers and their peoples predated the imposition of Spanish rule, he stresses that the resources remaining with the *naturales* were more important than the undeniable and often onerous Spanish exactions by the colonial state, notably the demand for *mita* labor for Potosí. He also emphasizes the significance of face-to-face relations, custom and tradition, and incompletely developed market relations within a colonial system that rested on the crown's supremacy and lacked the reciprocity that typified the historic relationship be-

tween Andean rulers and their peoples. The relationship between native rulers (*curacas*) and their communities, he argues, was as important as that between the native population and the colonial state.

Particularly fascinating chapters of this thoughtful study are the two focused on sexual values and marital life and robbers, rustlers, and highwaymen. The Andean custom of trial marriage disturbed Spanish clerics, although most tolerated what they could not eliminate. Once an indigenous couple married, however, Christian values coincided with and thus reinforced indigenous values emphasizing faithfulness. Stavig stresses the significance of such overlapping values in reinforcing the legitimacy of colonial rule. Similarly, indigenous communities, routinely charged with maintaining internal tranquility, enjoyed the support of the colonial state and its officials as they enforced traditional values of law and order.

Clearly and often vividly written, this book is based upon archival research in Bolivia, Peru, and Spain as well as an extensive bibliography of relevant secondary works. Both specialists in Andean ethnohistory and social historians of colonial Spanish America in general will benefit from Stavig's study.

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JOEL OUTTES. *O Recife: Gênese do Urbanismo 1927-1943*. (Série Estudos e Pesquisas, number 93.) Pernambuco, Brazil: Editora Massangana. 1997. Pp. 250.

As the subtitle makes clear, Joel Outtes is concerned with the genesis of urbanism, or with the concept of the city as a part of the modern landscape. He has written on the transformation of Recife, the largest city of the Brazilian northeast and one of the most important industrial cities of the country, as a kind of case study in the development of modern, scientific urban planning. Outtes, who is an architect as well as a historian of urban planning, examines the renovation of Recife's city center during the 1930s and early 1940s. The story of renewal begins in the waning years of the First Republic, when the general preoccupation with building Brazil's import/export economy was very much a part of the political and cultural agenda of the entrepreneurial elites. Not until the end of the Republic and the introduction of the administration of Getúlio Vargas did the push for modernity reach fruition, however. Given the technocratic and authoritarian nature of the Vargas period, the engineers, technicians, and urban planners pursued a path quite different from the piecemeal and halting renovations of the 1920s, when urban improvements were preceded by lengthy consultations with political forces and medical personnel concerned with combating the environmental sources of disease.

Outtes contends that the main difference in the 1930s and 1940s from the earlier Republican reforms was the triumph of "new rationality," an ideology that

dictated the city's transformation as a part of a larger, abstract vision of "urbanism." Under this new rational urbanism, the city was like a factory with specific zones for different tasks: commerce, industry, residence, port, universities, etc. According to Outtes, this "Process of urban Taylorism implied a conception of extreme modernity: that of the city in the era of the machine" (p. 214). If earlier urban renewal projects had been concerned with beauty, health, combating disease, crime, and other "urban pathologies," urban planners of the 1940s were preoccupied with constructing fast arteries for traffic flow and good communications, and doing so with an eye toward costs, financing, taxes, and occupancy rates rather than style or beauty.

The new rationality triumphed in an era of the political hegemony of the technocratic urban planner. Vargas's suppression of the institutions of representative governance, especially after 1936, granted free rein to the engineers, technocrats, and urban planners who no longer needed to concern themselves with the encumbrances of opinions from political parties, labor unions, and representative bodies. The only trade unions consulted were those of the engineers and the association of newspapermen. The bulk of the book is a reconstruction of the process through which individual engineers and urban technicians reached unity on their plan. For those interested in the ins and outs of meetings, proposals, plans, and contracts of urban renewal, the book will be useful; others may find it tedious.

Finally, the book would have benefited both in readability and scope by placing the in-house debates of Recife's urban planners within the broader context of debates concerning urban planning and renewal projects in other cities. While Outtes asserts that the French were influential, and I agree, he does not tell us why the Brazilians sought out this model. Certainly French influence was instrumental in the earlier renovation of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, Argentina, but that was so because of the high regard accorded French civilization and the Brazilian elites' penchant to emulate French styles. Outtes argues that the Brazilian planners copied the model of U.S. cities in the 1930s and especially the 1940s but does not explain what it was about American zoning that captivated the Brazilian technocrats. Moreover, the author discounts the centrality of technical issues such as traffic flows, financing, and zoning in earlier urban renewal projects. Certainly these issues were of great importance in the renovations of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo. In addition, whether imposing a factory-based design or copying a European city, the class character of the urban renewal heavily influenced decisions at the turn of the century as well as during the 1940s, a point I wish Outtes had discussed more. In summary, Outtes asserts the ideology of modernity, captures the centrality of technocratic solutions to urban problems, and offers a por-

trait of some of the personalities involved in the renewal projects.

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ROSEMARIJN HOEFTE. *In Place of Slavery: A Social History of British Indian and Javanese Laborers in Suriname*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 1998. Pp. xii, 275. \$49.95.

After the slave emancipations in the Western hemisphere, in those cases where plantation slavery was still potentially profitable but a supply of free labor was not forthcoming, indentured labor from India, China, and Indonesia was brought in to fill the gap. Where the ratio of land to labor was low—Antigua is an example—former slaves had few opportunities beyond return to the plantation. Where the land-labor ratio was high, the local labor supply dried up, and continuation of a profitable plantation system required a new source of workers.

Planters everywhere complained that the freed slaves wanted high wages and were undisciplined. This should have surprised no one: if the labor force were willing to work for sufficiently low wages and forego a premium for undergoing the onerous discipline of plantation agriculture, there would have been no need for slavery in the first place. It should have been obvious that, given an alternative, former slaves would not return at low levels of remuneration. Indentured servitude was seen as the remedy at hand.

The system of indentured servitude has been described as just another form of slavery or coerced labor, an "exile into bondage." When one considers the living standards and working conditions of the indentured servants of the post-emancipation period, this is perhaps understandable. Yet it is true only metaphorically. In the abstract, an indenture is a contract, between two parties: those who wish to emigrate (presumably to better their status) contract for the cost of their passage with future employers and repay them with specified amounts of labor. At the expiration of the contract they will then be free to pursue their lives at the desired place. With perfect information and perfect enforcement of the terms of the contract, this is just a case of free labor making a voluntary choice: there is nothing like slavery involved. Indentured servants formed an important part of the labor force in colonial British North America and the British West Indies in the pre-slave period, and it can be demonstrated that many of them approximately fit this description. But it is only by assessing the crucial assumptions of perfect information and perfect contract enforcement that we can judge the nature of indentured servitude.

Rosemarijn Hoefte has written a splendid account of indentured servitude in Suriname, a solid book that documents the reality behind the theory of indentured servitude there. It should be on the shelf of anyone interested in the history of labor supply in the Western

hemisphere, placed next to the good studies we have of indentured labor in British North America and the West Indies, especially Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana. There is a gold mine of comparative history to be exploited here, and Hoefte's book is an indispensable contribution.

The abolition of slavery in Suriname in 1862 was followed by a disappointing transitional period, and in 1873 the importation of indentured servants from British India began. In 1917, this source was closed—opposed by the unlikely combination of Lord Curzon and Mohandas K. Gandhi—and replaced by Javanese indentures.

Hoefte's treatment is based on the experience of the Marienburg estate, the largest, longest-surviving, and most important employer of indentured labor in Suriname (it ceased operations only in 1990). Her treatment is topical and descriptive, neither chronological nor analytical. This is no criticism: an attentive reader can construct a chronology, and the materials for testing hypotheses or devising grand theories are abundantly laid out.

The contract between workers and planters was never viewed as one between individuals. Attempts at regulation by the home governments, the colonial government, and local authorities intervened at every stage: recruitment, "warehousing," shipping; conditions of work and remuneration; housing, health, and provisioning. Since two streams of servants were involved, two states, English and Dutch, were involved, and even two local jurisdictions, since British Indian workers kept their citizenship and had access to the British consul. Conflicts between planter and worker and the regulator and the regulated are inherent in any such situation, and in Suriname they were especially complex.

Hoefte covers all the issues and also briefly considers and contrasts the social, religious, and cultural lives of the British Indians and Javanese immigrants and the implications of this history for the modern state. She tells the story of these desperately poor people—from the moment they were preyed upon by unscrupulous recruiters to their wretched lives on the sugar plantations of Suriname and the doomed efforts of many to protect them and ameliorate their conditions—in cool, careful, and well-documented detail. The Depression of the 1930s ended contract labor in Suriname.

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#### EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

CHERYL ANNE COX. *Household Interests: Property, Marriage Strategies, and Family Dynamics in Ancient Athens*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. xx, 253. \$45.00.

The Athenian household in classical Greece extended beyond the nuclear family and its property (including domiciles, urban workshops, farmhouses, slaves, other

livestock, olive trees and grapevines, and farmland transferable apart from plants on it). The elite, source of most surviving evidence, had a bifurcated strategy. They usually kept wealth within their patrilineal kin-groups, but they also cultivated matrilineal, friends, and neighbors (local endogamy). Cheryl Anne Cox's virtue is to stress tendencies of division in this system of partible inheritance. The Athenian problem of "over-parceling" the smallish Attic farms (a territory smaller than Rhode Island) in a society with a high death rate found various solutions, including small dowries and the epiclerate. This peculiar institution transmitted the estate of a man without sons through his unmarried daughter by her marriage to his closest male kinsman from a shared male ancestor.

Athenian society and law exhibit primitive and sophisticated features often without analogue or influence on other ancient and subsequent legal systems. Stephen Todd, in *The Shape of Athenian Law* (1993), contrasts this non-legacy to the vast influence of Roman law. Cox, whose bibliography generally stops after 1991, ignores Todd's excellent survey of the forest to examine some tall trees. Todd's useful glossary for readers not versed in Attic legal procedures has no counterpart here, a disappointment that constricts the audience for a topic in family and women's history.

Cox argues for the instability of the Athenian *oikos* (household). Death, remarriage, service abroad, exile and colonial residence, and fluid boundaries complicated the ideal life cycle of a family unit. Like quantifying women's happiness or Spartan courage, gauging standards for this relative term poses a serious problem. Cox's thesis and contribution is that the interest of the Attic household looked beyond the patriline to the matriline, families with similar political and economic interests, also non-kin neighbors (when not foes), concubines, freedmen, and slaves. Beyond the male family's DNA, custom and law allowed for adoption (a mother's brother, a sister's son, a neighbor, a slave), guardianship, and extended loan (sometimes a hidden divestment of property).

In-marriage and out-marriage alternate among leading families in obscure strategies of building new and affirming old alliances. The search for better land and concerns to spread agricultural risk drew men from ancestral demes (wards, villages, and political units studied by David Whitehead and Robin Osborne) to those of their wives, contrary to the usual rural virilocality. The uninitiated must note that a person's demotic (Pericles of Cholargos) identifies one's family's residence at the time of Cleisthenes's 508–507 reform, and does not thereafter change. It never proves residence at the time of a lawcourt oration or grave inscription, and this problem vitiates any conclusion about the distance between the actual homes of two marrying persons. Many households owned holdings scattered across the varied Attic landscape and in town and might possess no property in their original demes.

The ancient evidence is fragmentary and biased

towards the wealthy. Cox necessarily proceeds family by family (relying heavily on John Kenyon Davies's essential *Athenian Propertied Families 600–300 B.C.* [1971]), with frequently acknowledged conjectures about connections and motivations. The book provides no map despite repeated and necessary references to property locations in the demes. Any study laying weight on deme location and proximate holdings of intermarrying families (e.g. pp. 17–22) must suffer from this frustrating absence.

Successive chapters explain how the elite's practices manipulated legal standards of patriliney; how they trafficked in women (oratory), how propinquity of property mattered less to city families (tombstone inscriptions); how siblings, including women, exercised private power in arranging marriages and defending relatives' inheritances (controversial); and how wealth was acquired, transmitted, and dispersed between generations and across a single one in specific situations.

Cox notes that norms and laws are to be obeyed, bent, or ignored as advantage dictates and opportunities knock. Crisis strategies, when the paradigm fails, keep the *oikos* intact and prevent its extinction; guardianship (frequently litigated in a record-poor society), adoption (convenient for amalgamating estates), and remarriages of fathers and mothers (the bane of step-siblings) provide solutions and new problems. Marriage itself was less stable and less exclusive (especially for males) than we assume. Divorce was simple, and concubinage and extramarital sex were unremarkable. Slaves themselves are known to have been freed, adopted, and even married into their Athenian masters' families (Phormio's fortune).

The book's full title shows that Cox has compiled disparate topics relevant to the Attic transmission of wealth. Its central thesis, the fluidity of the *oikos*, finds compelling support in her thorough survey of the orators' evidence. Cox, detailing the frequent fusion and fission in the Attic *oikos*, shows us that the Athenian family absorbed various non-linear elements. She has fruitfully complicated an already difficult historical picture.

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JOSIAH OBER. *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule*. (Martin Classical Lectures.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 417. \$35.00.

This volume by Josiah Ober treats a number of works that belong to Athenian intellectual traditions critical of democracy. Seven chapters focus, respectively, on the treatise on the Athenian "constitution" (usually called the "Old Oligarch") falsely attributed to the historian and friend of Socrates, Xenophon; on Thucydides; on the *Ecclesiazusae*, a comedy of Aristophanes; on four Platonic works (*Apology*, *Crito*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*); on two of Isocrates's programmatic speeches (*Antidosis* and *Areopagiticus*); on the *Politics* of Aris-

totle; and on the Attic polity as presented in the *Athenaion Politeia*, the surviving example of the individual surveys of politics produced by the school of Aristotle.

Chapters on the "Old Oligarch," Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle (259 pages, 69 percent of the book) were presented as the Martin Classical Lectures at Oberlin in 1994. The book may thus be considered a massive expansion of what one suspects was considerably more satisfactory as lectures. Although Ober has been working on his topic since 1989, complexities of interpretation, the density of the texts' interaction with their social and political contexts, and the embarrassing wealth of earlier scholarship rendered this expansion overly ambitious. For example, Ober's juxtaposition of the Aristotelian treatment of constitutional reform with a provision outlawing constitutional subversion of the Macedonian sponsored League of Corinth (338/337) perhaps sounded provocative; so, too, a related suggestion to read the *Politics* as containing advice for Macedonian colonization in Asia. Within a lengthy chapter, any novelty descends to idiosyncratic assertion without sustained argument on issues like chronology and Philip II's actual contemporary colonial practices.

Both subtitle and title tell us much. Ober commendably explores texts vital for understanding ancient democracy in a presentation well designed to encourage dialogue between historians and political scientists. Readers will find him most valuable where he situates analysis of ancient texts vis-à-vis work on modern democracy. His readings are close, however strained at times. The author's control of interpretive detail is uncertain at times. They will challenge advanced students to thorough counter-exegesis, and that is no small contribution. To speak of Plato and Aristotle as "intellectuals" evokes a useful analogy; yet the classification will hardly pass muster for the others.

It is also surprising that "dissent" is so crudely formulated. In our recent history, dissent entailed proposing that current policies were not veritable expressions of American values, so our dissenters could inveigh against favoritism for multinationals or hostility in foreign policy toward national liberation movements. Ober's "dissent" can subsume modes of divergence that vary markedly in their allegiance to democratic institutions, because all his authors belong to an Athenian critical community (in very hazy focus throughout) and share a common sensitivity to the issue of democratic knowledge as embodied in decisions of the Attic assembly.

One need proceed no further than the early discussion of the "Old Oligarch" for doubts to emerge about Ober's critical community and hence the cohesion of the entire work. For Ober, the contribution of this treatise lies in its exemplification of the idea that democracy was the dominance of a "sociological faction." The "Old Oligarch," however, rejected the main line of normative and institutional development of the Athenian people over the previous five generations,



seeing democracy as an inverted supremacy not only of economic but primarily of *ethical* inferiors and ignoring the actual mechanisms for distribution of material goods. That entailed a misrepresentation of the ideological attitudes of the vast majority of elite Athenians. Nor was his rejection made on behalf of an indigenous alternative ideology. To make this odd, poorly contextualized treatise the ground document revealing an *aporia* about democracy suggests fatal confusion about the actual status of the Athenian constitution and about Attic perceptions of the international situation (and just when the "Old Oligarch" wrote is an issue unfortunately skirted). Hence, Thucydides, son of Melesias, the most prominent "right-wing" opponent to Periclean democracy, receives a most inadequate discussion.

An uncertain feel for social context is exacerbated by the homogenization of Attic democratic experience. Ober led a celebration of the 2500-year anniversary of Attic democracy in the early 1990s, naturally predicated on seeing the populist constitution of Cleisthenes (ca. 508) as the essential watershed. As *demokratia* is better connected with the constitution after the Ephialtic reforms (460s), gauging fine gradations of dissent has become intractable for Ober. The meliorative "dissent" of Thucydides, Aristophanes, and Isocrates (perhaps of the historical Socrates as well) deviated to a lesser degree from Attic democracy during the Peloponnesian War than the war democracy deviated from Cleisthenic politics (510–490), Themistoclean politics (488–472), and Ephialtic politics (the 460s). Thus this work systematically under-appreciates the cleavage between the ameliorists and both the subversives like the "Old Oligarch" or the rejectionists like Plato in the *Gorgias* and parts of the *Republic*. The interpretation of Thucydides is particularly affected. Although Ober did not invent the cliché of "Thucydides-the-Oligarch," may his labored variations on the theme lay him to a final rest.

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SANDRA R. JOSHEL and SHEILA MURNAGHAN, editors.  
*Women and Slaves in Greco-Roman Culture: Differential Equations*. New York: Routledge. 1989. Pp. xii, 287. \$75.00.

This book contains an introductory essay by its editors and thirteen essays by other contributors that together treat women and slaves in Greco-Roman antiquity as two marginalized categories of people capable in various modes of intellectual discourse of being simultaneously assimilated to and differentiated from each other. The essays show, the editors maintain, "how thoroughly the ancient Greeks and Romans relied on the polarities of male/female and free/slave in order to understand themselves and to organize their societies, and they make it clear that these categories achieved their signifying power, not in tandem, but in combination with each other" (p. 3). The papers range from the

world of Homer to the world of Augustine and include historical, literary, and archaeological studies. All in all, they make a rewarding, if provocative, contribution to the study of Greco-Roman culture.

Historians will be especially stimulated by the brief but convincing essay by Richard Saller on how rituals and protocols in the Roman household encouraged a firm distinction between the two subordinate categories by stressing the honor associated with free women and the shame associated with slaves. They will also find valuable Ian Morris's study of how archaeology reveals no easily visible traces of characteristically female or servile domestic space in the male-dominated society of classical Athens and Attica. And they will be impressed, above all, by Patricia Clark's acute analysis of domestic violence in Roman society, which, concentrating on the case-history of Augustine's mother, Monnica, sensitively discusses abusive treatment of Roman women in the context of a culture permeated by the particular violence of slaveowning.

The more literary papers focus their attention on representations of women and slaves in various texts: the *Odyssey*, Greek tragedy, Roman comedy, and Latin elegiac poetry. Necessarily subjective, they are less concerned with the everyday realities of women's and slaves' lives than with the ways their authors assume elite Greek and Roman men were continually engaged in a discourse, or a series of discourses, about those they held in subjection to them. They offer "readings"—by nature susceptible neither to proof nor disproof—in which theoretical positions are imposed on literary texts largely in order to illustrate self-fulfilling prophecies; and because they rely for their effectiveness on persuasion rather than evidence, they contribute little to the history of Greco-Roman culture. More successful, in contrast, are studies that show how Roman oratorical training perpetuated conventional male values in the men trained (Joy Connolly's meditation on Quintilian complements recent work by Martin Bloomer) and how Greek law court speeches not only failed to reproduce the viewpoints of the socially marginalized but also how their silences have to be regarded as historical facts (Steven Johnston).

Despite expectations raised by the book's title, the essays as a whole have more to say about elite Greek and Roman men than women and slaves (whose marginality, incidentally, is never defined conceptually). The picture they paint is not flattering. The predominant impression they create is that the male authors of extant texts and those they represent were constantly riddled by "anxieties"—the word, modish in the extreme, appears ubiquitously—that were caused, on the one hand, by fears of those subjected to them, and, on the other, by desires to maintain the traditional social hierarchy that afforded elite men so many privileges and benefits. A study of tales of loyal wives and slaves in Roman literature typically concludes: "These tales calm the masters' fears, bring them honor, and serve as an ideological weapon. The leg-

ends of loyal slaves and loyal wives are a fund of stories that Roman men told each other so that they could sleep at night, surrounded by those they most trusted and most feared" (p. 170). Elite Greek and Roman men, it seems, century after century, age after age, were locked in a state of constant psychological turmoil.

The unequal distribution of wealth and power among the Greeks and Romans undoubtedly provoked social tensions, and, at times, disruptions. But "anxieties" of the type assumed here for the male interior world are difficult to verify and are never actually demonstrated by the contributors at all. It is difficult, moreover, to reconcile a picture of chronic elite male distress with, say, the building and maintenance of empires, in all their brutality and with all their benefits, that are one of the chief features of Greco-Roman history from the Bronze Age to Byzantium. The overall approach is too reductionist and more indicative of modern than of ancient preoccupations. Nonetheless, this well-edited book is a timely example of how many classicists are currently engaging with Greco-Roman culture. It will generate debate and stimulate further research. But it is at its best when it favors the empirical over the cause.

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MARTIN GOODMAN, editor. *Jews in a Graeco-Roman World*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. ix, 293. \$72.00.

This collection of sixteen essays edited by Martin Goodman seeks to understand the similarities and differences between Jews and non-Jews in the Greco-Roman world, the degree to which Jews were socially integrated with the non-Jewish world, and the degree to which Jewish evidence can and should be used to illuminate Greco-Roman history. The contributors are Goodman, "Jews, Greeks, and Romans"; Erich Gruen, "Jews, Greeks, and Romans in the Third Sibylline Oracle"; Seth Schwartz, "The Hellenization of Jerusalem and Shechem"; Daniel Schwartz, "Josephus' *Tobiads*: Back to the Second Century?"; Benjamin Isaac, "Jews, Christians and Others in Palestine: The Evidence from Eusebius"; David Noy, "Where Were the Jews of the Diaspora Buried?"; Albert Baumgarten, "Graeco-Roman Voluntary Associations and Ancient Jewish Sects"; William Horbury, "Antichrist among Jews and Gentiles"; Michael Satlow, "Rhetoric and Assumptions: Romans and Rabbis on Sex"; Joshua Schwartz, "Gambling in Ancient Jewish Society and in the Graeco-Roman World"; Hannah Cotton, "The Rabbis and the Documents"; Aharon Oppenheimer, "Jewish Penal Authority in Roman Judaea"; Lee Levine, "Synagogue Leadership: The Case of the Archisynagogue"; Margaret Williams, "The Structure of the Jewish Community in Rome"; Tessa Rajak, "The Gifts

of God at Sardis"; and Sacha Stern, "Dissonance and Misunderstanding in Jewish-Roman Relations."

The most stimulating essay is the one by Goodman. He proposes that the oddities of the Jews were no greater than those of such other ethnic groups as the Idumaeans, Celts, and Numidians. The only reason, he says, why they appear more peculiar is that they are better known through the religious traditions of rabbinic Judaism and Christianity. Goodman tests his hypothesis by asking how the evidence about the Jews would be interpreted if our knowledge about them were based solely on what pagan authors, together with inscriptions, papyri, coins, and archaeological finds, say about them.

One wonders, however, how valid it is to generalize on the basis of so little evidence, since we have such a small percentage of what was written (almost certainly not more than one percent). Stern's monumental three-volume collection of *testimonia* seems large; but I have found a total of only 3,372 lines of actual text in Greek or Latin in volume one, which covers the five centuries from Herodotus through Plutarch, and this includes much that is only peripheral to anything Jewish. In volume two, covering another five centuries, there are 5,006 lines. This comes to a grand total of approximately 204 pages for a millennium; and much of this discusses the properties of the Dead Sea.

But this does not mean that Jews were not viewed as very different from others. There is hardly any area that is more indicative of lifestyle than food, and here the verdict is unanimous that the Jews are very strange indeed, so that even a writer such as Plutarch, who is hardly an anti-Semite, finds the Jewish abstention from pork odd. Moreover, the fact that Jews during this period only rarely intermarried with non-Jews (among the by-now many thousands of papyri, we have only one unambiguous mention of an intermarriage between a Jew and a non-Jew) indicates a barrier between Jews and their neighbors. As for Goodman's statement that the oddities of the Jews in the Greco-Roman world were actually no greater than those of other ethnic groups, this is comparing what little is said about the Jews by Greek and Roman intellectuals with the even smaller amount said about the Idumaeans, Celts, and Numidians.

In support of Goodman's thesis, Isaac notes that there is evidence in Eusebius that the overwhelming majority of villages during the third and fourth centuries in Palestine had a mixed population: pagan, Jewish, Christian, and Samaritan. Yet Eusebius is hardly the most objective of authorities. Moreover, this would mean that there was economic interchange among the various strands in the population and not that there was substantial intellectual, cultural, and social interchange.

Noy, in his essay, concludes that prior to the latter part of the second century, Jews tended to be inhumed in largely non-Jewish burial areas and that the development of separate Jewish burial areas was a relatively late phenomenon. He concludes from this that Jews

were not so very different from others. But this conclusion is based overwhelmingly upon inscriptions from one city: Rome. Moreover, one would have expected that, in the course of centuries, the Jews should have become more like their neighbors, as they did, for example, in their choice of names, whereas in their adoption of separate burial areas they became more distinct from their neighbors.

Cotton, in her study of legal documents—especially marriage contracts—dating from the early second century and found in the Judean Desert, notes discrepancies with later Jewish law and cites their close resemblance to Egyptian pagan counterparts. But were the Jews who drew up these documents typical, any more than those at Qumran?

These essays are truly challenging, and Goodman and his colleagues are to be commended for their independence of judgment.

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TONY HONORÉ. *Law in the Crisis of Empire, 379–455 A.D.: The Theodosian Dynasty and Its Quaestors*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University. 1998. Pp. xii, 320. \$85.00.

This work is a treatise of the Theodosian Code in which Tony Honoré attempts to analyze the laws of the late Roman Empire, specifically those of the Theodosian Age, during the time period from 379 to 450 A.D. in the East and 383 to 455 A.D. in the West. An examination of his published works reveals that Honoré is well qualified to undertake such an analysis.

In his study the author analyzes the skills and abilities of the quaestors. The quaestorship dates back to the beginnings of the Roman Republic where they were assistants to the consuls. After 287 B.C. they were elected by the Assembly of Tribes (Comitia Tributa). Their duties were varied, but usually they dealt with financial matters. The function of the quaestor changed drastically with the advent of the Empire. Professor Honoré states that the quaestorship can be traced back to Constantine (p. 1), but he probably means that the power the quaestor held in the Theodosian era goes back to Constantine. In fact he seems to correct himself as he progresses. The imperial quaestor dates back to Augustus; he was appointed by the emperor and given the title *Candidatus Caesaris*. His main duty was to read the communications of the princeps (emperor) to the Senate (see Fergus Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World: 31 B.C.–A.D. 337* [1977], p. 304).

A table lists the quaestors of the Theodosian age and indicates where they are discussed in the work (pp. 275–77). Not all the quaestors are known by name. The table lists thirty in the East and nineteen in the West. In the East eleven are known, three are questionable, leaving sixteen unknown. Seven are known in the West, four are questionable, and eight have no names that are known. The quaestors of the Theodosian age are highly trained legal experts, or most of them seem to be, much more so than those of the Republic. While

Honoré doesn't actually say so, one gets the impression that he thinks these lawyer quaestors make for a smoother government administration.

The author states that the western part of the empire was no longer a viable political unit after 455. By contrast, the East was a viable unit, strong enough to defend itself by 450. Honoré poses the question that perhaps a greater commitment to law and regular administration helped the eastern government survive as a strong political entity. Regular administration is not defined, leaving us to ponder the meaning. It is interesting to note that by 450, the brunt of the barbarian attacks were borne by the West. Would a strong commitment to law and "regular administration" have allowed the Western Empire to survive much longer? Was the strong commitment to law and "regular administration" the reason the Eastern Empire survived Sassanid attacks?

In the preface Honoré states that this book is a work of reference, an essay in the analysis of style, a contribution on the prosopography of the late Roman quaestorship, and a reflection on the fall of the Western and the survival of the Eastern Empire. Starting with his reflections on the fall and survival of the respective parts of the empire, I think that the author does a decent job but could have expanded his reflections even further. His contribution to the prosopography is of top quality. As an essay on the analysis of style of the quaestors who drafted the laws, Honoré's work is outstanding. The palimpsest (found on two disks in the back) listing all the laws of the Theodosian age certainly makes this a work of reference. These disks, which can be read using Microsoft Word, print out a total of 959 pages. This allows scholars to study each individual law in minute detail; the laws are, however, translated into English and cannot be perused in their original form.

The research conducted for this work is of the highest quality. Honoré makes use of the legal texts of the period, as well as numerous scholarly secondary sources. His bibliography consists of 401 entries. The style of the author is very readable, although the nature of such a work does not make for easy reading. I recommend this book for students at the senior undergraduate or graduate level, but certainly not for undergraduates below the senior level. Not only should copies be found on the bookshelves of prosopographers and legal experts, but it is useful and valuable for any scholar interested in the late Roman or early Byzantine Empire.

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LESTER L. FIELD, JR. *Liberty, Dominion, and the Two Swords: On the Origins of Western Political Theology (180–398)*. (Publications in Medieval Studies.) Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1998. Pp. xviii, 542.

The first thing likely to strike a reader of Lester L. Field, Jr.'s book who has any serious acquaintance with

its subject matter is that, despite 170 pages of endnotes and a bibliography of almost 80 pages, the author ignores not only significant modern studies whose ideological bent he finds unsympathetic but also some of the most important achievements of modern historical scholarship relating to the role of Christianity in Roman society in the third and fourth centuries. Conspicuously absent from the bibliography (and, unless I have overlooked a stray reference, from the notes) are both Peter Brown's classic *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (1967) and Geoffrey de Ste. Croix's monumental *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (1981)—a book whose trenchant treatment of the social teaching of the early Christians and the social aspects of early Christianity is not vitiated by the author's claim to be the authoritative exegete of Karl Marx's analysis of the Greco-Roman world. Equally disconcerting is the technical incompetence that pervades Field's book. In the space of three pages, which are, unfortunately, far from atypical (pp. 215–17), Field makes Ulpian the author of Justinian's Digest, misrepresents the content of the *lex de imperio Vespasiani* by selective quotation, and mistranslates part of a letter of Ambrose, which he transfers from its real historical context into a false one.

Yet a historical study full of inaccuracies and minor mistakes may not only be enjoyable and exciting to read but also contain original and valuable ideas. Does Field's book? I have to say with regret that its leaden prose depicts a Roman Empire and an early Christianity that often bear very little resemblance to historical reality. When sketching the Roman background, Field asserts that "with the putative exception of the *senatus consultum ultimum*, no senatorial ordinance actually had the power of law until after the establishment of the Principate" (p. 407 n. 4). This is almost the exact opposite of the truth. Under the Roman Republic, the legal force of senatorial decrees was generally acknowledged, with one notorious exception. The validity of the emergency decree, which moderns mistakenly style the *senatus consultum ultimum*, was contested on every occasion when it was passed and sometimes successfully challenged in the law courts or popular assemblies—as the exiled Cicero knew full well. As for early Christianity, Field begins from the proposition that "ancient Christians regarded liberty as humanity's greatest gift and highest goal" (p. xiii). That is both anachronistic and perverse: the New Testament makes it abundantly clear that the earliest Christians, who expected the imminent end of the world, had little concern for personal or political liberty; on the contrary, even after the world failed to come to an early end, they accepted the institution of slavery without cavil and commended unhesitating obedience as a virtue (Titus 2:9). Nor is Field any more accurate when he comes to the fourth century. He asserts: "a lay person could not receive the episcopate, any more than a recruit (*tiro*) could receive the *imperium*" (p. 249). There are obvious reasons why a raw recruit cannot immediately become a general in any army, but

the provincial governor Ambrose was technically not even a Christian layman when he was elected bishop of Milan in 374: his biographer Paulinus explicitly puts his baptism after his election (*Vita Ambrosii* 9.2–3).

Despite pervasive inaccuracy, does Field's book perhaps advance a significant thesis? It does, but one that is grievously mistaken. Field belittles and disparages the originality of Augustine, whose insistence on the central role of original sin he presents as the mere reaffirmation of an existing consensus among the "Latin Fathers" (p. 258). In Field's view, the dominant intellectual influence on the thought of subsequent generations was Ambrose, who, with his contemporaries of the generation before Augustine, "laid the foundations of the medieval church" (p. 250). How does Field reach this remarkable conclusion? First, he reads the late medieval interpretation of the gospel text "Behold, we have two swords" (Luke 22:38) as referring to the temporal and secular power into a series of early Latin Christian writers from Tertullian to Ambrose. Next, he finds an implicit allusion to this later exegesis in almost every occurrence of the word *gladius* in these writers, even when the word occurs in the singular. And third, he claims that this doctrine, which he alleges to be ubiquitous, is central to the way in which Latin theologians of the third and fourth centuries thought about the relations between the Christian Church and the Roman Empire. All of this seems to me to be completely misguided.

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RAMSAY MACMULLEN. *Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1997. Pp. vi, 282. \$30.00.

Ramsay MacMullen's most recent book is a slender volume that takes on a big question: how did the ancient world turn from paganism to Christianity? MacMullen's answer here builds on his earlier studies in religious history. He addressed the nature of *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (1984) and then turned to Christianity and conversion in *Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100–400)* (1989). Now MacMullen has brought together these two religious systems and articulated, in detail, his notion of the religious transformation of the ancient world. This book also offers an opportunity for MacMullen to respond to scholarly criticism of his earlier work.

Among the admirable aspects of MacMullen's new book is the restatement of paganism as a vital religious system. He shows just how well paganism worked as a comprehensive system by including details of religious life drawn from deep knowledge of pagan practice in an empire that spanned several centuries and continents. Here we encounter private worship by pagans, a subject too often overlooked. MacMullen describes it not only with well-known details such as the worship of the Lares and Penates in the wall niches and tiny chapels in Pompeii but in more unfamiliar ways, such



as the dream about celebrating a funeral banquet at a tomb recounted by Artemidorus in his second-century treatise *On Dream Interpretation*. The rich notation that accompanies the text, emblematic of MacMullen's thorough scholarly style, makes paganism come alive in all of its otherness. One important conclusion that MacMullen draws from his detailed reconstruction of paganism is the degree of personal loss that conversion represented to whole segments of the population.

Yet, if this system worked so well, why did Christianity succeed? MacMullen's answer is clear. Christianity had spread to an estimated ten percent of the population by the end of the third century; miracles and the promise of curing the pains of the body still loom large in MacMullen's account. From the fourth century on, the urban and administrative elites by and large turned to Christianity driven by positive incentives such as material gain and social advancement. But for the majority of the population, living as it did in the countryside, force was necessary. Pagans were persecuted, starting in the fourth and continuing with greater force in the fifth century down through the eighth century. This process (described, too, in *Christianizing the Roman Empire*) relied heavily on the administrative machinery of the state and on the church's bishops and monks. Distance from imperial control enabled the rural population (where most lived) to maintain their pagan practices after the elites in the cities and in the government had converted.

Although the rural population was forced to convert in the fifth century and after (according to MacMullen), their pagan rituals survived and were assimilated into the Christianity that emerged in the Mediterranean world. This fact has long been acknowledged, as MacMullen himself notes. Yet, what distinguishes MacMullen's chapter on these practices is the claim that these rituals constitute a religious, not merely a cultural survival. Here he parts company from several other scholars whose definition of religion rules out practices such as rhythmic dancing, for instance, from being considered religious. This reviewer is in many ways sympathetic to the weight placed on such assimilation, but viewing all such rituals as religious is problematic too; even in the eyes of the participants, some pagan rituals were not meaningful as religious acts. Moreover, participants might feel totally justified in viewing these once pagan rites as "cultural," especially when bishops supported this notion by accepting such practices.

The assimilation of pagan rituals supports MacMullen's view that Christians were forced to allow such rituals even as they resorted to persecuting pagans in part because of "an emptiness call it, or some mix of deficiencies, in Christianity itself" (p. 72). This claim surprises, but it is consistent with MacMullen's view of paganism as a vital system and of his notion that theology cannot satisfactorily explain conversion. He argues, with justification, that few converts listened to the many sermons that were preached and carefully preserved by the church. These sermons, as Mac-

Mullen rightly notes, have falsely colored modern explanations of the religious transformation of the ancient world.

Perhaps the most provocative of MacMullen's arguments is his proposal of a marked increase in superstition among the elites as well as the population at large by the fourth century and after. By superstition, he means "the degree of acceptance of superhuman intervention in life as lived and observed" (p.84). MacMullen comes to this conclusion in part from looking at the evidence of elite sources from the first three centuries. Comparing for example the writings of men like Pliny, Plotinus, and Plutarch with the beliefs of a Diocletian, he concludes that "the spectrum of belief lost its skeptical and empirical-thinking extreme" (p. 83). MacMullen attributes this increase in superstition among the leading classes to a demographic shift. As large numbers of men from the lower classes advanced into positions of military leadership and civic administration, they, according to MacMullen, brought with them superstitious modes of thought. And once the upper classes were as credulous as the lower, the path was wide open for Christianity to "reinforce the tendency of the anti-pagan persecution in 'popularizing' the religion of later times" (p. 83). Yet the evidence for a rise in superstition is weak; Pliny, Plotinus, and Plutarch, however influential, were not necessarily typical. To posit from these that the spectrum included a greater number of "empirical-thinking" elites and a greater degree of skepticism in the first two centuries of the empire is not compelling; according to Suetonius, even the emperor Nero, a well-educated ruler if there was one, worshipped a statuette of a girl as a charm against conspiracies. Nor do demographic shifts necessarily bring changes in the history of thought; the spread of college education to the post-World War II generation did not bring a marked increase or decrease in the use of reason.

MacMullen's insistence on bringing paganism and Christianity into one "moving picture of change" makes this book a valuable contribution. Paganism did affect Christianity; its rituals and beliefs did seep into the Christianity that grew up in the Mediterranean world. The assimilation of pagan practices is but one aspect of this influence. The other side of this process, the ways in which Christianity affected paganism, is unfortunately largely lost from view, although some scholars have seen traces of this process in, for example, pagan notions of the afterlife that seem more consonant with Christian views. If MacMullen's slender volume cannot incorporate all of the complexities of religious change from the fourth to the eighth centuries, it does, nonetheless, demonstrate the necessity of viewing these two religious systems as influencing one another. Religious historians are well advised to build upon this insight.

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WARREN TREADGOLD. *A History of the Byzantine State and Society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1997. Pp. xxiii, 1019. Cloth \$79.50, paper \$34.95.

The long and colorful, often dramatic and melancholy story of Byzantium, the "Empire of East Rome," stands today as perhaps the most neglected area of historical studies in American colleges and universities. Students seldom learn of the Emperor Basil II, "the Bulgar-Slayer," whose reputation was such that enemies fled terrorized upon learning of his approach, or the haughty Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularius, who challenged the authority of the medieval popes. Histories of Byzantium are nearly as rare. For complete accounts spanning the Byzantine years, 284–1453, choice is limited mostly to G. Ostrogorsky's *History of the Byzantine State* (rev. ed. 1969) or C. Mango's *Byzantium: The Empire of East Rome* (1980), and it is this need that Warren Treadgold proposes to fill. The task is a daunting one, as few scholars today possess a thousand-year range, and this occasionally poses problems that Treadgold, for all his ability and confidence, is unable to meet. In the end, his effort is only partially successful, and a new single-volume history of Byzantium, particularly one suitable for classroom use, remains a highly desirable item for Byzantine studies.

Treadgold's approach is Gibbonesque, both in the narrative style employed as well as his ideas on the nature of history itself (e.g. the notion of the "Fall of Rome," the idea that history repeats itself). His narrative is often engaging, and the story of Byzantium that he tells is reliable, though not remarkable, and too frequently sacrifices a critical analysis of the events. The emphasis on the Byzantine state makes sensible the author's decision to begin the narrative with Diocletian and Constantine. These two Roman emperors changed radically albeit differently the nature of the Roman Empire. Although the discussion of these two key rulers is mostly reliable, some interpretations are debatable. The assessment of Diocletian (pp. 22–27) in particular is understated and seemingly fails to appreciate the internal and external crises the emperor faced when he seized power in 284. In fact, he faced a greater challenge than had Octavian/Augustus 300 years before, and with little money and fewer resources to throw at his many problems. Yet Diocletian found the ways and means to do just that, with the result that when he retired in 305, Constantine, who eventually succeeded him, inherited a much stronger state. The Diocletianic-Constantinian reforms together laid the foundations of Byzantium for hundreds of years to come.

Constantine's greatness lay in his vision, both in consolidating what Diocletian had begun and in reaching out to the emerging power of the Christian community. Treadgold's treatment of the Constantinian "dream-vision" tradition is again Gibbonesque, omitting analysis of the post hoc nature of these accounts. The discussion of Arianism, the major doctrinal dis-

pute in Constantine's reign, is effectively presented, but the building of the "New Rome," Constantinople, does not attract much notice (p. 45).

On the events and developments of the so-called "Middle Byzantine" era (610–1071), Treadgold is on more familiar ground, and his narrative is mostly sound. Here, however, readers need to beware a too ready acceptance of his views on the formation of the *themes*, the military/provincial system that emerged in the years following the Arabic invasions in 634. Treadgold attributes this, on the basis of "plausible guesswork" (p. 315), to the Emperor Constans (641–668). (Here he repeats views advanced in his *Byzantium and Its Army* [1995].) How Constans, who shared his reign with regents and lived away from the capital for prolonged periods, could establish a system of military grants that would become a provincial system is unclear. Elsewhere Treadgold offers a surprising assessment of the Arab effort against Constantinople in 674–678. This he characterizes as only a "raid in force" rather than an all-out effort to capture the imperial capital. Such a view ignores what was a major effort by the Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus to complete the destruction of the empire begun in 634. The last great theological dispute to trouble Byzantium, Iconoclasm, occurred in this era, and the treatment is reliable. A critical omission, however, and one that explains much that motivated the Emperor Leo III to destroy holy images of saints and even those of Christ, was the emperor's claim that he was both "Emperor and Priest" (in a letter to Pope Gregory II; see D. J. Sahas, *Icon and Logos: Sources in Eighth Century Iconoclasm* [1986], p. 28). Leo's assertion goes a long way in explaining this imperial program and efforts to widen its authority. Treadgold treats in relatively brief fashion the long decline of Byzantium following the sack of Constantinople by the knights of the Fourth Crusade (1204). His account follows that of D. M. Nicol and M. Angold, among other scholars, and the events and personalities of this era (e.g. Michael VIII Palaeologus and the restoration of the empire) are generally well told. The dismissal of the Seljuk Turks, however, as "disorganized nomads" (p. 667) is uninformative and begs the question as to the rapid success of these newcomers in rolling back millennia of Hellenism. So, too, the overall success of the Ottoman Turks in overwhelming Byzantium could have been better developed. Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of this last phase of Byzantium is the "Palaeologan Renaissance," which Treadgold examines, particularly the celebrated art in the Constantinopolitan churches of St. Sophia and St. Saviour in Chora (pp. 834–35). An equally rich but overlooked provincial example of this "renaissance" comes from Thessaloniki and the frescoes there in the church of St. Nicolas Orphanos.

While Treadgold aims at addressing Byzantine society, he is not always successful in doing so. He relates clearly various cultural events and personalities, such as the "Macedonian Renaissance" and the work of Michael Psellus, but he misses opportunities to discuss

changes in Byzantine society during its long history. One such example occurs in the aftermath of the Arabic invasions and an eighth-century text called the "Farmer's Law" (pp. 410–13). Treadgold mentions it in his notes, but what the work reveals in the way of changes in social structure and rural/urban life is passed over. This applies also to the *dynatoi*, the provincial elite who dominated Byzantine society after the tenth century. Similarly, discussion of Byzantine spirituality seems confused: at one point Treadgold notes the importance of monks, but elsewhere he skeptically dismisses a scholarly treatment of holy men (pp. 390, 931, n. 12).

Generally the text is well produced, and readers will find only a few minor typographical errors. Numerous well-chosen plates illustrate the narrative, although some of these are too dark and small to be of much help. One that illustrates the Palace of the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John on Rhodes is erroneous (p. 753): the photo shows instead the Street of the Knights, with its "Inns of the Tongues" in which an Italian Grand Master once lived. The family tree of Constantine the Great (opposite p. 47) does not show that the Helena married to the Emperor Julian was in fact Constantine's daughter. The name of the Constantinople church of St. Saviour in Chora means "in the country" and not "dwelling" (p. 834).

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WALTER POHL and HELMUT REIMITZ, editors. *Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300–800*. (The Transformation of the Roman World, number 2.) New York: E. J. Brill. 1998. Pp. vi, 347.

This volume of essays by fourteen international contributors is indicative of rising scholarly interest in the creation and character of ethnic identity. (Just since receiving my review copy of the book, I have randomly encountered other recently published discussions of ethnicity in times and regions as diverse as fifth/sixth-century Western Europe, early Israel, and pre-Hellenistic Macedonia.) In general, this interest is probably spurred by present ethnic political turbulence around the world. Co-editor Walter Pohl makes explicit his view that the issues illuminated in the collected essays have a clear application in the present: "if one deals with today's problems of nationalism, it is not enough to study the history and ideology of the last two centuries. One has to go back to the development of ethnic rhetoric and representation between Antiquity and the early Middle Ages" (p. 14).

This book is volume two of a project supported by the European Science Foundation entitled *The Transformation of the Roman World*. The project is slated to stretch to eighteen edited volumes dealing (through an interdisciplinary approach) with the transition from the late Roman Empire to the early Middle Ages in Western and Central Europe. The preceding volume

(also edited by Pohl) is *Kingdoms of the Empire: The Integration of Barbarians in Late Antiquity* (1997).

The collection is divided into five sections, including the introduction by Pohl and the conclusion by Ian Wood (the series editor of *The Transformation of the Roman World*). Four essays (by Pohl, Falko Daim, Peter Heather, and Jörg Jarnut) appear under the heading "Signs and Identities." This section, along with the introduction and conclusion, may be the most interesting and useful for readers who do not specialize in early medieval Europe, for the essays (especially those of Pohl and Daim) deal somewhat more broadly and theoretically than the others with the problems of defining and recognizing ethnic identity in historical and archeological sources.

Six essays (by Dietrich Claude, Wolf Liebeschuetz, Gisela Ripoll López, Hagith Sivan, Brigitte Pohl-Resl, and Michel Kazanski) are presented under the heading "Distinction and Acculturation." These essays are detailed, chronological case studies (the first four grounded in Visigothic Spain) of shifting and recombining ethnic identities illuminated by several different categories of (less than fully adequate) data: dress, language, law, grave goods. The remaining three essays (by Dick Harrison, Matthias Hardt, and Michael Schmauder), grouped under the heading "Political Rhetoric and Representation," primarily explore specific ways that objects (buildings, coins, religious relics, jewelry) were utilized in specific post-Roman contexts to express a meaningful ethno-political ideology.

This is a significant work, notwithstanding some (almost inescapable) unevenness in quality among the contributions and some internal contradictions on both factual and theoretical levels. The collected presentations are particularly successful in demonstrating what Pohl calls "the most fundamental point . . . that ethnic communities are not immutable biological or ontological essences, but the results of historical processes or, as one might put it, historical processes in themselves" (p. 8).

That is not to suggest, however, that one comes away from the book with a tidy understanding either of ethnicity in general or of the historical process by which ethnic communities were established in Europe between 300–800. Accidents of data survival and the choices of the contributors have enabled only fragmented geographical and chronological coverage. Moreover, ethnic identity, ethnic signifiers, and ethnic community often appear in the essays like a highway mirage whose reality disappears upon close inspection. In his essay "Telling the Difference: Signs of Ethnic Identity," for example, Pohl presents a detailed discussion of the significance of an array of factors that have traditionally been viewed as signifiers of ethnic identity: language, weapons and tactics, costume, hairstyles, and body decorations. Under his analysis, the absolute utility of each of these factors for reflecting ethnic identity is seriously diminished. The lesson here (and in the other essays) is that ethnicity is a complex psychological/behavioral phenomenon that cannot be

understood (either historically or in the present) in simplistic, non-contextualized generalizations.

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WILLIAM M. AIRD. *St. Cuthbert and the Normans: The Church of Durham, 1071–1153*. (Studies in the History of Medieval Religion, number 14.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell. 1998. Pp. xvi, 311. \$75.00.

The Community of St. Cuthbert, located successively at Lindisfarne, Chester le Street, and Durham, was the most powerful ecclesiastical corporation in the north at the time of the Norman Conquest of England; indeed, it alone had withstood that combination of external attack and internal decline that had led to the demise of other notable monastic centers. In 1083 there occurred one of what William M. Aird describes as the “two great crises” of the church of Durham: the replacement, by Bishop William of St. Calais, of the community that served the shrine, the *Congregatio Sancti Cuthberti*, with Benedictine monks. Historically this has been seen as a radical break in Durham’s history, one that symbolized foreign domination of the English church, the imposition of alien rule in the north, and Norman appropriation of the greatest of the Northumbrian saints. Aird questions this interpretation. Interrogating closely the sources, and particularly the Durham monk and historian Symeon (writing between 1104 and 1109), he challenges the notion that the events of 1083 were as cataclysmic or disruptive as portrayed in the official Durham history. Indeed, he argues for a strong sense of continuity across the “divide” of 1083.

As background to his main study, Aird provides us with a rich and detailed study of the development of the church of St. Cuthbert and its patrimony, as well as its place in Northumbrian politics, from 635 to the coming of the Normans. What emerges is far from the traditional picture of fugitive monks driven from their island home of Lindisfarne in desperate search of safe haven from the Vikings; rather, we see a purposeful, powerful community taking a proactive role in Northumbrian politics in order to safeguard its status, lands, and wealth. Aird discusses the attitude of the *Congregatio* to its own transformation in 1083 in this context of a tradition of searching for survival and preservation. He argues convincingly that Symeon was misleading when he suggested a complete change in personnel in the community: indeed, there was no violent resistance to change, which came gradually over a period of at least twenty years. For Aird, there is a case for seeing the momentum of change in the church of Durham accelerate, not with the establishment of the Benedictine priory in 1083 but in the episcopate of Rannulf Flambard (1099–1128), who upset the harmony that had existed between Bishop William of St. Calais and the convent by exploiting the estates of the patrimony and granting them to his *nepotes*. Indeed, as Aird demonstrates in chapter five

(“The Knights of St. Cuthbert”), it was in the time of Flambard that the upper echelons of society in the patrimony became predominantly French. Thus, the native aristocracy—like the Community of St. Cuthbert—was not “totally overwhelmed by French settlers in the aftermath of Conquest” (p. 225).

The laying of the foundation stones of the new cathedral of Durham in 1093 was marked by a great ceremony, and the two most significant secular figures present came not from the court of the English king but from the north: they were the Scottish king, Malcolm III, and his son (p. 275). A constant theme in Aird’s book is the way in which the period from 1071 to 1153 was a defining one for the land between the Tweed and the Tees, an area disputed between two monarchies, the Anglo-Norman and the Scottish. He cautions against an anachronistic approach that sees Northumbria and Durham, and the bishops of Durham, as bastions of Englishness facing the hostile Scots. Although it can be demonstrated that there were periods—the reign of Malcolm III, for instance—when St. Cuthbert’s patrimony suffered at Scottish hands, there was by no means unremitting hostility between the *haliferfolc* and their neighbors to the north. As Aird argues, to think of the folk of St. Cuthbert as English or Northumbrian is misleading; its members were the people of the holy man; they had their own identity and their own interests, and these they pursued tenaciously across the centuries.

The book is characterized by a rigorous use of a whole range of sources and by attention to detail. Aird is to be congratulated for having produced a fine study that challenges many assumptions about the history of the church of Durham in its formative years, the nature of the Norman settlement in the north, and the political transformation of the area.

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KASPAR ELM. *Umbilicus Mundi: Beiträge zur Geschichte Jerusalems, der Kreuzzüge, des Kapitels vom Hlg. Grab in Jerusalem und der Ritterorden*. (Instrumenta Canonis-sarum Regularium Sancti Sepulcri, number 7.) Bruges: Sint-Kruis. 1998. Pp. iv, 566.

The present volume provides us with a valuable collection of Kaspar Elm’s writings on the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem and the religious institutes that developed from devotion to the burial place of Christ between the end of the eleventh century and the French Revolution. The formation of the Chapter and Regular Canons of the church by Godfrey of Bouillon; the transformation of the church itself into the seat of the Latin Patriarchate, with the fifteen canons as electors of the Patriarch; and the erection of the crusader church (1149), uniting elements on the site that had previously been separated, mark the beginning of a rich and complex history in the institutional and religious life of the Catholic Church. But,



for the most part, the locus of that history was to be found not in the Holy Land but in the West. The final loss of Jerusalem before the middle of the thirteenth century forced the Canons of the Holy Sepulcher to move, with the Patriarch, to Acre. Following the loss of Acre in 1291, they transferred their seat to Perugia. The spread of the devotion to the Holy Sepulcher among the laity, especially through the formation of lay confraternities of men and women; the foundation of the Knights of the Holy Sepulcher; and the growth of houses of canonesses of the Holy Sepulcher dedicated to the education of girls belong to the period between the early fourteenth and the seventeenth century. Elm provides a detailed picture of these developments, with emphasis on Germany and the Netherlands.

He is master of the considerable and often unreliable literature dealing with the Knights of the Holy Sepulcher. He provides a useful summary of earlier work, with careful acknowledgement of the contributions of previous scholars in his article on "Kanoniker und Ritter vom Heiligen Grab: Ein Beitrag zur Entstehung und Frühgeschichte der Palästinischen Ritterorden," which will prove very useful to those working on the history of the military orders and trying to locate the Knights of the Holy Sepulcher in that history. In actuality, they had no military role. Founded in the fourteenth century, their history belongs more to that of chivalric knighthoods than to that of the military orders. Like most such groups, they were closely bound up with the fortunes of the aristocracy, waxing and waning accordingly. Their modern form has received recognition from and been revised by a number of recent popes. Although a Catholic order, they do have some Protestant members.

Other sections of this book deal with the role of women religious. "Fratres et Sorores Sanctissimi Sepulchri" studies not merely lay men and women affiliated with the order but women religious as well, a topic that is dealt with more fully in the article on "Die Frauen vom Heiligen Grab." Elm makes clear the relationship of these women religious to such orders as the Ursulines, thus tying them to the general movement for the education of women in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Another entire section is devoted to the history of St. Pelagius in Denkendorf, the oldest German priory, whose story traces the history of a single German house during the German Reformation.

The importance of Elm's research to both medievalists and early modern scholars lies chiefly in his profound understanding of the religious culture of both periods. It is impossible to read these essays without recognizing that efforts to characterize the religious movements of the period have to take into consideration not merely traditional and conservative elements but also the way in which they dealt with an ever-changing world in dynamic ways. These movements speak to us of many different responses. With Elm's help, we can understand some of them better.

Unfortunately, this book is not well edited. There are too many typographical errors, and the format is not attractive. These features detract from an otherwise valuable work by a learned scholar.

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BRUNO LEMESLE. *La société aristocratique dans le Haut-Maine (XI<sup>e</sup>-XII<sup>e</sup> siècles)*. Foreword by DOMINIQUE BARTHÉLEMY. (Histoire.) Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. 1999. Pp. 315. 170fr.

The wave of regional studies that restructured medieval French social history in the last generation bypassed the county of Maine. Beyond a number of studies on individual castellan families, no work of synthesis has replaced Robert Latouche's *Histoire du comte du Maine pendant le X<sup>e</sup> et le XI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (1910). So it is a minor historiographical event when three major, and quite different, studies on medieval Maine appear within the space of five years. Daniel Pichot (*Le Bas-Maine du X<sup>e</sup> au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle: Étude d'une société*, [1995]) combines archaeological and documentary evidence to view society in the Bas-Maine through the chronological and conceptual framework of Georges Duby's 1953 study on the Mâconnais. Robert Barton's dissertation ("Power and Lordship in Maine, c. 890-1100" [1997]) uses Maine as a laboratory to engage recent debates on the nature of lordship and the "feudal transformation" around the year 1000. And Bruno Lemesle, adopting the insights and perspectives recently pioneered by Dominique Barthélemy, proposes a fundamental reinterpretation of the social order and aristocratic practices in the Haut-Maine.

Lemesle begins with a brief political history of Maine based on the narrative sources, but he argues that their depiction of endemic war and violence should not be accepted uncritically. War filled only twenty-five years of the eleventh century and often was self-limiting, ending in negotiated settlement rather than wholesale destruction. It was simply the means by which counts and castle lords protected their legitimate rights, not the result of "feudal anarchy," and it was neither the defining factor of the eleventh century nor responsible for the restructuring of society. Lemesle takes his critical view of the ecclesiastical sources to the second part of his study, where he cautions that the charters depicting conflicts with laymen distort the wide range of relationships between monastic institutions and aristocratic families. Counts, barons, and knights were not so much the enemies of monasteries as their symbiotic benefactors who sought spiritual benefits and burial rights, who liberally endowed new communities and patronized old ones, and who often joined communities where they had close relatives. In his subtle analysis of sources, religious institutions, and aristocratic families, Lemesle gives us a far more nuanced and ordered eleventh century than

the one we customarily envision, and it deserves serious attention within the larger discussion on the nature and extent of violence in medieval society.

The last part of the book consists of equally suggestive essays on the aristocratic family, lords and vassals, and the exercise of power. Lemesle's analysis of the family is particularly refreshing. Critical of medievalists' continued misuse of the term lineage to mean agnatic descent, he constructs a more complex notion of the aristocratic family based on the conjugal unit, where the right of eldest son was preferential, not exclusionary (all children received an inheritance), and where the wife enjoyed substantial dower rights (later defined as one-third of her husband's property) in addition to her own dowry. Lemesle argues persuasively that the conjugal family was not new in eleventh-century Maine but only better exposed because monastic institutions referred to it in the records they increasingly drafted to protect their own property rights. The evidence from Maine is entirely in accord with practices in contemporary Anjou, and it makes a strong case for the centrality of the conjugal family long before the canon lawyers formalized their thoughts on the subject in the twelfth century.

Only in his fifth chapter does Lemesle enter the lists against the dominant paradigm of social organization: rejecting the traditional scheme of "nobles and knights" (he finds no evidence of a fusion of the two in the twelfth century), he settles on "lords and vassals" as the best way to represent relations between the endogamous elite of castle lords and the knights, which he sees as a diverse class of middling landed proprietors and stipendiary soldiers. He finds eleventh-century Maine to have been highly feudalized in the sense that fiefs with their concomitant military service, mostly castle guard, were widely held, but the pattern of fiefholding was more horizontal than pyramidal. All of this is a useful reminder that feudal institutions were formed long before they were explicated by customary codes and exploited by the king and powerful princes. The implications of Lemesle's well-written, provocative study extend far beyond Maine and the eleventh century.

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JOHN B. FREED. *Noble Bondsmen: Ministerial Marriages in the Archdiocese of Salzburg, 1100-1343*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1995. Pp. xvi, 304. \$49.95.

This is a social history of the "ministerial" class in a German principality in the central medieval period, with special reference to marriage. John B. Freed traces the rise of the ministerial class in the archdiocese of Salzburg from serfdom through aristocratic status to decline in the fourteenth century. One long-term reason for the decline was a new marriage pattern, normal from the mid-thirteenth century, by which more than one son was allowed to marry. This

tended to split up the family lands. The new pattern went together with and tended to foster the rise of the dowry, paid from the bride's side, as opposed to the dower, paid from the husband's side. (The latter may have been hard to enforce against the husband's family.) As the patrimony was spread thin among more than one son, it became important for the family of the bride to make sure she would be provided for if her husband died and indeed that the couple should have the wherewithal to start a household. The prince bishop threw his growing authority behind the new system, even contributing to some dowries. Nevertheless, Freed stresses that the principality of Salzburg did not follow a pattern observed elsewhere (notably Florence), where the dower dwindled into insignificance, and the dowry became grossly inflated.

Dowries and dowers, however, are something of a sub-plot. The main storyline is about the implications of servile status for marriage. Lords controlled the marriages of their serfs, even if the serfs had become powerful nobles. Here Freed could have developed further the comparison with England, where lords controlled their free vassals' marriages both before and after Magna Carta (see clause 6 of the 1215 version). What difference then did servility make? The answer would seem to be as follows: in England a marriage was a danger to the lord of the wife, whose new husband might be an enemy. That could also hold good for Salzburg. In Salzburg, however, there was also a danger to the lord of the husband. The latter's new wife might be a "serf" of a different lord, who might gain control of her children and land. Serfdom here was governed by the principle that children normally went with the mother. So the personal unfreedom of *ministeriales* did make a difference.

Freed points out that the church's consanguinity prohibition made it hard for *ministeriales* to find spouses with the same lord. A solution in the thirteenth century was for the lord of the unfree man and the lord of the unfree woman to agree to divide the children between them. In the early fourteenth century, a different solution evolved: the wife's lord surrendered his rights over her to the husband's lord, but she abandoned claims to inheritance of her family's land (her dowry might be enhanced as a compensation). This is serious and interesting social history. One is impressed by Freed's scholarly honesty and integrity. He does not cut corners with his tricky source material, and he is never pretentious. Nor is he myopic. He makes intelligent though discreet use of social anthropology. The last chapter relates social history to cultural history (the Rodenegg frescoes and the poem *Frauendienst*). There is some subjectivity here, but Freed has something to offer even the medieval Germanists: notably the observation that the lord of Rodenegg married a widow of superior social status, just as Yvain did; and Freed's general point about the chivalric sophistication of this parvenu class

is undeniable. Altogether, this is a valuable book by a scholar's scholar.

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JOHN HINE MUNDY. *Society and Government at Toulouse in the Age of the Cathars*. (Studies and Texts, number 129.) Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Pontifical Institute. 1997. Pp. xiii, 528.

This book draws on John Hine Mundy's research during more than half a century to reiterate and revise his understanding of medieval Toulouse. Having devoted his first book, *Liberty and Political Power in Toulouse, 1050–1230* (1954), to the rise and decline of consular power in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Mundy subsequently examined the repression of the Cathars (*The Repression of Catharism at Toulouse: The Royal Diploma of 1279* [1986]) and the experience of women (*Men and Women of Toulouse in the Age of Cathars* [1990]). In the present volume, he returns to all these themes and takes up others in a lavishly detailed study of Toulousan society, family, economy, and government. What he finds is that the city and its hinterlands revived in the twelfth century as an open society hospitable to trade and credit and tolerant of heresy; that a civic elite gained a large measure of political autonomy toward 1190–1210; that Catharism, whose diffusion is skilfully traced in consular lists and family histories, and interest-bearing credit became vulnerable to moral theology and an increasingly repressive clergy; and that the consular regime lost power to resurgent princely initiatives in the thirteenth century.

The strength of the book lies in its assemblage of a massive documentation of society and economy. Long ago, Mundy photographed Toulousan records from the municipal and departmental archives in vast quantities; he has spent decades analyzing and indexing them. The present book adds to the familial histories set forth in earlier ones. Cogent mini-histories of enterprise and usury spring from the analyses of testaments and contracts. Mundy is at his best in making sense of an original parchment sale or donation preserved in Series E (which means family history, for which the deposits are much fuller for the Middle Ages in the archives of the Haute-Garonne than is usual in France); and close to forty percent of his book consists of appendixes devoted to families, lists of consuls, a calendar of testaments, and the like.

What results is a veritable sourcebook of classified information about status, occupations, wealth, and obligations of people at Toulouse. I know of nothing quite like it for other Mediterranean towns for periods before 1250. But readers interested more generally in medieval urbanism may find the author too close to his sources for comfort. Mundy may be right to associate the structural pattern of Toulousan growth with that of Italian towns; but since he fails to cite, or even to list,

the more eligible case studies for comparison, such as David Herlihy on Pistoia and Pisa or Stephen Bensch on Barcelona, the analogy remains questionable. There is no reference to R. I. Moore, whose thesis about a "persecuting society" is not so different from, and rather more cogently expressed than, Mundy's own conception of the crisis of heresy. On these matters the historical chronology seems parochial and unclear, and not on these alone. Mundy's latest treatment of the lord-princely origins of Toulouse is less satisfactory than that of 1954, for here the implications of recent research on feudalism and nobility have been misunderstood. In my view, the comital charters granted to the Toulousans in the 1140s and after bear the record of a timely reaction against arbitrary lordship such as is visible also in the viscounty of Béziers and the county of Barcelona; while the incipient consular regime of the later twelfth century—itsself emphatically a regime of lordly pretension—coincides with both the reorganized Peace in Occitania and the systematizing of feudal lordship and dependence. Engaging though he is on names and their meaning, Mundy says nothing about the Mediterranean contexts of anthroponymy developed by Monique Bourin and J.-L. Biget. The *Usatges of Barcelona*, which in the present case have very dubious comparative pertinence, are much cited (pp. 33, 37, 43, 45–47, 76), but not the records of consular experiments and fiscal accountancy in Catalonia, which assuredly do matter for Toulouse. The name of Paul Guilhiermoz is misspelled (pp. 109, 485); the county of Toulouse is confused with the (factitious) duchy of Narbonne (p. 234).

This is nonetheless an important book. It is perhaps the most thorough study of a great city of southern France in its formative age ever attempted by a modern historian, a study based on a lifetime of devoted scholarship. It is a story of urban growth and crisis supported by a wealth of documentary information.

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CHARLES DE MIRAMON. *Les "donnés" au Moyen Âge: Une forme de vie religieuse laïque (v.1180-v.1500)*. Foreword by ALAIN BOUREAU. Paris: CERF. 1999. Pp. vi, 486. 270fr.

When medieval sources discussed the people in religious communities, they ordinarily concentrated on the "real members," whether monks, nuns, canons, friars, or hospital workers. But the sources also contain elusive references to other men and women who were somehow affiliated with religious communities. Medieval intellectuals and administrators often could not tell whether those people were in or outside the religious life—and often, neither can we. The Latin terminology, which varied by region, time period, and monastic tradition, compounds our uncertainty about who they were. They were called *oblatis*, *redditi*, *con-*

*versi*, *prebendarii*, *donati*, and other terms. It is difficult to know if the different words signified the same or different sorts of people. Modern scholars have coined terms such as “semi-religious” to refer to these people.

Charles de Miramon has undertaken the daunting task of making historical sense of these semi-religious men and women, who have almost no personal voice in the sources. He chose the word *donatus* (“given”) as the most appropriate way to name them—hence the *donnés* in his title. Because he judged it impossible to find a historical origin for the *donati*, he began his study about 1180, when a few charters enabled him to pour some content into the word *donatus*. In his definition, a *donatus* was a person who had given to a religious community *se et sua*, that is, himself/herself and his/her property. The donation was often recorded in a written contract. The *donatus* wore clothing that set him/her off from both lay people and professed religious.

The author’s treatment is remarkably comprehensive, ranging across three centuries in Latin Europe (Spain, Italy, France) with a foray into the Germanic-speaking Netherlands to study the *donati* in the late medieval *devotio moderna*. The book is distinguished by prodigious research, particularly in manuscripts and rare printed sources. De Miramon analyzes, sometimes brilliantly, sources about *donati* in monastic houses, hospitals, leprosaria, and other institutions. He treats the theological “discourses” about *donati*, and is particularly skilled in ferreting out and interpreting canonical sources and their “discourses.”

But the *donati* are elusive quarry. They appear mostly in brief or secondary ways in charters, canons, jurists’ commentaries, reformers’ writings, the statutes of religious houses and orders, and other sources. They resist generalizations. They ranged in social status from poor agricultural workers, to married couples, to clergy, to well-off retirees. Their obligations ranged from residence in a community with a commitment to obedience and chastity to living at home in control of their property until death. Analyses of the canonists’ views bring into view the stubborn problem at the heart of any study of *donati*. The medieval lawyers were puzzled and frustrated by the task of categorizing the “semi-religious” status, whose complexity outran their efforts to catch it on parchment. Categorization was no idle activity. If the *donati* were “religious,” they could claim the legal and economic privileges of the clergy. If they were lay people, their services and wealth were liable to claims from parish priests, Italian communes, and other governmental bodies. De Miramon, like the lawyers, is sometimes overwhelmed by the complexity and ambiguity of the realities that lay behind the words, which are so hard to grasp.

To me, the book’s least satisfying aspect, which is certainly attributable to deficiencies in the sources, is its inability to demonstrate the “religious” aspects of being “semi-religious.” There is a school of interpretation that sees such “gifts” as basically economic transactions, through which the giver sought security

and the religious house sought labor or wealth. The author clearly believes that the donation of *se et sua* was, or could be, a religious act. But we are not told—perhaps cannot be told—what the *donati* themselves thought they were doing. When medieval sources move beyond concern about the property and legal status of the *donati*, they are almost uniformly negative about them. Reformers excoriated them as parasites, disrupters of tranquillity, wasters of property, or simoniacs who were buying spiritual things. De Miramon never attempts to probe such contemporary views. Instead, he marginalizes criticism by relegating it to a mere “discourse”: some bishops and reformers had agendas that were advanced by a negative “discourse” about the *donati*. Perhaps, but I wish he had confronted the substance underlying that negative discourse.

This learned book is full of insights, telling us a great deal about the cloud of semi-religious who attached themselves to most medieval religious communities (but not to Franciscans, Dominicans, or religious communities in England). Even with this solid contribution to our knowledge, much about the *donati* remains elusive.

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MAIJU LEHMJOKI-GARDNER. *Worldly Saints: Social Interaction of Dominican Penitent Women in Italy, 1200–1500*. (Bibliotheca Historica, number 35.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1999. Pp. 189.

This modest study of social roles for religious women is based on the biographies (*vitae*) of nineteen Dominican penitents (*pinzochere*) in late medieval Italy. When composing these exemplary *vitae* Dominican friars selected their subjects for their reputations as conduits to the holy and for their potential as models of behavior. Maiju Lehmijoki-Gardner interrogates the *vitae* for information on the penitents’ involvement in worldly activities such as manual labor, teaching, and charity, and on the friars’ attitudes toward those activities. She argues convincingly that while the Dominican men who supervised these women tolerated active service and even praised it occasionally, they ultimately subordinated its value to the goal of spiritual retreat. They reserved their highest praise for the penitents’ mystical and contemplative powers. As St. Catherine of Siena wrote, the penitent was to carry a “mental cell” with her everywhere, to which she could retreat while scrubbing floors or emptying bedpans. This contrasted with male models of sanctity, which more readily combined active and contemplative roles.

These penitents, for whom Catherine (1347–1380) became the towering model, took a vow of chastity and wore a habit to indicate their status but remained in lay households. Rising in the cold night to hold prayer vigils while the rest of the household slept, retreating from the ribald stories at the hearth to solitary meditation in another room, penitents faced a very different



set of challenges than did the nun in a convent. Like all lay women, particularly single women, they were caught up in endless rounds of housework and caring for others. Some few ventured into informal teaching activities, although this proved risky. Despite the confessors' mistrustful view of social action, Lehmijoki-Gardner concludes, the penitent life did offer some limited opportunities for lay women to participate in the world.

A useful contribution is the book's focus on what distinguished Dominican penitent women, and their confessors, from those of other orders and those without affiliation. Franciscan and Dominican rules for penitents were both composed in the 1280s, but the Franciscan rule received papal approval right away, while the Dominican rule remained unsanctioned until 1405. Throughout the fourteenth century, therefore, Dominican penitents hovered on the margins of institutional life. Their more vulnerable status, Lehmijoki-Gardner argues, made their confessors reluctant to take risks. This, along with the Dominican order's more conservative slant, may help to explain why Dominican women eschewed the more militant Franciscan pattern of social criticism and rarely worked in public institutions such as hospitals. Instead, their social activities remained largely in the home, the neighborhood, or within the Dominican order. Lehmijoki-Gardner further hypothesizes (tentatively, given her lack of archival evidence) that Dominican penitents did not often live communally until the later fifteenth century, while their Franciscan counterparts were routinely living together in semimonastic houses a century earlier.

This is a narrowly focused book that does not explore several important contexts. It was these women's spiritual charisma, particularly their visions, that drew their biographers and their audiences. Yet the author does not venture to link their secular activities to their more famous experiences of the divine. Was there a mysticism of everyday labor? More centrally for her argument, Lehmijoki-Gardner pays little attention to the politics of sainthood: she notes that only one of her nineteen subjects was canonized (Catherine) but does not ask why, or what role the *vitae* might have played in a larger picture of Dominican strategies. Did the mendicants aspire, with these hagiographies, to take control of local cults they feared were getting out of hand? For example, André Vauchez (*La sainteté en Occident aux derniers siècles du Moyen Âge* [1988, English translation 1997]) argued that the mendicants feminized lay sanctity in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as part of a policy to direct the laity away from the social reform of the early mendicant movement and toward a more meditative mysticism.

Despite some hesitant attempts (pp. 172–73), one looks in vain for connections to such larger questions, whether those of evolving and contested models of sanctity or of women's roles in the church and in society. The abundant literature in English, French, Italian, and German is cited respectfully but not

critically. This book breaks little interpretive ground, but it will be of use to specialists in late medieval devotion and women.

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ELLEN E. KITTEL and THOMAS F. MADDEN, editors.  
*Medieval and Renaissance Venice*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 1999. Pp. viii, 345. \$45.00.

Festschriften, including this valuable collection of thirteen essays in honor of the late Donald E. Queller, almost always exhibit three overlapping and sometimes conflicting aims. The first and most obvious is to showcase the scholarship and research interests of the various contributors, who are usually friends or former students of the honorand. The second is to group the articles under some broad subject that reflects the recipient's scholarly interests and expertise. The third is to commission essays that can be organized into a coherent whole, providing a volume on a single, unifying theme rather than a miscellaneous collection of studies. This festschrift succeeds admirably in fulfilling the first aim, somewhat meets the second goal, but fails completely to provide a coherent volume of studies. Even the title is rather a misnomer. A more accurate title would be "Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Venetian History," for the volume lacks the coherent plan and broad essays of the collection edited by the late Sir John Hale, *Renaissance Venice* (1973), with which it invites comparison.

In their introduction, editors Ellen E. Kittel and Thomas F. Madden attempt to make the case that the thirteen essays reflect Queller's changing interests as exhibited in his three major books on the medieval office of ambassador, the Fourth Crusade, and the Venetian patriciate. The introduction contains an insightful, sometimes moving evocation of Queller as a teacher and a careful analysis of his scholarship. But the essays really do not fit the categories the editors have assigned them. Only one, Madden's revisionist study of Venice's relation with the Byzantine Empire in the decade following the hostage taking of 1171, falls under the heading of diplomatic history. Two treat the era of the Fourth Crusade. Alfred Andrea and John Moore attempt to contextualize Pope Innocent III's famous Letter of Advice (Reg. 6.102) to the western knights at Zara and conclude that it was probably written in June 1203. Arguing from numismatic as well as literary evidence, Alan Stahl convincingly provides the historical context for the issue of the silver grosso under Doge Enrico Dandolo and the reasons for its status as the standard silver coinage in the Mediterranean for the next centuries.

The other ten essays, which include several gems of historical research and argument, investigate different aspects of Venetian society and government, not just the patriciate, over several centuries. Building on her previous research, Louise Buenger Robbert recon-

structs the business and family world of a thirteenth-century merchant of Venice, Domenico Gradenigo. Juergen Schulz continues his painstaking case studies of the private palaces of Venetian noble families, in reconstructing, with the aid of illustrations and plans, the changes in use and ownership of the pre-Gothic Ca' Mosto located on the Grand Canal near the Rialto. David Jacoby brings great erudition to illuminate the profitability of the medieval cheese trade on Crete. Here Venetian feudatories advanced cash to local peasants for the future delivery of hard cheese at a low price, ensuring a large profit for the middlemen and a ready supply of cheese for shipment to and sale in Venice.

Three essays investigate sexual relations, marriage, and the family in Venice, the subject of Queller's research during his last years. Guido Ruggiero uses the records of the Holy Office to reconstruct the relation between a country abbot and his concubine in the late Cinquecento. This masterful microhistory has important implications for the history of sexuality, including the old theme of life in the capital as a training ground for young prostitutes from the provinces. Alexander Cowan exploits the *Matrimoni Secreti* series of the Archivio patriarchale as well as judicial sources from the state archives to examine the growth of concubinage and "consensual" secret marriage among Venetian patricians in the seventeenth century. He demonstrates that the establishment of a household, even without the benefit of the sacrament of matrimony, often provided the appearance of marriage, and that the boundary between patrician men, especially from the cadet branches, and non-patrician women was much more porous than often assumed. Stanley Chojnacki examines the reasons for dowry inflation in late medieval Venice, directly challenging the conclusions of the 1993 essay by Queller and Madden, who had argued that the contributions of female kin, not the ambitions of fathers, had fueled the increase in the cost of marriage settlements in the fifteenth century. Chojnacki argues that the inflation resulted from the transformation of the bride's trousseau of household goods, clothes and finery (the *corredo*) into a nearly mandatory cash gift for the groom, which sidestepped the monetary limit placed on the dowry while enabling the father to acquire a well-placed son-in-law in an era of intense political competition within the patriciate.

Two essays investigate the relations between Venetian public authority and groups subject to its control. Brian Pullan utilizes the reports of the mainland rectors for Bergamo to examine issues of poverty, welfare, and government intransigence under Venice's *ancien régime*. In a study with much broader implications than its title, "Curfew Time in the Ghetto of Venice," Benjamin Ravid details the government's attempts to regulate the presence of Jews in the city and the numerous exceptions made to the circulation of Jews outside the Ghetto after dark.

Finally, two studies treat very different aspects of the world of Venetian high politics. Borrowing from

the methodology of cultural anthropology, Robert C. Davis describes and explains a famous spectacle, the "war of the sticks" staged between factions of the *popolo* to celebrate King Henry III of France's visit to Venice on July 26, 1574. Robert Finlay provides a close reading of the "orations" attributed to Venetian senators during the War of the League of Cambrai in Francesco Guicciardini's *History of Italy*, which underscored the fragility and mortality of Venice's polity in a time of crisis. With many of its essays employing different methodologies and based upon extensive archival research, this festschrift documents the growing centrality of Venice in premodern historical studies. Ever the realist and a connoisseur of fine historical research, Queller would have appreciated that this volume inevitably reflects not so much his own particular interests but the vitality of Venetian historical studies in the anglophone world that he did so much to stimulate.

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DUCCIO BALESTRACCI. *The Renaissance in the Fields: Family Memoirs of a Fifteenth-Century Tuscan Peasant*. Foreword by EDWARD MUIR. Translated by PAOLO SQUATRITI and BETSY MERIDETH. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1999. Pp. xxiv, 146. Cloth \$48.50, paper \$14.95.

This is an abridged and translated version of a work first published in Italian in 1984. It deals with the life and activities of Benedetto del Mazzarizia, a farmer who lived a few miles outside of Siena. Two of his farm diaries, covering the period 1439 through 1502, survive. These little books, whose contents are printed in translation in an appendix, kept track of Benedetto's payments and receipts as a result of his numerous contracts, purchases, tax payments, and much else. Benedetto could read but not write. Hence, every time he engaged in some financial endeavor that needed to be remembered exactly, he had someone write it in his books. Some thirty different hands recorded these entries, always in the vernacular, with the occasional date in Latin. Duccio Balestracci discovered these unique farm diaries in a Siennese archive and filled the story out with additional research in order to provide readers with this account of life in the Siennese countryside.

As Edward Muir points out in his introduction, the most interesting point is the multiple uses to which farmers put the *mezzadria* system. Meaning "half and half," the *mezzadria* was a form of sharecropping in which the owner provided the land and loaned money or seed to the farmer; owner and farmer split the harvest. Scholars have traditionally seen the *mezzadria* as a system of entrapment and perpetual debt for the sharecropper. But Benedetto freely entered into *mezzadria* contracts in order to acquire additional land or to get income to pay loans on properties already

owned. *Mezzadria* was only one part of his life of contracts and arrangements.

What emerges is a farm system of surprising complexity. Benedetto was a farmer-proprietor who lived in a village. With his family he farmed a series of properties, some owned, others rented or share-cropped. Benedetto, his father and brothers, and their respective sons and daughters produced grapes and wheat, had woodlands that provided firewood to be sold in the city and that fired their own kilns, which produced lime, needed in mortar, to be sold in Siena. Benedetto adeptly used the courts to extricate himself from an uneconomic usufruct contract with a monastery, even though a battery of lawyers defended the latter. Benedetto's net worth at its highest was 1,175 lire, making him the wealthiest man in his tiny village.

But there were problems. Siena imposed an endless array of indirect taxes: on the pasturage that he rented for his oxen, on the lime that he took to the city, and everything else. He had to pay direct taxes and was forced to loan money to Siena. He needed to provide dowries as high as 600 lire for his daughters. His net worth seems to have declined over time.

Balestracci's work is very welcome. Especially welcome is his detailed account, bolstered by his additional research, of Benedetto's transactions. Criticisms are few. Balestracci makes generalizations about larger issues without much evidence. He was unable to use scholarship that has appeared since 1984 on the availability of schooling in villages in Renaissance Italy. Besides the farm diaries, the book includes a number of translated quotations; but the original Italian is never given in the notes, and this leaves questions. For example, in the discussion of the availability of schooling in rural Tuscany, some contemporaries spoke of learning "grammar." In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Italian *grammatica* usually meant "Latin," not vernacular grammar.

The translation seems fluent if sometimes casual e.g., writing "the 1400s" instead of "the fifteenth century." But this reviewer was unable to locate an original Italian edition to check the translation. Hence, some questions remain. The translators use the terms medieval, late medieval, Renaissance, and early modern without indication of the centuries meant. Does the original Italian do this? Or is this an issue of translation and ideology? "Renaissance" as a name for a period of history (normally the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) has become politically incorrect with some scholars, who prefer to use the politically correct "early modern" for these centuries and sometimes later centuries as well. This produces confusion. The English translation does not provide information about the extent and nature of the editing. This raises other questions; for example, why have a handful of works published after 1984 been added to the notes? Despite the translation questions, this is a useful book.

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AGOSTINO PARAVICINI BAGLIANI and FRANCESCO SANTI, editors. *The Regulation of Evil: Social and Cultural Attitudes to Epidemics in the Late Middle Ages*. (Micrologus' Library, number 2.) Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, for SISMEL and Galluzzo. 1998. Pp. 211.

Although individually worthwhile, the contributions to this volume scarcely match the expectations raised by its ambitious title. The essays represent the proceedings of a special seminar, and like many such collections they remain discrete studies of particular themes. The fact that three are in Italian, two in French, and two in English adds to the impression of a work lacking in coherence and editorial grip. It badly needs an introduction drawing the contributions together and filling in some of the evident gaps. A bibliography has been added, however, and the book perhaps works best as an introduction to the literature, both primary and secondary, on plague and other epidemics in the later Middle Ages.

Piero Morpurgo, Francesco Gianni, and Mario Ascheri look at different kinds of literary reaction to these phenomena, from Giovanni Boccaccio to the fully developed plague tractates of the Renaissance. They find there evidence both of the immediate shock caused by the Black Death and of the slow evolution of more measured responses in the following century and a half. Traditional approaches to therapy, consolation, prevention, and cure in epidemic circumstances had gradually to be rethought. It was not until 1500 that new orthodoxies became established, and not all novelties had much of a future. Chiara Crisciani and Michela Pereira examine the notable example of an alchemical remedy—potable gold—whose pursuit acquired new urgency with the Black Death, and they compare it with the better-established claims of theriac or "treacle," which remained in use until the end of plague in Europe.

Shifts in social and cultural responses to disease, however, require more space for their elucidation than is available here. This applies particularly to the public health precautions that municipal governments were beginning to put in place against plague by the middle of the fifteenth century. David McNeil rehearses some of the interesting questions raised in this area by Ann C. Carmichael's *Plague and the Poor in Renaissance Florence* (1986) but without providing anything by way of new answers. We still require close analyses of the chronology, both of epidemic disease and of administrative innovation, in order to see when and why responses changed, although Gianni's essay in this collection has some interesting remarks about civic attitudes in Florence in 1383.

We also require more knowledge than we at present possess about the diseases at work in the fifteenth century, of which bubonic plague was plainly only one. Here the archaeological record may well be helpful, but it is left unconsidered in this volume, except in an essay by Françoise Bériac about leprosy. Although scarcely relating to any other contribution, Bériac's

essay is a fine brief discussion of the potential reasons for the late medieval decline of leprosy. Not the least of its strengths is its awareness of the need to combine a multiplicity of sources and inputs—archaeological, architectural, documentary, and even biological—if past epidemics are to be properly understood. At the other extreme, the micro rather than the macro level, much can be achieved by a local study. The only example in this volume is Véronique Pasche's fine account of the plagues of 1348–1349 and 1360 in the Pays de Vaud. Pasche uses testamentary records to indicate both levels of mortality and changing responses: the fact, for example, that confraternities suddenly began to feature among bequests in 1360 (and not in 1349). Cultural attitudes—toward prayers for the dead and much else—were plainly altering here. But it is impossible to tell from the disparate essays in this volume how typical or otherwise the Pays de Vaud may have been.

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KIRSTEN A. SEAVER. *The Frozen Echo: Greenland and the Explorations of North America, ca. A.D. 1000–1500*. 1996. Pp. xvi, 407. \$49.50.

This is an ambitious book because its author, Kirsten A. Seaver, covers the entire 500 years of medieval European contact with Greenland and North America. The text is packed with data, supported by almost 100 pages of "reference matter," but is nevertheless written in a manner that conveys the author's enjoyment of her literary, historical, and archaeological research. Seaver is at home in both English and the Scandinavian languages and sets out to create a bridge not only between the two language groups but between the rather different scholarly traditions and methods governing Greenland research in particular and that of North Atlantic exploration and colonization in general (p. 7).

Although Seaver describes the initial establishment of Norse settlement in Greenland at the end of the tenth century as also the evidence for the earliest Norse exploitation of North America, her main concern is with the later phases and, in particular, with the demise of Norse Greenland. She challenges old assumptions that the Greenland colony was somehow doomed to failure because of its harsh environment and isolation from Europe and that the fate of the Greenlanders was ultimately sealed because of their abandonment by the Norwegian authorities, on whom they were supposedly dependent. Despite separation from the Norwegian church in the late fourteenth century, there is enough archaeological evidence to demonstrate that connections were maintained between Greenland and Europe during the fifteenth century.

Seaver describes the conditions in the two Norse settlement areas—the so-called western and eastern

settlements—charting their economic growth and the role played by the church in the life of medieval Greenland. The western settlement flourished not only because of its proximity to the northern hunting grounds (for walrus ivory, pelts, and furs) but also because it had easier access to North America (for timber and iron) because of the Greenland current. By the end of the fourteenth century, however, the western settlement had come to an end. Cooling temperatures meant worsening conditions for cattle farmers, together with competition for the hunting grounds with the southward-moving Inuit, although there is no evidence for death by starvation, pestilence, or Inuit aggression. Relocation is suggested, but if so, as Seaver admits, we cannot tell whether this was prompted by "a wish for less isolation, or to the lure of the American coast" (p. 138).

Seaver's focus then shifts to the fifteenth century, and she develops the theory that it was English fishermen and merchants, notably those from Bristol (in their quest for cod, ivory, and furs), who maintained contact with Greenland. The English documentary sources record sufficient contact with Iceland to suggest knowledge of Greenland, but no more. Seaver advances the hypothesis that this undocumented interaction between the English and the Norse Greenlanders contributed to making Bristol the natural point of departure for John Cabot's expeditions, after whose 1497 voyage the rich fisheries of the Newfoundland Banks were revealed. Yet more speculatively, she proposes that the Norse Greenlanders of the eastern settlement adjusted to the falling temperature by turning their attention to the production of stockfish and train oil to barter with the English. This trade, Seaver suggests, petered out at the end of the fifteenth century because the Bristol boats learned how to exploit the New World fishing banks directly, with no need to visit Greenland. The Norse Greenlanders thus became truly isolated, just when their contacts with Europe appeared to be increasing.

Seaver's last chapter is devoted to "The Age of Discovery" and sets the scene for her final suggestion that the Norse Greenlanders eventually set out across the Davis Strait into "the great unknown." This undocumented attempt at North American colonization is speculatively linked to involvement with an ill-fated Anglo-Portuguese expedition of 1501. In the author's words, the Norse Greenlanders "had remained opportunists to the end and joined the early-sixteenth-century European surge towards North America" (p. 311).

This conclusion is well beyond proof, as Seaver readily admits, given that her main hypothesis is built upon circumstantial evidence. Until the quality of the evidence can be refined by further archaeological and archival research, Seaver cannot be considered to have solved the puzzle of the Greenlanders' disappearance, but her own, more modest purpose—to provide "at



least a partial answer"—is deserving of our serious consideration.

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#### EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

JOHN DILLENBERGER. *Images and Relics: Theological Perceptions and Visual Images in Sixteenth-Century Europe*. (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 248. \$45.00.

This is a puzzling book. John Dillenberger states in his preface that "from the standpoint of theology the artists themselves and their works deserved more attention" (p. viii). Yet what purports to be a book about images has not a single color plate. Matthias Grünewald's complex devotional visions in the Isenheim Altarpiece are missing the mystical and expensive indigos and blood reds; Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel lacks the flesh tones he made so insistent in that extraordinary image of resurrection.

Dillenberger divides the book into three parts. In part one, "Cultural and Theological Settings," he sketches briefly "the chronology of reform" between 1500 and 1570; religious images and relics; and "popular culture," including printed images and their scriptural referents, the social ethics of medieval piety, "the anticlerical mood," and peasant unrest. In part two, which comprises 150 of the book's 190 pages, he treats selected images of a total of seven artists. Part three, "Iconoclasm and Beyond," summarizes briefly the positions of Martin Luther, Andreas Karlstadt, Huldrych Zwingli, and John Calvin on images; sketches the geographic breadth of iconoclasm without attending to the kinds of images destroyed; and turns to "the Catholic Tradition."

Dillenberger selects seven artists, four of whom—Grünewald, Albrecht Dürer, Lucas Cranach the Elder, and Michelangelo—are treated in individual chapters; three others—Hans Holbein the Younger, Hans Baldung Grien, and Albrecht Altdorfer—are treated together, for reasons that remain unclear. Yet the artist himself is of so little consequence that Dillenberger can write of one painting, "no serious consequences follow from not knowing which Cranach was most involved in its production" (p. 101). He provides no discussion of the relationship between an artist and his workshop in the production of images, which might have suggested the many different links between art and artisans, or of the complex negotiations between artists and their patrons, which shaped and sometimes determined the content and the intended meaning of works. He is interested in the degree to which the individual artists had access to the ideas of theologians: whether, for example, Michelangelo could read Latin, whether Dürer read Luther's treatises. Dillenberger's choice of artists is also puzzling: scholars

remain uncertain of Dürer's relationship to evangelical theology, and some of Dürer's most "evangelical" images, such as his Last Supper, predate Luther's posting of the Ninety-five Theses—the moment that Dillenberger sees as the beginning of "the Reformation."

In his chapters on artists, Dillenberger takes up some of the most complex images of late medieval and early modern Christianity. His point of departure for all images is texts: theological and biblical. The images are not treated within visual traditions: he does not attend to how Dürer or Cranach or Michelangelo took up a familiar physical relationship or gesture and transformed it. For him, images remain without original theological content that could itself challenge the faithful to act or to believe. Those artists were learned, but not in the language Dillenberger pursues. They were not formally trained theologians but worked in the language of visual piety: of Christ's Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection; of Mary's particular place in that story of Incarnation and of the ways in which her person, her body, could articulate grace and mercy; of the ways in which the human form, far more eloquently than words, could represent humility, devotion, and redemption.

The chapters are underannotated, often paragraphs without clear direction concerning Dillenberger's sources, whether scholarly literature or source materials. In his preface, Dillenberger states that all the research for this book was lost in the California fires; it was reconstituted from disks and talks scattered elsewhere. Is that then a justification for the frequent absence of the kind of scholarly apparatus that enables the reader to test hypotheses against the sources, to explore the degree to which a particular argument rests upon the work of another?

Dillenberger is to be commended for his effort to link theology and images. But he remains grounded in the theological texts: he does not see the images in their own languages of color, line, and physical relationship but as iconographical texts. And that is perhaps the most puzzling thing of all. One of the most trusted historians of theology—Dillenberger's editions of Luther's and Calvin's works have been the mainstay of undergraduate teaching—does not take up how Christian art, both Protestant and Catholic, could render in visual language dimensions of the mystery of Incarnation that texts could only point toward.

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ALESSA JOHNS, editor. *Dreadful Visitations: Confronting Natural Catastrophe in the Age of Enlightenment*. New York: Routledge. 1999. Pp. xxv, 198. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$19.99.

This anthology emerged from a conference held at the University of California at Berkeley in 1995 and includes contributions from David Arnold, Daniel

Gordon, Carla Hesse, Alessa Johns, G. A. Starr, Alan Taylor, Stephen Tobriner, and Charles Walker. Interdisciplinary in approach, it succeeds well in its aim to capture the global impact of catastrophes that shook the early modern world. Too often, specialists in national histories lose sight of the fact that people of the eighteenth century were eager for news about events that occurred in other lands and tended to think of themselves in a global context. This text broadens our historical horizons considerably, offering a richer understanding of the interaction between cultures. Divided into two sections, "European Responses to Catastrophe" and "Colonial Perspectives and New World Calamities," the essays explore responses to the Marseilles plague of 1720; the London plague of 1665; the Noto earthquake of 1693; the Bengal famine of 1770; the Lima, Quito, and Arequipa earthquakes of 1748, 1783, and 1797; and the dearth experienced in Canada and New York in 1789.

Although enticing, the phrase "deadly visitations," taken from Daniel Defoe's *A Journal of the Plague Year* (1722), is perhaps not the best title for this book, for the authors and editor Johns are much more interested in secular responses to crises than they are in the religious and epistemological concerns that Voltaire so effectively crystallized in his poem on the Lisbon earthquake. Rather, what preoccupies the contributors are other, less well-known themes like the social tensions that disasters exposed and the changes in perceptions that they precipitated.

Defoe believed that disasters strip human beings of their social trappings and reveal their true moral nature. In the case of the London plague, he saw that selfishness was bound up with survival and thus natural and beyond reproach. What troubled him, however, was the way in which some people actually profited from the misery of others in times of crisis. He was struck by the irony that traders had never been so prosperous as after the plague. Although plague can be classified as a natural disaster, in his essay on Defoe, Starr notes that disasters had humans not only as victims but also as perpetrators. The authors of the essays in this volume are interested in the ways in which human agency can be used for good or ill. Too often, they discover, human agency deepens tragedies provoked by natural forces rather than alleviating them.

The great culprits behind the destruction wrought by humans would appear to be capitalism and colonialism. One of the central themes of this book is that the expansion of commerce and colonial activity actually increased the susceptibility of people, especially non-Europeans, to catastrophe. Yet in the eighteenth century, Europeans tended to idealize commercial and technological change and to deemphasize or rationalize away the pain that came in the wake of apparent progress.

The theme of commerce is first raised in Gordon's essay on the plague in eighteenth-century France. He is struck by the contrasting images of plague presented

by the *Encyclopédie* and by authors who had actually experienced the full brunt of the plague in Marseilles. While the authors of Marseilles reiterated earlier accounts of the destructive and terrifying nature of the plague, identifying it as the very paradigm of disaster, the *Encyclopédie* article on the plague downplayed its danger, suggesting that many of the effects attributed to the plague were psychosomatic. Gordon argues that the editors of the *Encyclopédie* embraced this view not because it represented better science but because it was more compatible with their own commitment to the improvement of the world through commerce. The notion that contagion, as well as profits, was spread through commerce would hardly advance this ideology.

Arnold's article on the Bengal famine of 1770 rejects the Enlightenment ideology of progress as it exposes the full extent of suffering in India resulting from the conjunction of natural forces like drought, crop failure, and flooding with human agency in the form of colonial rule. Ten million people, a third of the population of Bengal and Bihar, died in the famine. Extant reports by either Europeans or Indians are rare, but they reveal a dramatic shift in European perceptions of Bengal. Whereas before the famine, Europeans had romanticized Bengal as a place of natural abundance and venerable culture, after the famine it was envisioned as a land having reverted to the wild and as a society too feeble and fatalistic to fend for itself.

The record of British assistance to the Bengalis during the famine was not exemplary. Arnold quotes various officials as being more concerned with the intolerable affront to their sensibilities that famine victims presented than they were with providing any meaningful assistance. The scale of the disaster provoked impassioned debate over the East India Company's operations and over Britain's emerging role as an imperial power, leading to the Regulating Act of 1773 and the impeachment of Warren Hastings. It prompted British construction of granaries and botanic gardens to fend off future disasters. Yet ironically, despite the inefficacy of the British response, the British view that emerged after the famine was that the suffering of the Indians was the consequence of their own passivity and that they could be spared further suffering only by submitting to the superior imperial power of the West. As a result of the famine of 1770, Indians were excluded from senior positions in the administration of their own country.

Arnold challenges this British notion of Indian passivity, citing examples of activity in reports of vociferous protests; attempts by peasants to sell their oxen, plows, and land; and Indian experiments with variolation when smallpox followed the famine. He suggests that the pressures that British officials were under to maximize profits made them unable or unwilling to heed the cries for help. The legacy of the Bengal famine thus lay not in the enormous loss of life

but in the tragic subjugation and incomprehension of one culture by another that it provoked.

The themes of subjugation and economic exploitation are sounded again in Tobriner's discussion of the Bourbon reluctance to bear the economic burden of reforming building codes and city planning in Noto after a devastating earthquake. They also figure prominently in Walker's discussion of how earthquakes in Peru prompted fear of social uprisings and the determination of the elites to preserve a hierarchical, exploitative social order at all costs.

In an interesting twist on these themes, Taylor notes that Canadians under imperial rule actually fared better than did the independent Americans in the dearth of 1789. American entrepreneurs exported grain to Europe in search of a better price while settlers on the frontier were starving. Meanwhile, the British funneled grain to Canadians in an effort to demonstrate the superiority of their paternalistic regime. They used the dearth to denounce the United States as a greedy commercial republic that ignored the poor. As in the cases of India and Peru, this essay reveals not only how human agency can deepen natural tragedy but also how cultural stereotypes and conflicts are accentuated rather than overcome by natural disaster. In the face of the great leveling forces of nature, these accounts reveal that humans rush to reconstruct not only destroyed buildings but also threatened regimes.

The strength of this anthology lies in its global perspective and schematic vision. Many of the articles are admittedly preliminary inquiries; the authors promise more extended studies later. That there was a dark side to the Enlightenment ideology of progress is hardly a new idea; one wonders if perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on the evils of colonialism and capitalism, resulting in just the kind of cultural dichotomization that the editors of this volume deplore.

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VICTOR KARADY. *Gewalterfahrung und Utopie: Juden in der europäischen Moderne*. Translated by JUDITH KLEIN. (Europäische Geschichte.) Frankfurt aM.: Fischer Taschenbuch. 1999. Pp. 302. DM 24.90.

This excellent textbook provides a clear, detailed, well-informed and balanced survey of Jewish history in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe from the Enlightenment to the present. Victor Karady's main assertion is that the Jews played a central role in the modernization of Europe even as they benefited from the continent's progressive secularization and liberation from the remnants of feudalism. The tremendous strides made by European Jews during the era of emancipation, manifested in their astonishing overrepresentation in educational institutions and the professions (especially in Central and Eastern Europe), can be explained partly by Jewish traditions of learning

and economic activities that preceded the modern period. Conversely, however, Karady insists that gentile reactions to the growing success and visibility of the Jews similarly reflected premodern European prejudices.

In a series of succinct yet informative chapters, Karady discusses the repercussions of the Jewish entry into the modern world from both the Jewish and the gentile perspectives in a variety of very different societies. Noting the pressures on individual and collective identity produced by the process of assimilation, Karady stresses that breaking away from traditional constraints was often accompanied by a sentiment of loss and guilt, just as the price of integration into gentile society was a sense of rejection, suspicion, and otherness. Jewish reactions to these tensions stimulated the rise of national movements, such as Zionism, self-emancipation, and socialist Bundism. For its part, gentile society reacted with increasing support for anti-Semitic organizations. Karady concedes that modern anti-Semitism gained from the discontents of industrialization and the intolerance of nationalism. Nevertheless, he insists that one cannot accept at face value the explanations given by anti-Semitic ideologues for their ideas and actions, since the gap between the extent to which their assertions reflected reality and the actual consequences of anti-Jewish violence was far too great. In some parts of Europe, such as Scandinavia, Britain, and several Mediterranean societies, Jew-hatred was at most a marginal phenomenon. In others, especially in Central and much (but not all) of Eastern Europe, there were, according to Karady, certain anti-Semitic dispositions that existed quite independently of objective or conscious motivations. It was such collective mental structures that led to the creation of anti-Jewish "philosophies" based both on distinctions between "us" and "them" and on the related traditional Christian attitudes toward the Jews.

Karady is aware that this interpretation goes against much of the recent literature on modern political anti-Semitism as fundamentally distinct from traditional anti-Jewish prejudices and policies. His position is especially striking since he is generally much more concerned with social history than with ideology and belief. Moreover, Karady's subsequent analysis of the emergence of anti-Semitic parties in Austria and Germany, the rather different developments in Eastern Europe, and finally the appearance of Nazism and its "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" does not fully support his own basic assumption. Indeed, his argument has a somewhat tautological tone, since it implies that Germany, which pursued the most brutal anti-Semitic policies, must have had deeper anti-Jewish dispositions than such countries as Hungary or Bulgaria, whose anti-Semitic policies were somewhat less blatant. Even if this was the case (and Karady does not enter into the political, economic, administrative, and technical constraints on genocide in these states), one still needs to explain why such dispositions existed

where they did in the first place, how far back they can be traced, and what their relationship is to the rise of a regime totally committed to anti-Semitism and extermination.

This being said, I find Karady's book a superb introduction to modern Jewish history and would urge its swift translation into English so as to make it available for students taking courses on Jewish and general European history. As Karady rightly comments in his introduction, there is every justification to publish this work in Fischer Verlag's series of textbooks on European history. From the moment the Jews began assimilating into European society in the wake of the Enlightenment, their history became part of European history as a whole, just as the latter could no longer be fully grasped without taking into account the crucial role of the former. Tragically, this process ended in the destruction of two-thirds of European Jewry. If in 1900 the vast majority of the Jews lived in Europe, since the Holocaust they mostly reside elsewhere, especially in the United States, Israel, and Russia. But the heritage of this painful yet remarkably creative Jewish-European relationship remains an important component of our civilization.

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PETER BALDWIN. *Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xiii, 581. \$69.95.

Peter Baldwin has written an expansive book bridging political history and the history of disease regulation. Baldwin's aim is to "use public health to illuminate broader issues of state intervention" (p. 2). To that end, he documents the regulatory histories of three diseases (cholera, smallpox, syphilis) in various Western and Central European contexts (mainly England, France, the German territories, and Sweden, with a few allusions to the Russian Empire and Italian states). The book covers a century-long period that is best described as the ascendancy of European liberalism.

Baldwin's approach is shaped largely by his engagement with the historian of medicine Erwin Ackerknecht's now-classic article, "Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867" (*Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 22 [1948]: 117-53). Ackerknecht proposed a broad framework for understanding the relationship between politics and the regulation of disease in the modern age. Before the scientific discoveries of Louis Pasteur, he argued, disease regulation both served and reflected the politics of the nation-state. This could be seen in the tendency of liberal nations to identify with an environmentalist understanding of disease and the reforming ethos of sanitation that it endorsed, while autocratic governments championed contagion as a way of pursuing the repressive practices of quarantine. Pasteur's discoveries reversed the relationship: science now informed political agendas, as manifested in a

renovated understanding of contagion focused on microbe hunting.

Until now, Ackerknecht's argument has proven widely popular among historians. This is due, in large part, to the fact that it enables historians to bring together a study of science and politics without forsaking a commitment to an understanding of the autonomy of science that is so much a part of the accepted narrative of the rise of modern science. Such appeal, however, is more than offset by unsatisfying generalizations about nineteenth-century science and politics. It is as an attempt to evaluate these generalizations that Baldwin proposes such an in-depth and ambitious study, aiming at nothing less than the examination of three very different diseases in (at least) four very different political and social contexts. Do these correlations between politics and regulatory practices hold? If not, how can we account for the prophylactic differences? And might the existence of these differences serve as the basis for a new theory of how regulatory practices shape nation-state politics, instead of (as Ackerknecht argued) vice versa? These are the questions that animate Baldwin's 563-page study.

Not surprisingly, Baldwin has no trouble documenting the lack of fit between explanatory paradigms, prophylactic practices, and politics. Few if any countries adopted rigid understandings of contagion or environmentalism. Rather, they adhered (inherited from the eighteenth-century experience with the plague) to the notion of direct contagion during the first cholera crisis during the 1820s and 1830s, only to support a synthesis of the two categories by century's end. Liberal governments like England envisioned and realized systematic sanitary interventions in working-class dwellings as part of a broader regulation of cholera, while supposedly authoritarian ones like the German Empire shied away from such interventions. In dealing with the cholera epidemic of 1893, the liberal trading port city of Hamburg rejected the interventionist implications of Robert Koch's microbial discoveries, but it had no compunction about enforcing strict regulations for syphilis. Baldwin sees France as not only weakening Ackerknecht's thesis but constituting a regulatory and political mystery as well. France, which Baldwin describes as a liberal polity with a centralized state, produced a harsh regulation of syphilis focused on the surveillance of prostitutes that was widely admired by other European governments; after lagging behind other nations, in 1902 it issued stringent regulations concerning compulsory vaccination against smallpox. More often than not, however, France's actions did not measure up to its regulatory pronouncements, revealing (in Baldwin's estimation) a disjuncture between theory and practice. Considered collectively, Baldwin concludes, these prophylactic divergences not only put into question whether politics shape regulation but also whether the terms by which we characterize the politics of nation-states (for example, that liberal polities privilege laissez-faire policies, reject intervention, and honor the individual's right to



privacy) are nothing more than stereotypes that need to be reformulated or abandoned.

As an alternative to the ways in which historians might think about the categories of scientific explanation, regulation, politics, and their relationship, Baldwin calls for a focus on the "geoepidemiological learning curve," which, as he formulates it, affords a multicausal explanation of the relationship between regulation and politics that favors location—chronological, geographical, topological. In light of such an approach, Sweden's adoption of quarantine measures against the impending cholera epidemic would not be explained by any preexisting commitment to authoritarian politics, but to its geographical isolation that made such practices appear effective. Once cholera had arrived in England and France at the beginning of 1832, their respective governments did not reject the quarantine practices that Russia had relied upon a year earlier because they were "liberal" and Russia's was "authoritarian." It was the gift of experience and observation, offered by the time lag between the arrival of cholera in Russia and its movement toward Western Europe, that enabled France and England to reject quarantine as an ineffective and disruptive prophylactic instrument.

Baldwin's reliance on the geoepidemiological learning curve makes possible a more subtle understanding of how governments attempted to understand and regulate disease. It is less successful, however, in offering a way of thinking about how the regulation of epidemics might have shaped the political principles and practices of nations like France, Britain, Germany, and Sweden. Baldwin argues that we should consider political traditions "learned behaviors—reinforced, diverted, or undermined by accumulated experience" (p. 557); in this case, the accumulated experience concerns the regulation of disease. But the experiential and empirical emphasis of the learning curve he proposes as the basis for rethinking politics sounds a lot like the conventional understanding of how public health officials (and other scientists) come up with truthful and effective ways of helping governments to formulate policy regarding disease. Ironically, Baldwin's learning curve leads him in the end to confirm Ackerknecht's understanding of how modern medical science has enabled governments to pursue regulatory practices free of politics. In this respect, the task of rethinking the relationship between disease and politics, and specifically of how the regulation of disease might help us to think about politics differently, awaits other historians. In accepting that task, they will find Baldwin's informative, well-written, and engaging book indispensable.

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SUSAN R. GRAYZEL. *Women's Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France during the First World War*. Chapel Hill: University of North

Carolina Press. 1999. xix, 334. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$19.95.

In her new book, Susan R. Grayzel argues that motherhood was the main way women were encouraged to identify with the nation during World War I. Following the excellent recent examples of Laura Lee Downs (*Manufacturing Inequality: Gender Division in the French and British Metal Working Industries* [1995]) and Susan Pedersen (*Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914–1945* [1993]), Grayzel evaluates the social and political significance of gender by comparing France and Britain. What becomes immediately obvious is that motherhood was everywhere in wartime discourse, knowing no national boundaries or, in fact, any other sort of boundaries. Motherhood was a universal identifier, available to commentators of all political stripes. Moreover, it was an important way to represent a unified national response to the war. As all men were supposedly unified in the trenches, so, too, all women were supposedly unified as their mothers. In Britain, the interment of the unknown soldier in 1920 was planned to include a selection of bereaved mothers, "with Duchess next the charwoman" as the secretary of the planning committee enthused, to represent national equality in suffering, an image that hopefully would "have its effect . . . upon the industrial situation" (p. 230).

In focused comparative studies, Grayzel shows that although the discourse of motherhood was ubiquitous, it was never coherent and stable; while it could provide the terms of the debate, it could not predict its outcome. A case in point is the apparently parallel discussion of "rape babies" in France and "war babies" in Britain. While the French debate eventually concluded that the children born of German rape could be recuperated for the nation by French mothering, in Britain, only the fatherhood of British soldiers saved the "war babies" from complete rhetorical rejection. Although a young woman impregnated by a soldier might only be "silly" and "weak," she was also a danger to the nation's defenders, a potential carrier of venereal disease and moral degeneracy. Patriotic motherhood could only exist within marriage.

Grayzel's book demonstrates the advantages but also some of the costs of comparative study. A big one is a flattening of the wartime context as well as the national context so that military, political, and economic changes over the course of the war disappear. Discussions that emerged from different wartime contexts are made to speak to each other in ways that sometimes obscure what they meant in a specific time and place. Although Grayzel points out that a range of other issues were transposed onto motherhood, the book does not always successfully identify them. Political context is particularly lacking in the discussion of the militarization of women in Britain and the Brion case in France. Sometimes Grayzel succumbs to the

discourse she is studying and implies that everything is about motherhood and it is all the same.

This study of discourse employs an impressive array of sources: newspaper articles, novels, government studies, wartime commentary, and even some archival material. Unfortunately, the book also claims to illuminate the experience of war for women and to show the impact of discourse upon policy. But, Grayzel makes little use of women's personal accounts of their wartime experience other than an occasional quotation from Vera Brittain. And, paradoxically, the book suggests that the flood of discursive motherhood had little impact upon policy. Despite the uproar over the "rape babies" and the dramatic identification of factories as "baby killers," France developed no new policies on these issues, while in Britain, the vigorous arguments against putting women into military uniform did not stop the government from forming women's auxiliary corps. The one area in which the war did advance policy was the ad hoc restoration of the Contagious Diseases Acts in Britain, but this was less a result of contemporary discourse than the army taking advantage of the national emergency to return to a policy that it had always favored. In the end, the reader is convinced that the discourse of motherhood was in spate during World War I in both Britain and France, but does not learn how deep this ran in the psyches of women and wartime society—not very, is my suspicion—or to what effect.

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HELMUT GRUBER and PAMELA GRAVES, editors. *Women and Socialism, Socialism and Women: Europe Between the Two World Wars*. New York: Berghahn Books. 1998. Pp. xvi, 591. \$85.00.

This collection packs in all you wanted to know about the left and women during this fraught period, plus sixteen pages of "photo essays." Virtually all of Western Europe is covered, although France, Germany, and Austria get the lion's share. But, as Geoff Eley suggests (p. 517), how does one compare Scandinavian countries pioneering social democracy with fascist Italy, or postrevolutionary Germany and Austria with victorious France and Britain? Editors Helmut Gruber and Pamela Graves's "geographic and thematic" framework (p. 16) compares like with like but assumes differences.

The essays judge shortcomings on national rather than comparative bases, and, except in Scandinavia, reformism gets a bashing. Vienna's public housing complexes and the many women enrolled in the German Social Democratic Party's (SPD) numerous cultural and sporting programs seem admirable in the light of French and British failings (not to mention Spanish and Italian tragedies). But Adelheid von Saldern, in a poorly translated piece, deprecates the SPD's reformism, while Gruber takes a sledgehammer to the Austrians' achievements: "the great majority of

Viennese workers experienced few of the benefits" except on a "symbolic" plane (p. 57). Gruber takes the same hammer to French socialists. I can hardly deny their failings, having made similar arguments, but Gruber delights in condemning reformists for being reformists, whether they achieve something in government, as in Austria, or achieve little in the difficult conditions of the Popular Front, as in France; they are masters at "presenting the symbolic for the real" (p. 287). The task, however, is not to blame but to understand the socialists in their differing contexts. Gruber provides no more insight than the many historians he disparages.

Communists are treated more subtly. Atina Grossmann highlights tensions in the German Communist Party (KPD): commitment to gender equality, including the right to abortion—"a revolutionary vision . . . compared to the rest of the political spectrum" (p. 156)—but "ambivalence" when such efforts succeeded because the party focused on industrial workers (p. 153). Christine Bard and Jean-Louis Robert demonstrate incisively how the shift to a mass-based nationalist approach sidelined the French Communist Party's (PCF) commitment to gender issues.

A section on "Grassroots Initiatives" includes Graves's insightful piece on British Labour and good analyses of Belgium and the Netherlands, although one wishes for more on cooperatives and *maisons du peuple* following the work of Ellen Furlough and Patricia Hilden. "Prelude to Welfare States" does justice to Scandinavia. Ida Blom's analysis of Norway is of particular interest, especially with regard to the party's astonishing efforts on birth control. Hilda Romer Christensen provides an insightful analysis of Denmark, with its socialist alliance with organized feminists. Putting these countries together, however, precludes obvious comparisons. For Renée Frangeur, 8.4 percent women city councillors in Sweden represents a "pervasive masculine culture" (p. 447); what then does one say about France, Spain, and Italy?

Three framing essays offer little to make sense of these disparate experiences. Michelle Perrot's introduction on prewar feminist expectations is badly translated and sits ill with the main themes of the volume, although it has the merit of synthesizing her ideas. Louise Tilly's short piece sketches some valuable suggestions. Geoff Eley's more substantial one offers real insight, but mainly on Britain and Germany.

The underlying problematic is the tension between the class focus of the parties (including many of their women militants) and the gender focus of the feminists and feminist militants in the parties. Contributors waver on this. Graves suggests that "Labour women did not see" issues as conflict "between socialist women's class and gender loyalties" (p. 190) but simultaneously condemns Labour leaders for "indulg[ing] in the hypocrisy of declaring equality to exist where it could not" (p. 187). Ulla Jansz, on the Netherlands, notes that "former members remember the relations between the sexes . . . as very egalitarian," but adds

that "historians . . . have established that responsibilities were clearly segregated along gender lines" (p. 220). These two truths point toward a whole that we need to understand in terms of evolving ideals of equality. Gender relations are so hegemonic and profoundly inscribed that no generation makes complete progress, while each perceives its progress as immense.

To understand the intractability of gender inequities and the national differences in their persistence, we need contextual analysis of participants' discourse. It is time to apply to the twentieth century the analytical framework pioneered by Joan Landes (*Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* [1988]) and Carole Pateman (*The Sexual Contract* [1988]). The ways in which citizenship was constructed, inherently masculine but differently in each national context, may provide keys to twentieth-century difficulties with gender issues.

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ALISON GAMES, *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World*. (Harvard Historical Studies, number 133.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1999. Pp. xiii. 322. \$45.00.

During the last couple of decades there has been some important writing on Atlantic history, especially on British migration to America and the dissemination of British culture in the New World. For the colonial period, Bernard Bailyn's *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution* (1986) and David Hackett Fischer's *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (1989) have gained considerable attention. Alison Games, a student of Bailyn, makes a solid contribution to the field with this book.

Based on her doctoral dissertation, Games's book focuses on the migration from the port of London to England's colonies in 1635, which was part of the "crucial migration" that "secured England's precarious Atlantic empire" during the critical time of Charles I's personal rule and the rising influence of Archbishop William Laud (p. 4). The migrants of 1635 were selected because they are unusually well documented, thanks to a complete set of port registers for that year. These registers, or passenger lists, which have been used by other scholars, do have their limitations. They include only 7,507 passengers, fewer than five thousand of whom actually went to the American colonies; the rest were mainly soldiers going to the continent. The Welsh, Scots, and Irish are not represented. The occupational data are not complete, and Games was able to trace only a little more than a quarter of the migrants in the colonial records. Furthermore, London as a port of embarkation attracted different sorts of migrants than ports like Bristol or Plymouth. Nonetheless, Games uses wills, deeds, inventories, and a wide variety of other published and unpublished

sources to augment the registers and largely overcome their limitations, and in the process she explores an important episode in English and American history: the origins of the English Atlantic world. Through careful contextualization Games makes a convincing case that the migrants of 1635 are a reliable sample of the formative migration to early colonial America. Although the book is by nature reliant upon data, it is not data-bound. Throughout, Games provides lucid stories and colorful vignettes that successfully illustrate the point and bring the reader into the story. Excellent maps, illustrations, and thorough endnotes enhance the study.

Games compares the migrants of 1635 according to three main destinations: the Chesapeake, New England, and the island colonies (mainly Bermuda and Barbados). Some of the demographic comparisons confirm what we already know: those bound for New England's emerging towns were more familial and on average younger than those heading for Virginia's plantations. Virginia saw very high rates of indentured servants coming in. Altogether, private enterprise dominated this phase of migration and colonization and provided the dynamism that proved crucial in stimulating economic development and integrating England with its colonies into the emerging Atlantic world.

Games makes some particularly valuable and interesting contributions in her exploration of internal migration in America. She finds that the "defining characteristic" of the migrants was their remarkable mobility, which was consistent with their pre-migratory experience in England. Thus, the characteristics that Games finds for the migrants of 1635 are in some ways consistent with those of the migrants of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Throughout the centuries, the English were exceptionally mobile. Many crossed the Atlantic several times. They often followed networks of information laid by previous migrants, and in a sense migrated in "chains." Although most were indeed poor, many also seem to have been resourceful and ambitious persons who were exercising options and taking a degree of control over their lives. Some even migrated out of a sense of adventure. And Nonconformists (the Puritans being the obvious ones in 1635) were over-represented among the migrants.

England had a truly formative influence on North America through its colonial development. Yet, Games appropriately ends by underscoring the multi-racial heterogeneity of North American culture and the interaction among the English, Dutch, Spanish, Indians, and Africans in America. Though the colonies appeared from England as "simplified renditions" of the mother country, from an Atlantic perspective they were more complex and diverse than that. It did not suffice to recreate English institutions in America. Already the colonies were experiencing differences that would lead them toward their own destiny.

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THOMAS COGSWELL. *Home Divisions: Aristocracy, the State and Provincial Conflict*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1998. Pp. xvi, 336. \$55.00.

The two principal themes of Thomas Cogswell's richly textured study of politics and administration in early Stuart Leicestershire are state formation and aristocratic power. In both areas he has novel and important things to say.

Historians of early modern England have long suspected that much of the cost of sustaining the developing state and paying for the military revolution fell on local ratings rather than national taxation, but Cogswell is the first historian to document this with any precision. The sources for Leicestershire are full enough to allow him to quantify some of the more elusive local burdens, such as purveyance, coat and conduct money, militia charges, and compositions for depopulation. Once these are factored in, he is able to show that out of a total of over £73,000 raised in the shire between 1614 and 1638 to meet central government demands, only £29,000 came in the form of the national taxes (subsidies, the forced loan, and ship money) on which historians have normally concentrated. Over sixty percent came from ad hoc levies on local ratepayers, and this in a county that completely escaped one of the heaviest local burdens of the late 1620s: the cost of billeting soldiers.

Cogswell's finding offers the basis for a reappraisal of some of the key features of the early Stuart state. It does much to correct the impression of a country that was seriously undertaxed in this period. The burdens still fell well short of the levels of the 1640s and 1650s, but they were substantial, especially in the late 1630s, when the build-up of taxation can be seen, on Cogswell's account, as *the* fundamental cause of political unrest. It also counteracts the image of a government system close to "functional breakdown" and incapable of producing the revenue needed to fight wars effectively. To be sure, the system was extremely ramshackle and had changed little since the medieval period; but, as Cogswell's analysis shows, it was still capable of generating significant amounts of revenue.

Moreover, this book offers a fascinating study of the successful application of aristocratic power in a period when, as Lawrence Stone put it, the aristocracy "never had it so bad." The central figure is the fifth earl of Huntingdon, whose substantial but largely unexploited archive at the Huntington Library provides the basic source. He is an intriguing, contradictory figure: a staunch Calvinist, but not a Puritan; a dedicated servant of the crown who shunned the court; and the head of Leicestershire's foremost family, but constantly worried about honor and status. For over three decades, Huntingdon dominated local politics, winning battles over local appointments, controlling the shire's parliamentary elections, and seeing off a series of well-placed opponents. He was also able to deliver to the crown a high degree of local compliance with a whole range of initiatives, from militia reform to the

collection of ship money. The keys to his success lay not in the traditional aristocratic assets of wealth and territorial power but in his virtual monopoly of crown offices in the shire, well-worked contacts at court, and an unusually high degree of hands-on involvement in the day-to-day work of local government. He demonstrated that where a nobleman was able to adapt to the prevailing climate and work the system, he could still dominate county life. He also shows the power inherent in the much-maligned office of lord lieutenant. Huntingdon eventually fell victim to the political forces that were undermining the power of the aristocracy elsewhere, notably the greater weight given to ideological concerns and the increased influence of gentry and freeholders. He became too closely identified with the Caroline regime, and as it collapsed after 1640, he was dragged down with it. In the same year, he suffered a series of humiliating reverses in the parliamentary elections, and two years later his family's efforts to raise the county for the king were largely ignored. A broken man, he died in 1643.

The book also treats important subsidiary themes. The importance of honor to the nobility and gentry is graphically illustrated, with some of the most memorable—and entertaining—passages describing Huntingdon's long-running feud with the equally touchy Sir Henry Shirley. Intriguing insights into the operation of Star Chamber in the 1630s provide a telling corrective to some of the more benign assessments of its role. And there is an evocative study of a county at war in the 1620s, tracing the ramifications right down to the "Dad's Army" experiences of the trained bandsmen. Above all, this vividly written and immaculately researched work vindicates the place of the local study. Since their heyday from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s, these have fallen out of fashion; however, as Cogswell shows, certain questions—particularly ones relating to the workings of the highly decentralized early modern state—can only be answered by the sort of detailed and intelligent analysis, and sensitivity to context, on display here.

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PENELOPE GOUK. *Music, Science and Natural Magic in Seventeenth-Century England*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 308. \$35.00.

The legacy of the Warburg Institute, Frances Yates, and D. P. Walker lives on in the meticulous work of their many students, among them Penelope Gouk. Her mentors made early modern magic in relation to science a respectable area for scholarly enquiry, and in the book under review Gouk refines the legacy by adding music to the complexity of a baroque cosmology that had collapsed by the time of Isaac Newton's death in 1727. Not that Newton would have sought its demise. Only a philosopher obsessed with the Pythagorean legacy, with the wisdom of the magi, could write, as Gouk quotes him, "I suppose, that as



bodies of various sizes, densities, or tensions, do by percussion . . . excite sounds of various tones & consequently vibrations in the Air of various bignesse so when the rayes of light . . . excite vibrations in the ether, those rayes . . . excite vibrations of various bignesses . . . that in the sense of Hearing Nature makes use of aerial vibrations of several bignesses to generate Sounds of divers tones: for the Analogy of Nature is to be observed" (p. 243). Remarkably, Newton believed that the length of the spectrum of light could be divided into ratios corresponding to those of a musical scale. Gouk demonstrates that he could so believe because of the deep impact magical thinking had made on his cosmology. Magic and music had been inextricably linked ever since the ancient Greeks had written about them.

Thinkers as diverse as Robert Fludd, John Dee, Johannes Heinrich Alsted, Francis Bacon, Marin Mersenne, Christopher Wren, Robert Hooke, and Newton populate Gouk's beautifully written account of the effort to establish a science of acoustics and still maintain the harmony of nature. They differed, they struggled to maintain the distinction between good and bad magic, but they never sought to escape, as Dee put it, "the mystic arithmetic of Pythagoras" (p. 94). Their basic similarities in cosmology make the Newtonianism that emerged out of the Scientific Revolution, and that came to dominate eighteenth-century science and medicine, all the more difficult to explain. After reading Gouk's account—one that reinforces and complements the work of Betty Jo Dobbs and Richard Westfall in the case of Newton—we are left to see that the gap between Newton and his followers was almost as great as that between Newton and the scholastics. There were two transformations inherent in the rise of the new science, one away from Aristotle and all that he represented, and the other away from the very cosmology to which a majority of the new natural philosophers themselves adhered. Not all readers will be able to follow the musically technical aspects of Gouk's account, and the paperback edition would be well served by a glossary of terms. With that one caveat I applaud the appearance of a book that has all the earmarks of becoming a classic.

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EMMA VINCENT MACLEOD. *A War of Ideas: British Attitudes to the Wars Against Revolutionary France, 1792–1802*. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. 1998. Pp. viii, 240. \$76.95.

Emma Vincent Macleod organizes her study around the contention that ideology had an impact on British responses to the wars with revolutionary France. She concludes that ideology shaped the attitudes of only a minority of Britons but insists upon the significance of this influence although her analysis leaves one impressed with the extent to which ideology *failed* to

produce a unified front in prosecution of the war. The fragmentation of British society reflected in the multiplicity of positions on the conflict challenges Linda Colley's interpretation of a widespread British nationalism developing in response to the war, which Macleod notes almost as an afterthought in the next-to-last paragraph of this monograph. The first five chapters examine the attitudes of political interest groups. Starting with Edmund Burke, the individual who sounded the ideological alarm against the French Revolution, Macleod then turns to King George III and his cabinet, the mass of loyalists and the smaller aggregation of Burkean war crusaders, the Foxite Whigs, and then radicals and the Friends of Peace. The next three chapters consider groups that represented ideological cross-sections of the British populace: churchmen, women, and the middling and lower ranks of people.

Macleod's thesis proves cumbersome even in pursuit of her central contention of Burke's influence over government policy. Yes, she admits, "strategic issues were usually uppermost in ministers' thinking" but "hostility to French Revolutionary ideology also played an important part in shaping the attitudes of the British government. The probability that it was secondary to less pragmatic considerations in causing the actual recourse to war should not lead us to ignore or depreciate its significance in reinforcing these strategic concerns" (p. 31). The problem comes in trying to distinguish private beliefs from public rhetoric. In disputing Philip Schofield's interpretation of a falling off of ideological concerns after 1795, she cites William Grenville's anti-Jacobin fulminations in Parliament. What is the meaning of such rhetoric in a decade that had Church and King rioters sometimes chanting "Down with the Rump"? Recently purged Jacobins, like long-dead regicides, continued to be useful when justifying action against opponents. Macleod does not effectively address the impact of this conflict as a propaganda war until chapter ten, in which she skillfully reconstructs public opinion by comparing sentiments expressed with actual behavior. Taking her question "The Voice of the People?" in this chapter heading as her starting point probably would have produced a more engaging study.

Strapped into an analytical straightjacket, Macleod gets to admonish five historians for following J. Holland Rose in not giving ideology its just due in understanding government attitudes toward the war, then seems restrained from pursuing more fruitful lines of enquiry. The book's organizational framework involves a forced march over well-trodden territory. Macleod's narrative of Burke, the government, loyalists, and radicals yields little fresh insight. Regarding the Foxite Whigs, however, she makes good use of private papers and public speeches to capture the tensions among ideological beliefs, party principles, and tactics, and to explore the problematic concept of a loyal opposition in wartime. The chapters on churchmen and women suggest similar tugs of war among

personal belief, societal expectation, sense of duty, and tactical considerations. The war of ideas that emerges is less against revolutionary principles than of competing ideas and identities both within and among individuals and interest groups in eighteenth-century Britain.

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PETER JUPP. *British Politics on the Eve of Reform: The Duke of Wellington's Administration, 1828–30*. New York: St. Martin's. 1998. Pp. xiii, 483. \$79.95.

Peter Jupp's study of the political order of pre-reform Britain is an impressive book, and both its coverage and importance are greater than its title might suggest. Jupp provides us with a broad and detailed vision of the political world on the eve of the Great Reform Act, similar to that of Lewis Namier on the 1760s and Robert Gash on the 1830s. To do this, he has undertaken a huge amount of research, trawling through numerous British archives. The result is a scholarly, illuminating, and lucid work. Jupp's vision of politics between 1828 and 1830 takes in the extraparliamentary and the popular, but it is dominated by the high political world of Parliament and the monarchy. In particular, this book provides highly detailed accounts of the workings of the cabinet, the growth of departments of state, the passage of parliamentary legislation, and the workings of Parliament on a day-to-day basis. Jupp is able to show that many aspects of parliamentary business were dominated by a hard core of active members and that, for these men at least, being a parliamentarian was a time-consuming and arduous job, which belies the conventional image of pre-reform politics as relaxed and casual.

The monarchy still retained a large degree of power and influence in this period, and politicians recognized the need to have royal patronage to secure their objectives. As Jupp reveals, the Duke of Wellington appears to have been acutely aware of this fact. He is described here in ways that provide fascinating insights into a man often dismissed as an incompetent and hot-headed prime minister. Wellington emerges from Jupp's account with rather more credit, not least because of his concerted—and often successful—efforts to manage his interest amongst the political elite and his ability to control the crown's influence. Yet as we witness Wellington struggle to retain power in a Parliament swarming with several competing political parties, we are reminded that the business of government was complex and unpredictable.

Jupp is keen to counter older interpretations of the political world in the early nineteenth century that describe a number of discrete political cultures, including those of the landed elite, the emerging "middle class," and the "people." Instead, he argues for a cohesiveness in British politics. In this area Jupp is particularly revealing. He demonstrates that Parliament and parliamentarians were closely integrated

into politics out of doors, and he argues that Parliament could be receptive to public pressure and public opinion in significant ways. The rapid expansion of the press ensured that parliamentary proceedings were common knowledge, while individual politicians actively engaged in attempts to influence public opinion through their associations with middle-class lobby groups and the promotion of petitions. As far as the lower orders were concerned, Jupp argues that ties with parliamentary politics were stronger in rural areas than in the towns, since "a form of deference that bordered on the politics of mutual accommodation" (p. 443) was evident in the countryside, whereas such bonds were weaker in urban areas. Yet Jupp also suggests that "fault lines" in the relationship between Parliament and the public developed during this period, spurred on by a press that was largely liberal and pro-reform, and by the issues of Catholic emancipation, unemployment, and rural distress. Despite drawing our attention to the political world outside Parliament, Jupp contends that it was events within Westminster that led to the demise of Wellington's government, albeit that one of the main criticisms levelled against the duke by parliamentary rivals was that he was out of touch with public opinion.

In his discussion of politics out of doors, Jupp's account differentiates between "public opinion," which he equates with middle-class opinion, and "popular politics," which he links to the politics of the lower orders. This division is not entirely convincing. It is not clear that the print culture Jupp uses to explore public opinion was entirely the preserve of the middle and upper classes, just as, of course, the spread of political unions and growth of radical politics was not restricted to the urban lower orders. A broader and more theoretically informed conception of the public and public opinion, and the institutional framework within which opinion was formulated and expressed, might have allowed him to stress the cohesiveness of the political world in this period—or at least its interconnectedness—even more forcefully.

HANNAH BARKER  
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SUSAN THORNE. *Congregational Missions and the Making of an Imperial Culture in Nineteenth-Century England*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1999. Pp. ix, 247. \$49.50.

As religious institutions grew rapidly in the early nineteenth century, social class presented special problems for England's growing number of churchgoers. For centuries, the clergy of the established Church of England had been preaching the virtues of deference and accommodation to social hierarchy. The evangelical revival of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, placed a heavy emphasis upon equality before God and reinforced latent individualist and anti-establishment strains of English Protestantism. By the middle of the nineteenth century, roughly

half the churchgoing population had rejected the socially conservative Church of England altogether. Instead of attending their parish churches, churchgoers frequented more plebeian places of worship affiliated with one of the Nonconformist Protestant denominations: Methodist, Baptist, or Congregationalist.

Susan Thorne's book on Congregationalist foreign missions takes both religion and social class seriously, and contains a great deal of thoughtful and sophisticated commentary on issues of gender, race, and empire. The London Missionary Society (LMS) was the most important Congregationalist bureaucracy in the nineteenth century, as well as one of the most important (and most liberal) of Britain's missionary societies. At the heart of Thorne's analysis is an account of how upper-middle-class notables used the LMS as an instrument of middle-class self-assertion. Despite its bourgeois reputation, Congregationalism was predominantly lower-middle-class, artisan, and working-class in the nineteenth century. The upper-middle-class elites who controlled the denominational bureaucracy expected and received deference from the humble rank and file of the missionary movement: ministers, laity, missionaries, and non-Western Christians.

In the late nineteenth century, the LMS was transformed by the influx of unmarried women, who constituted fully one-half of all missionaries by 1900. Alarmed by what appeared to be the spread of non-churchgoing among the working-class, the LMS redoubled its efforts in the most popular working class religious institution, the Sunday school. Working-class children were enrolled in large numbers as financial contributors to the missionary enterprise through Sunday school collections and the distribution of little boxes to take home for the collection of small coins. In Thorne's view, the participation of women and working-class children provided further opportunities for control by upper-middle-class elites. Women missionaries used their superior professional qualifications to establish new hierarchies of race in non-Western nations. At home, missionary rhetoric appealed to the working class with a renewed emphasis on racial distinctions.

It is difficult for a historian to devote too much attention to the unmasking of hierarchies of class, gender, and race. Evangelical Protestantism submerged issues of power in a universalist rhetoric of equality in the eyes of God, making the task of unmasking a challenging one. Many historians have commented on the influence of social class on religion, but few have looked at the way religious institutions were used to create class distinctions. Thorne avoids the deadly abstractions found in some works of class analysis with her judicious use of historical anecdote about personal relationships within the world of English evangelical Nonconformity. Her categories of class are for the most part rooted in nineteenth-century languages of class. It is not clear that her analysis would work very well if applied to other sections of

English evangelicalism, particularly in the established church, but no one who has read Thorne's book could doubt that the egalitarian rhetoric of the Victorian missionary movement hypocritically obscured patterns of class subordination and racial hierarchy.

Having explained in detail how even the more liberal wing of the missionary movement imposed class and racial hierarchies, Thorne finds it difficult to understand why so many people cooperated in their own oppression. The answer, perhaps, is that the stated missionary aim of building a multiracial Christian commonwealth transcending the boundaries of race, class, gender, and empire had a powerful appeal because of their partial success at building multiracial and multiclass institutions. The point of view of the large number of non-elite participants in the missionary enterprise deserves to be taken seriously on its own terms. If class and racial subordination were all the missionary movement had to offer, we would not be living in a world where one half of all Christians are either African or of African descent and where the major world religions show with every new generation their ability to address human aspirations.

JEFFREY COX

*University of Iowa*

KALI ISRAEL. *Names and Stories: Emilia Dilke and Victorian Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. ix, 367. \$45.00.

The title reflects the twin foci of Kali Israel's study of the life of Emilia Dilke, the Victorian art critic and feminist. She traces the significance of Dilke's changing names as the child Emily Francis Strong became Emilia Dilke. "Stories" reflects Israel's privileging of representations over other evidence. She criticizes biographers in general for presenting their subjects as "exceptional," for failing to recognize that they construct their subjects, and for occasionally inserting themselves into the text, "narrating their responses to their 'subject'" (p. 16). "Traditional" biography merely provides "a refuge from postmodernity, a haven in an epistemologically unsettled world" (p. 17). Rather than reconstructing Emilia Dilke's life, Israel explores "the resources of stories—how they create, contain, extend, multiply, and make lives" (p. 7), resolutely refusing to search for the "real" woman. Stories by and about Dilke, Israel claims, offer "exceptionally useful material for considering the relationships between lives, images, and stories," and "her life offers an extreme occasion for thinking about how a life may be caught up in texts" (p. 7). She examines Dilke's own works and studies written about her, both by contemporaries and later scholars, mining these sources not for information but for the way they construct the elusive image known as Emilia Dilke. Israel has grander ambitions than mere biography: "My overriding goal . . . is not to locate Emilia Dilke in a critical pantheon alongside other famous women, but to use her as a site for analysis of nineteenth-century Britain"

(p. 7). This is a heavy burden to place on any individual.

Israel explores such issues as the nature of Victorian marriage, the struggles of Victorian women to be taken seriously as scholars, the ever-shifting nature of memory, the unreliability of narrative, and the deliberate attempts we all make to write and rewrite our own history. She analyzes Dilke's art criticism, essays, correspondence, and her involvement in the Women's Trade Union League for representations of class, empire, marriage, knowledge, power, and sexuality, for she considers these stories more important than Dilke's actual experience. But her insistence that Dilke offers a means of access into nineteenth-century Britain needs serious qualification. While an individual's life (or stories about an individual) indeed illuminates an era, every individual still inhabits a circumscribed world, and, as Israel acknowledges, Dilke's was a privileged one. Israel criticizes previous studies of Dilke for their tendency to view her as "exceptional," but she errs from the other direction: she constructs Dilke as a sort of everywoman whose life is a lens through which we can view all Victorian society. Dilke, through her marriages to the Oxford don Mark Pattison and the politician Charles Dilke, offers a glimpse of life for a certain type of elite Victorian woman, but not for all Victorian women. And herein lies the contradiction: Israel argues that the stories by and about Dilke are constructed and unreliable, yet she seems to regard them as authoritative texts for understanding "nineteenth-century Britain."

The overriding "story" which emerges is that of a woman with a keen hunger for knowledge. Like many Victorian women, Dilke's intellectual ambitions were limited by barriers to women's education and entry into the professions. These obstacles did not prevent her from spending a lifetime studying and writing on French Renaissance art, which seems to have been her most intense passion. Dilke's marriage to Pattison, while unhappy, offered her "access . . . to contemporary intellectual life" (p. 99). Dilke achieved a measure of independence by evading her conjugal bonds through illnesses and discomforts eased only by long absences from her husband. After Pattison's death, she married Dilke, whose promising political career was imploding amid accusations that he had committed adultery with Virginia Crawford. In this happier marriage, Emilia Dilke became more active in promoting the welfare of working women, though her primary role was as an intellectual.

Israel states "although I stress interpretation and problematize identification, reading this book need not be a bloodless and cold, if theoretically and intellectually proper, undertaking" (p. 18). Since theory is the star of this show, readers seeking an example of sustained postmodern interpretation of texts may find this work absorbing and enlightening. Others may find that the focus on representations wears thin. In the end, the reader hears most about postmodern "life-writing," the unreliability of sources, and the ultimate

unknowability of the past. This may be new to some readers, but historians have wrestled with such issues since Herodotus. One need not be committed to postmodern theory in order to understand that our knowledge of history, however gained, is tenuous and ever changing.

SANDRA J. PEACOCK  
Georgia Southern University

R. J. Q. ADAMS. *Bonar Law*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1999. Pp. xvii, 458. \$60.00.

Our interest in the lives of Britain's twentieth-century leaders appears unquenchable. At present there are in print multiple biographies of Herbert Asquith and David Lloyd George, not to mention Winston Churchill, whose life has spawned its own publishing industry. Stanley Baldwin, although neglected after World War II, is the subject of a new work by Philip Williamson. Yet, although he served as Conservative leader for more than a decade, piloted his party through the Home Rule crisis and the Great War and, in 1922, formed the first Conservative government in seventeen years, Andrew Bonar Law has received relatively little attention. There have only been two biographies of Bonar Law, and the most recent, Robert Blake's *The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1923* (1955), is nearly a half-century old. Moreover, as its title suggests, Blake did not challenge the dismissive view articulated by Asquith and echoed by George Dangerfield in *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (1935). In Dangerfield's estimation, Bonar Law was an unimaginative politician out of his depth. R. J. Q. Adams provides an authoritative biography, rooted in a mastery of the primary sources, which demonstrates how the Conservative leader and prime minister successfully guided his party through this turbulent period.

Adams reveals the character of the man, his stern but self-effacing and driven personality. Bonar Law was a "Striver" (p. 11) who caught the early train to his Glasgow business. With his prodigious memory, he honed his oratorical skills at the Glasgow Parliamentary Debating Association. He played bridge but had few other hobbies. He cared little for social conversation, outdoor pursuits, country house weekends, or dining parties. Yet Bonar Law was a man of strong attachments. He was a loving husband who did not remarry after his wife died in 1909. In contrast to his own father, Bonar Law doted on his children. Adams recounts poignantly the wartime deaths of Bonar Law's two elder sons. After his son Jim was shot down, Bonar Law traveled to France and sat for hours in the cockpit of a plane like the one his son had flown.

In general, however, this is a book about Bonar Law's political life. Adams focuses on the role Bonar Law played within the Conservative and Unionist Party, devoting only one-eighth of the book to the period before the fifty-three-year-old Bonar Law rose to party leadership. In Parliament, Bonar Law had an



effective, hard-hitting debating style one colleague described as that of "a skilled riveter" (p. 26). Amidst the partisan fray of prewar politics, Bonar Law adopted an aggressive approach that Asquith denigrated as "the new style." In a famous 1912 speech, Bonar Law said that he could "imagine no length of resistance" to Home Rule which he would not support. Adams argues that Bonar Law's views were rooted in Unionist ideals, not bigotry; he even hired an Irish Catholic nanny for his children. In Adams's interpretation, Bonar Law was leading from "a war chariot" (p. 73) in order to bind dissident factions. He was an astute leader who held together a coalition of Conservatives, southern and Ulster Unionists, free traders, and tariff reformers. And he acted with a modesty and honesty that drew wide support from a party disheartened by three electoral defeats, policy divisions, and inadequate leadership.

Early in World War I, Bonar Law became convinced of the need for a coalition government, but this leader of the backbenchers was unable to advance without his followers. Once Bonar Law brought his party into Asquith's coalition in May 1915, he accepted a lesser office because the patriotic struggle demanded such sacrifices. However, his willingness to collaborate with Liberal leaders weakened Bonar Law's position as party leader. His leadership was further undermined by his reluctance to press for conscription and his refusal to criticize his Liberal colleagues. Meanwhile he struggled on after his sons' deaths in 1917, driving himself ever harder and experiencing a near nervous breakdown after the armistice. In 1922, concern for his party and followers brought Bonar Law back to politics for a brief tenure as prime minister.

In *Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values* (1999), Philip Williamson calls for a new understanding of British political leaders by focusing on "their widest public functions . . . their relationships with the electorate, opposing parties, and the media, and to their interaction with 'political culture'" (p. 1). Adams does not take on such a task. Yet this is a fine political biography that demonstrates Bonar Law's role in rebuilding the Conservative and Unionist Party and his contribution to British policy.

NEAL R. McCRILLIS  
Columbus State University

KAREN J. MUSOLF, *From Plymouth to Parliament: A Rhetorical History of Nancy Astor's 1919 Campaign*. New York: St. Martin's. 1999. Pp. xi, 244. \$45.00.

In 1919, Nancy Astor became the first woman in Britain to take her seat in the House of Commons, where she remained the sole woman Member of Parliament for two years. Her parliamentary career spanned twenty-five years, during which time she campaigned vigorously for, among other things, the emancipation of women. Yet despite the historical and parliamentary importance of Astor's life, her political biography has never been written. In the light of this

neglect, Karen J. Musolf's contribution to revealing the significance of Astor's political work is most welcome. A second plaudit is due to a publishing company with the vision to enable a writer to explore the time-frame of an election campaign within the space of a book.

Focusing on such a concentrated moment in time provides an opportunity for in-depth revelations. Musolf investigates Astor's journey as a prospective parliamentary candidate in the November 1919 election campaign for the Sutton division of Plymouth, a seat previously held by her husband. The author provides a useful biographical sketch of Astor, explains the circumstances surrounding Astor's candidacy as a "substitute" for her newly ennobled husband, details the grinding demands of the campaign and Astor's electioneering tactics, clarifies the complexities relating to Astor's position in relation to her rivals, and analyzes the election outcome. She concludes with a compressed history of Astor's parliamentary career.

This text is situated within what the author describes as "rhetorical history," "a blended form that joins historical description with rhetorical criticism" (p. ix). The preface attempts to introduce the distinguishing features of this treatment, many of which seem indistinguishable from other historical/academic or scholarly research. To inform us that authors of such histories "recognize that 'when something happens, it stirs up a hell of a lot of rhetoric'" (p. ix) hardly assists in elucidating the tenets of this methodology. That "rhetorical history is an emerging genre, more familiar to scholars in the field of communication than in other disciplines" (p. ix) prepares us to alter our expectations from those we might entertain of a more traditional academic discourse.

The inherent interest of this book lies in its detailed exposition of Astor's complex position in relation to the British social and political scene. Musolf's perception is that such complexity forced Astor into inhabiting many juxtaposed personas. The improbability of Astor's position as an American with no previous political experience being able to transcend the supposed deficiencies of birth, limited education, and gender to achieve political success is ably handled. How that transformation was accomplished during the brief but hectic weeks of the election campaign makes the narrative fascinating. However, Astor's significance as a political pioneer, her initial relation to the women's movement, and movement leaders' doubts in accepting such an improbable candidate for this crucial role do not receive the attention that they surely warrant. Rather, the account of the campaign stresses Astor's oratorical power to manipulate the electorate, the press, and, indeed, the Conservative Unionist Party into accepting the credibility of her claim to office. This focus is the result of Musolf's use of rhetorical history methodology, where she concentrates on the ploys Astor used in her platform performances at campaign meetings to woo electors, reassure her party, outwit the press, and confound her two electoral rivals.

This is engaging and significant, but Musolf's evident passion for this novel methodology results in a somewhat bludgeoning style whereby, in the early chapters, she is constantly flag-waving for this rhetorical history genre. Her insistence on a "show and tell" style sometimes detracts from the text and results in some repetition, while research material is sacrificed to fit the methodology.

It may also be the limitations of this treatment that produce a largely descriptive text, short on analysis and with judgments twisted out of the confines of rhetorical history rather than from a sound understanding of the political circumstances of the period. The conclusion is rather a misnomer; it does not draw together the themes of the research, assess the success or otherwise of the book's intention, review the book's sources, or delineate the avenues for future researchers. Instead, it delivers a rather congested summary of Astor's subsequent parliamentary career that is at odds both with the book's intention and its style.

There is an important story to be told of Astor's political career and her contribution to the development of women's emancipation in Britain. Musolf's intricate examination of the factors relating to how Astor found herself as the first woman MP to take her seat, and of her social and political location in this postwar era, sets the scene admirably for future researchers.

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PAUL WARD. *Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British Left, 1881–1924*. (Royal Historical Society Studies in History. New Series.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press, 1998. Pp. viii, 232. \$63.00.

Was British socialism an "invented tradition"? This is the burden of the last line of Paul Ward's fine study of the development of British socialist ideas between 1881 and 1924. Locating his careful research in the Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger tradition, Ward highlights the merger of radical patriotism with loyalist patriotism in this period, so that by the mid-1920s, the Labour Party could claim national rather than sectarian status and appeal to the electorate for the right to speak for the nation.

The crucial period of this story of the emergence of "social patriotism" is the 1914–1918 war, and not the last two decades of the nineteenth century, as the "invention of tradition" hypothesis suggests. But it would be churlish to judge a book solely by its last line. This is an intelligent and astringent critique of what might be termed the structuralist view of Labour politics. That is, Ward shows the difficulty of arguing that the rise of Labour was solely a function of the change of the franchise in 1918 and the weight of trade unionism within the parliamentary Labour Party. Ideas mattered within the House of Labour, but the ideas

behind Labour politics had more to do with the nation than with the working class.

There are unevennesses in Ward's study. The notion of popular militarism is bought uncritically (p. 102), and comparisons with European labor movements are rudimentary, but there is much intelligent comment and insight in this book. It is particularly good on the wartime transformation of the Labour Party, on the pastoral *imaginaire* of Victorian socialist thinkers, and on the links with later Labour thinking on the National Land Fund, the National Parks, and the National Trust. Here then is the prehistory of Blairism, which is a natural outcome of the Scottish form of Labour patriotism that Ward so cogently scrutinizes. At the end of the study, the Red Flag is essentially nowhere to be seen; burying it, Ward suggests, was the precondition for Labour's few electoral triumphs in this century. Now, eighty years later, Tony Blair seems to have read the historical tea leaves right; only through a patriotic discourse can he (or any other Labour leader) hope to realize some elements of the vision of social justice at the heart of twentieth-century Labour politics.

JAY WINTER  
University of Cambridge

ANDRZEJ OLECHNOWICZ. *Working-Class Housing in England between the Wars: The Becontree Estate*. (Clarendon Press of Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. 273. \$85.00.

Becontree Estate in Essex, a post-World War I community of over 25,000 houses built to accommodate over 100,000 city dwellers, was in its time the crown jewel of the London County Council's vast housing empire and the world's largest public housing development. If the wartime promise of "Homes for Heroes" had any meaning, Becontree was the most watched (and most controversial) of the new housing "estates." Indeed, from one perspective it was a wild success. It ended "multiple occupation" (i.e. more than one family in a single dwelling) and provided an improved housing environment for thousands of families. Perhaps more than anything else, Becontree offered its occupants their first experience with family and individual privacy, a fact of cultural life that has hardly been considered by historians.

It is ironic, then, that over the decade of its creation (and still today) Becontree conjured up little more than negative debate. Some of the controversy centered on legitimate issues, such as proximity to work and a paucity of certain services like health and education. There were a number of reasons for its shortcomings, including inadequate funding and the Ministry of Health's high-handedness. Sadly, its failure to bring industry with it meant that it was more of a "garden suburb" than a "garden city." Nevertheless, Andrzej Olechnowicz shows that much of the criticism of Becontree was the product of misplaced middle-class fears of things it perceived to be working class:

“one-class” (i.e. working-class) communities, Bolshevism, corruption, crime, extravagance, and poor financial management. Most important, Becontree was a place where nothing raised the ire of the middle class more than their own misconceptions of working-class leisure habits.

Overall, the strongest argument of the book is that the creation of a misleadingly negative image of Becontree was in reality a tool by which Conservative politicians, the press, neighboring middle-class suburbanites, and even well-meaning social workers excluded the working-class from increasingly narrow definitions of community and citizenship. Such proto-fascist sentiment is interesting in light of popular middle-class attitudes in other parts of Europe in these interwar years.

Middle-class perceptions could not have been more off base. In reality, Becontree gave birth to a new breed of suburban working-class dwellers most interested in staying at home to work in their gardens, listen to the wireless, or go off to one of the many local cinemas. The successful design of the houses (not befittingly examined by the author) meant a working-class love affair with individual comfort and privacy. “Community building,” a sort of intellectualized working-class ideology of cooperation, did not take place. Despite a crusade by voluntary social work organizations for community centers (or “community development,” as it was called in the 1950s and 1960s), “community” turned out to be “wishful thinking” (p. 228). In the end, the new “estates” led to a significant adaptation of the working-class to a changed physical context, not one of *embourgeoisement* but one of a suburbanized, working-class subculture.

This is an interestingly written book. If it has a weakness, it is that Olechnowicz does not tell us much about interior and exterior space in Becontree and how such spaces differed from, say, life in London’s Bethnal Green, or how they reshaped working-class life. The book includes but a single photo and no layout or design plans whatever. Overall, however, as a monograph the book deserves a wide audience, particularly for the way it extends our understanding of interwar middle-class (and Conservative) perceptions of working-class culture. In terms of class relations, Becontree is the sad underside of the wartime enthusiasm for “Homes for Heroes.”

JAMES SCHMIECHEN

*Central Michigan University*

ENRIQUE MORADIELLOS. *La perfidia de Albión: El gobierno británico y la guerra civil española*. (Historia.) Madrid, Spain: Siglo Veintiuno de España. 1996. Pp. xviii, 408.

Enrique Moradiellos’s superbly researched and beautifully written book adds to his reputation and distinguishes him as one of the few Spanish scholars to have successfully engaged with the history of another country. It also raises profound intellectual issues that can

only be lightly touched upon here. The key to the book’s deliberately pejorative title is a speech in the House of Lords by Henry Snell, a Labour peer of humble origins and honest opinions. It was made in March 1939, as the anticommunists in Madrid were finally tearing the heart out of the Spanish Republic’s resistance to Francisco Franco. In an understandably emotive tone, Snell accused the British government “before history and the conscience of humanity, of the ignominious sacrifice of the democratically-elected Spanish government, with all the betrayals of faith and brutality which accompanied it” (p. 360).

The sheer volume of writing on the international dimension of Spain’s Civil War is daunting. The genre, in its original propaganda phase, was born within weeks of the military uprising in 1936, and the first studies by professional historians appeared not long after 1945. Since then, Britain’s role in managing the war’s international context has been appraised with rigor and judged with severity. It is widely recognized that the effect of non-intervention was to expose Spain’s legitimate government to military aggression by Italy and Germany, while placing serious obstacles to the supply of aid from its ally, Soviet Russia. Various earlier studies, although not as thorough and wide-ranging as the work under review, have anticipated Moradiellos’s deeply unfavorable conclusions. Appeasement, and even the Munich Agreement, have had their defenders, but no scholar has ventured to defend the National Government’s policy of non-intervention in Spain.

It is one thing, however, to acknowledge the failure of the policy, to expose its hypocrisies and occasional pusillanimity. It is another to blame Britain directly for the overthrow of the Spanish Republic. This book never propounds the latter contention in so many words. But its dialectic depends on the notion that Britain’s “malevolent neutrality,” combined with its international prestige, placed it at the forefront of democratic Spain’s enemies. At many points, the impression comes across that the true assassins of the republic were Stanley Baldwin, Anthony Eden, and Neville Chamberlain rather than Franco, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. In this version, not the Junkers 52—nominated by Hitler—but the bowler hat of the foreign office official should have been the object monumentalized by Franco in thanksgiving for his victory. It almost goes without saying that the argument is informed by the premise that the republic’s defeat was an unmitigated disaster for the Spanish people and for the wider world. The reader will accept the book’s hypothesis to the extent that s/he accepts its premise.

In my opinion, the indictment should not be murder (of any degree) but (at worst) citizen indifference, as it is called in France. To plead thus, we do not need to exaggerate the force of the terrible dilemma that Britain struggled to cope with in the later 1930s. The present policy of the British government (as instanced in the case of Indonesia’s rule in East Timor) is that

weapons should not be supplied to any state when intended for aggressive use against another state, or against its own people. If this principle of an "ethical foreign policy" were applied to 1936, no arms could have been supplied to either side; in other words, non-intervention. On the less ethical strategic issues, Moradiellos overestimates the extent to which non-intervention prejudiced the neutrality of Spain during World War II. Franco was benevolent to Hitler and Mussolini while they were winning, and thereafter to the allies. Almost all the relevant detail fits inside the two facts that the pro-Axis Ramón Serrano Suñer was appointed as foreign minister in October 1940 and dismissed in September 1942.

This said, Moradiellos wrote truer than he knew, at least in one respect. As he impressively documents, British governments were prejudiced against the Second Republic from its inception in 1931, characterizing it as a Kerensky-type regime that was, in effect, the trojan horse of revolution. Whitehall used the turnip-ghost of a "communist revolutionary conspiracy" as justification for its actions in 1936, in the full and certain knowledge that all such allegations were false. MI6 interceptions of Comintern radio messages, released by the Public Records Office since this book was written, prove not only that there was no "Bolshevik plot" that fateful summer—a fact long accepted by historians—but also that, on the contrary, the Spanish Communist Party was anxious to discourage revolutionary activity on the part of anarchists and other groups.

ROB STRADLING  
Penarth, Wales

B. J. C. MCKERCHER, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930–1945*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 403. \$64.95.

Canadians, strategically vulnerable, have shared an abiding interest in relations among the powers of the North Atlantic triangle and an enduring national interest in promoting good relations between Great Britain, the premier world power of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the United States, the foremost global power of the second half of the century. It is fitting, then, that, B. J. C. McKercher, has produced a fully professional study of the seminal forces and events through the turbulent years from 1930 to 1945, when Britain lost its global pre-eminence to the United States. McKercher, author and editor of several studies of Anglo-American relations in the 1920s, comes well primed to write this book. Indeed, his study opens with a thirty-page prologue that provides the reader with a masterful summary of British foreign and defense policies in the wake of the Paris peacemaking, through the naval and Pacific treaties of the Washington Conference, the Locarno accords, which defined British relations to continental security, and the diplomacy of war debts and reparations lead-

ing to the revised settlements named after the Americans Charles Dawes and Owen Young; all with an eye on the Anglo-American dimension and all thoroughly informed by the most pertinent and recent historiography.

The prologue also lays down themes that figure prominently in subsequent chapters. McKercher asserts that, despite the shifting indices of coal, iron, and steel production, which showed America far out-pacing Britain by 1920, it is inaccurate to translate these crude figures to indicate, as do Paul Kennedy and many others, that the United States had now clearly become the world's strongest power. Such a conclusion overlooks other sources of British wealth and influence, particularly financial and commercial. More importantly, it fails to appreciate how influence is deployed in international relations. For McKercher, faithful student of Donald Cameron Watt, influence is primarily effected through the skills and diligence of national political elites, encompassing leading politicians, diplomatists, bureaucrats, press barons, and military chiefs in their willful pursuit of national interests. This study focuses intentionally on British and, to a lesser degree, American elites, and by McKercher's measure, Britain was still clearly the preeminent world power at the end of the 1920s, given the relative gains, losses, and liabilities of the Great War.

This is a study of how such preeminence was lost in the era of the Great Depression and World War II. The analysis focuses on topics often given minimal attention in standard diplomatic histories, perhaps because of their inherent complexity, the frustrations and failures involved, and the demanding, interlocking, multilateral attention and research required. After surveying the successes of cooperation between the Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald and the Hoover administration, which led to the London Naval Treaty of 1930, ending the last vestiges of Anglo-American naval rivalry, the analysis turns to detailed examination of the frustrations and failures that marked the preparations for, and subsequent deadlocks of, the World Disarmament Conference and the tense negotiations on reparations and war debts that preceded the disappointments of the World Economic Conference. In explaining the failures of these crisis-filled years, McKercher emphasizes the short-sightedness and unilateralism of the Americans, the refusal to concede necessary war debt reductions, or to work collaboratively with League of Nations powers in constraining Japan as it launched a new phase of imperial expansion with the absorption of Manchuria.

The author's major criticisms are directed at President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose economic and military policies after 1933 were so confused or inward looking as to drive British leaders to despair of achieving mutually beneficial cooperation in Europe or Asia. McKercher gives a close reading of the development of British defense policy in face of the simultaneous challenges from Adolf Hitler, the Japanese, and Be-



nito Mussolini. Repeated British overtures to America for possible cooperation to uphold peace, as in appeals for support of oil sanctions to dissuade Mussolini from conquest of Abyssinia, were rebuffed. This study offers valuable new detail on many of such efforts, and argues, for example, that the Hoare-Laval plan resulted more from American non-cooperation in sanctions than from British efforts to appease Mussolini. The American factor is also presented as significant in the termination of Robert Vansittart's dominant role as Foreign Office permanent under-secretary. Vansittart's carefully constructed "world leadership" strategy of counter-balancing German and Japanese power depended on a modicum of Anglo-American cooperation. With Neville Chamberlain's assumption of the prime minister's office in May 1937 and Vansittart's subsequent replacement, the diplomacy of proactive appeasement proceeded apace; Chamberlain remained utterly opposed to cultivating the unreliable Americans, whose entrenched isolation and neutrality legislation presented an insuperable barrier.

When appeasement failed and Hitler generated a new war by attacking Poland, Roosevelt soon opened the stores of American supply to the British—on a cash and carry basis. Indeed, in the desperate perils that lay ahead for Britain, led by Winston Churchill after the Nazi victories of the spring of 1940, McKercher underlines the cold-hearted realism and national interests that propelled American largesse, through Lend-Lease and eventual belligerency, rather than any altruism, sentiment about Churchill's English-speaking peoples, or romantic "atlanticism." And, as United States economic and demographic power was now deployed for war, this simultaneously translated into political, strategic, and coalition hegemony, which, by the latter stages of the war, meant a role inevitably reduced to junior partnership for Britain.

McKercher's study both describes and explains the major events and transitions involved in the process of British imperial eclipse. His clear and deeply informed analysis stands as both a labor of love and a lament for the passing of "the greatest of the Great Powers."

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DAVID VINCENT. *The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832–1998*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 364. \$45.00.

At the heart of David Vincent's book is a depressingly familiar story about the development of "official secrecy" in the British state over the past 150 years and about frustrated attempts to attack and reform it over the past half century. What makes Vincent's treatment so ambitious and original—what has the effect of defamiliarizing though also confusing this story—is the layer upon layer of contextual material in which he cloaks it. Defining secrecy broadly as "blocked communication," Vincent burrows into the heart and soul of the English gentleman to observe the creed of

"discreet reserve," into the working-class slum to compare its own internal gossip networks with the intrusive probing of the friendly visitor and the social worker, into the subcultures of government clerkdom and the learned professions, down the crooked corridors of corporate "confidentiality," and into the mysterious pages of company accounts. The result is a bewilderingly multifarious picture of a culture with secrets in every nook and corner, though whether this amounts to "a culture of secrecy"—and especially to a "peculiarly British" culture of secrecy—remains a moot point.

Betraying a mild Foucauldian animus against liberalism, Vincent begins his story with the attempts of the mid-Victorian liberal state to defend its right to block communication by means of the concept of "honourable secrecy," upheld by a gentlemanly civil service. But at first, the Victorian combination of a Benthamite faith in rational discourse, minimal government, a vigorously inquisitive free press, and mobilized public opinion appeared to hold official secrecy in check. The rot set in later in the nineteenth century, as government expanded—largely by public demand—without modernizing its internal culture. Why this happened remains something of a puzzle. Partly it was a matter of governing elites' mistrust of the people, even—especially—at a time of growing government intrusiveness in and collection of data about private lives. The increasingly cloak-and-dagger atmosphere of international relations made a contribution. So did a curious diminution of press assertiveness. On the other hand, the state was at the same time gradually recognizing rights to privacy, both of the sovereign individual and of corporate bodies such as trade unions and professions. Most significantly, many citizens seemed to tolerate "blocked communication" as the price of state power to improve their lives in other ways, or as a means of protecting private data in public hands. Strange to say, at the height of government paternalism and secretiveness in the first half of the twentieth century, public trust in government seems also to have been at an all-time high—a trust which cannot be explained away simply by calling it "passive" or attributing it to public ignorance carefully manicured by government. Certainly, the unwritten constitution and the tradition of "honourable secrecy" gave the British governing apparatus an astounding degree of latitude, but the citizenry put up with it, even identified with it.

Although Vincent promises "a social history of trust," he shows surprisingly little interest in the underpinnings of this public trust in government. His multifaceted approach distracts here from the core narrative, as he explores fascinating but not always pertinent by-ways such as the regulation of the patent medicine business (is all regulation therefore "blocked communication"?). Nor does he support his fashionable assertion that liberal regimes block communication as much as illiberal ones (although, he concedes, they do it differently) by reference to any detailed scrutiny of illiberal regimes. Indeed, occasional dark

allusions to a “peculiarly British culture of secrecy” imply that this liberal regime was generally *more* secretive than France, Germany, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States—the comparators vary according to context—not to mention Italy, Spain, or Russia. A closing plea that his study not be viewed as an exercise in pathology is unlikely to work the necessary balancing effect on most readers. Vincent is much better on the conditions that undermined public trust, particularly from the 1950s onwards: decline in the faith of “discreet reserve,” growing suspicion of Cold War secretiveness, a more self-conscious sense of personal privacy and individual rights, and the Thatcherite onslaught on all professional cultures including that of the civil service (making Margaret Thatcher a true “enemy within” of liberalism). His dispassionate consideration of Thatcher’s impact on public attitudes toward government and vice versa is the best short treatment of that still-recent revolution that I have yet read. In general, despite the lack of precision represented by Vincent’s kitchen-sink approach to culture, it is hard not to feel that in this kind of treatment one sees the future of political history—and, on the whole, it works.

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JOHAN VERBERCKMOES. *Laughter, Jestbooks and Society in the Spanish Netherlands*. (Early Modern History: Society and Culture.) New York: St. Martin’s. 1999. Pp. x, 214. \$65.00.

Did the Reformations sober up the famously bawdy humor of the Middle Ages? More specifically, did Catholic Reform in the Spanish Netherlands stifle the bare-bottomed buffoonery of the Burgundian era? These are two of the big questions this wide-ranging and interesting book tries to answer. In the process, we learn much not only about humor in the Low Countries but also about approaches to the history of humor per se.

Johan Verberckmoes previews his essentially chronological presentation with an informative survey of the existing literature on humor, which turns out to be thick in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and contemporary history but thin for the early modern period. Here and throughout, the author skillfully applies insights from other disciplines (including the usual list of luminaries, such as Michel Foucault, Mary Douglas, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Sigmund Freud, and more) yet in most cases does not allow them to overwhelm his immediate subject.

This subject begins in chapter one with the “Land of Cockaigne.” If such a land ever existed, then it must have been in the Burgundian Netherlands. Yet Verberckmoes warns against overstating or stereotyping: no one can quantify whether people here laughed more or harder than elsewhere, even if the region clearly boasted an “active urban festive culture.” Chapter two, “Laughter Embodied,” emphasizes the

unashamedly bodily quality of the age’s humor. “A Cure for the Civilized” reviews the resurrection of classical injunctions to constrain laughter by preferring wit to open-mouthed convulsions. Chapter four, on “The Politics of Joking,” moves us further into the sixteenth century, by showing the effects of the early Reformation and the Eighty Years’ War (1568–1648) on humor, which retained its bodily quality while taking on a more biting and highly confessionalized tone.

At this point, the author pauses for an “Entrement” in order to “turn Bakhtin upside down.” Though Mikhail Bakhtin was more concerned with the power of “carnavalesque laughter as a guarantee of liberty” than he was with periodization, he nevertheless argued that from about 1600 on both church and state did much to bring about a repression of laughter. Such a view also fit Max Weber’s “disenchantment of the world,” when the irrational, including laughter, became marginalized. Verberckmoes refutes these views, not by arguing that the contrary was true but by showing strong continuity between the humor of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If there was a turning point in laughter becoming more “civilized” or “modern,” argues the author, then it occurred closer to 1700 than 1600—if by modern one means “a smile” rather than “a trigger for a body to sweat and piss” (p. 182). As for Bakhtin’s argument that medieval humor was “all-inclusive” while modern humor was marked by “ridicule,” Verberckmoes is unconvinced: too much new research reveals plenty of ridicule in both periods. On the issue of laughter as subversive or as a safety valve, the author concludes that both were present in both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and existed alongside yet another function of humor: mere fun. Of course, what makes something “fun” in a particular time and place might require study as well, but Verberckmoes’s approach is nuanced and convincing.

The pause for Bakhtin sets up the final three chapters—“Censoring Lies,” “Jestbooks in the Spanish Netherlands,” and “Counter-Reformation Humour”—each of which offers evidence for the continuation of old forms of humor, among all sorts of persons, long into the seventeenth century. Efforts to restrict or refine laughter are noted, of course, but in the end what existed in this region was a “Hispanic-Flemish hotchpotch” of humor, which was one reason “Belgian” culture was so rich.

A certain amount of repetition is inevitable in the study of any abstract concept. And a work so heavily informed by theory will occasionally slip into clinical statements that explain everything and nothing, such as “laughter creates a dynamic in which confrontations, exchange and hybrid cultural mixing takes place” (p. 6). Finally, although it is no mean achievement to write a book in a language not one’s own, the Dutch original flows more smoothly and idiomatically than the author’s English rendition—noteworthy here because if there is any subject that depends on idiom, it

is humor. Still, this is a useful and interesting work, suitable for specialists, graduate students, and even advanced undergraduates.

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RUTH MACKay. *The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile*. (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. pp. xii, 193.

During the reign of Philip IV (1621–1665), the Spanish monarchy was in a constant state of war, often fighting several enemies at once: the Dutch in the Netherlands and America (1621–1648), Protestants in Central Europe during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), French allies in northern Italy (1628–1631), and the French monarchy (1635–1659). Within the Spanish monarchy, the extraordinary fiscal and military demands created by war ignited revolts that became new wars in Catalonia (1640–1652) and Portugal (1640–1668). Yet at the heart of the Spanish empire, Castile remained strangely calm, like the eye of a colossal storm.

Ruth MacKay's study of opposition to military levies during the critical years 1631–1643 attributes Castile's relative tranquility to the relationship between Castilians and their king, which "provided individuals and corporate institutions with sufficient rights and capacities to dissuade them from rebelling" (p. 1). Contrary to the generalized image of an absolutist Spanish monarchy, "the form of rule in seventeenth-century Castile was not absolute in any sense" (p. 3). Despite the king's claim to be above the law, Castilians expected his actions to respect the law, privileges, and the common good, which guaranteed subjects "a wide range of tools at their disposal that almost always made armed resistance unnecessary" (p. 13). "Castile's apparent passivity in the midst of oppression, war, taxation, and hunger" (p. 13) is therefore a mirage; under its veil of tranquility, MacKay has uncovered abundant evidence of persistent resistance to royal authority.

The bureaucratic labyrinth of military recruitment, finance, and judicial appeals, which at first may seem designed solely to execute the king's will with implacable force, on closer inspection reveals endless opportunities for subjects to challenge, delay, and negotiate royal orders. Ultimately, subjects usually complied, but their resistance could help them secure concessions and "gifts" (*mercedes*). The Cortes gave in to demands for more soldiers but in return got a greater say over Castile's fiscal and military matters. Aristocrats raised soldiers in exchange for royal privileges, whereas towns and villages could send away unwanted criminals to war. Commoners had less leverage to negotiate concessions, but they could resist compliance by charging that a conscription lottery had been rigged, or that laws exempted them for being too old, too young, married with many children, or desti-

tute. Authorities investigated charges of abuse and seriously considered pleas, even from the most humble subjects, so that, surprisingly, "virtually no appeal based on reasons of poverty was turned down" (p. 143). When appeals failed, enlisted men opted with alarming frequency for desertion. For example, in 1635, of 1,300 soldiers sent to the port city of Cádiz, 1,087 fled! In short, Castilians had so many ways to resist unfair and excessive demands that violent confrontation became rare and unnecessary; and that was "a sign not of complaisance but of resources. It would be foolish to rebel if one could attain the same end with less trouble" (p. 167).

MacKay's book is most engaging when it weaves individuals' stories of resistance into the impersonal narrative of a state's insatiable need for soldiers and money. These vivid glimpses of the struggles of men and women—drawn from an impressive cache of archival documents—demonstrate that even ordinary Castilians believed that their "loyalty was not unconditional, that their duty was derived from a pact, and that such a pact ennobled them all" (p. 177). In the end, however, does this explain why Castile did not revolt? That the Dutch had been "faithfully addicted to the king's majesty" did not stop their rebellion against Spanish tyranny in the late sixteenth century (Martin Van Gelderen, ed., *The Dutch Revolt* [1993], p. 50). Even as the revolt of 1640 was under way, Catalans insisted they were the king's most loyal and obedient subjects. I suspect MacKay's assertion that Castilians described resistance as "a sort of long-term obedience, a way in which the subject, by not obeying, is arguably protecting the king from himself" (p. 25) was true of Andalusians, who between 1647 and 1652 so often turned to violent resistance. Had Castile become immune to the plague of rebellions that swept across Europe in the 1640s? Faced with the same question for the unrevolutionary kingdom of Valencia, James Casey confessed that the task "of explaining why something which might have happened did not in fact materialize always remained a rather nebulous one" (*The Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeenth Century* [1979], p. 2). Nevertheless, the pursuit of an elusive problem has yielded a new and compelling look at Habsburg Spain's century of gold and war.

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TOMÁS A. MANTECÓN NOVELLÁN. *La muerte de Antonia Isabel Sánchez: Tiranía y escándalo en una sociedad rural del Norte español en el Antiguo Régimen*. Madrid: Alcalá de Henares. 1997. Pp. 187.

On the night of July 1, 1799, the body of Antonia Isabel Sánchez, the wife of a prosperous peasant and petty merchant, was discovered in an isolated village of the Cantabrian region of northern Spain. The victim suffered thirty-seven stab wounds in an attack of exceptional savagery. The local community suspected the victim's husband, whose violent behavior toward

his wife and apparent illicit relationship with a servant girl in the family household had already created scandal in the village. The fact that the husband was in Seville on business at the time of the murder did not prevent the local judicial authorities from ordering his arrest in a case that dragged on for years and ended unresolved when the husband died in prison without ever having been brought to formal trial.

Tomás A. Mantecón Novellán, who has relied heavily on three thousand pages of testimony taken during the case, has written a sophisticated microhistory that passes far beyond the realm of a historical "whodunnit." He describes the patriarchal character of a village society that permitted the abuse of the victim in spite of the efforts of the parish priest and local notables to curb the husband's violent actions towards his wife. He analyzes power relationships of the village, especially the rivalry between the accused and one of his principal detractors, his brother-in-law, the most influential person (*cacique*) in the village, Antonio Bajuelo. He analyzes the values of village society when confronted with actions departing from prevailing community norms. Finally, he dissects the corrupt actions of the local judicial authorities to whom the *cacique* was linked in a client-patron relationship that determined the accused's fate in spite of the exhaustive nature of the judicial investigation.

Historians of eighteenth-century Spain have substantially enlarged knowledge of the complexities of the kingdom's society over the past three decades, whether through studies of the peasant economy, charitable institutions, or poverty and the poor. But when all is said and done, the study of how this Old Regime society functioned at the local level, especially in the countryside, has only just begun. Mantecón Novellán has made an important and original contribution to the study of the values and social assumptions of rural society in northern Spain. He has also provided invaluable insights into the operations and failings of a judicial system at the local level when it became enmeshed with the naked self-interest of judicial officials and village notables.

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CHRISTOPHER ELWOOD. *The Body Broken: The Calvinist Doctrine of the Eucharist and the Symbolization of Power in Sixteenth-Century France*. (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 251. \$49.95.

This book is a rare work that delivers more than its title promises. Christopher Elwood studies John Calvin, but also Antoine Marcourt, Guillaume Farel, Pierre Viret, Théodore Bèze, and others who have received little attention. The book explores how polemic and propaganda about symbols of faith transformed an economy of (political) power in a revolutionary way.

Elwood begins with the premise that "the eucharist

was the central symbol defining power in the late medieval period." To reject Catholic doctrine constituted "radically new ways of symbolizing power" (p. 4). Through an in-depth study of treatises and pamphlets, the author depicts the changing politico-religious landscape of early modern Europe. An examination of the eucharist in late medieval society develops the political context, as the increasingly popular feast of Corpus Christi introduced Christ's body into public and secular space. Elwood argues that "[t]he conception of a corporal presence . . . [was] the central element establishing the unity of the faithful in the church" (p. 18). A bearer of power, it was appropriated by the kings of France by the end of the Middle Ages.

The ensuing chapters examine changes in eucharistic/political thought beginning with the events of 1533–1534. The first wave of Protestant attacks on Catholic doctrine constituted an "unprecedented campaign of political propaganda" (p. 29). In Paris, the royal procession of January 1535 juxtaposed the host and the fleur-de-lis, decisively connecting the sacrament to the well being of the realm. Elwood asserts this response shows the reformers "had inadvertently also taken aim at the symbolic underpinnings of French society" (p. 32). Chapter three examines Calvin's *Short Treatise on the Holy Supper* (1541), a work intended for and accessible to a large audience; it was the reformer's first attempt to treat the topic fully. In the treatise, Calvin attempts to balance the visible sign with its invisible reality but reserves his most serious attack on the priest's role. Calvin adopted some of the views of Huldrych Zwingli and Johannes Huszgen (Oecolampadius) while retaining enough of the real presence to allow for rapprochement with Catholics.

Elwood then analyzes the diffusion of reformed thought after 1540. In a long-overdue study of Farel and Viret, he shows how the former modified his position by 1542 to argue for a much stronger efficacy of the sacrament. By contrast, Viret engaged in a "systematic and rhetorically flamboyant assault" on what he saw as blasphemy and idolatry. Viewing the Catholic doctrine as "sorcery and magic," Viret contends it would be better to have nothing at all. The author also examines the works of Bèze, strongly influenced by Calvin. For Bèze, God's word is the *sine qua non*; without it, the sacrament is invalid. The chapter title, "Seeds of Discord," is telling, for as early as the 1530s, Catholics were defending the Mass against what they viewed as multiple interpretations. Elwood contends that "in the writings of Farel, Viret, and Beza . . . [there is] some subtle resistance to elements in Calvin's eucharistic conception . . . and a tendency to concentrate on the subjective appeal of communion" (p. 109). This is critical: in granting power to the individual, society was turned upside down. Elwood goes farther, suggesting these views empowered individuals at the expense of institutions; "they also aimed to render profane the holy objects and sacred centers that organized religious and communal life" (p. 111).



Chapter five investigates the Catholic response. I would suggest it is found earlier than Elwood suggests, in preaching rather than printing. The sermons of François LePicart, given between the 1520s and his death in 1556, concentrate heavily on the eucharist, but were only printed in the 1560s. The author also argues that despite its *raison d'être*, the Colloquy of Poissy effectively eliminated the possibility of a middle ground.

Elwood then turns to how Calvinism led to an ideology of resistance. The "leaders of the Reformed movement [made] . . . the evangelic eucharist an instrument of social definition . . . made secure from the incursions of the outsiders and the unworthy . . ." (p. 150). The resulting depiction of the Calvinist faithful in France as "exiles in a polluted land" could only have major sociopolitical consequences that ultimately divided through a symbol that had earlier served a unitive function. It also undermined support for the French monarchy. Despite Calvin, his eucharistic position, as elaborated and changed by his followers, paved the way for political revolution and resistance theory.

This is an important book, thorough, convincing, and well documented. Elwood demonstrates the revolutionary impact of religious change on society and politics, challenging the very bases of secular authority. That the Catholic League used some of the lessons in their own questioning of power and justification for tyrannicide proves the power of this argument. This superb book will be of interest to historians, theologians, and political theorists. Ideas have power that can transform. In sixteenth-century France, they did just that.

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ÉTIENNE TAILLEMITE. *Marins français à la découverte du monde: De Jacques Cartier à Dumont d'Urville*. Paris: Fayard. 1999. Pp. 725. 180fr.

Étienne Taillemite, well known French archivist, biographer of the Marquis de Lafayette, and author of numerous volumes on French maritime history, offers here a long and often charming chronicle of French mariners' contributions to the "discovery" of the world during the three centuries separating Jacques Cartier and Jules Dumont d'Urville (the 1530s–1830s). "Discovery" to him means not just a Jacques Cartier sailing up the St. Lawrence for the first time or Dumont d'Urville's men first setting foot on Antarctica, but rather the gradual increase of natural and social scientific information about places and peoples around the globe. Taillemite, a would-be, latter-day French Hakluyt, has crusaded for decades to make his countrymen aware of their predecessors' record of maritime achievement. He brings great erudition to the task, and a major source of the book's charm is extensive quotation from printed and manuscript accounts by participants in French voyages. Taillemite's

notes allow readers to familiarize themselves with recent French doctoral theses, unpublished work, and articles in relatively obscure journals as well as more major and publicized work in the field.

The first third of this 700-page survey covers a wide variety of sixteenth and seventeenth-century voyages whose goals were commercial, colonial, missionary, and/or military. None sailed purely for the sake of scientific discovery, as would be the case in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Taillemite laments that the meager results of these earlier enterprises left France sailing in the wake of Iberians and Anglo-Saxons. He blames Europe-fixed policies of the last Valois and early Bourbon kings, internal social and political conflicts such as the Wars of Religion, and a stay-at-home attitude of too many Frenchmen. True, maritime France spawned numerous energetic and curious mariners, but their ambitions encountered indifference or even hostility from the state. This thesis is certainly not new, but it provides a workable framework for his chronicle.

North American readers will be disappointed with this first section and perhaps tempted to shelve the book. Specialists will find little that is fresh and rather more that is outdated, and there are points of view that some will consider quaint and others offensive. Taillemite constantly complains that Frenchmen have always been too parochial in their standoffish stance to the world, but his almost total ignorance or ignoring of English-language sources ironically validates his complaint and damages especially this first section. Due to a lack of awareness of the major work North Americans have accomplished in the last three decades, he often uses narrow, old-fashioned interpretations. To choose one of many examples, his view of the Florida debacle of the 1560s ignores recent work based on Spanish archives that challenges the traditional idea of a Spanish "massacre." The dozens of specialists whose books are ignored here will be comforted to be in each others' company. Taillemite can devote many pages to the exploits of the St. Malô privateers in the South Seas without a mention of the pioneering work of J. S. Bromley. (Of course, Taillemite is not the only major French historian guilty of such parochialism, but that hardly excuses him.)

Readers annoyed by the author's historiographical tunnel vision and his half-embrace of cherished colonialist myths of Frenchmen's special, indeed sexual, attraction to natives (e.g. pp. 37–38) may be forgiving because the balance of the book concentrates on a series of long voyages from the 1760s to the 1840s, all of which had a serious scientific component. "Enlightened" public opinion supported natural history and ethnological projects, and unlikely kings such as Louis XVI, Louis XVIII, Charles X, and Louis-Philippe took direct interest in voyages that lasted sometimes three to four years and hauled to France tons of foreign objects. Those of Louis Antoine, comte de Bougainville and Léon Dalmas de Lapérouse will be perhaps most familiar to historians, but except for the revolu-

tionary era at least one such expedition annually was cruising the world's seas. Despite occasional difficulties due to poorly defined goals, inferior ships and technologies, French discoverers added greatly to European knowledge of the world—although less so of its peoples. In the latter case, as Taillemite points out, an emerging climate of good will toward aborigines did not eliminate the cultural lens of Western superiority characterizing ethnological observations.

In chronicling these adventures, Taillemite certainly has a good eye for the picturesque detail, the exotic episode. It is charming to read, for example, about how Rhodes appeared to an eighteenth-century visitor or to read descriptions of eighteenth and nineteenth-century Dutch and Portuguese Timor in light of current events (pp. 320–25). Or to be told that a French engineer designed the fortifications at imperial Hue based on those of Strasbourg (p. 571). In the manner of the late Samuel E. Morison, Taillemite's bêtes noires enliven the volume—or enrage the reader. He despises certain rulers (Louis XV, Napoleon Bonaparte), ministers (especially Talleyrand), Rousseauan noble savage admirers and salon intellectuals in general, many unnamed historians (but fortunately no Americans), and most missionaries, especially Protestants. He admires men of action, especially courageous mariners who decried French provincialism and who alerted public opinion to the rapid decline of certain noble species such as whales. These are the men he hopes to rescue from undeserved oblivion.

There are many problems with the format. The primary source quotations, although very enjoyable, are not adequately referenced and thus not easily stripped. There is no bibliography, and the notes use *op. cit.* reminders but usually without specific pages. As serious is the shortage of maps, with only four to assist readers. All but the greatest specialists in world geography will need an atlas at hand to follow Taillemite's voyagers. These flaws, as well as those discussed above, diminish an otherwise valuable and enjoyable book.

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FRANCIS BRUMONT. *Madiran et Saint-Mont: Histoire et devenir des vignobles*. Foreword by M. LACHIVER. Biarritz: Atlantica. 1999. Pp. 359. 150fr.

Here is a book that I wish had been published about twenty-five years ago. I could have used it in my own work on viticulture. Francis Brumont studies the viticulture of southwestern France, between the Jurançon and just to the northeast of the Armagnac area. The towns and villages are Madironsais for reds and Saint-Montais for whites.

Brumont begins his study in the late Middle Ages but does not truly start until the sixteenth century, when he suspects that white wines outnumbered reds. Clearly one of his difficulties with documents is deciding how vines were cultivated. He knew from the documents available that most were *hautains*: that is,

attached high on poles, espaliers of long wood, or on trees with some merely grown on the ground.

What were the early vines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Most popular was *tannat*, deeply red and therefore a *teinturier*, and finally the *manseng* (including the *petit*) which also made whites. These latter came chiefly from the *arronsiac*. As usual, these vines had to be trimmed drastically, then branched and folded, then tied to the echelas, smoked to kill insects, and finally picked. They were labored by bulls and cows, which explains the width between rows, and finally by shovel or hoe to perfect work on fine vines.

Wine commerce was a fairly serious matter. It had always been carried on with mountain peasants who drank regularly, not only on Sundays and holidays. Bayonne was the focus for fine whites, which were shipped by boat to Holland and other northern ports, and the few reds to the Antilles. As a result, viticulture grew enormously by 1830.

The nineteenth century was notable for two crises, caused by nature but with considerable economic effects. The first was the oidium in the 1850s and the phylloxera. The phylloxera was an insect that attacked the roots, gradually killing the vine. It appeared in the region in early 1892, about twenty years after it had begun in the Gard. Growers of all sorts were not truly ready to defend their vines, especially smaller ones who habitually worked for wages on holdings of twenty hectares or more. Many of them now either left, or became full-time, or turned to other crops. The original vines were never restored. Which vines were saved? Piquepout came back, although in small numbers for reds, larger for whites. For reds, the tannat returned, and added were the pinot, cabernet, gamay, and malbec. The evolution to quality was not emphasized. Yet the pinot (pineau) gave aroma, bouquet, delicacy, and alcohol.

In November 1907, the municipal council of Madiran called for "Vins de Madironsais," thus including towns and surrounding villages. This was the first effort to get an official name for wines of a certain region, until the arrival of the nationally recognized Appellation of Controlled Origin (AOC) in the 1960s. This was equally true of Saint-Mont where the organizers could use the label Wine of Superior Quality (VDQS). Save for individuals of rather large vineyards, cooperatives produced about half the wine each year. The first coop was set up before World War II, then elsewhere after the war. Finally three coops emerged and continue today. At first, whites required nine months in barrels, the reds thirty-three months. These were AOC, and in 1966 the reds were changed to twelve months because nearly three years seemed far too long and costly. In 1997, a law stated that the rendering of grapes should be fifty-five hectoliters per hectare.

Although Brumont's book is very good, I think he failed to explain the connection between wine and its growers. The author does give considerable attention to merchants in the nineteenth century, but he hardly

deals with large or small growers. And although he deals with commerce, he has little to say about the vinicultural economy in general or in detail. We do not know the steps used to make reds and whites, the technology of winemaking, nor the costs of growing vines and of producing its final product. Finally he has nothing to write about the politics of growers. Of course these events were not his goal; he has written a history, first of hectares used for vines, then a history with some information about roads and railroads, the vines used and changed, and finally he offers us some information on commerce.

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PHILIPPE MINARD. *La fortune du colbertisme: État et industrie dans la France des lumières*. Paris: Fayard. 1998. Pp. 505.

Before 1791, many branches of French manufacturing industry were subject to an extensive body of administrative regulation affecting either the agents, the materials, the processes, the products, the markets, or the transactions involved in domestic or foreign trade. One of the many institutions responsible for enforcing these regulations was the small but influential body of inspectors of manufacture. The institution grew out of a royal decision in 1669 to establish a number of inspectors to oversee standards in the manufacture of woollen cloth, which, at the time, was one of the keys to successful competition in foreign trade. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the inspectors had become an identifiable part of the royal administration, operating under the aegis of the French board of trade (*bureau de commerce*) and, after 1722, reporting to the permanent group of royal officials who made up the French council of trade. By the third quarter of the eighteenth century, there were over fifty inspectors. Their remit had grown to encompass the production of many different types of woollen, linen, silk, and cotton textiles in many parts of the kingdom. But the European-wide reassessment of the achievements and legacy of Louis XIV's minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, generated an intense debate about the nature and purpose of an institution that its critics associated with "the mercantile system." One of the last decisions made by the French National Assembly in September 1791 was to abolish it entirely.

One of the aims of Philippe Minard's substantial and impressive monograph (marred, however, by the absence of an index) is to reconstruct the history of the institution by describing its various attributes, powers, organization, and membership as these changed over the course of nearly a century. By piecing together information about a total of 326 individuals who held the office during its lifetime (it was never venal), he has managed to produce a remarkably vivid and absorbing account of the concerns, interests, capabilities, and achievements of this small body of specialist

administrators. The main aim of the book, however, is more ambitious. It is to use the copious information contained in the inspectors' reports (and, in some measure, the papers of their interlocutors and opponents) to assess the part played by regulation in eighteenth-century French manufacturing industry as a whole. Here, Minard's major claim is that regulation sometimes (perhaps often) served to facilitate, not obstruct, improvements in manufacture and trade, either by functioning as a proxy for information when market agents were imperfectly informed, or by enforcing rules when genuine competition could not occur, or by disseminating technical information or qualitative standards when markets did not exist. His brief account (pp. 280–81) of the way that the linen industry in Brittany was able to capture and develop markets in Spain and Spanish America in the late seventeenth century at the expense of linens produced in Silesia is one of the best illustrations of his claim. Throughout the eighteenth century, merchants in both Saint-Malo and Cadiz could produce solid evidence to argue that regulations served to promote, rather than impede, the workings of markets.

As Minard himself emphasizes, any assessment of the part played by regulation in promoting or impeding prosperity in eighteenth-century France is likely to turn on the nature of the products and the markets in question and will have to be investigated case by case (and there are a lot of cases to be investigated). Since quite a large proportion of what was manufactured in eighteenth-century France was not covered by the inspectors' remit (the silk industry of Lyons, for example, was not subject to their powers), it is unlikely that information from that particular source can be used to make any comprehensive claim. But the broader argument about the connection between rules and competition goes with the grain of a great deal of recent work on eighteenth and early nineteenth-century French manufacturing industry (by, for example, Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, Carlo Poni, Katie Scott, Cissie Fairchilds, Louis Cullen, and Alain Cottureau) and serves to reinforce their earlier claims. By now, it may not be quite so necessary to insist on the somewhat spurious nature of the antithesis between free trade and industrial regulation as strongly as Minard has done. Many of the individuals who addressed the subject in France (and the rest of Europe) from the time of Colbert onward did so in ways more subtle and complicated than have sometimes been noticed. So, too, in the early nineteenth century, did the assorted advocates and critics of "industrialism." As Minard's first-rate monograph shows, modern historiography is beginning to catch up with the richness and subtlety of those earlier debates.

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CHANTAL THOMAS. *The Wicked Queen: The Origins of the Myth of Maria-Antoinette*. Translated by JULIE ROSE. New York: Zone Books. 1999. Pp. 255. \$26.00.

Around the time of the French Revolution's bicentennial, in the late 1980s, Marie-Antoinette became for a while a minor academic industry. A new interest in the role of gender in political culture led a cohort of French and American scholars in several disciplines (including Lynn Hunt, Jacques Revel, Elizabeth Colwill, Madelyn Gutwirth, Mary Sherriff, and myself) to explore the meaning of the unusually vicious polemics directed at King Louis XVI's wife from the 1780s to her execution on October 16, 1793. For the most part, this scholarship was fragmentary, published as articles and portions of books. The only book-length study of the question was the work of a French literary scholar, Chantal Thomas, whose *La Reine scélérate: Marie-Antoinette dans les pamphlets* appeared in French in 1989. A decade later, Zone Books has brought out a handsome translation of this book, raising this question: are we still as interested, after ten years, in the meaning of this muckracking literature?

To scholars acquainted with the question of this sovereign's reputation, it will be immediately apparent that the book covers a lot of familiar ground. The literature against Marie-Antoinette, while strikingly nasty and obscene, is not enormous, amounting to a few dozen pamphlets, a handful of which were immensely popular. The great events framing the queen's public life, from the Diamond Necklace scandal of the mid-1780s to the hideously vindictive trial that sent her to the guillotine in 1793, appear in Thomas's work, as do the familiar episodes featuring Marie-Antoinette in the revolutionary upheaval: her encounter with the Parisian market women in October 1789, the flight to Varennes, her long tumbril ride to her death. Furthermore, the literature against the queen before and during the revolution, while high in negative affect, was thematically limited, and the "wicked queen" we discover in Thomas's pages is a creature we have met before: foreign, frivolous, scheming, adulterous, bisexually and incestuously debauched, a harpy, a pig, the "New Messalina."

It should be stressed that Thomas's work was not at all derivative, was indeed highly original when first published, and that for the purposes of this translation she has updated her bibliography and graciously cites all of the works, mainly by American scholars, published after hers. On its own terms, however, her study does suffer from some methodological confusion. The introductory chapter forcefully makes two related claims about the author's approach: that her purpose is to break free of both nostalgic adulation and republican demonization of Marie-Antoinette; and that Thomas intends to approach the anti-queen literature as a "mythological" genre that developed, and therefore can be understood, without reference to any biographical "reality" (she conspicuously invokes Roland Barthes). Although this premise makes eminent sense,

Thomas proceeds immediately to contradict her own position by launching into biographical material. Her second chapter, entitled "The Hostage Princess," poignantly evokes the plight of a woman still in her teens thrust unprepared into the intrigues of a foreign court and the bed of an unknown and unappealing husband. While in the course of her chapters Thomas does indeed analyze the pamphlets as a closed system of misogynistic "signifiers," she throws enough biographical information about, and feminist sympathy for, the real woman to make her point of view inconsistent.

The strength and originality of Thomas's book comes from its being written by a well-read literary critic whose approach to the material is more impressionistic and also more daring than that of most historians. The book's chapters, while roughly chronological, flash backward and forward in the queen's life, introducing in cameos as a series of characters—Antoine Barnave, Count Honoré de Mirabeau, Charles de Talleyrand—whose lives intersected briefly but tellingly with Marie-Antoinette's. The narrative features a few postmodern touches, such as an alternative ending in which the queen escapes from Versailles early in the revolution to join a troupe of wandering players and eventually learns that a double has been executed in her place. The book is studded with evocative remarks, often drawn from literature. Thomas points out, for instance, the analogy between the queen's mother, Empress Maria-Theresa, and another famous letter-writer, Madame de Sévigné: both were powerful and doting mothers who sought, from a distance, to control their daughters' reproductive lives. Although the book is brief, Thomas has an eye for detail worthy of Simon Schama, as when she describes Marie-Antoinette in prison forced to remove the embroidered crowns from her sheets, "to unpick the last vestiges of her splendor herself" (p. 103).

In sum, this book contains very little that specialists are not familiar with by now, but it does add elegant and suggestive touches to a well-known theme. It should serve as a useful, highly readable introduction for anyone unfamiliar with the question. And because this edition contains, following Thomas's own brief text, translations of some of the shorter and racier pamphlets against the queen, it makes the material accessible to the many non-francophone students who have an interest in the subject.

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LADAN BOROUHAND. *La guerre des principes: Les assemblées révolutionnaires face aux droits de l'homme et à la souveraineté de la nation mai 1789-juillet 1794*. Foreword by MONA OZOUF. (Recherches d'histoire et de sciences sociales/Studies in History and the Social Sciences, number 85.) Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. 1999. Pp. 583. 200fr.

The proposition that the Reign of Terror represented the putting into practice of ideological principles in-



herent in the very nature of the French Revolution rather than a response to emergency circumstances has long been one of the central mantras of the brand of historical revisionism inspired by the late François Furet. With analogies to Bolshevism and other utopian “social experiments” implicitly lurking in the background, revolutionary repression and intolerance are generally presented by the Furet school as rooted to a significant degree in Rousseauian notions of an omnipotent political will. In this passionate and at times poignant account of the systematic revolutionary triumph of the principle of unlimited national sovereignty over respect for human rights, Ladan Boroumand provides an interesting twist to the revisionist schema by focusing on a mystical and eternal idea of the nation, one that precedes the existence of autonomous individuals, transcends human will, and has little if anything to do with Rousseauian contractualist thought.

A stranger to the Cold War mindset that originally generated the revisionist paradigm as an ideological prop to Western antirevolutionary propensities, Boroumand approaches the French Revolution as an Iranian exile and democratic oppositionist seeking a deeper understanding of why “the sovereignty of the Western Powers, guarantor of their own interests, could not accommodate itself to the Rights of Man in Iran” (p. 17). For her, accordingly, the revolution serves first and foremost as an emblem of colonialist betrayal in which the promise of democracy and human rights is quickly revealed to be an empty one. In addition, the savage moralism and quasi-religious insistence on absolute truth that she portrays, often with great ingenuity, as setting in motion the judicial abominations of 1793–1794 bear an uncanny if only implicit resemblance to the presumed ideological underpinnings of the judicial system operated by the Iranian ayatollahs.

As a disappointed but still devoted advocate of the individualist worldview that she envisions, rather monolithically, as the basic legacy of Enlightenment thought, Boroumand is led to what might be described as a streamlined version of the revisionist paradigm. Whereas Furet and his followers typically find the sources of Jacobin tyranny in a mélange of Rousseauian and Enlightenment hubris and the absolutist tradition of the monarchy, Boroumand’s denial that the idea of the nation that drove revolutionary events was in any way a contractualist one allows her to avoid this ambiguity and, in effect, to absolve Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Enlightenment of any responsibility for the Terror. The eternal and providential idea of the nation, rooted in the archaic residues of the collective unconscious and inherited from the monarchical tradition, is then left standing as the sole villain in the piece, relentlessly ensuring, from the convocation of the Estates-General onward, the closing off of democratic accountability and oppositional space.

In chronicling this scenario, Boroumand displays a prodigious capacity to detect the decisive presence of

the notion of the primordial nation over the course of five years of parliamentary debates. Thus, for example, Third Estate insistence in May 1789 that all deputy credentials be verified in common, rather than being seen as a pragmatic bid for authority and legitimacy, is read in portentous terms by Boroumand as the opening gambit in a systematic effort by every revolutionary assembly to appropriate the mystical prestige of the idea of national sovereignty and thereby deny any necessity for accountability between the representatives of the nation and those who elected them. Similarly, Boroumand is able to find apocalyptic meaning in a tortuous spring 1791 compromise concocted by the Constituent Assembly regarding the right of refractory priests to say mass. For in combining approval of Parisian departmental regulations recognizing this right with a mild reproach to the Parisian authorities for overstepping their jurisdiction in issuing these regulations, the Assembly had passed a liberal measure “which carried in itself the germs of its suspension since the National Representation denied the citizen automatic access to rights” (pp. 246–47). By setting itself up as the ultimate arbiter of the exercise of rights, Boroumand argues, the Assembly had actually helped enshrine the principle that the prerogatives of the nation took priority over the inalienability of rights.

Almost always thought provoking, although not immune from occasional predictability, Boroumand’s interpretative agility makes this book well worth reading, even for someone, such as this reviewer, who is fundamentally at odds with an approach that tends to equate a parliamentary assembly with a political philosophy symposium. Ultimately, however, Boroumand’s work raises normative issues which go beyond historiographical questions regarding the explanatory power of ideology (and of the language in which it is expressed). For in presenting a “war of principles” in which the “bad” principles essentially defeated the “good” ones, Boroumand does not seem to have given sufficient consideration to the potentially poisonous effects of a fervent and single-minded devotion to principle of any kind.

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SAMUEL F. SCOTT. *From Yorktown to Valmy: The Transformation of the French Army in an Age of Revolution*. Niwot: University Press of Colorado. 1998. Pp. xiii, 251. \$39.95

Samuel F. Scott’s new study of the French Army has an imprecise title, since it covers much beyond the Battle of Valmy (September 1792), but it serves well. As with his classic *Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution* (1978), Scott’s subject is the “regulars”—the men and officers of the regiments that fought in the American Revolution under the Count de Rochambeau—their influence on the coming of the French

Revolution and their fate in revolutionary and Bonapartist France.

The climax of French action in America was at the Battle of Yorktown (October 1781). The Battle of Valmy (September 1792) was the last battle in which the "American" regiments were recognizable. They had begun losing identity after the "Amalgam" (February 1792), which mixed regulars and volunteers, and to which, after September 1793, the *levée en masse* added conscripts. Many officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) resigned or emigrated, Scott emphasizes, not for political reasons but because the army had become so unprofessional.

This book is remarkable in that it is history from below, insofar as Scott's exhaustive research in the available sources could make it, and could have been prosopographic had not the personnel of the "American" regiments been so scattered during the revolution and their records grossly neglected. The enlisted men "disappeared" via the "Amalgam," the promotion of NCOs into the officer corps, deaths (battle and non-battle), retirements, or informal transfer (via desertion) to National Guard units or regiments offering greater opportunity for advancement. For the officers, there were emigration, promotion, and transfer. The officers faded from the picture earlier than enlisted men because most officers who served in America (1780–1783) were lieutenants and captains of ten to twenty years service, and by 1792 (when the Wars of the Revolution began) they were becoming middle-aged.

Many stayed in the army, nonetheless. Alexandre Berthier, a captain on Rochambeau's staff, served in the Versailles National Guard as well as the Army. A general in 1792, he was dismissed after the king was overthrown, but he enlisted, rose through the ranks, and was a major general in 1796 when Napoleon made him his chief of staff, a position he held until 1814 (pp. 139, 170). Mathieu Dumas, an aide-de-camp to Rochambeau in America, was elected to the Legislative Assembly (1791), proscribed in 1792, fled to Switzerland, returned in 1795, fled again in 1797 after trouble with the Directory, returned to the French Army in 1800, became a general, and served Napoleon in administrative roles all over Europe (pp. 170, 189).

The flight of noble officers after the overthrow of the king (August 1792) created opportunities for competent corporals and sergeants. From the "American" regiments, some ninety-three men who had served in America and forty-odd others became officers in 1792 alone (p. 171). One Nicolas Lenoir, born in Lorraine, had enlisted in 1759 and was a sergeant major when he came to America in 1780. He made lieutenant in 1792, was in sixteen campaigns during the revolution and the Napoleonic era, and retired as a colonel in 1814 with fifty-five years of service (p. 191).

The detail on individual soldiers and officers is the most fascinating part of this fine book. Scott draws broad conclusions from his "prosopographic" work, however: the "American" regiments did little or nothing

to inspire revolution in France. Most men and officers were career soldiers. Their story, during the revolution, is typical of the Royal Army in general. As the revolution became more violent (after August 10, 1792), the men (and many of the officers, such as Berthier and Dumas) were less zealous for the revolution than eager to take advantage of the opportunities it opened to them. Some officers emigrated early in the revolution. The "Americans," such as the Lameth brothers, had hope for the revolution until the king was made captive (August 1792)—then they emigrated. Their associate in the National Assembly, the Marquis de Lafayette, behaved similarly. (He had served with the Americans, not Rochambeau.)

The book also illustrates not only the close connection between revolution and war but also that many military professionals can generate no zeal for politics or revolution at all. A good example is Lazare Carnot, one of the rare commoner-officers in the French Army in 1789, a captain of engineers who became the republic's "Organizer of Victory." He stood for "careers open to talent" and induced the Convention to reinstate many noble officers who had been dismissed but were needed in 1793–94 (p. 187).

One of the author's more solid points is that the "most pervasive characteristic of the French officer corps" between 1794 and 1799 was "growing professionalism." This goes far toward explaining the success of Napoleon between 1799 and 1812.

Overall, Scott has produced a fine, informative, and most readable book. The best parts are the mini-biographies that dot the text and add a human element, as well as color to this basically military history.

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CAROL E. HARRISON. *The Bourgeois Citizen in Nineteenth-Century France: Gender, Sociability, and the Uses of Emulation*. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. viii, 268.

Voluntary associations in nineteenth-century France have generally been studied for their political significance, especially their links with republicanism. Indeed, the creation of a French bourgeoisie has generally been seen as a political as well as a social process. But Carol E. Harrison explicitly rejects this: "politics did not make the French bourgeoisie" (p. 7). She also rejects attempts to define the bourgeoisie in socio-economic terms, instead arguing that bourgeois class formation was the product of a particular type of sociability that defined a man's identity both as male and as bourgeois within a particular locality. It was a combination of social practices and rhetoric that produced class.

Harrison's focus is on three towns in eastern France: Besançon, Lons le Saunier, and Mulhouse. They were very different in size, political affiliation, ethnic and religious composition, and in their hierarchies of wealth and status. Yet each town had its voluntary

associations, whose ruling ethos was (despite the usual association of bourgeois society with competition) "emulation": a spirit of cooperation among equals for the benefit of society. These bodies served to define bourgeois men by excluding women and the uneducated, both groups with no place in the public sphere of early or mid-nineteenth-century France. The associations organized lectures, libraries, museums (especially of natural history), and musical events; they subscribed to journals, and some provided spaces for gaming and smoking. Some went in for charitable activities. But political questions were scrupulously avoided as divisive and hence counter to the spirit of emulation, and in any case would have antagonized the authorities. (The attitudes of successive governments are the subject of one chapter of the book.) The men who belonged to these associations were different in each town but occupied a similar place in the local social order, saw themselves as bourgeois, and behaved and spoke in very similar ways.

Voluntary associations flourished after the revolution and empire and declined with the advent of the Third Republic. The divisions within postrevolutionary society, Harrison suggests, made "emulation" an attractive "rhetorical tool for reconfiguring social order" (p. 3). But after about 1870, bourgeois society began to fragment. The Franco-Prussian War disrupted bourgeois social practices, and under the new republic the public sphere was transformed. Rival voluntary associations now became the focus for class and political conflicts, as a white-collar petite bourgeoisie and a far wider range of leisure associations began to emerge. Thus the appearance and disappearance of Harrison's societies are very closely tied to politics, to economic change, and to social conflict, even though she allows these factors little or no role in bourgeois class formation. This is a tension throughout the book, resulting perhaps from a rather narrow definition of what is "political."

Another problem concerns geographical coverage. The book claims to be about the whole of France, and although many of the arguments are certainly more widely applicable, it is not clear how typical the voluntary associations in these three places were. Paris and other major cities were clearly very different, as Harrison admits. If male bourgeois identity was primarily a local formation, did politics, social tensions, understandings of masculinity, and social practices perhaps interact in different ways in other parts of the nation? A detailed discussion of these issues would have improved the book.

Nevertheless, Harrison's emphasis on social practice and performance as the formative component of individual class identities is very convincing. I was also persuaded by her stress on bourgeois status being locally defined and her focus on masculinity and its role in class formation is refreshing (reversing the all-too-common association of gender with women). All of these arguments, though, raise further issues. I remained uncertain, at the end of the book, what

Harrison sees as the connection between these local bourgeois identities and any sense of belonging to a nationwide French bourgeoisie. Was it purely rhetorical? Or were wider identities also formed through performance (such as voting, a political as well as a social act)? I also wondered what common elements might exist in the identity of bourgeois men and bourgeois women. Here the shift from "the bourgeois citizen" of the title to "the French bourgeoisie" is problematical.

Some of Harrison's writing is excellent (I particularly enjoyed the story of the phosphoric chicken of Lons), and the research is also very sound. She might nevertheless have extended her analysis by examining buildings, artefacts, iconography, and maps: there is no sense of her bourgeois in the space of their towns. Although in some respects incomplete, this book is nevertheless a valuable contribution both to our understanding of nineteenth-century provincial France and to current debates on class formation.

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DOUGLAS PETER MACKAMAN, *Leisure Settings: Bourgeois Culture, Medicine, and the Spa in Modern France*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 219. Cloth \$46.00, paper \$18.00.

The construction of bourgeois and middle-class identities has figured prominently within cultural history. Recent studies include how the bourgeoisie and the middle class used pets (Kathleen Kete, *The Beast in the Boudoir: Petkeeping in Nineteenth-Century Paris* [1994]), fashion (Philippe Perrot, *Fashioning the Bourgeoisie: A History of Clothing in the Nineteenth Century* [1994]), cholera (Catherine J. Kudlick, *Cholera in Post-Revolutionary Paris: A Cultural History* [1996]), and parlor making (Katherine C. Grier, *Culture and Comfort: Parlor Making and Middle-Class Identity, 1850-1930* [1997]) to construct their identities.

In a similar vein, Douglas Peter Mackaman argues that the spa formed an important part of the construction of bourgeois identity. He has written a fascinating book that describes and analyzes French spa culture from the *ancien régime* to the end of the nineteenth century. Using archival sources and contemporary accounts, such as guidebooks written by both physicians and spa-goers, Mackaman explores why the bourgeoisie went to spas and what they did there. He provides a detailed description of the daily spa routine including mineral water treatments, rules and regulations, and social events. Mackaman shows how medicalization and regimentation applied to virtually every area of spa life from eating and drinking to exercise, sleep, and amusements. The book is copiously illustrated with drawings, photographs, and architectural plans of spas.

Mackaman argues that the bourgeoisie found neither aristocratic nor popular forms of leisure appropriate to their values of productivity and respectability,

but that the spa became the perfect bourgeois vacation. Spas created for the first time a productive and therefore bourgeois model of vacationing. The spa, as a therapeutic site, promoted both better health and appropriate consumption. Spas became increasingly respectable as entrepreneurs (often physicians) redesigned them to satisfy bourgeois needs for modesty and to reinforce class distinctions.

After an introductory discussion of *ancien régime* spas, the author moves to a description and analysis of the medicalized spa (1815–1850). Physicians prescribed hydrotherapy for a variety of internal and external afflictions. Indeed, one had to have a doctor's prescription in order to take the waters. Physicians served as both gatekeepers and promoters of mineral water establishments. Each spa had its own physician, and physician-entrepreneurs ran some of the spas. In the early part of the century, there were three main types of mineral water establishment: those managed by the French government, such as Vichy and Plombières; those run by another government, such as Aix-les-Bains, under the control of the Piedmont-Sardinian crown, 1815–1860; and private establishments, such as Evian-les-Bains.

After 1860, the medical component receded in importance as pleasure and leisure became more central to spa vacationing. In 1860, the law requiring a physician's prescription was abrogated, thus opening the way for non-curists as well as curists to vacation at spas. Railroads made it easier and faster for visitors to travel to spas. With its park, promenade, casino, ballroom, and other amenities, the spa offered respectable and appropriate ways for the middle class seeking bourgeois status to socialize. Spas became sites where bourgeois identity could be confirmed and reproduced by a vacationing and consuming middle class. The spa vacation itself became a socially acceptable form of bourgeois consumption, and the spa and its surrounding *ville d'eaux* became locales where spa-goers could participate in and display further consumption. To see and be seen was one of the principal functions of the spa. By the late nineteenth century, the management of spas had changed, as government-run establishments were privatized. By 1900, spa vacationers numbered 800,000, a vast increase from 31,000 in 1820.

The French were not unique in their emphasis on hydrotherapy and the spa vacation. Taking the waters was a European-wide phenomenon and a central feature of the nineteenth-century middle and upper-class American experience as well. The French case illustrates the therapeutic uses of hydrotherapy and is important for understanding the role of thermalism in the history of medicine. The French spa experience also exemplifies the construction and evolution of the bourgeois vacation. This work raises larger questions about the history of vacations: who took them, what did they do, where, and for how long?

This is a book that all historians will enjoy, and I enthusiastically recommend it. Mackaman's account is not only historically important but is of current cul-

tural and medical interest. Spas continue to flourish in France as medical institutions paid for by national health insurance. They have become ever more democratized, offering rest cures and hydrotherapy to large numbers of spa-goers.

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ISABELLE OLIVERO, *L'invention de la collection: De la diffusion de la littérature et des savoirs à la formation du citoyen au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*. (Collection "In Octavo.") Paris: Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. 1999. Pp. 334. 220fr.

To walk into a French bookstore is immediately to be made aware of the seemingly peculiar French mania for "series," especially of the pocket variety. From the "Livres de Poche" to the "Collection Folio" to every historian's dream—the five-dollar-a-volume "Points Histoire" series by Seuil—the triumph of the French pocket edition is perhaps best epitomized of late by the international success of the heavily illustrated and creatively formatted "Découvertes Gallimard" series. Is it Cartesianism or simple fetishism that drives the French passion for the pocket series? Isabelle Olivero's book offers a history of the origins of "the series" that situates the phenomenon in its most conventional context: the history of book publishing in the nineteenth century.

The history of the book and of commercial publishing represents an important and lively field in modern French history. The multi-volume *Histoire de l'édition française* (1990), under the direction of Roger Chartier and Henri-Jean Martin, has established the general outline of the history of book publishing in France, ranging from the evolution of technologies of production, to new consuming practices, to the development of specialized niche audiences of readers such as children and women. The third Chartier-Martin volume, dedicated to the "short nineteenth century" from Romanticism to the Belle Époque, is subtitled "the publishers' era." The general narrative includes increasing readership as part of the republican democratizing agenda, offering cheaper editions made possible by industrializing technologies, and publishing in a variety of new formats such as the illustrated and railroad editions. It is within this project and as part of the research concerning the history of publishing in nineteenth-century France that Olivero makes her contribution.

Olivero's study begins with an interesting empirical observation: 1830–1914 witnessed the publication of seventy-one "collections," as compared with eight for the period from 1660–1830. Part of what she calls "the second reading revolution" (p. 10) Olivero contextualizes the popularity of collections in the context of the spread of learning and popular education. To her credit, she also offers the French case in relation to changes and developments in other European countries as well as in the United States. The book aspires



to be more than an empirical history of the publication of series (although the appendixes at the book's end certainly offer a wealth of information and make the volume a quasi-reference work as well). Olivero asks about the conceptual category of the series and what it can tell us about the organization of knowledge and information. The most interesting part of her account is in tracing the rise of Gervais Charpentier, Émile Zola's publisher, who invented not just a new format but a new editorial genre, the "Bibliothèque," which bore his name and prefigured the modern "collection" with which we are now familiar. Olivero also covers the more familiar tale of reading in the nineteenth century: change in reading habits, including the transition from renting to buying books; the development from a notion of books as texts to be read and reread to the notion of one-time reading material; and the visual standardization that accompanied many of the series, a pattern established by W. H. Smith in England and copied by Louis Hachette in his railway station vending kiosks.

Olivero argues that scholars wanting to understand broad public reading habits have too often focused on the newspaper and especially its serial novel, the "roman-feuilleton." Like the daily and weekly periodical press, the diversity of series published reflected the multitude of groups with a vested interest in a newly literate population. Republicans especially promoted practical knowledge, popular science, and republican ideology in fictional guise. They triumphed, Olivero argues, by trumping the more traditional church, which did not keep pace with such modern forms of propaganda as the series.

In the conclusion, Olivero strains to situate her history within Pierre Nora's framework of a "lieu de mémoire." What is important about this attempt is the recognition, sorely missing from most of the essays in Nora's edited volumes, of the centrality of the burgeoning mass culture whose commercial nature situated it squarely outside the domain of official state culture. But the attempt is "strained," because one feels impelled to consider the other possible contexts and framing for this fascinating topic. First, one wishes Olivero had considered her project in relation to the history of seriality and collecting. In this context, visual homogeneity becomes an even more important and defining characteristic of the book series. Olivero does not make enough of the changing formats of the books or why people liked collecting and then displaying these series in their homes. In addition, continuing the scope of her research into the twentieth century would have illuminated this element of the history of the book collection even more and allowed us to grasp the broader intertextual history of how glossy magazines and film in the twentieth century helped to shape the production and consumption of the series in new ways. Last, she rightly identifies the series as a product of social and cultural conceptualization and in so doing goes beyond seeing them in their usual context as cultural expressions of rising capitalism. Yet, in the

end, Olivero sees republicanism as the over-arching ideology shaping and driving this morsel in the history of publishing. Aside from being a fairly predictable framework for an otherwise very good book, one has to ask whether republicanism caused these new formats (after all, fascists also published literature in popular formats) or simply benefitted from the way they helped the republican agenda.

This is a fine contribution to the growing field of the history of the book, but it does not offer any startling new evidence or insights. It is an informed, well-researched, and intelligent book that left this reviewer still scratching her head about the marvelous French mania for the series and the "livre de poche." That book, about those little books and their popularity, has yet to be written.

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LAURENCE BADEL. *Un milieu libéral et européen: Le grand commerce français, 1925–1948*. Foreword by RENÉ GIRAULT. (Histoire économique et financière de la France: Études générales.) Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France. 1999. Pp. xviii, 576. 249fr.

Harbingers of a profound shift in French cultural identity during the Third Republic, department stores like the Bon Marché, the Louvre, and the Galeries Lafayette represented consumption rather than production with seductive displays of retail goods that attracted masses of new shoppers. Drawing attention to this phenomenon in *Au bonheur des dames* (1883), Émile Zola nevertheless reaffirmed that commerce, especially in this guise, was morally suspect. Indeed, prosperous owners of department stores, chain stores, and single-price stores found themselves politically and socially isolated until they established an effective professional organization after World War I.

Through neglect, historians have unconsciously reaffirmed the social marginality of retail commerce before World War II. Although French business history has flourished since the 1960s, the most notable studies until the 1980s dealt with production, transportation, public works, banking, and petty shopkeeping rather than brilliant new meccas of the retail trade. Michael B. Miller's *The Bon Marché: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store (1869–1920)* (1981) thus broke new ground, and in the past decade studies of other department stores have appeared. Laurence Badel's work is unique, however, in that she deals only peripherally with the economic, social, or cultural significance of particular stores. Instead, her book traces the efforts of merchants to organize a lobby and carry out a strategy. Badel's study of a business milieu makes an unusually rich contribution to political and diplomatic history by analyzing an important source of support for European unification.

Motivated by the strikes of 1919, the *patronat* of *grand commerce* established the Groupement d'études

des grands magasins and hired a *normalien*, Jacques Lacour-Gayet, as secretary-general. These merchants proceeded over the next two decades to construct a stronger professional identity and gain influence among politicians and the general public. Badel surveys a rich array of institutions, personalities, and ideas surrounding the politics of commerce, but the central strand of her study is Lacour-Gayet and the Groupement d'études, which in 1925 evolved into the more inclusive Comité d'action économique et douanière (CAED).

In analyzing the formation, development, and influence of this business association, Badel draws on a wide range of sources (including the Lacour-Gayet papers) to present an intriguing case of a cultivated liberal "vanguard" leading capitalists rather than proletarians. Surrounding himself with graduates of the rue d'Ulm and other *agrégés*, Lacour-Gayet fashioned a respectable public image for CAED and advocated a diminished economic role for the state, free trade, and new political structures to correspond with modern economic realities.

Foreign trade became a priority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the wake of the Great War. Hence Badel explores ties between liberals involved in *grand commerce* and government officials who supported lowering tariffs and modernizing commerce as well as industry. Particularly illuminating is her survey of a broader discourse about uniting Europe politically to coincide with expanding producer and consumer markets. While embracing a European vision for the long term, Lacour-Gayet and his milieu emerged from World War II with greater influence because they had distanced themselves from Vichy and later opposed collectivism of the right or left.

Badel devotes almost half of her study to the Vichy and postwar years leading to the Congress of the Hague and the Marshall Plan, but only briefly discusses the "aryanization" of department stores under Vichy. She concurs with Renaud de Rochebrune and Jean-Claude Hazera, *Les patrons sous l'Occupation* (1995), about the motivation of most *patrons* during the war by concluding that merchants participated in "aryanization" to defend their enterprises and shape the results (p. 276). But what role did Lacour-Gayet play in this process? While Annie Lacroix-Riz, in *Industriels et banquiers sous l'Occupation: La collaboration économique avec le Reich et Vichy* (1999) sees him as a willing collaborator, Badel stresses his liberalism, his pragmatic resistance to dirigist as well as corporatist factions in the Vichy government, and his eagerness to assure the survival of larger enterprises that he represented and considered essential to the modernization of distribution (p. 288). She concludes her study with the postwar success of a pro-European free-trade lobby that emerged relatively untainted politically from the recent war while having largely succeeded in protecting its economic interests.

This is a pathbreaking study of hitherto unexplored relationships between *grand commerce* and govern-

ment during an era whose history will remain highly charged.

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VENITA DATTA. *Birth of a National Icon: The Literary Avant-Garde and the Origins of the Intellectual in France*. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 327.

At the beginning of her study, Venita Datta points out that if the history of intellectuals in France since the Dreyfus Affair has received ample investigation, their "prehistory" has as yet been subject to little inquiry. This neglect has partly been rectified by Christophe Charle's *Paris Fin-de Siècle: Culture et politique* (1998), but her claim remains a fair one. Datta's text aims to repair this situation by separating the "origins of the intellectual in France from the strict confines of the Dreyfus Affair" and by examining "the key role played by the literary avant-garde in the emergence of this figure." This itself discloses "the ultimate goal" of the book: the examination of "the emergence of the intellectual as a national figure" (p. 2). Datta's argument is sustained by two key themes. The first is that anti-Dreyfusard and Dreyfusard intellectuals shared much in common. Specifically, despite their differing visions of France, "both groups believed that the intellectual should play an important role in society." Second, the emergence of the intellectual has to be located within "the context of the contemporary crisis of gender identity" and thus related to "representations of both masculinity and femininity."

The text is probably at its weakest when explaining the broader context in which the intellectual emerged (references to such generalizations as the "literary nature of French culture" are far from convincing), while the chapter on "The Generation of 1890" does little to dispel doubts about the usefulness of the concept of generation for the historian of ideas. More troubling still is the author's failure to explain what is meant by a "national icon." If, as Datta argues, the 1890s saw the collective self-realization of the intellectuals as "a sociological group," this is not enough to explain how the intellectual came to be seen (if this is true) by others than themselves as "the product and symbol of modern French culture." More needs to be done to establish if this is anything but a self-image.

These and other concerns are far outweighed by the merits of Datta's investigation into the literary avant-garde. By working her way through the literary periodicals of the *fin-de siècle* period, Datta clearly demonstrates that the character and function of the intellectual was much discussed, that a lineage was established with such literary giants as Victor Hugo, F. A. R. Chateaubriand, and Alphonse Lamartine, and that the intellectuals themselves, jealous of the power of politicians in the mass democracy of the Third Republic, sought to endow themselves with a moral

authority that would entitle them to be heard. Here lay the “dream” of an “intellectual aristocracy.”

By far the most fascinating part of Datta’s discussion, however, arises from what she describes as “a common discourse of honor and masculinity” shared by intellectuals of all persuasions. With the case of Oscar Wilde as its prelude, Datta shows how the intellectuals repeatedly associated their own cause with the virtues of manhood and the cause of their opponents with effeminacy. If this was especially true of the anti-Dreyfusards, it also figured in Dreyfusard rhetoric (with their hero Georges Picquart cast as both man of action and intellectual and their opponents seen as prey to sexual perversion). A set of illustrations demonstrates this argument well.

Datta’s broader argument is that the birth of the intellectual in France has to be seen as “part of a larger quest for national identity” (p. 63). It is with this theme that she concludes her text, arguing that “opposing visions of the hero” disclosed different visions of the nation. Yet both, fearing national decline, privileged the claims of social solidarity over individualism (an argument explored through an examination of the contrasting positions of Ferdinand Brunetière and Émile Durkheim). Datta ends by telling us that the intellectuals’ “participation in the life of the city has become a fundamental aspect of French national identity.” This could well be true; but the fact that both Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals turned their backs on individualism also tells us something of profound importance about the anti-liberal nature of French political culture. Datta’s well-documented and clearly argued account, therefore, provides further evidence to support the controversial thesis earlier advanced by Tony Judt in *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (1992). In the birth of a national icon lay the seeds of what would be later errors.

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HERMAN LEBOVICS. *Mona Lisa’s Escort: André Malraux and the Reinvention of French Culture*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1999. Pp. xiii, 246. \$29.95.

In a country with a long tradition of public intellectuals, few have managed the double life with quite the éclat of André Malraux (1901–1976), celebrated writer, Resistance fighter, and for a decade (1959–1969) France’s first minister of cultural affairs. Herman Lebovics contends that Malraux was far more than Charles de Gaulle’s house intellectual; indeed, as opposed to those who dismissed it as an administrative reshuffling with little significance, he argues that the creation of the ministry marked an important shift in the state’s conception of its mission to promote and safeguard French culture.

After an opening set piece on one of Malraux’s signature works of cultural diplomacy, the 1963 loan exhibition of the *Mona Lisa* in Washington and New York, and a brief history of French notions of its

civilizing mission from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, Lebovics devotes two brisk chapters to Malraux’s life. He sees the writer’s thirst for adventure, his political engagements (more spectacular than effective) in the Spanish Civil War and the Resistance, and his literary endeavors as part of a life-long search for transcendence and communion. All along, that quest had an important aesthetic component, and by the 1950s art criticism had become its primary outlet. Malraux took from Walter Benjamin a concern with the decline of the aura of works of art, but he placed this notion in the context of a national culture and proposed a universalizing aesthetic humanism as a remedy. For Lebovics, the Gaullist movement, which Malraux joined at its beginnings in 1947, represented only the latest in a series of engagements through which he hoped “to bring back the lost aura of French cultural life” (p. 50).

For both de Gaulle and Malraux, rehabilitating French culture—most visibly in the cleaning of public monuments in Paris and elsewhere—constituted an important part of the project of restoring France’s grandeur on the world stage and thus demanded heightened state involvement. Renewed attention to French cultural achievement, in both the past and the present, had an important symbolic dimension, deflecting attention from decolonization and general loss of status. But cultural policy also had practical goals. In particular, Malraux’s great innovation, the creation of cultural centers in provincial cities, aimed at a more even distribution of cultural resources with, Lebovics believes, the ultimate goal of increasing the amenities available to, and thus the mobility of, the *cadres* or middle managers crucial to France’s postwar economic boom.

Lebovics persuasively argues that the ex-colonial bureaucrats to whom Malraux entrusted important administrative positions brought a new missionary zeal to cultural policy. But his assertion that Malraux and his ministry effected a “profound transformation of the relationship of the aesthetic sphere to the French state” (p. 133) is less convincing. Malraux’s ministry was not created *ex nihilo*; it simply regrouped a number of services formerly under the umbrella of the Ministry of Education, and it never had authority over secondary-level arts education or over the extensive cultural programs of the Foreign Ministry. Lebovics’s “evidence of some prior thinking” (p. 89) about the larger purposes of the culture ministry comes chiefly from 1968, toward the end of Malraux’s tenure, and the controversies and polemics he traces to demonstrate a shift in the relationship between the state and culture producers do not differ significantly from those that have marked French cultural life since at least the early nineteenth century. Although the ministry’s budget did increase during Malraux’s tenure, and the percentage of funds devoted to current arts projects nearly doubled, the majority of its expenditures went to the operation and upkeep of existing state institutions. As Lebovics admits, in the end Malraux’s poli-

cies did not create new audiences for high art, and not until the arrival of a Socialist administration did the ministry take any interest in popular culture.

Some of Lebovics's balder assertions, notably that Malraux "nationalized French culture" (pp. 133, 199) or that decolonization compelled a "separation of language and culture" (p. 188) in overseas cultural policy (which was outside Malraux's purview) blur important distinctions between culture as the output of specialized professionals, as what in anthropological usage characterizes particular groups of people, and as an arena of policy making. Lebovics's identification of French civilization with a tradition of print culture, although inconsistently applied, further limits the scope of his analysis; discussions of the visual arts and of music remain largely anecdotal. This book's principal value lies in its synthesis of recent French research on cultural policy in the 1960s, much of it unpublished. Its limitations point to the need for an analytical framework that places cultural policy more fully in the context of cultural practice.

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TOM SCOTT. *Regional Identity and Economic Change: The Upper Rhine, 1450–1600*. New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University. 1997. Pp. 363. \$92.00.

On the gravelly plain of the Alsatian Sundgau sits a regional airport that serves Basel as well as Upper Alsace (Mulhouse) and Baden (Freiburg) and their surroundings. It can be reached by a fenced road without officially leaving Swiss territory, although nearby border crossings are today barely staffed. Eurocross, as the airport is called, already offers service to a goodly number of European cities. Soon, with a new terminal already being built, the business traveller going from Bilbao to Budapest, or Milan to Glasgow, will have a choice that bypasses the congested major airports, while locals will actually find it easier to get around Europe than their metropolitan counterparts.

Today, the Upper Rhine Region or *Regio Basiliensis* is both a well-integrated ensemble and a full participant in European unification and the global economy, despite having to cope with national sovereignties, regional and local particularisms, and the special status of Switzerland within a united Europe. This balancing act between the cosmopolitan and the provincial is nothing new. Its manifestations in the century and a half that stand between the medieval and the early modern ages form the subject of Tom Scott's book. To be sure, the external political actors were different: the German language and the Habsburgs were dominant within a region still fragmented among many postfeudal "states"; the Swiss Confederation was still building; religion caused deep divisions; and first Burgundy and then France posed expansionist threats. Also, the strong dual (local/global) personality of the region was waning then while it is waxing now. The objects of trade were rather less elaborated than they

are, although wine and some textiles remain significant. But the region was then and is today both a prosperous zone of settlement and production and an active transit area and crossroads.

Scott poses two principal questions and tries to link them. First, was the Upper Rhine a region in some testable and meaningful sense? Second, why did its economy stagnate in the second half of the sixteenth century and after and fail to participate meaningfully in the development of capitalism? To probe these questions, he combines a great deal of historical (and geographic) detail, using abundant archival as well as printed sources, with close discussion of more theoretical work, notably concepts of regions and urban systems. (This reviewer's work gets a more than fair hearing.) The attempted link comes with the idea that a stronger sense of regional identity might have made for better policy and greater economic success. As it was, internal squabbling and petty rivalries among the fragmented political, social, and religious interests meant that the combined threats posed by strengthening territorial powers and an unfavorable *conjoncture* reduced the formerly active region of transit to something of a (still prosperous) backwater. Not until the development of calico printing in Mulhouse and, later, chemicals in Basel and machinery in Mulhouse would modern manufacturing reach the area. Rural crafts, although present, did not generally reach the level that might justify the term protoindustrialization.

The plan of the work is topical. After introducing the region and the concepts to be explored, Scott first examines local conflicts over rural crafts and markets and then regional efforts at cooperation—not very successful in the main—in coinage and in two staple trades: (imported) meat and (exported) grain. The dual weakening of regional identity and economic activity closes the work.

This is a densely researched and written book, and one must applaud the effort to combine primary research and attention to local particulars with Big Think (perhaps Medium Think) concepts such as urban systems and models of regional development. It is not an easy work to read, since, despite a number of maps, the place (and person) names are hard to keep straight. But my principal misgivings, and the reasons why I would call the work only a qualified success, concern two other matters. The lesser one is that concepts and models, although intelligently grasped, are here taken a bit literally. General models will seldom provide a really good fit with the history at the micro scale on which this research and argument proceed. Models justify themselves if they serve to ask the right questions; one cannot expect from them accurate answers to particular cases.

My principal quarrel, however, is with the choice of materials, granted that the historian is a prisoner of his/her sources. Scott draws almost exclusively on the archives of various authorities, which controlled, regulated, and adjudicated economic activity in this emphatically pre-Adam Smith economy. Not only are



there no time series of production, exchange, shipments, or other measures; there is not even much discussion of their likely magnitudes or nature (basic commodities such as wine and grain aside). Is it any wonder that squabbling, litigation, and repeated attempts at regulation play such a dominant role? It is as if one were to write a biography by consulting only the files of the subject's doctor, lawyer, dentist, insurance agent, auto mechanic, and tax authority. Would one not expect to come away with a "life" filled with nagging cares and rather lacking in *joie de vivre*? At least in some towns of the region that have preserved their traditional architecture, one senses today that the past of which Scott speaks was far from drab, the material quest far from fruitless.

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H. C. ERIK MIDELFORT. *A History of Madness in Sixteenth-Century Germany*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1999. Pp. xvi, 438. \$55.00.

H. C. Erik Midelfort seeks to place the understanding and treatment of mental illness, deficiency, and deviation in its historical context. At the start, he tells the reader that he will "dwell" on madness precisely because "the very word resists specification" and it is so "vague" that it requires us to look carefully at sixteenth-century realities (p. 11). As a social historian, Midelfort provides the cultural and institutional contexts of sixteenth-century people's understanding of madness. Chapter one reveals the key issue: one cannot use late twentieth-century diagnoses to understand sixteenth-century problems. Demonic possession, for example, cannot be easily related to later medical diagnoses such as hysteria or schizophrenia. Using the writings of Martin Luther and Theophrastus von Hohenheim (Paracelsus), chapter two seeks to reestablish the sixteenth-century mental world, in which madness was a "moral and religious metaphor" (p. 81). Midelfort quickly asserts an adhesive metaphor for the book: that is, to the sixteenth-century religious mind (that believed in Satan and demons), "the world was mad" (p. 80).

The remaining chapters are all wonderful essays on discrete topics that could stand on their own. Chapter three exemplifies the state of the academic and Galenic practice of psychiatry. Chapter four investigates German legal attitudes toward madness based upon the insanity defense. The author describes Johann Weyer's contribution to an insanity plea for witchcraft, which is connected to Weyer's dependence on Luther. Sixteenth-century jurists increasingly turned to medical experts in such cases.

Chapter five deals with princely courts and the various "natural" and other kinds of "fools" kept at them. It provides an opportunity to place the discussion of mental deviation in the context of folly, that much used metaphor of great sixteenth-century writ-

ers. Using what limited sources are available, Midelfort shows that the use of "fools" at courts was probably a reaction of the nobles to having to abide by the civilizing requirements of the sixteenth-century court. However, he also shows that "fools" were "outsiders" who were manipulated and mistreated (p. 276).

The next chapter returns to the religious context of sixteenth-century views of mental deviation, focusing on German pilgrimage shrines. Based on little-used sources, this wonderful chapter enlightens the reader greatly about searches for cures at Rhenish and south German shrines. The portraits of the sick and disturbed at these shrines reveal the social reality sought by the author. Midelfort argues that, through these shrines, Counter-Reformation Catholicism continued to offer hope to all kinds of ill and mentally troubled people. The last chapter vividly portrays hospital life in Hesse and Würzburg. Midelfort argues that, in the latter case, there was a more modern focus on medical cure. A very short epilogue makes the case that sixteenth-century Germans had many and varying interpretations of mental deviance and that they were as ambiguous about it as we are today (p. 387).

The weakness of the book lies in its basic assumption that one can deal with madness without defining it. Those interested in the development of psychiatry will be disappointed. Midelfort's book is more a study of the variety and range of ideas that people had about behavioral deviance in the sixteenth century than it is a history of madness. Some readers will be unhappy with his attempt to locate the origins of a moral metaphor of madness (as an external, non-organic problem) in Luther's religious teachings about sin. The reader struggles to remember that madness has several meanings, for the author does not distinguish between metaphorical and possible literal uses of the terms. If Midelfort intends to convince us that Luther believed that satanic possession was completely beyond the control of people, he is mistaken. When Luther talks about Satan corrupting human reason, it is always through sin. For example, Luther taught that Satan's power is only a matter of deception, another meaning of possession (see *D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe* ([1888], 45: 528).

The rich portraits of the pilgrims to German shrines and the inmates of hospitals, taken from the many sources used by the author, are the strength of this book. These anecdotes uncover the social reality of the sixteenth century. Midelfort's book stands alone in the historiography. To my knowledge, no one before him has brought such an impressive knowledge of medical, legal, institutional, and cultural history together to write such a social history. This book will be important to social historians and all those interested in these several fields.

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PAUL S. SPALDING. *Seize the Book, Jail the Author: Johann Lorenz Schmidt and Censorship in Eighteenth-Century Germany*. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press. 1998. Pp. xvii, 347.

Johann Lorenz Schmidt, a minor official at one of the numerous small German courts, published an annotated translation of the first five books of the Bible in 1735. Within two years, he had been arrested and his book condemned by the leading Protestant and Catholic governments within the Holy Roman Empire, in what was the most important case of official censorship between the end of the Thirty Years' War and the Napoleonic reorganization of Germany. These events provide the starting point for Paul S. Spalding's fascinating study of ideas, intellectual life, and political and religious tensions in mid-eighteenth-century Germany.

In many ways, Spalding's work is reminiscent of Mack Walker's *Salzburg Transaction: Expulsion and Redemption in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (1992), in that it uses a striking case study to unlock complex cultural and political issues through a narrative structure that shifts perspective with each chapter to reflect the different levels in human relationships and imperial politics. Although not made explicit, the book divides into three unequal parts, with the first three chapters focusing on the production of what became known as the Wertheim Bible. The initial perspective is that of Schmidt as an individual, as Spalding discusses his early career and education within early eighteenth-century Pietist circles until he found employment as a tutor to the children of the counts of Löwenstein-Wertheim, which, like many other small fragmented territories within the empire, was governed as a condominium between a Catholic and several Lutheran branches of the same family. These complex arrangements proved important as two of Schmidt's former charges decided to sponsor his controversial rationalist translation of the Bible at a time when their Catholic cousin was seeking greater autonomy for his part of the common territory. Far from seeking controversy, Schmidt wanted to accommodate the new enlightened rationalism within more orthodox Lutheranism, but like other attempts to improve upon Martin Luther's German text, his efforts foundered on clerical and intellectual hostility and distrust of innovation.

The second part covers the period from the initial attempts to suppress the book to the imposition of the official imperial ban in 1737 and moves from the perspective of Wertheim politics, through the intervening level of the regional institutions within the empire and its major constituent territories, to the pinnacle of the censorship system, the Imperial Aulic Council in Vienna. The extent of territorial autonomy is demonstrated by the importance of the patronage of the two Wertheim counts, who not only printed Schmidt's translation but also protected him amid mounting criticism from the Lutheran establishment. Once the leading Protestant power of Prussia had

joined Saxony and the Franconian territories in banning the book, however, Schmidt's supporters retreated into silence even before the Imperial Aulic Council pronounced its definitive ban and ordered the Catholic Wertheim prince to seize and interrogate him.

The final section reverts to more conventional narrative as it follows Schmidt from his arrest in February 1737 through his escape the following year and subsequent life under an assumed name, first in Hamburg as a translator and later as a tutor at the Wolfenbüttel court, where he died in 1749. Thanks to an impressive and wide range of sources, Spalding is able to go considerably further than earlier accounts of Schmidt's life and to indicate that he remained an active, if circumspect, participant in German intellectual debate despite the official ban on his book, the end to open sales, and the forced cancellation of the planned further volumes.

Spalding writes with great engagement, treats the historical participants with considerable sensitivity, and has the enviable knack not only of unravelling the complex ideas behind the controversies but of showing why they mattered to the participants and why they matter now. Standing at the intersection of Pietism and the early Enlightenment, Schmidt is a particularly interesting figure who illuminates two of the major currents in eighteenth-century German thought. The discussion of the cumbersome imperial censorship system in action further reinforces the conclusions of other scholars that the empire functioned, however imperfectly, as a political and cultural collective underpinned by a conservative sense of legality and "justice." Harsh though they undoubtedly were, the misfortunes that befell Schmidt pale in comparison to those suffering at the hands of later German thought control: his place of confinement was the Wertheim palace, where his supporters supplied him with a servant and his jailor, the Catholic prince, treated him with every consideration and eventually arranged for his release on parole. Nonetheless, the deeper message of the book is much darker, as censorship harms those it touches, perverts truth, and stifles debate. It is fitting that so an important an issue as the freedom of speech has found such an eloquent treatment.

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ULRIKE VON HIRSCHHAUSEN. *Liberalismus und Nation: Die Deutsche Zeitung 1847–1850*. (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, number 115.) Düsseldorf: Droste. 1998. Pp. 347. DM 72.90.

The Revolutions of 1848–1849 were, among other things, revolutions in communication. Hundreds of newspapers and journals arose in 1848, enabling liberal and democratic forces to mold public opinion in their dense print networks. Because most newspapers circulated on a local or regional level, newspapers

operating at a national plane loom especially important for historians examining the evolving discourse of nation building in the years 1848–1849. In view of the many levels and locales at which the revolution unfolded, historians have recently questioned the degree to which a coherent national forum existed for the prominent liberal factions during the revolution. Ulrike von Hirschhausen's analysis of the brief but significant life of the *Deutsche Zeitung* (1847–1850) is, consequently, a useful case study, for she uses the national daily as a vantage point to modify and revise current arguments on German liberalism. The newspaper, which is handled as a social formation of moderate liberalism, merits such attention. Not only was the paper a leading advocate for a constitutional nation-state, but its connections to liberal political machinery are unassailable. Friedrich Daniel Bassermann published the daily; Georg Gottfried Gervinus and Karl Mathy counted among its founders; and sixty-five correspondents served as deputies of the Frankfurt Parliament, fourteen of whom sat on the parliament's all-important constitutional committee. Moreover, the newspaper's reading community of prominent bourgeois notables further underscores its close ties to moderate liberalism's constituency and its political aims.

The book is divided into three parts, examining the newspaper's business operations, political program, and readership. The first and third sections assess the network of correspondents and readers attracted to the newspaper's national constitutional program. For Hirschhausen, the paper's 500 correspondents distributed throughout Germany and Europe reaffirm the claim that a sustained discussion about constitutional nationalism indeed operated at an advanced level in the 1840s. The newspaper's wide distribution of readers also points to national resonance. Although southern Germany boasted the highest proportion of readers, most regions of Germany possessed subscribers. For scholars familiar with work on the philhellenic movement of the 1820s or the Presseverein network of the 1830s, this argument will hardly come as a surprise. Yet Hirschhausen sees little correlation between readership density and election results. Areas thick with readers did not necessarily elect right-center deputies, barring any straight forward assumption that national influence among free professionals, civil servants, and businessmen translated into regional electoral influence. The paper's failure to attract farmers, artisans, and middling burghers, Hirschhausen suggests, reflects the dilemma of moderate liberalism as a whole. This conclusion prompts her to question the arguments of Paul Nolte and others, who see in pre-1848 liberalism a tight relationship between notables and common social groups.

In evaluating the *Deutsche Zeitung*'s political program, the author queries a number of polished theses on liberalism. First, Hirschhausen does not assign the same importance to the liberal-democratic split in explaining the failure of the revolution as do other

current interpretations. The paper, she argues, was not "a prominent front against democracy" (p. 132). The most convincing evidence for this point is the paper's advocacy of suffrage in 1849 to all heads of households, regardless of property, education, or class. Particularism, not radical democracy, stood out as the paper's principal enemy. Second, Hirschhausen argues against the long-held thesis that liberalism placed aggressive imperialistic power before liberal principles during 1848–1849. Despite the growing attention to the realities of state power, the author maintains, liberals never lost sight of placing a united Germany in a European state system based on peace and mutual respect. Linked to this point is the question of ethnic nationalism, which Hirschhausen views as overemphasized in recent research. Although acknowledging that ethnicity played a prominent role with Slavic cultures, she nonetheless argues that the primary criterion for judging friends and enemies of Germany was the progressive status of a state's political system. Third, Hirschhausen's research on the paper's socioeconomic program undermines the thesis of Lothar Gall and others that liberalism envisioned a classless civil society of small, independent burghers. A stratified class society premised discussions of the social question, just as ambitious projects of industrialization emerged as possible solutions. Finally, the book seeks to revise perceptions about the relationship between religion and liberalism. Discussions on religion reveal neither a deconfessionalized upper middle class nor a liberalism striving to pry itself free of religion. Significantly, though, the study confirms the current historiographical consensus that liberalism at the national level remains a subsidiary phenomenon to regional liberalisms; the latter, she concludes, are more genuine expressions of the political movement.

Hirschhausen has thoroughly scoured an important newspaper and, in comparing its positions with current interpretations of liberalism, has challenged key interpretations of German liberalism. Whether Hirschhausen's theses will hold true for broader arguments on liberalism remains a critical question. Is the *Deutsche Zeitung*, one asks, a reliable proxy for explaining moderate liberalism? The paper, for example, advocated a progressive form of suffrage; this is not necessarily typical of the moderate liberal camp. It is difficult to weigh either the impact or typicality of the paper's positions on political debates and movements, because the paper's discussions are not situated within the larger discourse of moderate liberalism in 1848–1849. Nonetheless, wider analyses of liberalism will be indebted to Hirschhausen's exemplary monograph, for it reasserts the complexity and difficulty of defining an evolving moderate liberalism. For this, the author deserves praise.

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HARTWIN SPENKUCH. *Das Preußische Herrenhaus: Adel und Bürgertum in der Ersten Kammer des Landtages*

1854–1918. (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, number 110.) Düsseldorf: Droste. 1998. Pp. 651.

This is a fine addition to a long line of historical works that have sought to explain why the authoritarian Prussian system failed to modernize and how this contributed to the failure of democracy in Germany. Unlike a spate of recent studies that have focused on the bourgeoisie in Germany, Hartwin Spenkuch's book looks at one of the most important bastions of Prussian reaction—the upper house of the Prussian parliament—from its creation in 1854 to its demise in 1918. This collective biography combines quantification and biographical sketches with detailed discussion of political, constitutional, social, and economic issues.

Spenkuch shows that the upper house played a decisive role in blocking a true parliamentarization of Prussia. Up through the 1870s, a liberal faction of the upper nobility held out real hope for change. During the "Constitutional Conflict" (1859–1866), these Prussian "Whigs" (as Spenkuch terms them) attempted to exploit a major rift between the future Kaiser Wilhelm I and the conservative upper house. Their goal was the reform or even abolition of the upper house. As in later crises, however, the monarch and the upper house overcame momentary arguments, found their way back to what each saw as the natural alliance between ruler and Junker, and headed off reforms that could have led to the introduction of English-style parliamentarization of Prussia. Even the reforms of the crisis year of 1917 were limited in scope.

Two broad explanations for the survival of the upper house as a powerful center of ultra-conservatism emerge from Spenkuch's book. First, the kaiser and the Prussian ministry of state insured that the upper house was dominated by the traditional nobility and great landowning class and blocked a true opening of the chamber to the bourgeoisie. The few commoners in the upper house capitulated to the overwhelming power and presence of the aristocracy.

A second explanation lies in the unnatural alliance between the great aristocratic families, Junkers both rich and poor, and the bourgeois landowners. The cosmopolitan upper nobility, once open to liberalism and modernization, moved to the right in the imperial period but became politically inert. The Junkers—those militaristic, rural despots—became the driving force in the conservative camp. Although they embraced some forms of economic modernization, they remained fanatically opposed to political and social change and utterly convinced of their right to rule in Prussia. Generally economically rather well off, the Junkers who served in the Prussian upper house nonetheless took up the reactionary cause of the impoverished nobility and middle-class landowners, who were increasingly drawn into the right-wing fanaticism of the Agrarian League. Under the influence of these groups, the upper house became an "anti-parliamentarian parliament," blocking reforms initiated by

the Prussian Chamber of Deputies as well as by the Reichstag.

Spenkuch argues that restrictive policies in the naming of new members to the upper house had a very deleterious effect on the political behavior of the bourgeois elite. Wealthy businessmen pursued this "honor" because it brought with it contacts, respectful treatment by the bureaucracy, and prestige. Seats went to those who were not only politically loyal, but also pliant and not overly self-assertive. Spenkuch believes that the result was that the wealthiest commoners avoided taking a public stand on major issues (such as the *Daily Telegraph* Affair) and that they were ignored when it came to major affairs of state (for example the catastrophic anti-British policies).

Spenkuch, a student of Jürgen Kocka, has made a powerful case here in favor of a revival of certain aspects of the thesis of the German *Sonderweg* (the peculiarly illiberal Prussian path to modernity), particularly as it pertains to the dominant political role of the Junkers. His work is compatible with much of recent research on the German bourgeoisie. A bridge may be found in his thesis that, in Prussia, the bourgeoisie and the traditional aristocratic-bureaucratic elite largely kept to themselves. His work does, however, draw a line against a kind of revisionism that implicitly seems to have crept into some recent studies, which—falsely extrapolating from local studies—overemphasize the power of the bourgeoisie in imperial Germany, leaving a giant question mark over the whole question of why democracy failed.

As is the case with many revised dissertations, this book is organized more according to formal criteria than around central arguments, and some of the more interesting findings are buried in the text. Nonetheless, every serious student of imperial Germany should read this important work.

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SVENJA GOLTERMANN, *Körper der Nation: Habitusformierung und die Politik des Turnens 1860–1890*. (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, number 126.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1998. Pp. 360.

This book is one of a number of new studies of German nationalism written under the supervision of Hans-Ulrich Wehler. This might surprise readers acquainted with Wehler's work, rooted in the "societal" analysis of structural changes associated with modernity, focusing on Germany's special path to modernity, and theoretically shaped by Max Weber. Svenja Goltermann makes only a gesture to "objective" social change, asserting industrialization and urbanization as conditions for a longing for community. Social analysis extends no further than stating that most gymnasts came from artisanal and commercial trades. There is



nothing here on the gymnastic movement as a political force.

Instead, Goltermann's concern is the gymnastic movement and national identity. The "nation" is a construct, present only in its enactment (*Inszenierung*). National identity is diverse, contested, and combines with other identities. These volatile combinations are not just discursive, although Goltermann follows Michel Foucault in asserting the power of discourse. The visualization of identity in drills and festivals delineates and produces identity. The obsession of the movement with producing "real men" through physical discipline closely links gender, body, and nationality as constructed identities.

To sustain this argument, Goltermann turns to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of "habitus." This theory attracts historians because it includes both "structure" (forms of capital, social fields, rules for behavior) and "meaning" (habits, dispositions, tastes). Goltermann argues that the gymnasts' drills and displays defined and produced habitus, fusing individual and collective identity. She also argues that habitus underwent characteristic if gradual, almost imperceptible shifts before and after unification.

The book is divided into two sections covering the decade or so preceding the formation of the Second Empire and the two decades following. Each section is divided into two parts. The first outlines the political background and the various forms of political nationalism. The second—the core of the book—considers the gymnastic movement. Principal sources used are those produced by the movement: writings and speeches of activists, accounts of festivals, and periodicals as well as police reports and press coverage.

The novel argument is appropriate to its subject, which links physical discipline, masculinity, and national virtue. Goltermann illuminates the meaning of words like harmony (*Eintracht*), unity (*Einigkeit*), and freedom. Freedom is moral autonomy requiring free submission to discipline. That can justify curtailing the political liberties of individuals morally unequipped for freedom (socialists, Catholics, Jews, Slavs). Rooting moral freedom increasingly in Germanism rather than a liberal society, and appealing to Germans beyond the Second Empire, produces a *völkisch*, even biologically informed habitus, an identity asserted against the morally corrupt, divided, and unfree political nation. The national habitus of the gymnastic movement thus took on an increasingly authoritarian, ethnic, and militarist form.

There are problems with this argument, even though in a way it represents a "cultural" pendant to what has been argued before by more conventional political and intellectual historians. Goltermann's principal sources are public rhetoric and display. I would hesitate before constructing rank-and-file habitus from such evidence. One can easily envisage motives and consequences other than those rhetorically projected. Goltermann alludes to some—fun, dressing-up, exhibitionism, sociability—usually quoting the stern disapproval of a

true believer. There was rapid turnover of membership, decline from the mid-1860s to the mid-1870s and limited commitment. Can we assume that such an occasional activity really affected people's psyches in the way implied (hoped for?) in the official rhetoric? I would need to know a lot more about the routines and drills than Goltermann provides to be persuaded. Above all, I would want the analysis situated, as Bourdieu's theory requires, within a broader social and political context.

Otherwise, one could argue a different case. Public rhetoric is cliché. Clichés can be appropriated without serious commitment to what is said. (That does not mean clichés are not important but that they have a different kind of importance than that associated with the concept of habitus.) Goltermann cites the Saxon minister Friedrich von Beust, not a gymnast himself and deeply resented within the movement for some of his policies, who nevertheless instantly found the right wavelength (i.e. clichés) in his speech to a major festival and received a warm response. Does such facility tell us anything about his habitus? Friedrich Nietzsche is perhaps a better guide with his contempt for the truisms of a debased idealism that informed so much of the official rhetoric of the Second Empire. Its superficiality would also help to explain the fragility of the identities projected in such rhetoric.

But what if we accepted Goltermann's argument? Habitus implies stable and enduring identity formation, something critics have fastened on when questioning its capacity to deal with rapid change. However, Goltermann asserts rapid change and fragile identity, a position more appropriate to Foucault than to Bourdieu. These tensions between theory and evidence, habitus and discourse, identity as deep routine and as fragile enactment remain unresolved. Habitus may help with the shortcomings of a societal history that stresses structure at the expense of meaning, and this book promises much in that regard, but the theory needs more complete application to the social and political fields and cohabits uneasily with approaches derived from Foucault.

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STEPHANIE MERKENICH. *Grüne Front gegen Weimar: Reichs-Landbund und agrarischer Lobbyismus 1918–1933*. (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, number 113.) Düsseldorf: Droste. 1998. Pp. 424.

The question of how exactly the Hitler movement in Germany managed to achieve its electoral breakthrough in mainly Protestant rural areas has long intrigued historians. The period between 1928 and 1933 has consequently invited much research, and we are now well aware of how a combination of adverse economic conditions and the inherent defects of Weimar society and its constitution led the farming community in northern Germany to the radical solution of

supporting the Nazis. This work is in effect a further contribution to this theme, although its spotlight falls on the whole period from 1918 to 1933. The main accent is on the Reichslandbund or Reich Rural Federation (RLB), Germany's largest agrarian association, which actually boasted six million members in 1924, if the families of individual subscribers are included. Stephanie Merkenich's declared aim is to produce an examination of this precise, large-scale social formation, not for its own sake but to analyze its political implications. The RLB, she argues, set out to influence governmental policies but ultimately failed, and her research attempts to explain why.

Merkenich has adopted a broadly chronological framework in which to set out the evaluation of the origins and ideology of the organization, including the continuity of both ideas and personnel between the RLB and its closest pre-1918 counterpart, the Bund der Landwirte (Farmers' Federation). The author shows convincingly that although the traditional deference of the peasantry toward the landed gentry had been weakened during the war, the latter were soon able to reassert their old dominance, as the peasantry became absorbed in the daily routine of their holdings. Nonetheless, the RLB did not merely restore the status quo ante on the land, nor did it ever achieve the goal of uniting the entire agricultural community in one lobby. Catholic farmers in the south and west stayed obdurately independent and loyal to their existing agrarian associations.

Merkenich brings out very well how relatively weak the RLB was from its inception, despite the membership statistics already cited. Its decentralized structure entailed financial weakness at the top. More serious internally was the membership split in terms of allegiance to political parties. Most members favored the German National People's Party (DNVP), although there was a faction that leaned toward the German People's Party (DVP). Inevitably a grave problem arose for the DNVP majority as the latter party increasingly abandoned belief in parliamentary democracy and eventually chose Alfred Hugenberg as its leader, a rightist politician on whom Merkenich is severe. His election is seen as the end of moderate conservatism in his party. Its undying opposition to governmental policies and its ceaseless concentration on narrow agrarian interests robbed the RLB of real political influence.

Hugenberg is also seen here as instrumental in causing the fall of Martin Schiele, on whom the landed population had placed great hopes when he entered national government as the minister of agriculture. Since Schiele was an RLB leader, the chance for the association to exercise real political influence seemed to have arrived. Schiele's downfall signaled in effect the exclusion of the RLB from the real corridors of power. It assumed even greater significance since Schiele himself had proposed the foundation of a new political party, including the RLB, which would unite agriculture. As the author shows, the DNVP faction

around Hugenberg sabotaged the idea as it would have undermined the DNVP-landowner leadership of the RLB.

The elimination of the moderate group in the association, led by Schiele and Karl Hepp (DVP) was disastrous at a time when economic distress was steadily mounting. In the last sections of the book Merkenich chronicles the familiar two-stage process of radicalization that ensued in the countryside from 1928 onwards. Loss of confidence in the leadership drove the radicalized peasantry to act on their own initiative, using buyers' strikes of agricultural equipment, tax boycotts, and the like. Their lack of real political sense left a gap into which the Nazis stepped with alacrity.

Overall, this is an exhaustive study of an already well-documented theme. Exactly how detailed it is may be deduced from the list of secondary sources consulted, which runs to forty-one pages, apart from the archival evidence. The book is a revised Ph.D. thesis and still has a considerable feel of its origins: this is especially true of the over-use of direct quotations. That is a minor reservation, however, and although the final conclusions of this book are not in any way novel, the author is to be congratulated upon the diligence of her research.

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WILLIAM L. PATCH, JR. *Heinrich Brüning and the Dis-solution of the Weimar Republic*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. ix, 358. \$54.95.

William L. Patch, Jr. sets himself a formidable task in this ambitious work: to put a statue back on its pedestal after the statue has done a quite effective job of demolishing itself. Specifically, it is the author's thesis that Heinrich Brüning, the first of the so-called presidential chancellors at the end of the Weimar Republic, does not deserve the reputation of gravedigger of German democracy, an accusation that finds considerable support in Brüning's posthumously published memoirs. Patch is convinced that, for reasons of his own, Brüning was not telling the truth when he wrote his memoirs. According to Patch, Brüning's primary aim in these reminiscences was to show that Reich President Paul von Hindenburg was wrong to fire the chancellor in May 1932. Brüning's life-long anger at his abrupt dismissal and disappointment with the reception he received in Germany when he briefly returned there after World War II so warped his judgment that he pictured himself as a right-wing authoritarian.

Actually, Patch insists, Brüning was really a "classic republican" (in the sense in which the term might be used in France and the United States) who wanted to preserve parliamentary constitutionalism and the rule of law in Germany by relying on the Prussian ideals of diligence, self-denial, and devotion to the common

good. Patch looks upon Brüning much as the chancellor's contemporary admirers did, as the tower of strength who alone could break the Nazi flood. Patch claims that, had it not been for the Machiavellian intrigues of Kurt von Schleicher and Alfred Hugenberg—the villains in the book—Brüning, in cooperation with the Social Democrats, would have prevented Adolf Hitler and his henchmen from coming to power.

It is in the nature of this decidedly revisionist work that the author covers much familiar ground, and specialists may at times get a little impatient with the narrative. This is not a mere repetition of previously known facts, however. Rather, Patch repeatedly contrasts Brüning's account in his memoirs of the crucial events of his chancellorship with contemporary evidence drawn from a prodigious array of archival sources, notably the Brüning papers at Harvard University, an important collection that did not become available to scholars until 1992.

Patch succeeds to a considerable extent in revising the negative image of Brüning. He demonstrates that the memoirs are often unreliable, that Brüning was a far more sophisticated parliamentary politician than he would have us believe, and that the chancellor certainly had no intention of destroying the Weimar Republic as a parliamentary, constitutional system. Even the picture of the *Hungerkanzler*, who deliberately ignored human misery at home in order to pursue his ambitious foreign policy aims, looks less damning in light of the political straightjacket in which Brüning found himself in 1931 and 1932. Patch argues persuasively that by that time only foreign policy successes could prevent the rise of anti-democratic extremists in Germany.

Perhaps inevitably, Patch cannot quite resist the temptation, once he has put the Brüning statue back on its pedestal, to gild it as well. This effort is rather less successful. It involves a considerable amount of "if only" argumentation, some one-dimensional characterizations of the chancellor's political enemies and partners (especially the Social Democrats), and some fuzzy reasoning. Patch has a tendency to attribute Brüning's authoritarian thoughts and actions to the bad advice of his associates, while more democratic leanings reflect the chancellor's true feelings. In the final analysis, Patch's own description of Brüning as "mildly authoritarian" is more convincing than the label "Jeffersonian democrat" with which he attempts to adorn his subject in the book's conclusion.

The chancellor also does not come out as quite the astute politician that the author would like him to be. Patch contends that Brüning's early economic program would have been quite successful if only Agriculture Minister Martin Schiele had not forced the cabinet to agree to some disastrous agricultural tariffs. But surely it was a bit naïve of Brüning to think that the head of the largest farmers' lobby would not demand something substantial to benefit his constituency. Similarly, only someone who saw the Depression as a judgment for the hedonistic excesses of the 1920s would fail to

grasp the political consequences of mass unemployment until January 1931. Finally, there is the matter of Brüning's abortive alliance with a faction of the Nazis at the end of 1932. The chancellor's intended cooperation with the Nazis' number two man, the "mild-mannered" (a characterization few historians would agree with) Gregor Strasser, was not, I think, an action that would be typical of a Jeffersonian democrat.

Overall, then, this is an important revisionist study that will need to be considered seriously by future historians of the Weimar Republic. Patch at times overshoots his mark, and the Brüning statue is still left with some cracks, but that should not detract from the substantial merits of this book.

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VICTORIA J. BARNETT. *Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity during the Holocaust*. (Christianity and the Holocaust-Core Issues.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. 1999. Pp. xviii, 185. \$57.95.

Scholars of the Holocaust have tended to focus on the victims and the perpetrators. Victoria J. Barnett, a consultant at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, however, has convincingly argued in her book that the bystanders cannot be ignored, since they helped to make possible the success of those Nazis energized by virulent anti-Semitism and/or rabid nationalism. She has carefully used a wide range of historical analyses as well as such psychological contributions as those by Robert Jay Lifton, Herbert Kelman, Stanley Milgram, and Erwin Staub. Her book unpacks for the historian the psychosocial dynamics at work in value construction, attitude formation, and the development of behavioral patterns so that the bystanders' role as a major support in the brutal terror that was the Holocaust can be understood as an activist force.

Barnett's theme is that the Holocaust takes us beyond the normal understanding of daily life into the psychosocial issues centering on life and death. The Shoah demands that theologians and philosophers, for example, pose questions about God's identity and humanity's own self-image and not simply rely on traditional theodicy categories. Her analysis of the ethical and theological consequences stemming from the Nazi psychological strategy that nurtured a solution of sanctioned murder can help contemporary scholars recognize that the evil of Nazi policy was not ontological but rather was rooted in the dehumanization and objectification of others.

Following the lead of Elie Wiesel, Barnett has sought to understand how and why people remained indifferent during this era and so were instrumental in carrying out the political initiatives of the Nazis. Analyzing why the bystanders acted as spectators serves to raise fundamental questions about the ties that bind humans together in communities. Auschwitz is what happens when good and ordinary people do nothing. To avoid sanctioned, political murder in the

future, Barnett contends, something fundamental in human values and behavior has to change. Simply to identify those involved in genocide through the public media and subsequently to protect future victims through legal mechanisms do not go far enough and are only superficial solutions to the horrors witnessed in the twentieth century. What is needed is a proactivist and seriously empathetic response to those who can be persecuted. Solidarity with the potential or real victim accurately describes this needed relationship. Unfortunately, Barnett does not adequately succeed in spelling out the concrete strategies needed to promote such solidarity, which could serve to undermine systemic evil.

Individuals, of course, make moral decisions, but as persons they are conditioned by the culture within which they have to develop their identities. Dehumanizing social and political factors exist in institutions that have been constructed by generations of human interactions. Institutions play a dominant role in creating values and shaping behavior, even though it is *still the individual who acts*. Responsibility for moral behavior, therefore, is not as clear as philosophers and theologians have insisted. By displaying indifference, bystanders in corrupting institutions can do evil, and this is the situation that theologians and philosophers have to face.

Barnett rightly insists that the Holocaust was a seminal event in the last century. To sustain human dignity in our global culture, she has developed the theme of disruptive empathy as originally advocated by René Girard. She concludes that character is not merely an attribute but at a deeper level is connected to how persons relate to one another. Such relationships shape the identity of each person and can signal to men and women how to behave toward others in a humanizing or empathetic fashion. Thus, dehumanizing objectives can only be countered by humanizing tactics and strategies in political and religious societies, which seem to be prone to marginalize groups that they engage in constructing their own societal identity.

Barnett's book does not utilize primary historical sources. Her use of analyses made by social psychologists, however, can help to sensitize historians to the motives of the people who created and sustained the Third Reich as well as of those who silently supported them. Her book is an excellent model of a psychohistorical study that has been informed by the conclusions derived from experimental psychology. Her study of the psychosocial dynamics behind moral decision making can also help historians look for the patterns of primary data that can prove fruitful in understanding the behaviors of bystanders as they confront such assaults on humanity as those set in motion by the Nazis. She helps historians to answer the questions of why and how normal people watch political murder from the sidelines.

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HEIKE BUNGERT. *Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen: Die Reaktion der Westalliierten auf das NKFD und die Freien Deutschen Bewegungen 1943–1948*. (Transatlantische Historische Studien; Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts Washington, D.C., number 8.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 1997. Pp. 341. DM 76.

The argument presented in this book is that the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (NKFD), a body that was established under Soviet auspices in July 1943, consisting of German prisoners of war and exiled Communists, was taken much more seriously by Western policy makers than has hitherto been supposed. Indeed, according to Heike Bungert's account, several key moments in the development of the Cold War were affected by exaggerated notions in the West about the importance of the NKFD in Soviet policy toward Germany. The organization was also presumed, on the basis of no very clear evidence, to have influence over various "Free German" committees set up in Western countries by Communist émigrés and their sympathizers. From September 1943, a number of captive German officers, organized in the Bund deutscher Offiziere (Association of German Officers), were involved in the NKFD. The most prominent figure was General Walther von Seydlitz, but, after Adolf Hitler's repression of the July coup in 1944, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus also became rather distantly associated with the enterprise. Although both of them ended their careers in obscurity, the myth of a "Paulus" or a "von Seydlitz" army, trained in the Soviet Union, whose members would bring a mixture of Soviet Communism and unregenerate German nationalism back with them when they were repatriated, generated recurrent fears in the West until the end of 1948.

The NKFD was set up during a delicate period in Soviet-Western relations, after the Red Army had scored its victory at Stalingrad and had begun to take the offensive but well before Anglo-American forces were in a position to launch the Second Front. The formation of a German committee that was apparently going to be the basis of an antifascist Wehrmacht caused concern in the West, especially in Washington D.C. Somewhat illogically, it was linked to fears that Joseph Stalin might make a separate peace with the Nazi regime. Bungert is able to quote a telling entry from Henry Stimson's diary in October 1943, recording that Roosevelt gave the NKFD as his reason for wanting a rapid meeting with Stalin, an event that duly took place in Tehran at the end of the following month. In fact, however, Roosevelt had been eager for a meeting with Stalin for some time, and the need for closer East-West coordination within the Alliance was becoming obvious as the Nazi Axis started to crumble. At Tehran and Yalta, the Russians were able to convince the Western powers that the NKFD was a psychological warfare weapon designed to undermine the fighting spirit of the Wehrmacht, a claim that



subsequently proved true when the committee itself was shut down in November 1945. Yet this did not prevent the melody lingering on in the minds of intelligence officers, diplomats, and journalists, especially those working for the Americans. The bogey of a "Red Wehrmacht" was propagated with particular intensity by isolationist sections of the American press, and in their reaction to baseless rumors about the NKFD one can detect the symptoms of later McCarthyite hysteria. When the Soviet occupation authorities in East Germany established paramilitary police units—the KVP—in 1948, they were immediately associated in some minds with the NKFD, even though most of their personnel were selected for their Communist sympathies rather than any previous role in that enterprise. In 1953, only four percent of KVP officers had served in the former German army. The "Paulus Army" was, as Bungert herself demonstrates, a myth, but willingness to believe in it helped to exacerbate anti-Soviet, and to a certain extent anti-German, fears after the end of the war. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the NKFD played a crucial role in poisoning the atmosphere between the two sides. It was their own incompatibility that made collaboration impossible. This well-researched book is based on a wide range of American, British, and, to a lesser extent, French sources, as well as on archival materials now available from the former German Democratic Republic. Although the author sometimes exhibits an understandable tendency to ascribe rather more importance to the NKFD's role in Western decision making than the evidence seems to justify, she is careful to point out that fear of the NKFD was only one among many factors that explain Western-Soviet tensions both during and after the war. In any case, this admirable study is valuable for the light it sheds on Allied intelligence about Soviet policy from 1943 to 1948.

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ELIZABETH D. HEINEMAN. *What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany*. (Studies on the History of Society and Culture, number 33.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1999. Pp. xviii, 374. \$45.00.

In this fine contribution to the burgeoning field of German women's and gender history, Elizabeth D. Heineman makes an excellent case for the significance of marital status as a crucial but highly fluid marker of identity and gender roles. Heineman traces the fluctuating meanings of the difference between married and single women, both legal and in everyday life, from the 1930s to the 1950s, concentrating on a comparative study of postwar East and West Germany. The book begins with a trenchant analysis of the contradictory (and long-term) consequences of National Socialist social, racial, and military policies. The Nazis aimed to

improve the status of unwed mothers while also pronouncing many of them asocial; they valorized marriage but gave unprecedented opportunity to politically and racially acceptable single women. The increasing presence of foreign workers and prisoners of war on the home front meant that "The regime obsessed with racial purity had become the catalyst of an unprecedented number of relationships between Germans and foreigners" (p. 58). In an interesting generational division of labor that also shifted the "difference" a husband could make, the social work of mourning men and symbolizing marriage fell to older women, while younger married and single women did wage labor. Married women were widowed with children, and single women married soldiers with whom they would never live. War, defeat, and occupation exacerbated the instability of—and often rendered temporarily irrelevant—the marriage institution the Nazis had pledged to restore.

Drawing on her dissertation study of women in Darmstadt 1945 to 1955, and making excellent use of East German archives, Heineman then skillfully delineates the divergent developments in the two postwar Germanies. In the East, women's wage labor was a social goal as well as economic necessity. In the West, it was a necessity to be overcome, and welfare state entitlements and legal rights were designed to benefit married mothers. The male breadwinner norm, so vulnerable in the decade from 1939 to 1949, was reinstated, first in theory and then in practice. In the GDR, the establishment of combined work and motherhood as a norm "narrow[ed] the difference" between married and unmarried women while stressing the importance of children. Official antifascism also foreclosed a focus on the plight of women left single by Adolf Hitler's war as symbolic of a victimized *Volk*. To Heineman's surprise, the trope of women "standing alone" (*alleinstehend*) had no resonance.

Yet, despite—or perhaps because of—the fact that, as Heineman coolly remarks, "while men's absence had not shattered the ideals of marriage and the nuclear family, men's presence frequently did" (p. 108), marriage eventually became the overwhelming norm in both East and West. In both states, single women were marginalized and married women with children worked. Contrary to stereotype, for all the postwar angst about surplus women and a lost generation deprived of husbands, the rate of marriage increased so much that "by the early 1960s, women of the war generation were as likely to be married as had been women their age before the war" (p. 242). Moreover, even women "standing alone" were hardly alone; over a lifetime, they almost always lived in some kind of community, with children, with other women, or with male partners of various sorts.

Curiously, given her concern with the interplay between social and cultural prescription and experience, Heineman pays little attention to the popular culture sources in fiction, music, or film that have recently been used so well by scholars such as Maria

Hoehn, Robert Moeller, Uta Poiger, and Heide Fehrenbach. Relying on archival (especially women's organizations and state agencies) and press material, this resolutely political history (over)resists cultural and discursive analysis. One wishes that Heineman had interrogated her "goes without saying" assumption that marital status is more significant for women than for men, and told us more about why the awkward term "standing alone" has come to define the experience of unmarried women when, as she makes so abundantly clear, they were, in most cases, far from "alone." The reader wants to know more about the differential impact of "husbands" (who might or might not be present in real life) and male partners (who might or might not be "husbands"). One wishes for more discussion of the difference made not by "husbands" but by children. Nonetheless, Heineman's work is indispensable for students of postwar Germany; its rigorously comparative analysis makes usefully clear not only how differently the issue of marital status was perceived and deployed in the two Germanies but also how stubbornly both regimes maintained gender difference.

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YNGVE TIDMAN. *Spräng Amalthea! Arbete, facklig kamp och strejkbryteri i nordvästeuropeiska hamnar 1870–1914* [Sink the Amalthea! Work, Labor Conflict and Strike-Breaking in Northwest European Harbors, 1870–1914]. (Bibliotheca Historica Lundensis, number 90.) Lund: Lund University Press. 1998. Pp. 274.

Yngve Tidman's dissertation is a thoroughly researched, insightful, and well-written study of themes that fit, more or less, under the canopy of his title. The focus is generally more specific than the title implies, especially in terms of geography: Malmö, Göteborg, Norrköping, Gävle, London, and Hamburg are the most important ports. Vital to the work's quality is the fact that Tidman has far more experience and perspective than many researchers. He grew up in Ystad on Sweden's south coast, observed first hand the lives of dockworkers, and came to academic pursuits only after four decades in journalism.

Tidman was drawn to his subject by background and a fascination with the story that serves as the title and opens his analysis: the bombing in Malmö harbor of the English schooner *Amalthea* on the night of June 11, 1908, by young labor radicals as part of a drawn-out conflict between dockworkers and management. From there, his curiosity extended to who the dockworkers were and the lives they led, the national and international labor and management organizations that developed within this sector, the changes that occurred in the industry around this time and how they affected the dockworkers, what strengths and weapons each group had at their disposal, who became a strike

breaker and why, and why there were English laborers in Malmö as strikebreakers.

The work is based heavily on English, German, American, and Scandinavian secondary sources. Tidman uses these to explore conceptual themes and establish the pieces that tie the history of the dockworkers in this time period together across national borders. He also makes extensive use of Swedish primary source materials from union, management, and state collections, as well as interviews.

Stereotypes depict dockworkers as young, male, unskilled laborers performing jobs requiring little more than brawn and living in slums proximate to the docks. As Tidman admits, there is considerable truth to these views. However, the truth in terms of age, strength, marital status, skill level, specialization, and residence distribution is more complex. National and international organization of the dockworkers and their employers occurred mainly between 1890 and 1910, during the rise of the so-called "new unionism." These developments occurred in a rapidly changing environment in the shipping industry. For example, the transition from sail to steam and motor-powered vessels brought many changes. Sailing vessels came and went with the winds, without fixed schedules; the new motor vessels came and went with regularity. Loading and unloading had to occur quickly. Schedules, work demands, pace, the number of workers, and skills shifted. New dockside technologies had similar impacts. In this context, the dockworkers faced issues common to every working man in the period, such as the right to organize and take action against employers, hours, wages, work conditions, and job security. The employers saw the opposite side to each of these contests and focused particularly on their right to hire and fire freely. Often they were supported by the state through the police, military, courts, and government.

In the early years of the twentieth century, the dockworkers of northwestern Europe faced compounding problems: a surplus of labor fed by internal migration and international labor migration and the development of competing unions. "Strikebreakers," always a part of labor history, were particularly easy to come by in this period and crucial in an international labor market manipulated by the employers. Tidman examines a number of failed strikes (including Malmö in 1908 and the general strike in Sweden in 1909) that marked a reversal of the pattern of labor success enjoyed during the late 1880s and early 1890s. He shows how English workers were sent all over northern Europe, while Swedish workers found themselves in Kiel, Newcastle, and elsewhere.

In spite of its overall quality, the book has its shortcomings. Tidman tries to cover too much and leaves the reader wanting to know more about particular topics. For anyone who prefers history with people rather than groups, the lack of individuals/personalities will be disturbing, although understandable given the author's approach. Occasional copyediting mistakes are bothersome; the most notable is a

reference (p. 79) to a map that is not there. Particularly irksome is the English-language summary. Although it contains Tidman's key arguments, it is filled with language mistakes of every sort, and this reflects badly on the author and the press. Finally, there is no index.

Overall, Tidman's book is a fine review of northwest European and especially Swedish labor history. Its descriptions, analyses, and arguments are important. Also important is the book's reminder that class conflict, traditions, and the power of the "forces of order" were deeply ingrained conditions—opposing the development of economic, social, and political democracy—that were not surmounted for another half century.

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PATRICK SALMON. *Scandinavia and the Great Powers of 1890–1940*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Pp. xix, 421. \$69.95.

Many fine scholarly works have been written over the last fifty years or so about the impact of the two world wars of the twentieth century on the four Nordic countries of mainland Europe: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Most of this literature focuses on only one Nordic country (a reflection of the reluctance of Nordic scholars, until very recently, to study the history of their own countries in regional as well as national terms), and virtually all of it concentrates on either one global conflict or the other. One of the great merits of Patrick Salmon's study of relations between the four mainland Nordic countries and the great powers is that he adopts a much broader approach, while still describing developments at an adequate level of detail. This makes for a long and packed book, which requires close and careful reading, but the effort is well worthwhile.

Salmon's work is characterized by a number of original or unusual features. The first is that he chooses to write about the fifty years from 1890 to 1940. This enables him to draw out the many elements of continuity between the two prewar periods he covers. Salmon is not merely concerned with telling the story of the two world wars and their impact on the Nordic region. His treatment of the first global conflict is relatively brief (one chapter out of nine), and he only discusses the first ten months or so of the second. The two world wars are placed firmly in a larger and longer context of recurring patterns of great power interest and involvement in the Nordic region. Another unusual feature of the book is that it is as much concerned with the economic rivalry in the Nordic region between Britain and Germany as with political and strategic considerations.

Salmon sees the fifty years between 1890 and 1940 as a distinct phase in the relations between the Nordic countries and the outside world. Few would dissent from the view that 1940 was a major milestone in the

modern history of the Nordic region. The longstanding threat of serious Anglo-German hostilities in that part of Europe, which remained latent during World War I, became a reality. Any surviving notion of the Nordic region as a neutral zone insulated from external conflicts was shattered, and during the long years of the Cold War the Nordic countries were partially absorbed into the two blocks that divided Europe.

Salmon makes a more novel point when he argues that 1890 also represented a turning point in two fundamental respects. The first was that innovations in military technology conferred a new strategic significance, actual or potential, on several parts of the Nordic region. The second was the modernization of the Nordic economies and their growing integration into the world economy, which made them increasingly important to Britain and Germany both as export markets and as sources of raw materials and other products. This is why the first chapter, after the introduction, is called "The End of Isolation: Scandinavia and the Modern World."

These underlying characteristics of the place occupied by the Nordic region in international relations remained essentially unchanged between 1890 and 1940. Salmon's account of the evolution of the strategic and economic thinking of the great powers, and of the reaction of the Nordic countries to them, is clear, thoughtful and convincing. There is no work of similar chronological and thematic range in English or indeed in any other language.

Salmon's picture of the Nordic region as an insulated, marginal part of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars is somewhat overstated and pays too little regard to the role of the Baltic during times of Anglo-Russian conflict or tension between 1815 and 1890. The book is also stronger on Britain and Germany than on Russia, the third great power with a strong interest in the Nordic region in this period. These are minor quibbles. Salmon's overall argument is persuasive and his book is a remarkable achievement. He has mastered a great mass of secondary literature and carried out extensive archival research not only in Britain and Germany but also in Denmark, Norway, and, to a lesser extent, Sweden. The outcome is a learned and lucid book that will be essential reading for any scholar interested in the relations between the great powers and the Nordic region in the first half of the twentieth century.

THOMAS MUNCH-PETERSEN  
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MAURA PALAZZI. *Donne sole: Storia dell'altra faccia dell'Italia tra antico regime e società contemporanea*. (Testi e pretesti.) Milano: Bruno Mondadori. 1997. Pp. 476. L. 29,000.

Although comparative demographic historians of Old Regime Europe have focused primarily on married couples and their fertility, the proportion of never-married women then was relatively high because of late marriage, greater male migration, and higher male

death rates. Studying women who lived alone requires some ingenuity, because sources are generally less complete for never-married individuals. Maura Palazzi has done a heroic job of digging out the available information about women alone for Italy in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries and presenting it effectively.

Palazzi argues that the asymmetry in male and female power in Old Regime Italy was closely related to the fact that male children collectively assured the survival of the patrimony because their offspring would bear the paternal name. Ideally, the only alternative to marriage and parenthood for either men or women was a "spiritual marriage" in religious orders. Males were tied closely to their paternal family, but females were never completely integrated into that family, because they would marry out. Women's "value" to the family into which they married lay in their ability to produce male heirs. Nevertheless, married or single, women were dependent.

This book examines Old Regime patterns and efforts to reform them in the revolutionary period, the post-Napoleonic regimes, and in unified Italy to the present. Drawing on local population registers, Palazzi first investigates women in eighteenth-century Bologna. Whether they lived alone or shared housing with other women, most female heads of an urban household were impoverished. Single women were especially likely to live in crowded streets with many micro-residences: a reflection, Palazzi believes, of reciprocity among solitary women. In general, if they were not totally penniless, women could live independently of men, but relatively few men managed to live alone without the services (shopping, cooking, laundry, etc.) of a woman. Women household heads tended to be over forty, living as widows with children or other kin; younger unmarried women risked compromising their honor if they lived alone.

There were strict limits on wives' ability to divorce under the Napoleonic Code in northern Italy (this affected especially bourgeois and noble women), even though the code somewhat increased single women's and widows' right to act independently. After unification, the Pisanelli family code (1866) retained the Napoleonic limitations, which were only modified in 1919 to make it possible for women to pursue civil actions without their husband's permission. Family law created a contradictory situation in which the social vision of non-marriage continued to be an "incomplete destiny," while legally spinsters had a greater capacity to act independently than all other women.

The nineteenth-century family laws and familial control severely limited the types of jobs available to women. In urban manufacturing, poor unmarried women were tailoresses or seamstresses but the largest female occupation was the ubiquitous domestic servant. Only at the end of the century were any professionally qualified women teachers, physicians, or clerical workers to be found, most of them unmarried and government employees. After Italian unification, the

census reports on large cities and urban population registers indicate that in 1861, unmarried men outnumbered unmarried women aged fifty or over, and in 1911, there were even higher proportions of unmarried women in Italy, especially in the deep south and the northeast (from which emigration was high). In the same period, there were more woman-headed family households (nineteen percent) in cities where women could find jobs as seamstresses, laundresses, charwomen, or cigarette and cigar makers. Palazzi argues unpersuasively that by then, such women were able to make their own choice about how to live and with whom.

From 1860 to 1914 demographic patterns changed in Italy's regions, with varied timing, again reflecting women's residential patterns and responsibilities. Migration cityward brought changes in the countryside from which migrants had departed. Formerly self-sufficient farming families sent out some members to do daily wage labor on larger farms or in nearby textile mills. In large agrarian households of brothers and their families, a senior woman in the household directed the activities of other women, subordinating them to her command. The possibility of a woman exercising authority depended on how senior and central was her position in an extended family household. As the wife of a senior brother, she might seek to promote the future of her own children, as opposed to those of junior women in the same household. It was not simply laws, Palazzi emphasizes, but their husband's status that made the difference in adult women's lives. Women married to a wage laborer might themselves work for wages in agriculture, but their pay was usually merged into the family's collective income and spent by the household head. The end-of-the-century agrarian crisis led in some areas to the rigidification of gender roles in both migrating families and those who stayed behind.

The lives of urban single women changed substantially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They were the ones who most experienced the contradictions between their jobs and their family's efforts to control them. Such women enjoyed a degree of autonomy, but it was hard won, sometimes including alienation from their families if they insisted on living independently.

Palazzi closes with a quick overview of the twentieth century. Family law was revised once more in the 1920s, eliminating the need of a husband's approval for his wife to take a job. Benito Mussolini famously promoted fascist motherhood with his "Battle of the Births" but also fatherhood with a tax on unmarried adult males—the income from which was deposited in the National Fund for Mothers and Children! Despite fascist propaganda and incentives, there was no baby boom, and in the post-World War II period, there was a large influx of women into the labor market and an even larger "baby bust." (The sale of birth control devices and abortion were only then legalized.) Today, there are some continuities: men who are divorced or



widowed still remarry much more quickly than women, and most women who live alone are widows. Yet unmarried heterosexual couples living together are very common today. Italian demographic behavior has converged with that of northern Europe.

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R. J. B. BOSWORTH. *The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. x, 269.

R. J. B. Bosworth offers a personally inflected essay on the changing fortunes of the study of Italian fascism. With passion and wide range, Bosworth mines the historical literature on Italian fascism and calibrates it to shifting Italian social, political, and cultural conditions. Not surprisingly, he argues that interpretations and representations of the "Italian Dictatorship" since its demise have been profoundly determined by the climate that produced them. As he travels through the component parts of the historiography—society, culture, party and state—Bosworth combines analysis of the scholarly debates with discussion of their impact on Italian society and culture.

Within the project of reading the fortunes of fascist historical studies against the template of postwar Italy, Bosworth proposes a series of ambitious, if elusive, questions. His queries range from "Is the history of Fascism still significant?" (p. 10) to whether or not "historians and other social scientists courageous or foolhardy enough to build models of fascism should be encouraged to continue" (p. 229). Bosworth's central thesis is that recent trends in the study of fascist Italy, or what Bosworth calls "the culturalist turn," have deflected the field away from its moral and political purpose, which is to be vigilant against renewed fascism and protective of anti-fascism. Bosworth reduces what he calls the "culturalist turn" to cultural relativism and a postmodern rejection of absolute values. He also accuses postmodernism and "the culturalist turn" of elevating superficial jargon above ethics. Of the recent interest in gender, he writes, rather tendentiously, "as is often true at the current historiographical moment, it is easier to discover what it meant to be female in Fascist Italy than what it meant to be male" (p. 151).

Rather than using culture or postmodern theoretical tools to understand Italian fascism, Bosworth argues for historians to apply the debates and concepts that dominate the "more developed historiography of Nazism" to Italian fascism (p. 5). Taking inspiration from K. D. Bracher's notion of Nazism as a "German dictatorship," Bosworth asserts that "an understanding of Fascism must reckon with 'Italy,' that is, with the state created in the Risorgimento of the mid-nineteenth century" (p. 5). Historians, according to Bosworth, must highlight the specifically "Italian" aspects of Italian fascism. While he rejects reading Italian

fascism through the lens of its Nazi ally, he calls for an application of historiographic questions emerging from the study of Nazism. For example, Bosworth challenges Italianists to engage debates such as those in German historiography that "question[ing] the relationship between state and society" or that reveal "the exact decision-making process in the regime" (p. 31).

The book's theoretical questions about the meanings of fascism, its history, and its popular representation and reception are organized around the thematic categories that have shaped the field. The book's nine chapters move in a variety of directions, from scholarly debates to contemporary Italian politics to the author's personal experiences. At times, this leads to confusion. Bosworth appears to have written this book to take aim at what he considers two worrisome developments: the rise of the "anti-anti-Fascists around Renzo De Felice" and the "culturalist turn" in recent work on the Mussolini regime. For Bosworth, De Felice, the author of the definitive multi-volume biographical study of Mussolini and mentor to many prominent figures in the field, swung the field to the right and challenged the ideals of anti-fascism and the Resistance (p. 116). De Felice's emphasis on Mussolini's revolutionary character and ideology, as well as Italian fascism's fundamental differences with Nazism, represent a potential abandonment of anti-fascism.

As noted, Bosworth's primary position is one of disillusionment with recent shifts in the field. He rejects the last decade's interest in culture as a lens into the functioning of the dictatorship as too "apolitical" (p. 27). Instead, he calls for comparative thinking that analyzes "the political" in what he considers a traditional, pre-postmodern sense. In so doing, Bosworth simplifies and dismisses much of the determinative and innovative work of the last twenty years and remains locked into the interpretive orthodoxies of the Cold War. The turn to culture has brought attention to the internal incoherences of the fascist regime, its politics, its practices, and its modes of representation. Much of the new work has given us a "thick description" of life in fascist Italy and new insights into ideology, cultural products, government policy, gender relations, sexuality, and public and private space.

This book is a useful resource for students of the field, as it turns a needed lens upon the production of the history of Italian fascism. Nonetheless, some readers might find it confusing of purpose and, at times, unnecessarily polemical. Shedding light on the many forces that shape history writing, from contemporary politics to academic fashions, is an important project. Unfortunately, Bosworth fails to do this in a wholly satisfying manner.

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RICHARD BUTTERWICK. *Poland's Last King and English Culture: Stanisław August Poniatowski, 1732–1798*.

(Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University. 1998. Pp. xix, 376. \$95.00.

Richard Butterwick has made an important contribution not only to Polish historiography but also to the historiography of the Enlightenment in Europe. As a historian of Eastern Europe, I am especially gratified to see a work of such high scholarly quality that effectively reintegrates the study of an Eastern European country into broader European study. National borders are increasingly coming under criticism as the best means to organize historical scholarship; countries of the former Soviet Bloc carry the additional burden of this second definition as well, if only because so many American universities organized Russian and East European Studies programs and departments in the Cold War era.

The book is organized in several parts. First, Butterwick presents a brief discussion of the great gulf in understanding between "Sarmatian" (Polish *szlachta*, or gentry) political culture and that of England at the time of the election of Stanisław August Poniatowski, Poland's last king, and on the eve of Poland's destruction. He emphasizes the hostility of the Poles to any form of hereditary kingship or real kingly power, their suspicion that vaunted British "freedom" was illusory, and their profound animus toward English Protestantism. He also asserts essential Polish ignorance about England and a fundamental lack of cultural exchange between the two. Butterwick sets up the problem: how can we explain the transformation to a reform era in Poland that looked largely to the English model for inspiration? He finds the answer in the European Enlightenment and in Stanisław August's role. In a masterful summary of the changing attitudes all over the continent, especially in France, toward England, Butterwick shows that the Polish reorientation toward England was part of a much larger process. He demonstrates through a close study of translations, publications, and library holdings the extent to which the Polish gentry gained access to works of the Enlightenment, especially those of British political thinkers, often in French but also in Polish and English.

Butterwick's next task is to narrow his focus to Stanisław August himself, tracking through several chapters Poniatowski's Anglophile education, a formative trip to England in 1754 at age twenty-two, and his continuing friendships and correspondence with Englishmen, such as Sir Charles Hanbury Williams (who, as it happens, introduced the young man to the Grand Duchess Catherine, wife of the heir to the throne in Russia, the result of which is well known). The point is made that Stanisław August's Anglophilia was neither ignorant nor superficial but rather an educated, reasoned, and critical effort to incorporate the best and strongest elements of English political culture and tradition into the desperately chaotic and failing Polish Commonwealth. Butterwick's last chapters then demonstrate how Poniatowski, faced with a violently negative reaction on the part of "Sarmatia" to his first

attempts at reform, learned to moderate, compromise, and educate. The Constitution of May 3, 1791, Butterwick suggests, although far from a complete implementation of Poniatowski's English-inspired reform proposals, must still "be reckoned a very great victory [for Poniatowski] indeed" (p. 309).

In his conclusion, Butterwick writes that the final destruction of the Polish state in 1795 left two legacies for Polish political culture: the insurrectionary and the constitutional. Although "geopolitics," among other factors, determined that the former would dominate Polish political culture through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, Poniatowski's efforts did result in a renewal and strengthening of Polish culture in the broadest sense. "The English contribution to the renewal of Polish culture was substantial and, on the whole, beneficial" (p. 319).

Butterwick's book is ambitious in the range of issues and primary sources and secondary literature he covers. The core of his research is archival. He is careful and thorough. Although his objectives are ambitious, his conclusions are appropriately modest. The book is clearly and felicitously written, with touches of humor but no sentimentality, despite the inherent pathos of his subject. Prospective readers should know that frequent, lengthy, and important quotations in French are not translated, although all Polish is translated.

ANITA SHELTON

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ISMO NURMI. *Slovakia—A Playground for Nationalism and National Identity: Manifestations of the National Identity of the Slovaks, 1918–1920*. (Bibliotheca Historica, number 42.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1999. Pp. 202.

Ismo Nurmi's volume offers further evidence of a strong tradition of Finnish interest in the Slovaks and Slovakia. Based in part on multi-archival research, Nurmi's work examines many hitherto unexplored aspects in a tumultuous epoch for Slovakia. In short, it follows the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and subsequent anarchy and deprivations caused by four years of war. During this period, Slovakia became a playground for control by three neighboring peoples: Poles, Czechs, and Magyars/Hungarians. In their respective opinions, each group believed they could convince the considerably less ethnically aware Slovaks that they needed to join them in a common state. In pursuit of their goal, they alternately courted and/or terrorized the Slovaks. The Poles did so out of pure territorial expansionism; the Magyars/Hungarians sought to retain the integrity of their thousand-year-old Lands of St. Stephen or Kingdom of Hungary; and the Czechs to prove to the victorious Allies that a Czecho-Slovak state was indeed mandated by Slovaks and practical. The Slovaks quickly resisted the first option due to Polish overzealousness and callousness, while the Magyars/Hungarians, despite their centuries old common traditions with the Slovaks, had them-

selves destroyed any possibility of reconciliation by their intensive Magyarization policies over the previous half century. The third option thus won by default. Yet, the common state idea lost much goodwill as the Czechs pursued chauvinistic policies of Czechoslovakism to the detriment of Slovak ethnicity in many areas including religion, education, the civil service, and the military.

The usefulness of Nurmi's work lies in covering a short but critical era in which he amply proves that, much to the chagrin of their neighbors and many standard historical interpretations of this subject, the Slovaks felt secure in their ethnic awareness by 1918. This is clearly evidenced by the swift establishment of the national council in Turčiansky Svätý Martin and its local affiliates, as well as by other spontaneous and organized civic activity throughout the country shortly after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in late October 1918. The work also proves invaluable for its coverage of many incidents in which the seeds of later Slovak-Czech strife were sown, culminating in the dissolution of the common state first in 1939, and again at the end of 1992.

This deceptively thin volume is filled with much valuable information that proves the author's arguments. Yet, periodically, Nurmi accepts the information provided as fact without questioning the context or time frame. At the same time, he presents isolated incidents in obscure areas of Slovakia to support his arguments of a general movement while at other times using "eyewitness" accounts. For example, in the last chapter, "Signs of Frustration and the Continuation of the Nationally Oriented Civic Activity of the Slovaks," Nurmi uses the results of a late 1920s questionnaire sent out by the Slovak Museum to prove Slovak bitter disappointment with the developments between 1918 and 1920 that led to Slovakia's incorporation into Czechoslovakia. The responses cited came from the early 1930s, during the height of the Great Depression, more than a decade after the situation, when time and economic dislocation had clouded the questionnaire's judgment.

The work appears to be a thesis of some sort; as such, it has some of the usual trappings including a review of the literature/sources and an acknowledgment page thanking people and institutions of higher learning for their help. In addition, the book suffers from innumerable, rudimentary mistakes that a careful English-speaking proofreader could have easily remedied. When discussing the role of the Lutheran and Roman Catholic churches among the Slovaks, for example, Nurmi causes his arguments to become quite confused by continually referring to the Lutheran pastors/ministers by the Roman Catholic title of "father." Furthermore, misspellings abound: "It can be claimed" (p. 45), "difficult" (p. 86), and "and and his whose opinon" (p. 157), which make for stilted if not tiresome reading. There is also a lack of continuity in spelling and diacritical marks: Romanian/Rumanian, Žilina/

Zilina/ilina, Wien/Vienna, and SL'S/SLS. Lastly, the lack of any index detracts from the value of this work.

These annoying faults aside, Nurmi's study should become a standard monograph for required reading for students of the establishment of the Czechoslovak state and Slovak-Czech antagonisms or those interested in the multifaceted issue of broader nationalism where four ethnic groups have collided in an attempt to claim territory.

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NANCY SHIELDS KOLLMANN, *By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1999. Pp. xiii, 296. \$45.00.

In her new book, Nancy Shields Kollmann reexamines the governance of early modern Russia, the subject of her 1987 book, *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547*. Whereas the earlier work depended on a detailed examination of the political elite in the first centuries of Muscovite rule, the new volume concentrates on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and views Muscovite state and society through the prism of honor. Kollmann's conclusion, however, is the same: consensus was at the heart of early modern Russian politics.

The scholarship that informs the book is impressive; Kollmann shows herself to be widely read in sociological and anthropological theory and often invokes examples from Western European history to provide context for the Muscovite experience. The primary evidence pertaining to honor comes from two data sets: 621 legal cases pertaining to claims of dishonor, and 1076 cases concerning "precedence," a peculiar aspect of honor that allowed a small circle of the capital elite to defend their status in all official functions (p. 23).

Identifying honor as a cultural construct and symbolic discourse, Kollmann argues that the Muscovite state developed a defense of honor out of a desire to mobilize resources and minimize social dislocation, while individuals—through their clans, families, and other social groups—used honor to reinforce social status. Honor, therefore, became the "figurative glue binding all of society" (p. 187), which explains why it arose in sixteenth-century Russia, "a time of intense political and social change" (p. 31). Dishonor suits and squabbles about precedence gave voice to actors whose agency Kollmann wishes to emphasize against a dominant historiographical discourse that sees the state as all powerful. "It is my goal," she writes, "to stimulate rethinking of the nature of power in Russian history by exploring the practice of honor . . . that contrasts the rhetoric of authority with the negotiation of those discourses and that sees state power as comprised in large part by the actions of individuals and social communities performing as knowledgeable actors within received political institutions" (p. 20).

An awkward point for this claim is the fact that

informal mechanisms to defend honor, such as charivaris, evidently did not exist in Muscovy—at least no source has preserved a record of them. Instead, persons wishing to rectify the status harmed by dishonor had to appeal to the state. As a result, Kollmann's evidence comes almost exclusively from records of litigation begun before, written and archived by, and occasionally completed before state officials. But these facts, she asserts, “do not necessarily validate the statist interpretation of Russian history, that Muscovite society was passive and inert” (p. 92).

Although some might see the courtroom as a site of conflict, the author instead prefers to view litigation over honor as “a ritual moment, a space conducive to changing individuals' behavior, and community endorsement of the process” (p. 110). To make this case, Kollmann emphasizes that most litigation was settled without judicial resolution; the state only provided a forum that the litigants themselves used to restore social harmony.

Chapters five and six range more widely in an attempt to demonstrate how “Muscovite texts . . . overwhelmingly argue for a ‘consensus’ vision of autocracy” (p. 176). Asserting that the Muscovite state “worked positively to attract the loyalty of its subjects” (p. 183), Kollmann includes among these incentives the enserfment of the peasantry, convoking of consultative assemblies, new laws on inheritance, marriage strategies among the elite, official ceremony, and much else. Well in advance of Peter the Great, Muscovy encouraged a private sphere and a sense of self that “paved the way for Peter I” (p. 216) and made possible his absolutist state. In so casting Russia's history, Kollmann argues for a long seventeenth century.

For all the accomplishments of this book, some questions remain. The author observes that “No explicit theoretical discourse about society was present in Muscovite times” (p. 173), nor did any legal text ever define honor. How might these facts be reconciled with what Kollmann alleges about the centrality of honor in Muscovy? Also unexplained is the apparent disjunction between the ostensible rise of honor in the sixteenth century and the fact that the overwhelming bulk of the extant cases derive from the seventeenth century. In addition, Kollmann regularly reifies the state, attributing motives and “strategies” as though the state could be distinguished from the individuals who peopled its institutions. But this book challenges many accepted tenets, including the type of state erected in Muscovy, the basic periodization of Russian history, and the emergence of new identities and mentalities. It deserves to be read widely.

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DAVID WOLFF. *To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898–1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 255. \$49.50.

Over the last decade or so we have witnessed an explosion of studies on the history of the Russian emigration between the two world wars. The majority

have dealt with the life and contributions of individual writers and artists and have given but fleeting attention to local and historical background and contexts. As a result, the picture was all too often schematic and imbalanced; this was particularly true of the peripheral centers of émigré cultural life such as Riga, Belgrade, and, most conspicuously, Harbin. Harbin has suffered from an inadequate knowledge of the special geographic, social, and historic circumstances that have determined the life of the Russian community in Manchuria. David Wolff has successfully filled this blank spot for the period preceding the establishment of the Soviet regime that transformed an outpost community into an émigré center.

Russian Harbin owed its origin to the building of the Chinese Eastern Railway through Manchuria, in the last years of the nineteenth century, as part of Russian penetration into the Far East. From the start, it was both a private “company town” and a colonial appendage of the empire. Its political and legal status were regulated by both international treaties and Russian imperial legislation; its administration was handled by both the staff of a private corporation and the military and civil officers of the Russian Empire. Furthermore, it was in fact a dual city—Chinese and Russian—each having its distinct social and cultural life, but with only the Russian part enjoying a degree of autonomous political and administrative existence within the framework prescribed by authorities in faraway St. Petersburg.

Wolff gives a comprehensive account of the founding and development of Russian Harbin as well as its avatars in the first decade and a half of its existence. He provides the reader with a wealth of new, or heretofore little-known, information on the political, administrative, economic, and social aspects of the city's pre-Soviet history. He underpins his account with new documentation culled from Russian and Chinese archives as well as a vast array of published information in all relevant languages. Nor has he neglected information contained in the reports of diplomatic and military agents of the major powers with interests in the area.

Wolff begins with an account of the building of the Chinese Eastern Railway whose headquarters were established in Harbin. This leads to a description of the influx of Chinese “coolie” labor and the development of what can be fairly termed a colonial framework for the public and economic life of the city. Wolff brings into focus the fundamental tension between Harbin's private sector (i.e. the railway and commercial establishments) and the imperial state sector (political and military control and defense). The tension derived from the very structure of Russia's autocratic “system,” which gave rise to a state of permanent conflict between the ministries of finance (represented in this period by Sergey Witte and Vladimir Kokovtsev) and interior (under Dmitrii Sipiagin and Vyacheslav Plehve), as well as the local military and naval authorities.

The needs of the railway and Harbin's central role in the rapidly growing international commerce (e.g. in



soya beans) led to a population explosion comparable to that of the boom towns in the American Midwest (e.g. Chicago) only a decade earlier. Harbin became a multi-ethnic and multicultural city, largely thanks to policies that, contrary to the norms enforced within the Russian empire proper, permitted the settlement of national and religious minorities (Poles, Jews, Old Believers). All the while, droves of Chinese laborers, as well as Koreans and Japanese, created a "colonial" society with predominant Russian administrative and legal arrangements and a lively, picturesque multi-ethnic cultural and social atmosphere. Wolff claims that Harbin can be viewed both as a testing ground and a forerunner of reformist policies for Russia (e.g. Pyotr Stolypin's agrarian reforms). Whether this amounted to a genuine "liberal alternative," as suggested by the book's subtitle, hinges on the meaning given the term liberal. Finally, the book gives a good picture of the intricate interaction between diplomatic and military, as well as economic, concerns as they affected the destinies of Harbin, in particular the impact of the Russo-Japanese War and the provisions of the treaty of Portsmouth. The last chapter is a sketch of the history of Russian orientology in which Harbin played a notable part. From an outsider's perspective, this chapter (and its appendix) does not mesh well with the remainder of the book, although they provide useful facts and data on the formation of Russian experts in the major Asiatic languages.

Informative and useful as it is, the book suffers from a number of inadequacies of form. The thematic structure makes for some repetitiveness; yet, at the same time, it fails to bring out the causal connections between major aspects and factors in Harbin's evolution. The reader may feel a bit overwhelmed by lists of names and concrete detail whose interdependence and background are not adequately spelled out. Wolff's terminology and style are at times irritatingly colloquial or faddish. Is there any advantage in referring to Russia's ruler by his first name only (and in the Russian form at that)? The copyediting (surely a responsibility of the publisher) let too many errors of spelling, grammar, and translation go uncorrected. A last personal word: in recent years the acknowledgments in scholarly books have become more and more meaningless as thanks are given to persons whose professional and intellectual contributions were peripheral at best. The height of inanity, however, is reached by Wolff when he extends his thanks to a host of persons identified merely by forename, nickname, or diminutive!

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WILLIAM B. HUSBAND. *"Godless Communists": Atheism and Society in Soviet Russia 1917-1932*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2000. Pp. xviii, 241. \$36.00.

This is a study of the strategy and tactics applied by the Bolsheviks to eradicate religion and of the nation's

resistance to it. William B. Husband studies in particular the ordinary citizens who accommodated themselves to whatever system and yet engaged in a "quiet sabotage" of the militant atheism. That sabotage expressed itself in mass absenteeism from work and from school on Orthodox feast days even after the latter's abolition as days off by the Soviet government in 1929. Such resistance is particularly interesting in view of the well-known decline of religiousness among the Russian masses at least since the late nineteenth century.

As far as the study of the strategy, tactics, and intensity of Soviet atheism is concerned, the book has numerous predecessors, including: James Thrower's monumental *Marxist-Leninist "Scientific Atheism" and the Study of Religion and Atheism in the USSR* (1983), this writer's *A History of Marxist-Leninist Atheism and Soviet Antireligious Policies* (1987-1988), Arto Luukkanen's *The Party of Unbelief: The Religious Policy of the Bolshevik Party, 1917-1929* (1994). Husband's volume, similarly to Luukkanen's, differs from the former two by being based on archives not available to Western scholars before the fall of communism. Yet the weaknesses in both studies indicate that access to archives alone will not guarantee reliability of the information obtained. Many of the documents' authors were Soviet officials guided by ulterior motives in writing reports to their bosses. Yet Husband accepts Luukkanen's opinions as well as the archival material, it seems, uncritically. Thus he repeats Luukkanen's erroneous thesis, originated perhaps by the late John Curtiss in *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950* (1953), that the Renovationist schism "energetically protected" its independence from its Soviet masters (p. 58), which is completely untenable, especially after the publication in Russia of documents proving that the schism was launched directly by the Politburo and was minutely controlled by it. The documents also disprove the popular opinion among American scholars, including Husband, that the anti-religious front was not one of the regime's first priorities. No less questionable is Husband's explanation of the relatively restrained onslaught on religion in the 1920s (in comparison with the 1930s) by the early Bolsheviks' stricter adherence to Marxism. How could it be a restraining factor, when its creator was a violent atheist stipulating annihilation of religion as an essential condition for the building of communism?

Relying on archives, Husband accuses the Orthodox Church and Patriarch Tikhon of fomenting violence against the Soviet state and thus presents Soviet antireligious violence as a reaction. Nothing could be further from the truth. From 1917 to the end of the Civil War, the patriarch and the Moscow Church Council appealed to both sides for clemency toward their enemies and for an end to the fratricidal carnage, and the patriarch refused to give even a secret blessing to the White Armies. In his January 19, 1918 appeal, the patriarch called on believers to oppose the physical power of the persecutors by the spiritual strength of their faith. By the way, that appeal did not declare the

communist regime to be anathema, as claimed by Husband, but only those who, *while baptized Orthodox Christians*, were persecuting the faithful. The church can anathematize only its own members, not outsiders or parties. It is true that the clergy in most areas occupied by the Whites supported them, but this was not the patriarch's policy. Moreover, in his encyclical of October 8, 1919, the patriarch forbade his clergy to demonstrate public support for the White Army, declared the civic loyalty of the church to the Soviet state, and condemned any military intervention as futile without a spiritual renewal.

The weakest part of the book is its first chapter, in which Husband tries, rather unsuccessfully, to tie up his main story to Russia's distant past. There he "discovers" a patriarch at the head of the Russian church under the Mongols, whereas Russia's first patriarch was consecrated in 1589. God knows where he finds priests placing natal placenta on the altar. The altar table on which the Eucharist is prepared is the holy of holies in the Orthodox Church, on which only the Gospel and objects directly related to the Eucharist may be placed. The monk Filofey's doctrine of Moscow as the "third Rome" was "preposterous" in Husband's opinion, because the Moscow state's territory at the time was a mere 100,000 square miles. The doctrine, in fact, was a moral appeal to the grand duke, as the only remaining independent Orthodox ruler, to act as a truly Christian sovereign and the protector of all Orthodox Christians. There are numerous such gaffes in this chapter, suggesting that the author went too far into a field that is not his forte.

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JEREMY SMITH. *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917–23*. (Studies in Russia and East Europe.) New York: St. Martin's. 1999. Pp. xvii, 281. \$72.00.

About the time that the Soviet Union ceased to be a union, scholars became more interested in the non-Russian peoples that were tearing apart the world's largest state. The opening of Soviet archives at roughly the same time made it possible for historians to investigate the varied pasts of peoples whose experiences had been absorbed into a general Russo-Soviet history. Coincidentally a major theoretical shift toward a constructivist understanding of nationality and nationalism expanded the range of scholarly questions by no longer simply assuming the ubiquity, naturalness, and inevitability of nations. The end of the Cold War contributed as well. Instead of viewing Soviet policies as uniformly negative—Russifying and repressive—researchers inquired how imposed limitations on nationalist expression managed to coexist with projects of cultural revival and ethnic consolidation. Yuri Slezkine spoke of the USSR as a "Communal apartment" in which distinct peoples each had their own rooms, while

Terry Martin characterized the Leninist/Stalinist state as "an affirmative-action empire."

Jeremy Smith has made good use of the archives of the Communist Party and Stalin's Peoples Commissariat of Nationalities to tell the intricate story of how the USSR was put together in the years of revolution and civil war. He goes over old ground already plowed by Richard Pipes, Hélène Carrière d'Encausse, Stephan Blank, and others but introduces much exciting new material. Although his account is relentlessly empirical, with no excursions off into theories of nationness or ethnicity, Smith acknowledges, even applauds, the Bolsheviks' attempt to foster national cultures, languages, and political elites in the first decade of Soviet rule. He takes issue with earlier historians, most importantly Pipes, Carrière d'Encausse, and Moshe Lewin. For Smith, Pipes's explanations of Communist policies as uniformly Machiavellian and hypocritical are too simple. He sees more similarity than difference between V. I. Lenin's and Joseph Stalin's views and plays down the distinctions that led Lewin in particular to contrast the former's sensitivity to nationality aspirations with the latter's propensity for bureaucratic impositions from the center. Smith does not agree with those scholars, like Carrière d'Encausse, who see Soviet policies toward non-Russians as essentially guided by an aim to divide and conquer. Instead he argues that Soviet Marxists took nationality seriously, tried to link nation to territory, and used prerevolutionary ethnography to delineate "scientifically" the boundaries between peoples and lands.

Largely improvised in the early years, Bolshevik policies toward nationalities were guided by what was taken to be the imperatives of Marxism and the requirements of a weak state holding power. Smith claims that the Communists learned opposite lessons from their experiences in Bashkiria, where they relied on local nationalists and were betrayed, and Turkistan, where they backed Russian Communists who alienated the native peoples by their high-handed manner. Eventually Moscow settled on centralizing decision making in the capital, at least on the most important issues, while developing loyal cadres from the non-Russian nationalities. The policy of *korenizatsiia* (indigenization) was directed at turning local authority over to a new Communist elite from the indigenous peoples while promoting education and culture in the native languages.

This is a well-written study, solidly based on archival materials and the contemporary press. Smith adds significant details to the fascinating story of how Bolsheviks built expedient political alliances with the non-Communist nationalists who supported their program of cultural revival, while at the same time dealing with opposition to Moscow's centralizing program from "national Communists" in Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. The give-and-take of early Soviet politics, in which even Nationalities Commissar Stalin acceded to pressures from non-Russians, is carefully reconstructed. Smith's focus, however, is squarely on the

"national question," and he draws in little of the larger political or social context. The Soviet state and its nationality edifice were constructed during a civil war, at a time of economic collapse and social chaos, but the exigencies of state-building and military victory play no role in his narrative. This is largely a top-down story of a Marxist government contending with a vast, multinational country that relatively successfully devised a system that bound a diverse population to a new centralized state by supporting national cultures and giving them autonomous territories of their own. Smith has given us a reliable and admirably detached account of the formation of a unique political order that hoped to contain and eventually eliminate nationalism but ironically ended up making the very nations that would undo its internationalist vision.

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#### MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

JOSEF WIESEHÖFER. *Ancient Persia: From 550 BC to 650 AD*. Translated by AZIZEH AZODI. London: I. B. Tauris, distributed by St. Martin's, New York. 1998. Pp. xiv, 329. \$45.00.

This fine study examines Iranian society during the Achaemenian, Seleucid and minor dynastic, Parthian, and Sasanian periods from approximately 550 B.C. to A.D. 650. Changes in many administrative practices, artistic and literary conventions, cultural mores, familial and gender relations, political hierarchies, religious devotions, and societal institutions are traced and analyzed. Overall, Josef Wiesehöfer and his translator Azizeh Azodi have produced a lucid, highly informative, illustrated account of life in ancient Iran.

An introduction and four chapters, which comprise part one of the volume, focus on the Achaemenian empire. Chapter one provides an introduction to available textual and archaeological source materials, discussing historiographical problems associated both with transmission of tradition (p. 19) and imperial culture (p. 25). Chapter two focuses on the monarchy, using extant written sources of that era to construct a narrative on the lifestyles of rulers. Among other important contributions through this chapter, Wiesehöfer pointedly reassesses the images customarily assigned to Cyrus and Xerxes (pp. 48–55). Next, in chapter three, administrative operations are documented, inexplicably too briefly, for much is known about this aspect of the Achaemenian empire through bureaucratic records and archaeological remains that have survived at Persepolis, Susa, and other locales. Chapter four, one of the most engaging in this volume, provides fascinating glimpses into the lives of courtiers, overseers, and other state employees in the province of Persia. Although intellectually provocative in proffered details, one cannot help but ponder the extent to which idealization or stereotyping in the Old Persian, Greek, Hebrew, and Babylonian documents

affects the ability of contemporary scholars accurately to reconstruct relations between the persons attached to the royal court and the populace. It is true that not much is known from surviving written and archaeological sources about the popular culture of that time. However, glimpses that can be obtained into the lives of the commonality could be integrated more fully into the historiography of the Achaemenian period.

Part two, consisting of one short chapter (chapter five), peruses the Greco-Macedonian conquest of Iran, the Seleucid period in western Iran, and the Greco-Bactrian kingdom in eastern Iran. Wiesehöfer, unfortunately, treats the events of those centuries as an "interlude" and, therefore, does not assess the vast political, social, and religious impact of cross-cultural assimilation on Iranians such as the revision of Iranian epic history to incorporate Alexander and the Greco-Macedonian presence. When he does focus on specific details, such as the recording of Delphic maxims in the city at Ai Khanum (now in northern Afghanistan), the rich texture of the society that arose from an admixture of Greek and Iranian mores emerges vividly (pp. 112–114).

Parts three and four, on the Parthian and Sasanian periods, respectively, follow the same basic format as part one: chapters six and nine focus on textual and archaeological source materials coupled with examinations of historiographical problems associated with particular data; chapters seven and ten examine the lives and roles of kings and the functioning of the imperial bureaucracy, especially in relation to social and religious minorities; and chapters eight and eleven discuss cultural developments between the second century B.C. and the seventh century A.D. Each chapter provides readers with a valuable selection of translated source materials around which Wiesehöfer structures both historiography and analysis. He also suggests correctly (pp. 133–35), based on the evidence, that the later Parthian rulers did not reject philhellenism and return to indigenous mores, as has often been concluded by other scholars, but that a greater empathy for Iranian culture arose as the centuries passed after Alexander's conquest and the allure of Greek culture faded. Likewise, the impact of taxation on the commonality during the Sasanian period is cautiously probed (pp. 176–77), as is the complex social stratification of that time (pp. 175–82).

A conclusion and postscript provide synopses on the survival of knowledge about ancient Iran during the Middle Ages under Muslim culture, followed by the investigations of Western travelers and scholars into Iranian history. Most interesting, here, is Wiesehöfer's discussion of individuals—including Pietro Della Valle, Carsten Niebuhr, Georg Grotefend, and Henry Rawlinson—who were involved in the identification and decipherment of the Old Persian language between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and on the impact of these discoveries on the decipherment of other cuneiform scripts. Informative maps highlight each part of the volume. Detailed, up-to-date

bibliographical essays, chronological tables, and dynastic lists supplement the discussions. Finally, a useful index facilitates location of information within the book.

Any author who attempts to write about the people, culture, and events of a region as vast as that which lies between Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq) and the Indus valley (modern-day Pakistan) over more than a millennium has to be selective in terms of sources utilized and issues focused. Wiesehöfer offers students and scholars alike precious nuggets of information that have been skillfully crafted into an engaging narrative on imperial Iran during antiquity.

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COLIN IMBER. *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition*. (Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory.) Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 288. \$49.50.

This book is primarily conceived as a study of the legal thought of a major Ottoman jurist, Ebu's-su'ud (1547–1574), who held the prestigious office of *shaykh al-islam* (muftiship of Istanbul) for twenty-eight years, most of these during the reign of Sulayman the Magnificent, usually regarded as representing the zenith of Ottoman imperial might. This was the highest position a jurist could occupy within the Ottoman system. Ebu's-su'ud left an indelible imprint on subsequent Ottoman legal development as writer of treatises and commentaries on earlier authoritative texts, as codifier, as administrator, and as giver of legal opinions (*fatwas*) on particular cases. Colin Imber documents these contributions with an impressive array of data drawn from a careful reading of Ebu's-su'ud's writings.

The special interest in this great Ottoman jurist is reflected in the use of his name as the main title of the book. At the same time, the subtitle testifies to the book's being much more than a study of one jurist's thought and activities. As Ebu's-su'ud was firmly entrenched in a particular legal tradition *within* Islam that was many centuries in the making before Ebu's-su'ud's time, the book, in order to do justice to that tradition as part of its endeavor to situate Ebu's-su'ud's thought within a larger historical context, becomes to a very large degree an exposition of Hanafi legal doctrine. This makes the book potentially valuable to the general reader who wishes to have an overview of Islamic law and institutions. (The Hanafi tradition is by far the most widespread of the Muslim legal traditions, and in any case the several traditions agree on major points, differing mostly on detail, such that the book lends itself to use in a introductory course on Islamic law.)

The book provides an overview both of Hanafi legal doctrine and of the interrelationship between holy law (as represented by the Hanafi tradition) and secular law (as derived largely from custom and developed through imperial decrees). Thus the reader is made

acquainted with the *shari'a* (holy law), not as something that existed in a vacuum, but as a component of a complex social reality in which sacred tradition existed in a delicate balance with worldly practice. Imber notes that from time to time efforts were made to reconcile secular law with holy law and portrays Ebu's-su'ud in particular as dedicated to this undertaking, which was to be characteristic of Islamic legal reform right into modern times.

Imber's overview of Islamic law is not inclusive of all the topics one finds in the legal literature, but it does include topics of major interest among Muslim jurists: land tenure, taxation, marriage, divorce, crimes, and torts, to each of which he devotes a whole section. In addition, he devotes two chapters to the legal basis of the ruler's authority and the delimitation of the areas within which that authority was to be exercised. His discussions of all these topics are as good as any that can be found currently in the field.

In each chapter, Imber presents the traditional Hanafi doctrine as drawn principally from his reading of Hanafi authors of earlier days such as Qadikhan and al-Marghinani, to mention two especially frequently cited authors. In the context of this material, Imber then turns to Ebu's-su'ud's own contributions to the development of the particular area of law under consideration. What makes the book especially unique and at the same time most useful is the abundance, within the main text, of excerpts from the legal literature of the Ottoman-Hanafi tradition itself. The reader who completes the entire book will become familiar not merely with Muslim legal concepts and institutions but also with the form and style (insofar as this is possible through English translations) of Muslim legal literature in its various genres. Especially abundant, of course, are translations of *fatwas* from Ebu's-su'ud himself. Through these excerpts, the reader becomes familiar with living cases that the jurists had to deal with and can better appreciate how the law worked and how judges and jurists functioned within the lives of real human beings.

While drawing heavily on the Hanafi legal literature, Imber also demonstrates a firm command of modern and contemporary scholarship that has a bearing on his subject, blending primary and secondary materials nicely together. This scholarly soundness, combined with a most readable and engaging writing style, makes this one of the most valuable books in recent times in the field of Islamic legal studies.

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VAHAKN N. DADRAN. *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction. 1999. Pp. 214.

Vahakn N. Dadrian is a distinguished scholar of the Armenian genocide who combines the analytical skills of the sociologist with the documentary thoroughness of the historian. He has published a number of pio-



neering studies among which "Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications" (*Yale Journal of International Law* 14:2 [1989]) and *The History of the Armenian Genocide* (1995) stand out. The volume under review covers some of the same ground traversed in the earlier works but does so in a more concise and analytical fashion.

Starting in the nineteenth century, the Armenian minority desiring greater equality and liberty came into conflict with a Muslim Ottoman state whose very legitimacy rested on Muslim superiority and contempt for religious minorities. Confronted with demands for equality by its Armenian subjects, on the one hand, and by external military pressure by the great powers, on the other hand, the Ottoman state reacted with increasingly harsher repression leading to massacre. Indeed, the empire's external failure and loss of power in the international sphere was compensated for by using increasingly harsher measures against its domestic minorities, especially the Armenians. As the empire ceded territory and withdrew from the Caucasus and the Balkans, at the same time it transferred thousands of traumatized Muslim refugees precisely to the areas of Armenian settlement. Initially the goal was to dilute the Armenian presence in the eastern *vilayets* (provinces). Later, the Muslim refugees were encouraged and used as shock troops in massacres and genocide against the Armenians.

A major manifestation of this process were the events of 1894–1896, when Sultan Abdul Hamid II presided over the destruction of tens of thousands of Armenians. Terrible as these massacres were, however, they were but a prelude to the far more extensive genocide of 1915. Although Abdul Hamid had desired to extirpate the Armenians—"pull them out by the roots," as he later put it to Talaat Bey (p. 156)—the occasion had not as yet presented itself to do so. That changed with the coup of the Young Turks in 1908 and especially with the advent of World War I.

The Young Turks were more Turkish nationalists than Ottomans or even Muslims, and the war presented them with a unique opportunity to resolve "the Armenian problem" once and for all. Utilizing the subterfuge of deporting the whole of the Armenian population from the war zone with Russia, they set in train the policies that were to lead to the destruction of over a million Armenians, more than half of the original population.

This in a nutshell is Dadrian's argument. More so than other writers who have examined the same events, Dadrian emphasizes the role of Islam and Ottoman political culture, and, by the same token, he reduces—although he does not eliminate—the independent factor of Turkish nationalism in the unfolding genocide. Indeed, as he has done in his earlier work, Dadrian stresses the continuity between the massacres of 1894–1896 and the genocide of 1915. According to his analysis, it was the longstanding and underlying conflict between an Armenian minority seeking equality

and a theocratic Ottoman state contemptuous of religious diversity that led to the violence in both instances.

Dadrian's thesis is open to question on at least three grounds. First, although the Ottoman state was clearly not equipped to deal with minority demands for equality and self-determination, nevertheless, it was a regime that from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century had presided successfully over a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. The problem with Islam and the traditional Ottoman state was not its incapacity to deal with diversity, as Dadrian suggests; it was its incapacity to meet the modern demands for equality among its subject populations. Second, there is a problem with the notion of a conflict between the Armenian minority and the Ottoman state. If there was such a conflict, it may have existed more in the perceptions of the state than in the behavior of the Armenian population. Dadrian tends to confound the demands of the Armenian revolutionary parties—some of which did make demands for equality and even self-determination—with the wishes of the Armenian population as a whole. By the nineteenth century, Armenian peasants in eastern Anatolia were probably less interested in self-determination or even equality than in the Ottoman state's protecting them from the depredations of Kurdish pastoralists and the threats of desperate Muslim refugees who had been settled among them. Third, to argue that the genocide of 1915–1923 was only a more ambitious version of the massacres of 1894–1896 tends to equate the spontaneous, sporadic, and seemingly unplanned nature of the earlier massacres with the deliberate policy of genocide in the later period.

Although one can raise questions about this work, the fact is that Dadrian's contribution to the study of the Armenian genocide is unmatched and remains a primary basis for discussion and research.

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JUAN R. I. COLE, *Modernity and the Millennium: The Genesis of the Baha'i Faith in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 254. Cloth \$47.50, paper \$19.50.

In this carefully researched and perceptive work, Juan R. I. Cole proposes to look at the Western, Enlightenment idea of modernity through "new eyes": that is, through the eyes of Baha'ism, particularly those of the leadership of the movement during the formative period of its history. The basis for Cole's selection of Baha'ism as the lens through which to view the idea of modernity is nowhere spelled out explicitly, perhaps because his reasons are largely implicit in his analysis of the encounter between the two. Baha'ism arose in the Middle East and remained socially and, to some extent, spiritually close to its historical roots; at the same time, its religious character, and especially its millenarian stance, enabled it to distance itself from its

religious past and to view that past—indeed, the whole of the past—in a critical light. Baha'ism saw itself as the culmination of the earlier monotheistic traditions, both as fulfillment and as corrective. At least in terms of its own self-understanding, early Baha'ism represents an orientation that is neither Eastern nor Western. In the analysis and critical assessment of modernity, Baha'ism does indeed offer interesting possibilities and perspectives.

Cole's examination of the Western notion of modernity focuses on a number of key issues, among them: religious freedom and the relationship of religion to the state; political absolutism and democracy; nationalism and the state; and patriarchy and gender relations. Cole devotes an entire chapter to a discussion of each of these complex issues. He insists on viewing Baha'ism, especially during its formative period, as a tradition in flux or, one might say, as a set of general principles and values that had to be fleshed out, refined, and adjusted in response both to changing conditions and to the perspectives of other intellectual and spiritual traditions. This seems clearly to have been the view of the early leaders of the movement, including Baha'ullah himself. Within the context of these qualifications, Baha'ism did come to define its position vis-à-vis the critical issues posed by Enlightenment modernity. On a number of the principles to which Enlightenment modernity was committed, Baha'ism declared itself in essential agreement: for example, on the question of the separation of "church" and state, the primacy of the individual conscience, gender equality, and the rule of law.

But if Baha'ism did come to endorse many of the characteristic ideas and values of modernity, Baha'ism did find some aspects of modernity, especially some of the larger historical consequences that followed, or that seemed to follow, from its implementation profoundly troubling. The idea of an autonomous reason, and what Baha'ism saw as the repressive potential of a reason freed from the constraints of a transcendental frame of reference, raised serious questions at both the theoretical and practical levels. The industrialization of war and the enlarged destructive capacity of the modern army, all developed within the framework of modernity, had led to violence and death on a scale without precedent in the history of humankind. These and other reservations, articulated repeatedly in the early literature of the movement, led Baha'is increasingly to reject modernism's emphasis on the primacy of reason and its secularism—its Jacobin tendencies—and to call for the integration of a religious dimension into the framework of Enlightenment modernism. Baha'ism insisted that only a religious dimension is capable of providing the kind of constraints that the secularist and rationalist aspects of modernist doctrines need to protect them against excess—a concern dramatically underscored by the events of the modern period. To the degree that Cole endorses this Baha'i emphasis on the importance of a religious dimension, some readers will undoubtedly see the present work as

in part an apologia for religion. Whether one agrees with the position articulated in this work or not, one must concede that Cole has raised a set of issues that demand careful, critical attention.

This reflective and insightful work is based on an impressive array of primary (in some cases unpublished) sources, not to mention a very large body of secondary, interpretative studies, as will be seen from the notes and the bibliography at the end of the work. It is an important study that will commend itself especially to those who are concerned with modernist doctrine, Baha'i responses to that doctrine, and the implications of both for a fuller understanding of important facets of Middle Eastern history, especially during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

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AVRAHAM SELA. *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order*. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1997. Pp. xv, 423. \$24.95.

Avraham Sela assesses the interplay between inter-Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli confrontation. Unlike other studies on leadership personalities and Arab League policies, this book accentuates the shifting powers from the Arab League to Arab summitry as an instrument of regional dialogue.

Sela opens with the 1950s, when Arab leaders failed to play an effective role in coordinating regional policies, having been exposed to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's compulsive Pan-Arab aspirations. Nasser extolled the notions of the supra-state and regional hegemony, leaving little room for state particularism. Although most Arab leaders in the end shunned Nasser's centralized unity schemes, the Arab masses shared his aspirations. The birth of Arab summitry, while supported by Nasser, in fact began to replace Egyptian Pan-Arabism with inter-Arab dialogue conducted on a state-to-state level.

Since their inception in 1964, the Arab summits manifested solidarity over Palestine, at times superseding other inter-Arab dialogues of regional importance. Sela concentrates on two periods of Arab summitry: 1964–1967, until the outbreak of the June 1967 War, and from 1967 to 1990. He delves into the "great divide" of 1967: the shift in policy from complete enmity toward negotiated peace with Israel until the war to gradual recognition of Israel as an actor in regional politics afterwards. His findings corroborate that albeit projecting hostility toward Israel at the pre-1967 summits, Arab leaders were unable to launch an immediate war. Excepting Iraq and Syria, Arab leaders like Nasser muted or restrained impetuous proposals leading to a military confrontation with Israel, contending that the time was not ripe for such an initiative. On the other hand, the pre-1967 summits laid the groundwork for the birth of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and condoned its at-

tacks on Israel in the years predating the 1967 war. Although after 1967 radical elements called for total war to liberate Palestine, most Arab leaders opted for a diplomatic solution to retrieve territories occupied by Israel. Beyond diplomacy they narrowed their strategies to a limited war and the imposition of the oil embargo on the West as measures to realize this aim.

Sela argues that although inter-Arab rivalries frequently reached the boiling point, factionalism became more volatile after 1967. The frequency of shifting alliances between Arab states reflected at the summits is a case in point. In the generation since 1967, Syria aligned itself with Iraq against President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt but subsequently entered into an alliance against Saddam Hussein. Jordan aligned itself with Egypt and Saudi Arabia before and after Nasser's death, yet in later years King Hussein found an ally in Iraq. The PLO witnessed highs and lows in its status, sometimes receiving considerable support at the summits from both radical and conservative Arab leaders, yet at other times feeling estranged.

The Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the Persian Gulf War caused disarray at the summits, shifting much attention away from the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian issue toward wider regional security matters. During the Gulf War, Arab unity was compromised for an alliance with the West against Iraq. The isolation of Egypt at the summits between 1978 and 1989 and its temporary expulsion from the Arab League, following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, exacerbated Arab disunity and weakened Syria and other eastern confrontation states much to Israel's delight. Sela indicates that with time passing most Arab leaders recognized that effective Arab regional unity and leadership at the summits could only be accomplished with Egypt at the helm. Arab states also began to realize then, despite the Palestinian problem, that reaching separate agreements with Israel could be achieved with UN Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations. These developments, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, opened a window of opportunities for wider Middle East peace efforts, thus further legitimizing the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.

Sela underplays the role of the Maghreb in inter-Arab politics. In fact, during the pre-summit era, Nasser regarded Morocco as a valuable ally, despite the latter's conservative leanings. Until 1965, Algeria was pressured by Cairo to conform to Pan-Arab principles, and Algerian President Ahmad Ben Bella embraced such tendencies. Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba acted as a political counterweight to Nasser. Unsuccessful in his bid, as Sela admits, Bourguiba was among the most effective Arab leaders since the late 1950s who challenged Cairo's Arab leadership and stressed state particularism. No particular attention is devoted in the book to the mediation efforts by King Hasan II of Morocco that set the stage for

Egyptian-Israeli peace. Furthermore, Sela argues that it is erroneous to view regional Arab politics like recurrent cycles of shifting manipulations and alignments of individual actors in a perpetual effort to increase one's own capabilities at the expense of the other actors and the collective as a whole. He adds that from a historical perspective it appears that inter-Arab relations developed along the lines of regional order/disorder in conjunction with social change and the conflict with Israel. I believe that shifting alignments of individual actors as well as order/disorder and social change/Arab-Israeli conflict factors are actually intertwined.

This is the best book yet written on inter-Arab alignments, the historical drift of Arab summitry, the fading of Pan-Arabism since the 1967 war, and the evolution toward Middle East peace. It is recommended for students of conflict resolutions and regional summitry.

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MARK TESSLER, editor. *Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics*. Assisted by JODI NACHTWEY and ANNE BANDA. (Indiana Series in Middle East Studies.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1999. Pp. xxi, 164. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$19.95.

Although at first glance this book might appear "out of area" for historical review, containing only one contribution from a historian and mainly engaging debates within political science, its contents merit the attention of the historical discipline. The volume edited by Mark Tessler addresses a set of critical issues confronting all social scientists whose field of inquiry is extra-American. They extend well beyond the geographic scope of the Middle Eastern region that is used for their exploration.

In recent years, "area studies" have come under sometimes strident attack as atheoretical, disjointed from the commitments of mainstream social science disciplines to methodological rigor and the cumulative and scientific pursuit of knowledge. To the scorn heaped on "area studies" by the practitioners of more deductive, parsimonious, and ideally quantifiable paradigms is added the critique of postmodernism in its various guises that alleges an inherent subjectivity of inquiry, which makes objective scholarship a dangerous illusion. There is much more at stake than simply the outcome of an academic debate. The dismissive view toward "area studies" as an antiquated pursuit extends into the boardrooms of major foundations and the inner sanctums of university administrations.

Tessler assembled a distinguished collection of Middle East specialists, mostly political scientists, for the purpose of rebutting the prosecution brief with expert witnesses invalidating its principle premises. The chapters in this volume masterfully demonstrate that scholars whose intellectual background, training, and pro-

fessional identity lie in Middle East Studies bring a high order of theoretical sophistication and methodological talent to the analysis of a range of crucial contemporary issues. Precisely because the volume is tailored to a larger debate, its contributions speak eloquently to a scholarly community extending far beyond Middle East specialists.

Particularly brilliant is an essay by Lisa Anderson on the place of theory in understanding Middle Eastern and North African politics. The real insularity, she suggests, lies in the field of Americanist political scientists, who fail to appreciate the degree to which the main achievements in the understanding of voting and mass behavior, political participation and socialization, political parties and interest groups, legislative and judicial institutions are context dependent. Core questions arising in the study of the Arab world—authoritarianism, rentier states, Islamism and its political effects, the political role of security agencies, monarchy and succession—lie outside the intellectual universe of Americanists. To grasp the multilinearity of contemporary political change, one must place on the agenda these and other questions unlikely to arise in Western democracies. They are much less susceptible to formulation in quantifiable terms and are trivialized if forced into the framework of the currently influential paradigm of rational choice theory.

The postcolonial moment in Arab lands, argues John Entelis, is marked by the emergence of bureaucratic *mukhabarat* states, whose security organs constitute the core of state-building projects. The resultant authoritarian model is not necessarily permanent or stable, he shows, using the case of Algeria. Command economies and states have conspicuously failed to meet popular expectations, especially marginalized new generations. In assessing the uncertain prospects for liberalization, Entelis rejects any cultural deterministic theses for the persistence of authoritarian forms. Rather, the explanations lie in the particular sequences of state formation and civil society gestation.

Another especially insightful chapter by Augustus Richard Norton examines the particular form taken by civil society in Middle Eastern states and how authoritarian states overcome a legitimacy deficit and seek compliance. Civil society formation, in the face of popular disillusion with state formation, frequently occurs within the vehicle of Islamist associations. Their discursive recourse to a religious idiom makes repression difficult, and the effectiveness of a number of Islamic groups supplying not only piety but also valued material services to low-income populations helps explain their vigor. Once resonant state ideologies of social solidarity have in the last couple of decades entirely lost their appeal.

Other chapters deploy quantitative data to exhibit the capacity of Middle East specialists to make creative use of survey data where available. Intriguing findings are reported on why women are often attracted to the Islamist message. Three chapters illus-

trate the productive synergy between larger currents of international relations theory and the contextual specifics of the Middle East.

In sum, Tessler and his contributors succeed admirably in their goal. Without the deep knowledge of Arab culture, language, and history the authors possess, they would be unable to offer the conceptually rich insights that sparkle throughout the book. "Area studies" are an ineluctable and indispensable basis for larger transregional and thematic scholarship.

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MICHAEL WILLIS. *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History*. New York: New York University Press. 1996. Pp. xviii, 419. \$39.95.

Hardships caused by the deterioration of Algeria's hydrocarbon-based economy provoked a wave of rioting in 1988 directed against the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the country's sole political party since 1962. Thereafter, President Chedli Benjedid initiated an experiment in political pluralism intended to open new, less volatile avenues for the expression of dissent. Multiparty parliamentary elections were held in December 1991, but when it became clear that a second round of voting scheduled for January 1992 would secure a majority in the National Assembly for the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), the largest Islamist party, a junta of secularist military officers forced Benjedid to cancel the voting and then submit his own resignation. With this shortcircuiting of the electoral process, Algeria began a nightmarish descent into chaos and civil war.

For the remainder of the 1990s, events in Algeria produced a torrent of studies by French and, to a much lesser extent, British and American social scientists. Their best work uncovered fresh material or suggested creative ways of analyzing existing information to provide insights enabling readers to better comprehend the situation. Despite its hefty 400 pages, this book by Michael Willis does very little of either. It contains virtually nothing that is not available in other published sources, and its rather plodding chronological approach is quite conventional. This characterization is not entirely at odds with the author's objective, which is "to draw together most of the existing writing and sources on Algeria and its Islamist movement . . . in the hope of synthesizing a wide range of material to produce as comprehensive a study as possible" (p. xvii). A solid English-language overview of political Islam and its opponents in contemporary Algeria would have real merit, but in addition to lacking originality and an analytical focus, this book suffers from other critical flaws.

Willis's familiarity with Algeria is suspect, as revealed by egregious errors of fact. Geographical knowledge seems a particularly weak point. For example, Mostaganem is in western, not eastern, Algeria (p.



46); Sidi Bel Abbès and Bejaia, not simply Abbès or Bejaïma, are the correct names of Algerian cities (p. 71); and the river in Kabylia is the Soummam, not the Soumma (p. 135). References to the nineteenth-century Algerian hero Abd al-Qadir as al-Qadir (p. 6) indicate the absence of a clear sense of history. These and other similar inaccuracies point to an author with limited awareness of the cultural, geographical, and historical environment in which his study unfolds. For a Westerner examining the politics of a non-Western society, this is surely a considerable liability. It may help to explain some of Willis's dubious conclusions, among them the contention that "it is unlikely that there was any widespread understanding [among its young, uneducated, and impoverished adherents] of the FIS programme or Islamist ideas generally" (p. 387). Social and economic pressures undoubtedly drove many Algerians to the FIS, and many of these people did not conceptualize Islamism as did the FIS leadership, but Islam so permeated Algerian life that it is improbable that they were ignorant of the party's religio-political beliefs and agenda.

The book is based on the author's doctoral research and has the distinct feel of a dissertation rushed too hastily into publication with minimal revisions. Portions of the text are unnecessarily repetitive and footnotes sometimes provide the same ancillary information within the same chapter (e.g., fn. 84, p. 195 and fn. 121, p. 209; fn. 26, p. 126 and fn. 59, p. 143). Other footnote problems include a reference to an interview with FIS leader Rabah Kebir in an "FCO unclassified document" (p. 91). Because the author gives no explanation of the acronym—which probably stands for Foreign and Commonwealth Office—no date for the interview, and no other identifying information, he reduces the value of the citation to nil. Other footnotes seem not to match the material to which they refer (e.g., fn. 1, p. 307, in which the source for a statement made "in the immediate aftermath" of an assassination is a newspaper article that appeared more than two years later).

To make matters worse, the book is riddled with stylistic infelicities and grammatical errors. Occurring with a frequency unacceptable in even an undergraduate essay, they not only create an enormously irritating distraction, but also signal a disturbing nonchalance regarding the conventions of scholarly prose. Problem areas include the improper use of the possessive (e.g. pp. 109, 296); missing punctuation marks, particularly commas in appositive phrases (pp. 87, 122, 246, 269, 300); and a maddening misuse throughout the entire work of "their" for "its" when the antecedent is a singular collective noun, such as "the army" or "the FIS." Awkward and convoluted sentences abound, as do others rendered by misplaced modifiers all but incomprehensible as written. The frequent repetition of the same word in a single sentence deadens the narrative (e.g. pp. 74, 309), while a variation on this practice produces such ludicrous phrases as "young unemployed youths" (p. 375). Nor

are mistakes of this ilk limited to English; words and phrases in French are also misspelled (pp. 227, 327). To carp over a few such errors would be quibbling, but this is an endemic problem with the book. The author bears primary responsibility for his writing, but he was singularly ill-served by a publisher who apparently sent the manuscript to press without benefit of copyediting. Although the finished product is not one of which the press could possibly be proud—indeed, it should be embarrassed to attach its name to such a sloppily prepared volume—this did not deter it from affixing a quite substantial price tag to the book.

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### SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

ROBERT M. BAUM. *Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. Pp. xiii, 287. \$55.00.

Robert M. Baum's book on Diola religion and society is an important contribution to the history of Senegambia and to the history of African "traditional" religion. Baum's study, which is based on extensive field work carried out between 1974 and 1997, challenges many commonly held assumptions about the possibility of writing the history of "traditional" religions based on oral testimony and oral traditions. Many scholars have argued that oral sources reflect present beliefs and cannot be used to reconstruct a history of past beliefs or religious change. Baum's most effective argument against such skepticism is his detailed history of Diola religion from the era of the slave trade until the colonial conquest, which includes several periods of intensive innovation and adaptation. Diola religion changed in response to periods of environmental crisis, when prolonged drought signaled a crisis in ritual communication with the supreme being. Emitai, whose life-giving gifts were rain and fertility. Diola religion also changed in response to the increase of insecurity, social tensions, and inequality that emerged as a result of the Atlantic slave trade.

Baum's book is based on an intensive study of the Esulalu region on the south bank of the Casamance River, a region defined by a common dialect of the Diola language and five major historical townships. As in other Diola communities, daily life centered on intensive rice cultivation and fishing. There were no centralized political institutions. Community identity was rooted in religious beliefs and practice, symbolized by the numerous *ukine* or "spirit shrines" that served as sites of communication with the spirit world and the supreme being. Baum repeatedly visited this region over a period that spanned more than two decades. He mastered the language and interviewed hundreds of people, studying with the shrine elders who possessed specialized knowledge of religion. This intensive

method allowed Baum to get beyond the preliminary presentation of Diola beliefs to outsiders. As a "disciple" of the *awasena* path, Baum gained access to traditions about the history of individual shrines and their place in Diola history.

Baum presents Diola religion as a complex tradition or path that focused on the relationship among the people, the spirit shrines, and Emitai, the supreme being. Emitai was an active force in Diola life, who brought rain and fertility. There were special rituals that could be addressed to Emitai when the rains failed. Revelations about Emitai occurred periodically when spiritually gifted individuals were called to Emitai in visions or dreams. Generally, the spirit shrines served as intermediaries between the people and Emitai. Some spirit shrines were directly linked to Emitai, because they were created in response to revelations from Emitai. Other spirit shrines were conceived of as more independent from Emitai, as they represent spiritual forces with a separate existence.

The history of individual spirit shrines is the key that Baum uses to unlock the history of Diola religion. The most striking examples are the "shrines of the slave trade" mentioned in the title of the book. These shrines were created during the era of the slave trade to regulate and control the activities associated with the capture, ransoming, and sale of slaves. When an influential minority of Diola raiders gained wealth in the form of cattle, guns, cloth, and iron, they created new shrines that concentrated religious authority and social influence in the hands of a slave-trading elite. Rather than spiritual "sight" or "affliction," wealth was the new criterion of recruitment to religious office. The shrines of the slave trade incorporated slave manacles and only those who had captured and sold slaves could participate in rituals.

My one criticism of this study is the author's reluctance to engage the larger comparative issues he raises. Baum cannot be accused of ignoring this issue, but his comparative forays are carefully circumscribed. He criticizes Robin Horton's characterizations of "traditional" religion for minimizing the role of the supreme being and for suggesting a rigidity of explanation absent from Diola religion. However, when Baum compares the Diola shrines of the slave trade to the Lemba cult of West Central Africa (see John Janzen, *Lemba, 1650–1930: A Drum of Affliction in Africa and the New World* [1982]) or to contemporary developments among the Yoruba or Igbo, the discussion is limited to defining how Diola shrines differed from their counterparts elsewhere on the continent.

This book will be an important resource for scholars of African religion and readers interested in the history of the slave trade. At the same time, this book makes an important contribution to the history of small-scale, decentralized societies. Baum's book demonstrates the centrality of Diola religion to Diola identity and Diola history. Let us hope that other

researchers will show the same dedication and offer us similar histories of other neglected African societies.

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JOHN K. THORNTON. *The Kongolesse Saint Anthony: Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita and the Antonian Movement, 1684–1706*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. viii, 228. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$15.95.

In an African history context, this is an unusual book. It recreates the life and times of Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita, a Kongolesse woman who, claiming to be possessed by Saint Anthony, was burned at the stake as a witch in 1706. Not only is the story unusual, but so is its reconstruction. Kongo, which established relations with European traders, missionaries, and administrators from the late fifteenth century, is one of the rare regions of Africa with a sufficiently rich documentation to allow a detailed analysis of late seventeenth-century events. Although a variety of contemporary and ethnographic sources are used to fill out the story, the basic narrative derives from four eyewitness accounts by Capuchin missionaries. The primary goal of author John K. Thornton is also innovative, for he writes that it "is not to break new interpretative ground but to present a narrative account of the movement in a way that is accessible to a nonacademic audience" (p. 7).

A large part of the book is given over to explaining the context in which the Antonian movement unfolded, for its origins and goals were inextricably connected to the turbulence of the times, to a desire by ordinary people for a return to political stability and an end to destitution. Throughout the period, Kongo was embroiled in civil wars as contenders from three factions in the royal lineage fought each other for recognition as the paramount ruler. Such wars both encouraged and were a product of the Atlantic slave trade, which shipped thousands of captives annually to the Americas. Kongo politics were also complicated by interventions from Italian, Dutch, and Portuguese missionaries and traders, each with their own agendas and rivalries. Thornton strikingly shows how waging war involved ordinary people, not just in the wasting of the countryside but in support of armies. For one battle, he estimates that as many as 50,000—many women in noncombatant roles—were needed to produce 20,000 soldiers. He also deals in some detail with the traditional religious response to societal traumas and the appropriation of Catholicism into local belief systems, an essential part of the Dona Beatriz story. The ability of this twenty-year-old woman to find support from a faction in the civil war, to occupy with her forces the abandoned ancient capital of San Salvador, and to send out missionaries who spread a radical message—a black Jesus and Mary, a true Bethlehem and Nazareth located in Kongo, a revised Antonian catechism, and a promise of worldly

wealth—was bound to alienate local elites and European missionaries alike. Together the enemies of Dona Beatriz brought about her capture, trial, and execution. Thornton ends his account by connecting these events to a further flood of captives into the Atlantic trade and the possible inspiration of the Antonian movement in a 1739 slave revolt in South Carolina.

Altogether this is a masterly reconstruction of events in late seventeenth-century Kongo by an experienced scholar who for over twenty years has published on many aspects of Kongo history from politics to demography, from church history to family history, and from the slave trade to the diaspora. Thornton's acquaintance with a host of difficult sources is well displayed and if at times and given the sources, "the modern scholar has little choice but to try to read between the lines" (p. 3), one senses a judicious and highly informed eye at work. Whether the book will succeed in its stated goal of making this history accessible to a nonacademic audience is less certain. It is not a long book but, as a popular text, it might have been shortened even further. The Dona Beatrix story takes up a small part of the text, perhaps all that the extant documentation will allow. Although the context of the life is important, the details—especially the intrigues of the Kongo civil war—make a daunting and dense forest for inexperienced readers to navigate. Still, guided by an informed teacher, this text might work with undergraduates; it is certainly well-worth a try. Footnotes are kept to a minimum, which seems reasonable in a book of this kind, but the absence of a bibliography, even some sources for "Further Reading," seems a pity. The five illustrations from an eighteenth-century missionary account are a pleasing and instructive complement to the text.

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BRUCE VANDERVORT. *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1999. Pp. xviii, 274. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$16.95.

Bruce Vandervort presents here a sweeping and comprehensive narrative of imperialist wars in nineteenth-century Africa. German, Italian, Belgian, and Portuguese policies and campaigns are covered as well as the more familiar British and French endeavors. Imperial exploits in all regions of Africa are probed, although there are some notable omissions, such as the French in Dahomey and the British in Kenya and southern Nigeria, presumably for reasons of space. Vandervort claims to employ the "New Military History," by which he means a broad focus on the social impact of war, its cultural and political background, the role of leadership and fate of the individual, use of myth and ideology, and the function of technology. He also admits not to eschew entirely "guns and drums" battle history. Indeed, much of the central portion of the book trots from one key imperial battle to the next, from Médine to Kumase, Isandhalwana to Adowa,

Fashoda to Sokoto. Early in the book there is a fascinating, albeit brief, discussion of the structure of African armies, and Vandervort's coverage of the many set battles and campaigns includes even-handed descriptions of African tactics, maneuvers, and strategies.

The resulting book is greater than the sum of its parts. Reading about each specific conquest, resolutely strung one after the other, conveys the overwhelming cumulative message that, in case you weren't sure of it before, the Scramble for Africa was accomplished by military conquest and not by missionary persuasion, diplomacy, or trade. The book is aimed at the general reader and student. It is well written and easily read, although for a military survey it seems short on maps with which to locate all but the West African campaigns. Vandervort relies perhaps too much on secondary sources, some rather dated. The awkwardly formatted bibliography is difficult to use for citation and source reference.

Despite efforts to the contrary, Vandervort in the end conveys more about European military policies than those of African states. At times he fails to analyze African causal factors. For example, the reader is tossed directly into the logistical and strategic planning for the Battle of Adowa without any discussion of the diplomacy surrounding the fraudulent Treaty of Wichale leading up to the Italian invasion. He frequently includes useful biographical background on European generals yet rarely provides career profiles of African leaders. Although one of the author's key analytical points is the significant role played by European-officered African troops, he fails to explain how such troops were recruited, trained, and maintained.

Nevertheless, this book is better than any other survey in recounting the African military dimension. It contains excellent battle analysis and evaluation of both African and European equipment, logistics, tactics, and strategies. Several conclusions are worth noting. Vandervort emphasizes the European logistical advantages of possessing river steamers for transporting and resupplying troops, and gunboat fire power. He describes European technological superiority in guns, artillery, and equipment. Yet he rightly points out that the technological gap was rarely as great as Europeans believed, demonstrated indeed by many temporary African victories. Vandervort documents African states' frequent and systematic use of European weapons as well as African capacity to produce ammunition and some weaponry. But European armies could always come back with more—maybe after one year or ten years or forty—but back they would be. Vandervort subscribes to the theory that Africans suffered defeat in part because they failed to unite with one another in the face of European invasion, while Europeans regularly closed ranks. He also emphasizes the influence of the European officer on the spot who asserted that the only thing African leaders understood was force. While these

officials thus implied African societal immaturity, had African states negotiated submission without violent resistance, imperial apologists would have just as quickly touted African inferiority. It took an imperialist in the field to recognize that control of Africa was going to require forceful conquest. The broader implication—that precolonial African states possessed a structural toughness and well-articulated strength of purpose—had to be excised from colonial histories. Vandervort, however, argues that the legacy is a more violent African society today because Europeans used an excessive level of force to conquer. Although he does not intend to provide a new interpretation of the causes of imperialism, the nature of his evidence certainly strengthens the “pull of the man on the spot” theory. He does provide an excellent outline of the militarism of imperial conquest and demonstrates that the African side of military organization is a fertile field of future historical research.

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BILL BRAVMAN. *Making Ethnic Ways: Communities and Their Transformations in Taita, Kenya, 1800–1950..* (Social History of Africa.) Portsmouth: Heinemann. 1998. Pp. xiv, 283. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

In this important study, Bill Bravman traces the emergence of ethnic identity among a traditionally decentralized hill people, the Taita of Kenya. He presents an intriguing picture of how the region’s cultural politics shifted from a focus on localized neighborhoods in the nineteenth century to a transregional expression of common ethnicity in the earlier twentieth century. Unlike many other recent studies, Bravman’s treatment emphasizes intragroup struggles and tensions and not merely those between groups. The result is an intelligent, well-crafted reconstruction of a coalescence of Taita ethnic identity from within that stands out as one of the best contributions to the literature on East African ethnicity yet to appear.

The book is composed of an introduction, eight chapters, and a conclusion. In the introduction, the author discusses his main goals and includes a useful review of studies of ethnic identity, ranging from a critique of Frederick Barth’s classic preoccupation with boundaries to more recent treatments dealing specifically with East Africa. There is also an examination of research methods and a chapter by chapter preview of the subsequent narrative. In chapter one, Bravman gives an overview of the historical development of essentially localized Taita neighborhoods controlled by older men. The argument here is that, despite such things as interregional commerce, shared rituals, and common language, no wider sense of community emerged to instill any universal sense of “Taita-ness.” Rather, a wider ethnic identity would result only from conscious historical constructions from the 1880s to the mid-twentieth century.

The next seven chapters investigate those construc-

tions. Chapters two through four deal with the impact of colonial rule and show how Christian conversions, the creation of chieftainships, and new administrative “locations” assailed the preeminence of neighborhoods and elders. In chapter five there is an investigation of the processes, from about 1900 to 1930, by which older men countered threats to their positions through the mobilization of a new sense of Taita ethnicity based on a notion of “proper Taita ways.” While intended largely to ensure the continued obedience, economic support, and services of younger people, this expression of ethnicity eventually led to wider sociocultural unity. Chapters six through eight chart how notions of a universal Taita heritage evolved from the 1930s as younger “progressives” renegotiated the terms of authority with their seniors. Bravman convincingly demonstrates that the process was a gradual one, initially featuring alliance and compromise, until, finally, control inexorably slipped from the hands of older men with the emergence of political associations.

The book has many strengths. One is impressed, first, by the author’s highly effective collection and use of oral materials. Especially commendable is his sensitivity to issues of gender and his inclusion of many women among his informants. As much as possible, Bravman allows the Taita voice to speak for itself, and the narrative is regularly enlivened by direct quotations from oral texts. The intersection between oral and written sources also is exceptionally good. The sheer volume of data packed into the volume is astounding. Both text and footnotes are densely written and contain a wealth of information on the Taita region and its people. Beyond this, there are valuable insights into processes of ground-level imperialism. We gain firsthand glimpses of the effects of wage labor, the ambiguous position of chiefs, and the creation of political unions. In the process, the author’s deeply informed analysis challenges many hallowed notions of colonialism itself.

The only weaknesses worth mentioning pertain to the book’s chronological extremes. The narrative concludes quite abruptly in 1950 with just the barest hint that the subsequent period, marked by the Mau Mau emergency and the drive for independence, would also be vital to further constructions of Taita ethnicity. This is especially surprising as the only full-scale investigation of this era remains unpublished. Perhaps Bravman is planning a sequel?

At the other chronological extreme, the period before 1880, one is not wholly convinced by the argument that some broader sense of ethnic identity was completely absent in the earlier nineteenth century. The era is portrayed—in sharp contrast to the dynamic fluidity of the later ones—as almost artificially static. On another level, we are left wondering why the earliest outside observers (coastal traders and the missionary vanguard) were so definite in their depiction of a wider Taita “community.” Indeed, the frequent mentions of Taita mercenaries throughout the region in the earlier nineteenth century certainly sug-



gests some wider sense of "being Taita" than the author proposes. These mercenary contingents surely were of a size much larger than could have been drawn from only a few individual neighborhoods, let alone a single one. This might well indicate that wide military alliances, which the author detects only in the later nineteenth century, existed a good bit earlier. At the very least, one would expect that the experience of young fighting men from different regions serving together in mercenary contingents outside the Taita Hills would have been analogous to that of migrant laborers of the twentieth century, amongst whom a real sense of "Taita-ness" certainly did develop.

Significantly, Bravman's main analysis begins with the 1880s, a time when catastrophic famines were causing great upheavals. Many of the early European observations upon which his reconstruction is built date from this time, and Bravman warns us that even his own oral data relating to any period before the 1880s is used only "sparingly and cautiously" (p. 18). Is the resulting picture therefore somewhat skewed, reflecting more the temporary isolationism of Taita local groups in the wake of cataclysmic crises than some utter absence of an earlier wider ethnic consciousness?

But in any event, it is not with the chronological extremes that Bravman is primarily concerned here, and so these reservations are not intended to detract from the overall success of the book. Unquestionably, he convincingly demonstrates the emergence of a fresh sense of Taita ethnicity between 1880 and 1950. And, as emphasized above, his analysis of that process is frequently nothing less than brilliant.

JOHN LAMPHEAR  
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KEITH KYLE. *The Politics of the Independence of Kenya*. (Contemporary History in Context.) New York: St. Martin's, in association with the Institute of Contemporary British History. 1999. Pp. xviii, 258. \$65.95.

One of the most exciting periods in recent African history was the era of nationalism and decolonization. In varying degrees, there was a feeling that the continent was on the move, claiming its place in the world and attempting to define its priorities. In retrospect, some scholars have argued that this optimism and excitement was both naïve and misplaced. They have been quick to point to the "disappointments and failures" of the postcolonial era. It should nonetheless be stated that this harsh assessment often tends to dismiss and underestimate the optimism and "people's energy" that made decolonization possible. It was this "people's energy" that forced the pace of action by imperial powers and ultimately gained Africans their political independence. It was a complicated, multi-layered story full of intrigue, posturing, deception, agitation, struggle, and even compromise. Against this background of fast-paced action and conflicting motives, Keith Kyle's book must be assessed.

Kyle is a Western journalist who was based in

Nairobi, during the last days of British colonial rule in Kenya. From the beginning, he wanted to write a book based on his observations of the decolonization process. The result is a volume rich with anecdotes and profiles of major personalities but rather slim on analysis of the historical forces that helped shape the drama of Kenyan nationalism.

In part one of the book, Kyle offers a very abbreviated outline of the introduction of settler colonialism in Kenya. Sketchy and highly selective, this section unfortunately leaves out the crucial details about the nature of the settler colony and especially the financial and labor demands that it imposed on Africans. The economic policies pursued with regard to the reckless alienation of land for settlers and how these policies themselves led to the Mau Mau revolt do not receive sufficient attention. This is unfortunate, for after all it is these economic and social policies that not only produced the Mau Mau revolt but also formed the basis of the protracted negotiations for independence that are covered in part two.

The negotiations for *Uhuru* (independence), occurred against a background altered by the Mau Mau revolt and colonial secretary Iain Macleod's determination that it was impossible for Britain to hold its African empire by force of arms, "especially when the National Service was due to end in 1960." Kyle emphasizes the roles played by Macleod and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in the dissolution of the empire. This section forms the book's strongest and most admirable part. Kyle had access to the key colonial players and recorded their fast-altering positions on the Kenyan question. It is, for example, fascinating to read about the factors that led to the change of governors and the political calculations made in London before responding to the opinions and suggestions of the local colonial authorities. In this regard, it was revealing to learn of the factors that led to December 12 being fixed as the date on which to grant Kenyan independence. This book makes it clear that the personality of the key characters became an important factor in the politics of Kenyan decolonization. Macleod, "small, intense, highly intelligent," had a "quick thinking style," while Duncan Sandys had a "slow moving mind and a reluctance to read any but very short documents." In the end, the cordial relationship between Jomo Kenyatta and Malcolm MacDonald would prove decisive in giving shape to the nature of Kenya's *Uhuru*.

Unfortunately, Kyle does not pay much attention to the intricacies and motivating factors that shaped African nationalism. Whereas we read with interest of British colonial maneuvering in London and in Nairobi, there are scant details on the nature of African nationalism. Instead, there is an over-concentration on key personalities and how they fought for position and influence. The result is an analysis that celebrates "the big men" while neglecting the issues and the social forces that shaped the nature of even political posturing. The role of Kenyatta is over-

emphasized, continuing the colonial government's preoccupation with seeing him either as the arch devil or as the saintly saviour. It is worth noting that Kyle does not refer in his notes or analysis to any of the major recent studies on Kenyan nationalism, many of which have addressed questions related to the nature of nationalism in great detail. He seems to have relied on notes from "his archive" and other official sources without making an effort to revisit his story after thirty years, during which time recent publications have altered the historiographical landscape.

In the concluding section, the book undertakes a brief observation of postcolonial Kenyan society. Here, Kyle revisits the Kenyatta factor and asserts that "despite what has happened more recently in Kenya, history has come down decisively on the side of those who believed in Kenyatta" (p. 197). He regrets the cronyism "which started eating into Kenyatta's fine record as his term approached its end" and was "many times increased by his successor" (p. 203). But was it indeed true that Kenyatta was "a benign effective ruler" only tainted with cronyism toward the end of his rule? How did the author arrive at this position? It is also worth noting that Kyle does not readily see the organic linkage between the political economies of colonialism and neocolonialism, a linkage that has cronyism, among other issues, as one of its stubborn by-products.

The value of this book lies in its ability to take us to the center of action to observe key officials agonizing over policy matters without adequate information. The writing is clear and precise. The anecdotes are often dramatic and interesting. But they do not form a coherent detailed analysis of Kenyan nationalism or the complex politics of the decolonization period.

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TERENCE RANGER. *Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture, and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1999. Pp. x, 305. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$19.95.

The Matopos Hills stretch south from Bulawayo, in Zimbabwe, a rough-hewn landscape dotted with massive granite boulders perched precariously over the surrounding countryside. For white settlers from the time of Cecil Rhodes, the Matopos represented the grandeur of unspoiled nature, which they lost little time appropriating for themselves. Rhodes himself was buried in the center of the hills, and white farms soon dotted their perimeter. Later resident Africans were evicted for allegedly despoiling the wilderness (together with the settlers' farms) in order to create a national park.

Contrary to European visions of an ancient and empty wilderness, however, the Matopos have long been occupied by local peoples, the earliest evidence of which are cave paintings executed by hunters and

gatherers who have inhabited the hills for over 40,000 years. They were followed by iron age farmers in the third century A.D., Banyubi cultivators at least 400 years ago, Kalanga and Ndebele agro-pastoralists in the mid-nineteenth century, and European farmers and ranchers from the end of that century. Each set of inhabitants has left its imprints on the hills, and their historical memories overlap, change, and conflict with one another.

For Terence Ranger, the Matopos are a geographic expression of constantly changing boundaries and peoples who speak in multiple voices. They include the voices of Mwali (God), who literally speaks from the rocks to pronounce on environmental and historical issues; of Europeans who sought to clear the land of African homes, farms, and cattle; and of local people who organized rural protest movements in the 1940s to resist them. They also include the symbolic voices of Mwali's shrines counterpoised with those of the Brethren in Christ missions deliberately planted up against them, and of the grave of the conquering Ndebele King Mzilikazi confronting that of the subsequent white conqueror Rhodes. And they include the voices of Africans who found the hills a natural source of culture inscribed on the landscape as opposed to those of European scientists who sought to impose a reinvented culture of nature to "conserve" the hills from potential despoliation by African cultivators and herders.

Most of these conflicting voices had their origins in the nineteenth century as local Banyubi were successively displaced by Ndebele and Europeans. Banyubi combined cultivation of fertile flood plain vleis and rain-fed uplands with cattle herding sustained by the Mwali shrines that, literally, produced water and prophecy from stones. Conquering agro-pastoral Ndebele then subdued resident Banyubi and appropriated their shrines and their powers in support of their own leaders. Rhodes, in turn, sought "to summon their spirits to heel" (p. 31) and supplant them with the wonders of scientific survey, forestry, geology, and agriculture, while paternalistically promising Africans continuing tenancy rights as long as they were willing to labor on capitalist European farms.

Subsequently, earnest Kansas farmers enrolled as Brethren in Christ missionaries preached the dignity of labor and the gospel of the plough, leading to the rise of local Protestant entrepreneurs who prospered raising foodstuffs for the urban Bulawayo market while they defied and defiled Mwali's shrines. Although the future seemed increasingly to belong to Christian progressives, settler neglect of Rhodes's "promise" in order to dispossess Africans of their land and cattle led to a revival of "tradition" as cultural nationalists successfully reconfigured local historical memories to incorporate Mwali in an emerging Ndebele nationalist identity and ultimately to support the successful guerrilla struggle against the Rhodesian Front regime. The struggles were not over, however, as ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas opposed one another in the field; the

victorious ZANU government sent its Fifth Brigade into the field to terrorize local dissidents; and the government continues to cite environmental science and the rewards of tourism to oppose dispossessed local farmers today. Through it all, local identities, loyalties, and memories have been strained to the utmost in struggles among contending factions, chiefs, and shrine mediums.

This is a closely observed history whose vibrant vignettes of local personalities and the give-and-take of local politics constitute its principal strengths. The

title is misleading, however, for this is less a natural or environmental history than a finely drawn history of land, its uses and meanings to the Africans and Europeans who have occupied it, and the conflicts these have engendered, as Ranger traces the multiple meanings various peoples have entertained and the ways in which their historical memories have been transformed.

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## Film Reviews

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ANNA AND THE KING. Produced by Lawrence Bender and Ed Elbert; directed by Andy Tennant; screenplay by Steve Meerson and Peter Krikes, based on the memoirs of Anna Leonowens. 1999; color; 147 minutes. Distributor: Twentieth Century Fox.

Hollywood has been making films about the British governess and the king of Siam for six decades now, without managing to produce a single historically responsible version. Instead, the story of Anna Leonowens, who taught school in the royal palace of King Mongkut (Rama IV) during the 1860s, has always been plundered for its exoticism and transformed into a vehicle for an entirely supposititious romance. The latest version, *Anna and the King*, a lush, earnest epic starring Jodie Foster as Anna and Hong Kong martial arts actor Chow Yun-Fat as the king, turns out to be no exception. Writers Steve Meerson and Peter Krikes and director Andy Tennant claim a closer approximation to the truth because they have based their story on the diaries of Leonowens rather than on Margaret Landon's best-selling novel *Anna and the King of Siam* (1943), the source for all previous film and stage versions of the story, including *Anna and the King of Siam* (1946); the Broadway musical *The King and I* (1951, revived 1997); *The King and I* (1956); *Anna and the King* (television series, 1972); and *The King and I* (animated cartoon, 1999). In fact, Leonowens's diaries are no longer extant, although they were the basis for her two memoirs, *The English Governess at the Siamese Court* (1870) and *The Romance of the Harem* (1872), themselves a blend of memory, folklore, and imaginative self-invention.

Recent scholarship by both Thai and Western historians has discredited many elements of Leonowens's story, including autobiographical details about her social class and origins and her claim to have influenced King Mongkut's foreign policy by acting as his translator. Some also doubt the influence of her anti-slavery views on Mongkut's son, Prince Chulalongkorn (Rama V), who succeeded in freeing the last of Thailand's slaves only toward the end of his reign in 1905, nearly forty years after graduating from Leonowens's classroom. In Thailand, Leonowens is dismissed as a meddling busybody and a liar who repaid a generous employer by representing him in her mem-

oirs as a temperamental tyrant and crediting herself with the modernization initiatives for which he is revered in Thai history (see, for example, W. S. Bristowe, "Anna Unveiled," in his book *Louis and the King of Siam* [1976]; and Chantasingh Chalerm Sri, "The Americanisation of *The King and I*: The Transformation of the English Governess to an American Legend," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1999).

Recent feminist scholarship on Leonowens has presented her not as an upstart or a British imperialist but as an ardent abolitionist, an opponent of harem slavery who exhibited a great deal of courage in her domestic defiance of the king (see, for example, Susan Brown, "Alternatives to the Missionary Position: Anna Leonowens as Victorian Travel Writer," *Feminist Studies* 21:3 [Fall 1995]; Leslie Smith Dow, *Anna Leonowens: A Life Beyond the King and I* [1991]; and Susan Morgan's introduction to the reprint edition of *The Romance of the Harem* [1991]). None of this post-postcolonial rehabilitation has had any effect on the Thai government or that country's film board: Leonowens's books have been banned in Thailand since their first publication, as have all the movie versions of her story.

Hoping to film *Anna and the King* in Thailand, Foster and Tennant ran five versions of the script past the Thai film board before accepting defeat and moving on to shoot the entire film in Malaysia, where they built a spectacular seven-acre replica of the nineteenth-century royal palace of Bangkok. The completed film exudes historical verisimilitude in costumes, sets, language, even accents—in everything, finally, but the story. It is clear that a major motivation was to vanquish past Hollywood portrayals of the king, constructing him this time as a compassionate, shrewd, and intensely masculine ruler, in contrast to the mincing capriciousness of Rex Harrison in 1946 and the semiliterate dancing and singing buffoonery of Yul Brynner a decade later. The earlier portrayals had seriously offended authorities in Thailand, where centuries-old *lèse majesté* laws still survive. One long-overdue change was to cast an Asian actor as the king for the first time, though Chow Yun-Fat is not Thai. Another attempt to lend stature to Hollywood's new Mongkut was the inclusion of an entirely fictitious—some might say ludicrous—outdoor adventure (previ-



ous films took place within the palace walls). The king, threatened by a coup, retreats to the countryside with his wives and children following the assassination of his brother. Hopelessly outnumbered, he rises to the status of action hero by facing down the renegade General Alak and routing him with a ruse worthy of Indiana Jones that involves blowing up a bridge (Anna helps).

The real Mongkut had spent half his life as a Buddhist monk before succeeding to the throne. He was a linguist, an astronomer, and a skilled diplomat who successfully ward off colonization threats from both the British and the French while managing to keep control over troublesome members of the Thai nobility. It is clear from a number of incidents in the film, including a withering portrayal of British colonials, that Tennant, Meerson, and Krikes have done their homework in Thai history. They have researched the real king, yet, like their predecessors in the *Anna* industry, they chose not to portray him; rather, they decided that a manly, romanticized Mongkut made a better story than the cerebral, historical one. Most significantly, despite all their other attempts to placate Thai critics, Tennant and his writers were unwilling to sacrifice the romance between Anna and the king (this is possibly the most offensive fiction of all, since it implies an unacceptable intimacy between the historical king and his foreign female employee). In *Anna and the King*, that romance becomes the centerpiece of the story.

Perhaps a future filmmaker will find a story worth telling in the interaction of an outspoken, idealistic young European widow and a beleaguered Asian monarch nearly twice her age who do not fall in love with each other. But, given Hollywood's record to date, what are the odds?

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**TOPSY-TURVY.** Produced by Simon Channing-Williams; written and directed by Mike Leigh. 1999; color; 180 minutes. Distributor: October Films.

*Topsy-Turvy* (the title takes its cue from W. S. Gilbert's sobriquet as "The King of Topsy-Turvydom," a reference to the magical reversals that routinely figure in his plots) seems to mark a significant departure from British director Mike Leigh's previous work, notably his raw, documentary-like views of class divisions in modern English society in such films as *High Hopes* (1988), *Naked* (1993), and *Secrets and Lies* (1996). Here, by contrast, is what at first appears to be an artificially lit confection that limns Victorian society in the 1880s, specifically recounting the quarrelsome relationship between Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan during their painstaking preparation of *The Mikado*, the most popular of their light operas, for its premier at the Savoy Theatre in March 1885.

The historical record of the production is quickly sketched in. As *Topsy-Turvy* opens, librettist Gilbert

(Jim Broadbent) is scanning the opening-night reviews garnered by *Princess Ida*, his latest collaboration with composer Sullivan (Arthur Cordaner). Although the notices are generally favorable, one discouraging word (about that tendency toward topsy-turvy) devastates him, and he considers retiring from the stage. Likewise, Sullivan, although a more easygoing fellow, has become personally dissatisfied with the formulaic music he is providing for his collaborations with Gilbert. He wants to leave the stage to travel and perhaps compose that serious opera he has always wanted to do. Richard D'Oyly Carte (Ron Cook), manager of the Savoy Theatre, is shocked that his most dependable meal ticket, the celebrated Gilbert and Sullivan team, is going to call it quits. He pleads, he wheedles, he schemes. Gilbert, meanwhile, attends the Japanese Exhibition at Knightsbridge at the urging of his wife, and to his surprise he finds himself fascinated by the exotic theatrical rituals, masks, and costumes. Later, when a Japanese sword he has purchased suddenly falls from the wall with a clatter, he pauses a long moment, struck by the inspiration that will eventually become the story of *The Mikado*. He and Sullivan reunite and preparations for the premier begin.

*Topsy-Turvy* ranks with such films as Marcel Carne's *Les Enfants du paradis* (1944), Kenneth Branagh's *A Midwinter's Tale* (1995), and John Madden's *Shakespeare in Love* (1998)—not to mention that delicious theatrical spoof, Christopher Guest's *Waiting for Guffman* (1997)—as among the most fascinating "backstage" films ever made. In the first place, the irascible librettist and composer Gilbert and the amiably sensuous Sullivan are finely drawn in all their contradictory aspects by actors Broadbent and Cordaner. Where the characters find common ground is in their work, and together they supervise every detail of *The Mikado*'s production and rehearsals. Leigh is no less scrupulous in his accurate depiction of these preparations. As a document of Victorian stagecraft, *Topsy-Turvy* is unparalleled. It depicts with an almost clinical precision the relentless exactitude with which Gilbert drilled his players in their verbal and physical performance and with which Sullivan conducted his musical practice sessions. No detail is spared, from the precise intonation of a single word to the correct deployment of a Japanese fan, the authentic fastening of a costume sash, and the proper accenting of a triple-meter rhythm.

Woven through these moments of formal, brittle artifice are the very real threads of the Victorian age, a period as exotic, sumptuous, contradictory, and weirdly improbable as any of Gilbert's plots: the overstuffed sitting rooms with their dense accretion of bric-a-brac, the hothouse brothels, the starched tea rooms, and the dank alleys teeming with beggars and prostitutes. Modern technology has come to permeate the drawing room: telephones, for example, have invaded private lives. And the latest gossip about General Gordon's death in the Sudan is tossed about over a plate of raw oysters.

But this sort of thing is no mere accumulation of the quaint antiques and desiderata of a vanished age, no period piece simmering in its own nostalgic juices. Rather, *Topsy-Turvy* is a historical film that truly interrogates the genre. It does not strive to be a parable of our modern age but is instead content to reside within its own time frame. Unlike most films of its type, the cast members do not seem lost in their costumes. They are not strangled by the dense wordiness of contemporary modes of speech, and they do not seem self-consciously aware of their place in history. The film's cast members have, according to Leigh's customary procedures, been allowed to research, live in, and improvise upon their roles. As a result, they appear relaxed in this world, and they move and speak in it with ease and assurance.

*Topsy-Turvy* is very much the product of a director preoccupied with English class distinctions and prejudices. The world of the Savoy stage mediates between the pompous lavishness of the upper middle class in their museum-piece dwellings and the desperate straits of the poor in their back alleys. Members of the Savoy company, those dazzling apparitions on stage, reveal in their cramped, lowly dressing rooms their own inner demons: Durward Lely (Kevin McKidd) nurses a morphine addiction; Leonora Braham (Shirley Henderson) is an alcoholic who guards the secret existence of her illegitimate child. Gilbert's father is quite mad and, in a quietly chilling scene, the infirm old man turns a casual conversation into an inarticulate soliloquy of pain and paranoia. Hours after the spectacular success of *The Mikado's* opening night, Gilbert sits at the bedside of his wife, Lucy (Lesley Manville), mutely listening to her free-form fantasy about a woman who strangles newborn babies, an obvious allusion to the sterility of their own relationship. Likewise, the cozy post-premiere bliss Sullivan enjoys with his mistress, Fanny (Eleanor David), is interrupted by her admission that she is pregnant; quietly, with heartbreaking casualness, they arrange for an abortion (apparently not the first time).

In the film's penultimate scene, Braham sits before her dressing-room mirror, soliloquizing about the bitterness and folly of her beauty; it is only after a few moments that we realize her words beyond to the character Yum-Yum in the play. Moments later, in the final scene, she stands alone on stage, declaiming one of Gilbert and Sullivan's loveliest songs, from *The Mikado's* second act, "The Sun, Whose Rays Are All Ablaze": "Ah, pray make no mistake;/ We are not shy;/ We're very wide awake;/ The moon and I!" The song begins with a tight closeup of the singer's face. Gradually, slowly, the camera withdraws and spirals up and away in an uncut take that concludes in a long shot of the stage, the woman's tiny figure surrounded by scenery and proscenium. The lines are those of a heartless, utterly vain creature who is transformed by the sublime music into the apotheosis of beauty. The moment also bespeaks the intersection of the vastly contrasting worlds of Gilbert and Sullivan—the cold

calculation of Gilbert's chilly temperament and the buoyancy of Sullivan's lyricism—emblems of the schisms that demarcate the extremes of Victorian repression and indulgence.

Thus, in the final analysis, the collaboration between Gilbert and Sullivan reminds us that art and artifice hold out the model for negotiating the abyss between mind and heart. Here is a final, poignant reminder that the world is not so much a stage, but rather that the stage may contain—and reconcile—the world.

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THREE SEASONS. Produced by Jason Kliot, Joana Vicente, and Tony Bui; written and directed by Tony Bui. 1999; color; 113 minutes. United States and Vietnam. Vietnamese with English subtitles. Distributor: October Films.

The end of the Cold War has had a salutary, and often liberating, impact on the study of Vietnamese history. Like scholars working on the former Soviet Union and other geographical areas, historians of Vietnam are increasingly interrogating the univocal and nationalist narratives that have dominated and constrained apprehensions of the Vietnamese past. As Keith Weller Taylor, the leading historian of premodern Vietnam recently argued, the veneers of a national history that privileges an imagined unifying depth obscure the multivocal narratives of "what peoples we call Vietnamese were doing at particular times and places in the material and cultural exchanges available to them" (see Taylor, "Surface Orientations in Vietnam: Beyond Histories of Nation and Region," *Journal of Asian Studies* 57:4 [1998]: 949). Taylor's work has focused on the ways in which Vietnameseness was mediated in a variety of idioms in precolonial Vietnam. But his approach, and the broader contemporary reexamination of the Vietnamese past, offer a useful framework for approaching Vietnamese-American director Tony Bui's *Three Seasons*. Like the works of Vietnamese filmmakers in France and Vietnam itself, *Three Seasons* is a part of an emerging transnational dialogue that seeks to reenvision the meanings and shifting boundaries of Vietnamese national space.

*Three Seasons* aims to evoke and critique everyday life in contemporary Saigon (the film does not use the city's official name, Ho Chi Minh City), but the contemporary scene bears the deep marks of Vietnam's recent past. In particular, Bui's Saigon reflects the vast changes Vietnam has undergone in the last decade as the state has abandoned collectivization and socialist economics in favor of market economic reforms that have opened the country up to foreign investment. Saigon, whose entrepreneurial spirit was forged under French and American rule, lay dormant during the years of high socialism after 1975, but it has reemerged as the engine of economic development in contemporary Vietnam. With its new-found economic vitality, however, have come many of the familiar

stresses and strains associated with contemporary global capitalism, including a rapidly growing gap between rich and poor and fears of the culturally homogenizing forces of globalization.

Bui seeks to capture this historically laden moment in Saigon by structuring his film around three intertwined stories. In one, a poor cyclo driver woos a young prostitute whose clients are Asian and Western businessmen, the foot soldiers of the Vietnamese foreign investment boom. Another tells of an American veteran of the Vietnam war who returns to Saigon to confront his own past by finding the daughter he fathered with a Vietnamese woman during the war, as well as his encounters with a little homeless boy who wanders the streets selling trinkets, many of them battered relics of the war era. A third recounts of the emerging relationship between a reclusive Taoist teacher and a young woman from the countryside who is hired to pick and sell flowers from the teacher's garden, both of them seeming vestiges of an earlier, even precolonial Vietnam.

Unlike most American films on Vietnam such as *Apocalypse Now* (1979), in which the Vietnamese are at best a spectral presence, *Three Seasons* deals only indirectly with the war, concentrating instead on urban Vietnamese life in the decades after the Communist victory. It is the first American film made in Vietnam since the end of the war. With the exception of Harvey Keitel, who plays the returning Vietnam veteran, the cast is entirely Vietnamese, and the primary language of film is Vietnamese, with English subtitles. Bui's achievement in this regard is a considerable one, given the obstacles facing the realization of his project in Vietnam. While the market economic reforms in Vietnam have brought a certain loosening of state supervision of the arts, state control and censorship of film remains a common problem for both indigenous and foreign filmmakers. In addition, the endemic bureaucratic corruption that has accompanied the market reforms often frustrates foreign ventures in Vietnam. Bui's potential difficulties were intensified by his identity as a Vietnamese American (his father, who had worked as an intelligence officer with the American military, brought Bui and his family to the United States in 1975). The Vietnamese state continues to view the overseas Vietnamese with considerable ambiguity, as an invaluable source of investment capital but also as bringing the potential for political subversion and providing reminders of a troubled past. Ultimately, Bui's familial ties in Vietnam—an uncle, who is among Vietnam's best known directors, served as a liaison with state cultural bureaucrats—appear to have been critical to the completion of the film.

Despite considerable critical acclaim, including several major prizes at the Sundance Film Festival, *Three Seasons* is something of a disappointment. Although the elegiac cinematography of Lisa Rinzler, through which these stories unfold, is often breathtakingly beautiful, the film's multiple narratives are riddled with clichés, stock figures, and sentimental improb-

bilities that strain the viewer's patience and credulity. The hardboiled prostitute, who sees her wealthy clients as a way out of poverty, eventually softens to the attentive, good-hearted cyclo driver. The mysterious Taoist master, who retreated from human contact when his face and hands became disfigured by leprosy, is spiritually reborn shortly before his death by the influence of the young flower seller and her folk wisdom. Both characters seem more firmly rooted in Western notions of Eastern exoticism than in Vietnamese realities. And the Vietnam veteran, realized in much the same one-dimensional manner as he is in American films on the war and its aftermath, is forced to utter lines such as "Maybe I'm here to make some sort of peace with this place."

But the historical significance of *Three Seasons* is best appreciated within the broader context of contemporary efforts to reenvision a multivocal Vietnamese past by historians as well as artists from the diaspora and in Vietnam. Bui uses a series of idealized natural symbols to mark "Vietnameseness" in the face of rapid economic and sociocultural change. The most striking are the white lotuses grown in the Taoist teacher's gardens, which become a vehicle for Bui to convey an imagined Vietnamese identity based on enduring values, rooted in the precolonial past, and tested by historical forces of war and decolonization. In one key scene, the young woman who sells the master's flowers, after walking through the bustling Saigon streets and finding few takers for her lotuses, notices a group of merchants doing a brisk business selling plastic lotuses. Depressed, she takes refuge on a bench in a small park, only to be approached by the kindly cyclo driver who asks to buy her flowers. Nodding dismissively at the plastic lotus sellers, he suggests nothing can substitute for the visceral experience of the real thing.

Significantly, the French-Vietnamese director Tran Anh Hung evoked a similar pastoral sensibility in *The Scent of Green Papaya* (1993). Hung's film, set in Saigon in the 1950s, depicts the everyday life of a single household in intimate and often naturalistic detail. The film's remembered past of middle-class life is entirely disconnected from the turbulent political events of the period and the grittiness and tensions of the urban milieu of which the household was necessarily a part. But these departures from "reality" only reinforce the film's insistence on the natural world and familial ties as critical mainsprings for articulating Vietnamese identities. The imagined and naturalized visions of home in Bui and Hung's diasporic films also resonate with the works of directors in Vietnam itself. In *Nostalgia for the Country* (*Thuong nho dong que*, 1995) by Dang Nhat Minh, dissatisfaction with the market-generated rhythms of contemporary society are again expressed in a revalorization of rural life and deeper histories. Despite its narrative weaknesses, *Three Seasons* offers a powerful entrée into Vietnamese efforts at home and abroad to deconstruct the meanings of national community and reenvision a

national history in the interstices between the local and the global.

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*42 Up*. Produced and directed by Michael Apted. 1998; color; 130 minutes. Distributor: First Run Features.

*42 Up* is the latest in the series of landmark documentaries that began with *7 Up* (1963). Inspired by the Jesuit maxim, "give me a child until he is seven and I will give you the man," Michael Apted has interviewed fourteen children of startlingly different backgrounds at seven-year intervals, hoping for "a glimpse of England in the year 2000." Apted inquires in each film about everyday life topics—marriage, profession, love, money—while material from previous films captures the physical and mental transformation of these people over time. The participants are not asked simply to tell their story, as in most documentaries, but to provide a critical and self-examining account of their life. Behind the film is a question: how do we remember the past and how do we tell it to ourselves?

The combination of realism with the construction of memory makes this cycle of films exceptional. Most documentaries represent history as a closed narrative with a beginning, a middle, and an end; they tell the story after the fact, using witnesses who remember their experience and experts who analyze it; voice-over narration represents "the true history," while the viewer is called to decide which witnesses to believe. The *7 Up* cycle, in contrast, has no predetermined grand narrative and no foregone conclusions (although patterns of meaning do emerge over time). It tells the story of life as it unfolds, and the question of which witnesses to believe becomes irrelevant.

The open narrative of the cycle has resulted in a special film-audience relationship: a generation of viewers were also called, every seven years, to self-consciously reflect about their own lives. I reviewed *35 Up* (1991) in these pages six years ago (*AHR*, October 1994), and writing now about *42 Up* heightens the particular position of the cycle's reviewer, called to reexamine previously held views and assumptions. A review of a book or a film is commonly a one-shot task. But reviews of the *7 Up* films, while standing independently, are nonetheless linked. The present text, therefore, is a review of a film about life: film, review, and life are all works in progress.

What impression of British society emerges from *42 Up*? Initially, Apted viewed the *7 Up* project as a political statement against British class system. Class remained a determining factor through *35 Up*. I ended my review with Karl Marx's dictum: "Men do make their own history, but they do not make it as they please, not under conditions of their own choosing, but rather under circumstances which they find before them, under given and imposed conditions." In the ensuing years, class has slowly been superseded as the essential marker, reflecting the declining politics and

culture of class since the 1960s. Class has not totally disappeared; participants in *42 Up* still use it as a vague marker of wealth and influence. Most think that some class privilege and discrimination persist in British society; not surprisingly, rich participants are most apt to deny it. And, if we look closely at who among the *7 Up* children succeeded in life professionally and economically, we can still find the resilient structures of class society.

But, significantly, class is overridden by a personal sense of possibilities articulated less through social and economic mobility than in terms of the freedom to choose a lifestyle. At twenty-eight, Jackie is married but decides she is too selfish to have children. At thirty-five, she is divorced, a single mother of a child born out of an affair; it is the best thing that ever happened to her. At forty-two, she has had two more boys with Ian, from whom she has since separated. Throughout these changes, Jackie maintains the lower-class social standing into which she was born. Yet she, like all the other participants, strongly conveys the belief in the potentiality inherent in modern life to reinvent oneself, to find happiness tomorrow if not today. The cultural malleability and social sanctioning of different lifestyles in late twentieth-century industrial, democratic, capitalist society give people the sense that it is never too late to start again. As Bruce, finally married at forty-one, says: "I am happily married now, it takes off the regret."

A dominant leitmotif in the films through *35 Up* was future dreams and aspirations. The emphasis in *42 Up* has changed to a reckoning, a balance sheet in midlife of the price paid for past choices, of dreams and ambitions fulfilled and frustrated. Some have reached the limits of their social and economic advancement. Tony, who came from a lower-class family and dreamed of becoming a jockey, moved recently to a suburban house with a fenced yard: "You can only go so far, I'm only a cabby. This is about the limitation for me now." There is no bitterness, only coming to terms with life. "If anything else comes along, it's a bonus." The film leaves a strong sense of reckonings, but not of acute mid-life crises. Happiness is largely measured in terms of family life, children, and partnership (the word that replaces marriage, the term used in the 1960s). As Paul's wife says, "One of our ambitions was always to grow old together . . . it is nice to be loved." Paul, in many respects not successful, remarks: "I'm middle aged, but I am sort of pretty comfortable with it." Several participants use the word "lucky" to describe their life. Jackie, suffering from arthritis, sums her life up: "I'm lucky. There are people who are a damn sight worse off than I am." Participants acknowledge the fragility of modern life and the transient character of happiness, and they therefore appreciate the happiness they have found.

The picture that emerges from *42 Up*, therefore, is of identities in meaningful motion. It lends itself to a discussion of modern and postmodern selves. Participants in the film do not lend credence to postmodern



theories of the self as depthless and fragmented. I raised this critique in *35 Up* and now find my opinion confirmed. At the same time, they also do not support the modernist notion of the internal coherence and totality of the self. The dichotomy of the self as either fragmented or totality might better be replaced by a commingling of persistence and mutability. The modern world is disorienting and alienating, but people find ways to capture a sense of stability and meaning. Notions of stability are varied, and one perceives as stable different and even opposing lifestyles within one's lifetime.

Some developments are moving, as with Neil, the most intriguing character of the series, whose unusual story departs from the leitmotif of reckoning. Neil was an articulate and charming boy who had not found his place in society, dropped out of college, and became unemployed and homeless. To the question in *35 Up* of whether he felt like a failure, he answered, after an excruciating pause: "Well, my life isn't over." "Whatever will happen to Neil in the future?" I wondered and wrote then. At forty-two, Neil has twice been elected councilman for Hackney. He has turned his life

around: "What's the most enjoyable thing in life for the moment? I guess looking at the future."

Possibilities and limitations, contingency and predetermined conditions: *42 Up* and the cycle as a whole raise these topics in a riveting way. Marx was right: we do make our own history under imposed conditions, only he mistakenly regarded them solely in terms of class. Our ideas of limitations and possibilities are dialectically related, one a constitutive element of the other. Limitations in our society exist, and discrimination is real. But one also feels limited—regardless of wealth and influence—precisely because the ethos, and at times the reality, of our society emphasizes unlimited opportunities and happiness. Shining through *42 Up* is the idea that limitations of income and status remain, but they coexist with a perception of increased possibilities in everyday life: in consumption, sexual orientation, and forms of family, among other things. Perhaps this is one of the secrets of capitalist democracy's stability that eluded Marx.

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The following books were recently received in the *AHR* office. Books listed here do not include works scheduled for review.

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# Communications

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## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

### TO THE EDITOR:

Having just read Albert S. Lindemann's deeply misleading letter in the October 1999 issue of the *AHR* [1448–49], I would like to point out that he is totally off the mark in trying to attribute my negative review of his book *Esau's Tears* to some kind of personal resentment. My critique appeared over eighteen months ago in *Commentary* when Lindemann was known to me only through his earlier work *The Jew Accused*, where he referred to three books of mine without any hint of disagreement. Moreover, even in *Esau's Tears*, there are extensive citations of my work throughout—none of them negative—with the exception of the single passing (critical) reference to my book *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred*. It is thoroughly disingenuous of Lindemann to pretend that this was the reason for my dismay at his book. Apparently, it has not occurred to Lindemann that, given the low-level scholarship in his recent book, any praise from him could only be profoundly embarrassing, while to be singled out for his opprobrium might almost be considered a badge of integrity. Moreover, following his own logic, before he quoted Richard Levy so favorably on his behalf in his response he should have stated that he had given Levy, in effect, a rave review in *Esau's Tears* (xi, n.4).

Lindemann quotes at length from the letters section of *Commentary* (April 1998), but once again he is highly selective, omitting to mention that I gave a very detailed point-by-point rebuttal of every *ad hominem* accusation that he, Norman Ravitch, and Levy made

against me while extending my substantive arguments against his book. He also ignores David G. Myers's very instructive letter exposing Lindemann's ignorance of and bias against Judaism as well as his highly deceptive style of insinuation. Nor does he tell readers that Myers praised my review for telling the truth "about a bad and even a dangerous book."

It was therefore gratifying to read Judith Elkin's devastating critique of Lindemann in the same October issue of the *AHR*, a model review in its honesty and incisiveness [1370–71]. When one puts her perceptive comments alongside Lindemann's absurdly posturing comparisons of his own work with Hannah Arendt and Raul Hilberg and the narcissistic parading of testimonies in his favor (in place of argument), the contrast is indeed invidious. Similarly, the comments by Eunice Pollack and Stephen Norwood hit the nail on the head [1448]. That a self-confessed Holocaust "revisionist" like Ernst Zundel enthusiastically endorses Lindemann's book was only to be expected. Whatever Lindemann's subjective motives—and I am willing to grant that he may be self-deluded enough to think of himself as a "philosemite"—his book is grist to the mill of all the Zundels in this world. That is exactly why I called his book pernicious.

ROBERT S. WISTRICH  
*Hebrew University of Jerusalem*

### ALBERT S. LINDEMANN REPLIES:

I did not assert that my criticisms were the reason that Robert Wistrich wrote such an extravagantly negative and dishonest review; I merely observed that those criticisms were among various considerations that "shed light" on the review, that they were not mentioned in it, and that he had a responsibility as a reviewer to do so. In the above letter, Wistrich attempts to obscure the crucial fact that my criticism occurs in the opening paragraphs of *Esau's Tears* and, more to the point, that the criticism of his book *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred* is offered to indicate a kind of approach to the study of anti-Semitism that I think seriously inadequate—a key reason for writing my book and not just a "single passing" and inconsequential reference.

Wistrich is a prolific writer who has unquestionably done valuable research, but in dealing with the issue of anti-Semitism, his emotions get the best of him. He comes across as blind to nuance and moral complexity, shallow and monotonous in interpretation, and devoid of scruple in lashing out at those he defines as enemies. Much of his writing is characterized by neo-conservative polemic and a fervent nationalistic/ethnic partisanship. Were he a politician or an employee of a lobbying organization, his lack of restraint might be less troubling, but he holds a chair at a university, and for that reason is to be held to higher standards of balance and fair play.

As far as my being "self-deluded" is concerned, it was not I but Steven Beller, a fine scholar writing in a distinguished journal, who made the remark about philo-Semitism. ("It is abundantly clear . . . that [Lindemann's] sympathies in a larger sense lie fairly and squarely with the Jews"; *TLS*.) A large number of other scholars have observed that my efforts at scholarly balance are mixed with sympathy for the dilemmas of the Jewish condition: "It is clear that the author has enormous sympathy for the Jewish people and their history" (Robert C. Grogan, *CJH*). "Most open-minded readers . . . will find *Esau's Tears* a well-balanced and very readable history of antisemitism prior to the Holocaust" (Bruce F. Pauley, *Journal of Modern History*). "[Lindemann] evaluates the position of Jews . . . with originality and unwavering common sense . . . *Esau's Tears* is chock-full of . . . well-balanced interpretations" (Susan Zuccotti, *The Nation*). A number of scholarly reviewers have explicitly commented on the unfairness of Wistrich's review, ranging from Nicholas Wachsmann ("[Wistrich's] criticism is certainly overstated," in the *JCH*) to William Rubinstein ("[Lindemann] received the full treatment of hysterical abuse in *Commentary*," in *History Today*). Even Judith Elkin, in the April 2000 issue of the *AHR*, distanced herself from Wistrich's charges: "[Lindemann] expresses genuine compassion for Jewish victims of bigotry in many places throughout the book" (679).

If "hysterical abuse" seems overstated to some readers, I urge them to look up the review in *Commentary* and decide for themselves if it can be termed either accurate or fair-minded. Similarly, they might inquire into whether Wistrich in fact offered a "detailed, point-by-point rebuttal" of the ensuing letters critical of his review (rather than simply ignoring the points he could not answer and obfuscating on many others). I think most readers will conclude that in this case Wistrich reveals himself as a reckless partisan, immune to self-doubt, and incapable of recognizing, even to the slightest degree, injustice on his side. It says something about his curiously twisted perspectives that in the above letter he dismisses the large number of reviews favorable to *Esau's Tears* that I cite as "narcissistic," while he characterizes my references to the criticisms directed at Arendt and Hilberg (where the point was

simply that even such major figures have been crudely misrepresented and defamed) as "absurd posturing."

I further urge any readers who have not tired of this exchange (and I don't imagine there are many) to inquire into the scholarly accomplishments in this field—to say nothing of reputation for balance and fairness—of my other detractors. And then compare the scholarly accomplishments and general reputation of the some twenty reviewers who have disagreed, implicitly or explicitly, with Wistrich as to the merits of *Esau's Tears*. I think it will be obvious that he has few if any defenders of stature on this matter, while cranks and zealots have rushed to embrace him. In that regard, it is also obvious that if anyone is providing grist for the mills of the anti-Semites, it is Wistrich and his cohort, about whom the word "pernicious" is indeed appropriate because of their efforts, by shrill and unprincipled attacks, to obstruct open discussions of anti-Semitism.

Let me end by noting that, in spite of Wistrich's words about how "appalling" it is that Cambridge University Press has published my "ignominious" book, the editors have mysteriously decided to issue a paperback edition, to appear this fall. The editors at Longman, too, seem somehow unimpressed by these dire warnings and have published [April 2000] my new book *Anti-Semitism before the Holocaust* in their Seminars in European History series. "Relevant full citations are to be found at [www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/lindeman/lindemann.html](http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/lindeman/lindemann.html)."

ALBERT S. LINDEMANN  
University of California,  
Santa Barbara

#### TO THE EDITOR:

I thank John Henry Schlegel for his characterization of my book, *Community Denied: The Wrong Turn of Pragmatic Liberalism*, as a "tragic western" [*AHR* 105 (February 2000): 237]. His white-hat, black-hat trope accurately, though somewhat broadly, captures my argument. For I do regard the eclipse of Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmatism by that of William James and John Dewey as a tragedy for early twentieth-century political and social theory.

Having called attention to my narrative skill in giving a book about rarefied social theory the dramatic excitement of a shoot-em-up, Schlegel has stopped there. It would take a far more ungrateful author than I to suggest that the reviewer has done too little. The job of engaging the book's argument, as opposed to merely characterizing it, can be undertaken by those whom he has so artfully stirred to read it.

JAMES HOOPES  
State University of New York at Buffalo

John H. Schlegel does not wish to reply.

THE EDITORS



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**REQUIREMENTS** Fellows are required to be in full-time residence at the Center during the award period. They are expected to utilize the Center's resources extensively, participate in scheduled seminars, colloquia and luncheons, review and critique papers presented at these forums, and prepare a report on work

accomplished at the end of their residency.

Persons seeking support for research leading to degrees are not eligible under this program. Candidates for advanced degrees must have received the degree or completed all requirements for it by the application deadline. Foreign nationals are not eligible unless they will have resided in the United States for three years immediately preceding the award date.


**AWARD** Fellowships funded by the Program will allow recipients to spend six months or a year in residence with access to resources at both the Schomburg Center and The New York Public Library. The fellowship stipend is \$25,000 for six months and up to \$50,000 for twelve months. The Program is supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Irene Diamond and Ford Foundations.

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### FOR MORE INFORMATION AND APPLICATION FORMS

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**APPLICATION DEADLINE IS JANUARY 15, 2001**



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
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
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


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
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

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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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

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
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
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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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